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ABSTRACT 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) aims to have a regional central 
bank by 2016 and a common currency by 2018. The member states are at the early stages of 
the process of regional economic integration, having launched a free trade area in 2008. 
Monetary integration is an advanced stage of regional economic integration that requires 
progressive changes in the participating countries. The purpose of this study is to determine 
the feasibility of monetary integration within the SADC countries and hence, provide policy 
recommendations to guide the integration process. To accomplish this, the study analyses the 
extent to which the member states meet the criteria for an optimum currency area (OCA) as 
well as the degree to which their economies are converging.  
 
The study finds that the main macroeconomic objectives of SADC countries differ due to a 
difference in the relative importance of monetary policy instruments in member states, which 
influences each country’s commitment towards achieving the macroeconomic convergence 
targets and harmonising policies. A more appropriate approach to macroeconomic 
convergence would be to allow for variable speed, geometry and depth in each country as 
premature adherence to convergence targets could prevent a harmonisation of the economies 
in the future and possibly destabilise the union.  
 
In addition, the study investigates the importance and similarities of the monetary aggregate 
channel, the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel and the credit channel in the 
transmission of monetary policy using VAR analysis. This is important when considering 
monetary integration because differences in transmission mechanisms can result in 
asymmetric behaviour between member states, which in turn will prevent harmonisation of 
their economies. 
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The results of the analysis suggest that SADC member states display asymmetries in their 
responses to monetary policy shocks as well as the relative importance of transmission 
mechanisms. In addition, the results suggest that national monetary policy is generally 
inefficient in determining economic performance in the member states. Furthermore, the 
study finds that the failure to meet the OCA criteria implies that the SADC member states 
will respond asymmetrically to shocks within a monetary union. With no effective alternative 
adjustment mechanisms in place, the effects of the shocks will endure in union members and 
possibly widen existing cyclical variation. Hence, monetary integration would not result in 
harmonisation of the economies of member states. It is therefore, concluded that the SADC 
countries were not suitable for monetary integration at present. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
African countries initiated regional economic integration in two waves; the first wave was 
from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, which involved the re-establishment of some existing 
regional bodies and the creation of new ones. According to Dinka and Kennes (2007:6), the 
first wave of economic integration was inspired by the deliberate post-independence pursuit 
of integration by African policy makers and to some extent; it was in response to the success 
of the European Community (EC) and its first enlargement in the 1970s when the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland joined the EC.  
 
The Lagos Plan of Action (1980) for the Economic Development of Africa was the main 
driving force behind the first wave of regional integration. It envisaged three regional 
groupings aimed at the creation of separate but convergent and over-arching integration 
arrangements in three sub-Saharan sub-regions. These were the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and the treaty of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)1. 
Together with the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in North Africa, these regional groupings 
were envisioned to result in an all-African common market by the year 2025. 
 
The second wave of regional integration occurred during the first half of the 1990s and 
focused mainly on revitalising and expanding the mandates of existing regional bodies rather 
than on creating completely new groupings. This wave of economic integration, motivated by 
the ratification of the Abuja Treaty of 1991, was in a way prompted by developments in the 
global arena. Around that time, the North American countries created the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European countries consolidated the European 
Union (EU) with the launch of a single market and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty of 
1992 (Dinka and Kennes, 2007:6). 
 
                                                
1 It was approved in 1983 but remains to be fully ratified. 
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The second wave of regional integration saw the emergence of smaller regional economic 
communities (RECs) as subsets of the original groupings. To begin with, there is the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which is a subset of ECOWAS and the 
Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC) within the proposed ECCAS 
region. Similarly, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with its associated monetary 
union (the Common Monetary Area), the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) lie within the geographic area of COMESA. 
Some countries in this region are also in partnership with countries located on the Horn of 
Africa in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Dinka and Kennes, 
2007:6).  
 
The Abuja Treaty envisaged that these RECs would be the building blocks of the African 
Economic Community (AEC), with the hope that once they have successfully integrated, the 
AEC would be realised much smoother. According to the Economic Commission for Africa 
(2004:28), African leaders envisioned the transformation of African countries into the AEC 
to take place in six phases over 34 years. The first phase, 1994-99, focused on strengthening 
regional economic communities, that were to evolve into free trade areas and customs unions 
that would eventually consolidate and culminate in a common market covering the continent. 
 
The second phase, 1999–2007, was to focus on the freezing of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, 
customs duties, and internal taxes at their May 1994 levels while also gradually harmonising 
policies and implementing multi-national programmes in all economic sectors. The priority 
sectors were to be agriculture, industry, transport, communications and energy. The African 
leaders envisioned the third phase, 2007–2017, to be the period of consolidating the free trade 
zones and customs unions through progressive elimination of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and 
other restrictions to trade, and adopting common external tariffs for the continent as a whole.  
 
The fourth phase, 2017–2019, would be the period for finalising coordination and 
harmonisation of policies and programmes in trade and other sectors as a precursor to full 
realisation of the African Common Market and the African Economic Community, with all 
the regional economic communities. In addition, the leaders hope this phase results in the free 
movement of people, with rights of residence and establishment among the regional 
economic communities.  
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The fifth phase, 2019–2023, is the period for consolidating the continent wide African 
Common Market, and the sixth phase, 2023–2028, is the period in which the vision of the 
African Economic Community, with complete economic, political, social, and cultural 
integration and with common structures, facilities, and functions would be realised. This 
includes the realisation of a single African central bank, with a single African currency, a 
pan-African parliament, and a pan-African economic and monetary union (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2004:31). Each African REC therefore has set its own specific 
objectives and targets that would guide its integration process. The subsection below provides 
a review of the background to the SADC countries’ experience with regional economic 
integration.  
 
1.1.1 Regional Economic Integration Efforts of SADC Countries 
The SADC2’s regional economic integration process is set to follow progressive stages, 
beginning with the implementation of a free trade area (FTA) in August 2008. Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Seychelles however opted out of the integration 
arrangement. The SADC Trade Protocol, ratified in 2000, provides the legal basis for the 
attainment of the SADC FTA. The latter aims to stimulate intra-SADC trade, development 
and thereby eradicate poverty (Hansohm and Shilimela, 2006:6). The trade protocol called for 
the liberalisation of up to 85% of intra-SADC trade by 2008 at the onset of the regional FTA. 
The remaining 15% of trade, comprising sensitive products, is to be tariff free by 2012 
(SADC, 2006:7).  
 
The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) was set up to achieve these 
objectives. The strategy of the RISDP involves the gradual elimination of tariffs, the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers, the adoption of common rules of origin, the harmonisation 
of customs rules and procedures, the harmonisation of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, 
the liberalisation of trade in services and the attainment of internationally acceptable 
Standards, Quality, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM) (Hansohm and Shilimela, 2006:6). 
 
                                                
2 Presently SADC comprises of fifteen countries, namely: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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The second stage of the SADC integration process involves the implementation of a customs 
union, which was originally set for 2010, but the countries delayed its implementation to 
2012. The SADC countries envision the third stage to be the implementation of a common 
market in 2015 and the fourth stage, monetary integration. The implementation of a monetary 
union is to be in two stages, with the establishment of a SADC central bank by 2016 and a 
regional currency by 2018 (SADC, 2006:7). 
 
A sub-set of SADC countries, which consists of Angola, the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, are also members of 
another FTA known as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
founded in 1994. COMESA has 21 member states, which also include Burundi, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan and Uganda.  
 
COMESA launched its Free Trade Area in October 2000. From the SADC countries that are 
also members of COMESA, only Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
joined the FTA. These countries have since become members of the SADC FTA as well, 
consequently finding themselves in a conflicting position as members of two different FTAs. 
In June 2009, COMESA launched a customs union and aims to establish a monetary union by 
2015 and a COMESA community by 2025. 
 
Another sub-set of SADC countries comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa 
and Swaziland form the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which dates back to the 
late 1800s. All SACU countries, with the exception of Botswana also belong to the Common 
Monetary Area (CMA) established in 1986 as a successor to the Rand Monetary Area 
(RMA), established in 1976. Botswana was initially a member of the RMA before opting to 
withdraw from the arrangement in 1976 to pursue an independent exchange rate system. 
However, the Botswana pula remains linked informally to the South African Rand (ZAR) 
through a basket of currencies in which, since 1990, the latter weighs around 60 to 70%. 
Hence, literature sometimes regards Botswana as a de facto member of the CMA (Grandes, 
2003; Aziakpono, 2008). 
 
The CMA is a monetary integration arrangement where capital flows freely between the 
member countries which maintain common exchange controls. Article 2 of the CMA 
(Multilateral) Agreement gives Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (the LNS countries) the 
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right to issue national currencies, and their bilateral agreements with South Africa define the 
areas where their currencies are legal tender. The national currencies are legal tender only in 
their respective countries, while the ZAR is legal tender throughout the CMA. For this 
reason, South Africa compensates the LNS countries for forgone seignorage based on a pre-
determined formula (Wang et al, 2007:8).  
 
Article 3 of the CMA Agreement stipulates that no restrictions can be imposed on the transfer 
of funds, whether for current or capital transactions, to or from any member country3. The 
national currencies of the LNS countries are pegged at par to the ZAR and are perfect 
substitutes with the latter. In addition, there are no transaction costs in conversion 
(Oosthuizen, 2006; Wang et al, 2007).  
 
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is the only central bank that engages actively in 
discretionary monetary policy, while policies in the LNS countries are managed in line with 
the SARB policy. Consultations are made through meetings with governors of the central 
banks of the LNS countries and heads of research departments twice a year, before the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the SARB meets. However, there is no obligation on 
the SARB’s part to include its CMA partners in the monetary policy decision process 
(Aziakpono, 2008:191). 
 
Monetary policy in the LNS countries is designed primarily to ensure that the exchange rate 
peg within the CMA is maintained through sufficient foreign reserves, and that interest rates 
are kept at levels that prevent any distortions to the fixed exchange rates. Commitment to this 
arrangement effectively puts monetary policy decisions for the smaller countries in the hands 
of the SARB as it gives them little or no scope for further discretionary policy (Nielsen et al, 
2005; Oosthuizen, 2006; Aziakpono, 2008). 
 
1.2 CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
According to Mundell (2000:281), the support for the use of a common currency to fulfil the 
functions of money as a unit of account, unit of contract for current and deferred payments, 
medium of exchange and store of value, dates back to the classical economists who argued 
                                                
3 With the exception of investment or liquidity requirements prescribed for financial institutions. 
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for a single world currency as first best solution to globalisation. However, the desire to 
maintain a degree of sovereignty by independent countries makes it near impossible to have a 
single world currency. Thus, the second best solution is a system of well-managed state 
currencies that have a permanently fixed exchange rate, hence the desire for monetary 
integration. 
 
Yuen (1999:5) describes monetary integration as occurring within an area bearing a 
permanently fixed relationship between the exchange rates of the national currencies of its 
member countries. Either the countries use a common currency or, if there are several 
currencies, these currencies are convertible one into the other at immutably fixed exchange 
rates, thereby effectively creating a single currency. Regional economic communities (RECs) 
worldwide are realising the need for monetary integration as they pursue deeper regional 
economic integration. The latter process results in the integration of financial markets, which 
according to the Impossible Trinity Principle, implies that individual countries cannot pursue 
independent monetary policies and maintain flexible exchange rates when there is free trade. 
The move to adopt a common currency therefore, arises from the constrained optimisation 
decisions of countries (Wyplosz, 1997; Frankel, 1999; and van der Haegen and Viñals, 2003). 
 
However, the use of a common currency in a group of countries is not a simple, 
straightforward transition. The countries are required to form an optimum currency area 
(OCA), which is defined as the optimal geographical domain within which a group of 
countries share a single currency, or maintains several national currencies whose exchange 
rates are irrevocably pegged and are fully-convertible into one another. The single currency/ 
national currencies fluctuate(s) jointly vis-à-vis other currencies (Tavlas, 2008:12).  
 
Mongelli (2002:7) elaborates on the definition of an OCA, explaining that the domain of an 
OCA is determined by the sovereign countries choosing to adopt a single currency or to fix 
their exchange rates irrevocably. This in essence refers to the RECs seeking monetary 
integration. Mckinnon (1963:717) describes “optimum” as referring to a single currency area 
within which monetary-fiscal policies and flexible external exchange rates can be used to 
give the best resolution of three (sometimes conflicting) objectives: the maintenance of full 
employment; the maintenance of balanced international payments; and the maintenance of a 
stable internal average price level.  
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The OCA theory considers economic factors that determine the benefits and costs of adopting 
a common currency. The benefits from monetary integration include the lower transactions 
costs between the trading partners and the elimination of exchange rate variability. The costs, 
on the other hand, arise from the inability to pursue independent monetary policies and to use 
the exchange rate as an instrument for macroeconomic adjustment (Lundahl and Peterson, 
1991; Frankel, 1999; Bayoumi and Ostry, 1995; Mundell, 2000). Both benefits and costs of 
monetary integration depend on the structural features of the economies concerned including 
the free mobility of labour and other factors of production, economic openness, 
diversification in production and consumption (Bayoumi and Ostry, 1995:1). Optimality 
requires that these structural conditions exist in the group of countries (Mongelli, 2002:7).  
 
The OCA theory further prescribes that the countries attain convergence in macroeconomic 
stability indicators, such as their inflation rates, exchange rates, interest rates and the level of 
their budget deficits prior to integration (Jenkins and Thomas, 1997; McCarthy, 2002). The 
opening up of trade and capital accounts may result in increased exposure and vulnerabilities 
of the economies of the integrating countries to external shocks (Alberola et al, 2003:26). 
Sharing the above OCA properties reduces the usefulness of nominal exchange rate 
adjustments within the currency area by fostering internal and external balance thus, reducing 
the impact of some types of shocks or facilitating the adjustment thereafter. Thus, the OCA 
theory provides a foundation for evaluating whether or not a group of countries are suitable 
for monetary integration (Mongelli, 2002:7).  
 
For developing countries with substantial regional inequalities, monetary integration requires 
that the countries also achieve nominal- and real economic convergence. When assessing the 
degree to which potential members of a monetary union are converging; one also needs to 
consider the degree to which their income levels converge (Jenkins and Thomas, 1997; 
McCarthy, 2002; and Alberola et al, 2003).  
 
The most commonly used argument for monetary integration is that it provides a credible 
nominal anchor for monetary policy of member countries. Most national central banks in 
developing countries lack independence in general and some countries with their own 
currencies have experienced periods where the monetary authorities were forced to monetise 
fiscal deficits to prevent a financial crisis (Masson and Pattilo, 2003:33). Several authors 
argue that monetary integration, which would set policy rules at the regional level within the 
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framework of the union, is the only way to rebuild poor reputations in many African 
countries (Guillaume and Stasavage, 1999; Masson and Pattilo, 2003; and Balogun, 2007). 
 
Hence, an alternative method of assessing the desirability of monetary integration in 
developing countries is to determine the effectiveness of independent monetary and exchange 
rate policies in achieving macroeconomic stabilisation. The approach is based on the 
assumption that countries would weigh the advantages of maintaining autonomy over their 
monetary policy against the costs of surrendering it to a regional authority. If independent 
monetary policies have not been effective in determining macroeconomic performance 
indicators, the implication is that they would be better off surrendering autonomy to a 
regional authority (Balogun, 2007:4). 
 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The goal of the African Union (AU) is to have an African Economic Community (AEC) by 
the year 2028 with a single central bank and a common currency for the African continent. 
To achieve this goal, the AU tasked the African RECs to accelerate their regional economic 
integration efforts and attain the status of an economic and monetary union (EMU) much 
earlier than the target for the establishment of the AEC. The AU envisions that the 
achievements of the RECs will be building blocks for the AEC (Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2004:31). 
 
The SADC is one of the RECs given the mandate of reaching the status of an economic and 
monetary union (EMU). It is the goal of the SADC countries to have a regional central bank 
by 2016 and a common currency by 2018 (SADC, 2006:7). The SADC countries are 
emulating the integration process followed by the European Union (EU), which culminated in 
the implementation of a full EMU with a common currency. The EU countries adhered to the 
conventional methods of determining the suitability of its member countries for monetary 
integration, which insist on the ex ante achievement of the OCA criteria and macroeconomic 
policy convergence. 
 
However, it has been argued that the OCA criteria may be inappropriate for evaluating the 
feasibility of monetary integration in a group of developing countries because the underlying 
basic assumptions of the theory apply to market economies that are competitive, organised, 
developed and respond quickly to policy stimuli. In contrast, developing countries have less 
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developed regimented markets; application of the same model tends to produce indeterminate 
and undesirable results4 (Balogun, 2008:2). Alternative methods of determining the 
desirability of monetary integration in developing countries therefore, need to be taken into 
account. 
 
The theory of the endogeneity of the OCA criteria provides an impetus for considering 
alternative methods of determining the desirability of monetary integration in developing 
countries. The theory asserts that irrespective of the stage of development and economic 
structures, monetary integration can boost intra-regional trade and could act as an instrument 
for macroeconomic convergence. This would result in a high correlation between the income 
levels and business cycles of member countries and in turn, a similarity of shocks. Thus, even 
if countries do not meet the OCA criteria ex ante, they would do so ex post (Frankel and 
Rose, 1996; Arryo, 2003; Balogun, 2008). 
 
1.4 GOALS OF THE RESEARCH 
The goal of the research was to determine the feasibility of monetary integration within the 
SADC countries. To achieve this, the study: 
i. Assessed the degree to which the SADC countries meet the OCA criteria; 
ii. Assessed the progress of the SADC countries towards meeting the macroeconomic 
convergence criteria; and 
iii. Assessed the impact of selected monetary and exchange rate policy instruments on 
domestic economic performance in each country.  
 
1.5 HYPOTHESES 
The null hypotheses of the study were: 
i. The SADC countries do not constitute an optimum currency area; 
ii. The SADC countries do not meet the set macroeconomic convergence targets; and 
iii. Independent monetary and exchange rate policies in the SADC countries have been 
relatively ineffective in influencing domestic activities. 
 
 
                                                
4 See Jenkins and Thomas (1997), Agbeyegbe (2003), Carrere (2004), Khamfula and Huizinga (2004), Buiguit 
and Valev (2006). 
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1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Research conducted on the feasibility of monetary integration in the SADC countries tends to 
focus on the behavior of shocks in the countries or the extent to which the countries converge 
in macroeconomic stability indicators. However, considering the diverse nature of the SADC 
economies, these studies either find that shocks are asymmetric or that a subset of the 
countries converges5. The consensus of the studies is that the SADC countries are not ready 
for monetary integration. 
 
Nonetheless, the SADC countries are required to implement monetary integration. Thus, 
further research is called upon to guide the integration process. The present study contributes 
to the research by considering the effectiveness of independent monetary and exchange rate 
policy pursuits on macroeconomic stabilisation in the SADC member countries. The study 
argues for the need for monetary integration in the non-CMA SADC countries to gain 
credibility in their monetary policies. 
 
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter 2 is a review of the theoretical framework of regional economic integration. The 
chapter provides an overview of the process of regional economic integration and an 
explanation as to how monetary integration fits into the whole process. Chapter 3 reviews the 
theoretical frameworks of monetary integration. The chapter comprises a discussion on the 
theory of optimum currency areas, the impossible trinity principle as well as the need for 
economic convergence in a group of countries wishing to adopt a common currency.  
 
Chapter 4 provides an evaluation of the extent to which SADC countries are suitable for 
monetary integration. This was achieved by reviewing empirical studies on monetary 
integration within the SADC countries in addition to assessing the extent to which the 
member states meet the OCA criteria. Chapter 5 looks at the experience of the EU countries 
with economic integration and extracts some valuable lessons for the SADC countries from 
the assessment. Chapter 6 provides a description of the theoretical framework behind the 
methods and techniques used in the analyses. Chapter 7 discusses the results from the 
estimations, while Chapter 8 concludes the research. 
                                                
5 Mainly, the members of the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and a few other countries. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Regional economic integration has been a topic of discussion for decades in the global arena. 
Many regional economic communities worldwide are pursuing regional economic integration 
at different levels. The SADC countries are at the early stages of undergoing the process of 
regional integration with the aim of establishing a full economic and monetary union with a 
common currency by 2018. The present chapter discusses the theory of regional economic 
integration, with the aim of highlighting how monetary integration fits into the whole 
integration process.  
 
Section 2.2 reviews the theory of regional economic integration and discusses the rationale 
for integration in African countries. The section also reviews the different levels of regional 
economic integration. In addition, the section reviews the different types of monetary 
integration arrangements. Section 2.3 discusses the potential costs and benefits of regional 
economic integration to developing countries. This is followed by a discussion on the factors 
that hinder economic integration in developing countries in Section 2.4. Lastly, Section 2.5 
concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2  THE THEORY OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Tekere and Rusare (2001:1) define regional economic integration as “the unification of 
neighbouring states working within a framework to promote free movement of goods, 
services and factors of production, and to coordinate and harmonise their policies”. It 
involves a process of gradually eliminating economic barriers between independent states 
that would eventually function as one entity (Molle, 2001:4). 
 
Asante (1997:19) identifies two forms of regional economic integration, i.e. the dynamic and 
static forms. The static form of regional economic integration is defined as a state of affairs 
characterised by the absence of various forms of discrimination between the countries in the 
region; components of individual countries function together as entities of a single, larger 
economy. The United States of America can be characterised as existing in the static form of 
12 
 
economic integration. The states evolved from independent sovereign regional economies 
each with its own constitution and currency to an integrated national economy with a single 
currency (Kim, 1998:661).  
 
The dynamic state of regional economic integration is described as a process whereby all 
types of discrimination between economic units from the different countries within the region 
is abolished over time, with the formerly separate states gradually merging into a larger 
whole (Asante, 1997:19). The European Union (EU) has the longest history of economic 
integration, with its integration process spanning over 40 years culminating in the 
implementation of an economic and monetary union with a common currency, the Euro. 
Latin America is another region that has taken equally as long as the EU to integrate, though 
the impetus has been weaker and the obstacles and setbacks faced by the region arguably 
greater (van der Haegen and Viñals, 2003:4). 
 
Development in African countries has in the past, been hampered by the small nature of their 
domestic markets; this has prompted them to venture into regional integration to foster a 
more efficient allocation of resources (Mutambara, 2001:1). Furthermore, the World Trade 
Organisation’s rules for the world trade system have heightened global competition and 
raised stakes for Africa in particular. Jefferis (2007:2) notes that the motivation behind 
regional integration in African countries is more political than economic. The countries 
recognise that the continent is excessively fragmented on an economic level and that the 
small size of the economies is a barrier to growth, hence, the need for the creation of larger 
markets. 
 
However, Proff (1997:484) notes that regional integration amounts to a second best option 
given that trade liberalisation is still restricted to members of a regional integration 
arrangement (RIA) rather than a situation where there is unilateral trade liberalisation. 
Nonetheless, countries opt to pursue regional integration as opposed to unilateral trade 
liberalisation for balance of payments and political reasons, among other things (Winters, 
1991:183).  
 
The approaches to regional integration reviewed below have been termed the “textbook” 
stages of regional economic integration outlined by the market integration process. Asante 
(1997:22) however, notes that the stages of economic integration can exist in their own right 
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and should not be taken as a systematic process resulting in full economic integration. Each 
integration arrangement can have sectoral integration in particular areas of the economy. 
 
2.2.1 Market Integration 
Market integration calls for the progressive elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade among cooperating members, harmonisation of their external trade and eventually, their 
fiscal and monetary policy (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991; Davies, 1994; Asante, 1997). 
Market integration has been categorised into distinct phases/stages summarised in Table 2.1 
below; these stages are reviewed in the subsections that follow. 
 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of the Levels of Economic Integration 
Characteristic/ 
Integration 
Form 
Lower Tariffs 
between 
Member 
states 
No internal 
tariffs between 
member  states 
Common 
external tariffs 
Free flow of 
Labour and 
capital 
Harmonisation 
of economic 
policies 
Unification of 
political institutions 
Preferential 
Trade Area 
*      
Free Trade 
Area 
 *     
Customs Union  * *    
Common 
Market 
 * * *   
Economic  
Union 
 * * * *  
Political Union  * * * * * 
Source:  Haarlov (1997) 
 
2.2.1.1  Preferential Trade Agreements 
Preferential trade agreements entail the preferential reduction of tariffs and/ or preferential 
treatment on import restrictions between groups of countries, while maintaining normal trade 
restrictions towards third countries. Preferential treatment tends to be granted on specific 
goods and not to all products (Arguello, 2000:4). 
 
2.2.1.2  Free Trade Area 
A free trade area (FTA) entails the reduction and eventual removal of intra-regional tariff and 
non-tariff barriers on goods and services. In addition, there is free mobility of goods and 
services among member states but individual nations can still set different customs tariffs 
with respect to third countries (SADC, 2006:4). However, there is a possibility for trade 
deflection in an FTA, whereby goods enter through a country with the lowest external tariff 
for re-export to other member countries. Hence, FTAs require rules of origin to guard against 
trade deflection (Molle, 2001; Hansohm and Shilimela, 2006).  
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These rules of origin stipulate that internationally traded goods should be labelled with 
‘certificates of origin’ indicating in which country the goods were produced. In this way, 
customs officers at borders between member countries with different outer tariffs would be 
able to determine whether tariffs would still be due (on goods originating from a third 
country) or whether the goods originate from another member country and thus can be 
imported duty-free (Molle, 2001: 16). 
 
The SADC states launched a FTA in August 2008. The countries agreed to follow the 
principle of asymmetry in the implementation of the regional FTA, whereby more developed 
members liberalise faster than underdeveloped members. South Africa, the most advanced 
state in the region, agreed to a faster removal of tariffs, while other member states offered 
tariff reductions to South Africa at a slower rate than what they offered among themselves. 
SACU countries agreed to implement the removal of tariffs faster than the rest of SADC 
members, followed by Mauritius and Zimbabwe, and then by Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia (the least developed countries) (Hansohm and Shilimela, 2006:7). 
 
In light of the fact that some SADC countries are party to both the SADC and COMESA 
FTAs, Kritzinger-van Niekerk and Moreira (2002:2) state that there is a heightened risk of 
trade deflection within the region. Goods preferentially imported from a member of one of 
these regimes (e.g. Kenya, a member of COMESA), by a member of both regimes (e.g. 
Malawi) could be subsequently preferentially re-exported to a member of only the other 
regime (e.g. South Africa, a member of SADC). This makes it extremely difficult, though not 
entirely impossible for the FTAs to co-exist. However, as already noted above, it would be 
impossible for any member state to belong to more than one regime when the RIAs advance 
beyond FTA status.  
 
2.2.1.3  Customs Union 
A customs union (CU), like a FTA involves the removal of trade barriers between member 
countries and in addition, the countries must also conduct and pursue common external 
commercial relations, for instance imposing common external tariffs (CETs) on non-
members (Asante, 1997; Molle, 2001). The imposition of a CET eliminates the need for 
certificates of origin at internal borders. Once goods are imported through any member of the 
CU, they may circulate freely within the region (Molle, 2001:16). SACU and COMESA are 
examples of customs unions that some of the SADC countries are members of.  
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2.2.1.4  Common Market 
A complete common market consists of (i) an internal market, which entails the free intra-
regional mobility of products (goods and services) and factors of production (labour and 
capital); and (ii) common external regulations for both products and production factors. A 
complete common market is assumed to require not only the permanent removal of trade 
barriers, but also the removal of all governmental restrictions on the movement of factors of 
production within the region (Asante, 1997; Molle, 2001).  
 
It is possible for countries to have an incomplete common market, which may arise when 
barriers to trade still exist with respect to some categories of goods and services. Under such 
an arrangement, free movement of significant segments of labour and capital between the 
countries would occur while various options with respect to third parties are possible. The 
partner countries may choose to maintain different national regulations (as in the case of an 
FTA) or a common regulation (comparable to a CU). Alternatively, it is possible to 
implement combinations of common policies and national policies in relation to third parties 
(Molle, 2001:17). The Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), which comprises Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, is an example of a common market.  
 
2.2.1.5  Full Economic Union 
A full economic union is essentially a common market that asks for a high degree of 
coordination or even unification of the most important areas of economic policy. The policies 
comprise those that are associated with the common market (such as market regulation, 
competition and industrial structure), those associated with the monetary union (such as 
macroeconomic and monetary policies) and lastly, those that refer to the more social aspects 
(such as redistribution policies, social and environmental policies) (Molle, 2001:18). The EU 
is an example of a full economic and monetary union (EMU).  
 
Haseeb and Makdisi (1980:12) note that full economic integration entails increased intra-
regional trade (which requires payments for the goods exchanged), increased capital 
movements within the region (which calls for the exchangeability of different currencies) and 
free labour mobility (which calls for chances to receive and remit earnings by citizen of 
different states). All these processes require an international payments system that would 
allow payments and foreign exchange transactions without restrictions or controls hindering 
the integration process, hence the need for monetary integration.  
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2.2.1.6  Monetary Integration 
Monetary integration can be either complete or incomplete, ranging from policy coordination 
to full unification. Incomplete/ partial monetary integration occurs when member countries 
maintain some form of monetary arrangements that are rule-based and, they coordinate their 
domestic policies in order to improve on their macroeconomic stabilisation efforts. Complete/ 
full monetary integration, on the other hand, occurs when member countries give up the use 
of their national currencies for a common currency and have a central monetary authority that 
controls monetary policy within the region (Yuen, 1999:5).  
 
The subsections below outline the different types of monetary integration arrangements; each 
arrangement serves different purposes for the participating countries. Chang (2000a:3) 
classifies these arrangements into three distinct categories: regional payments agreements, 
agreements for balance of payments financing, and monetary unions. A fourth type of 
monetary integration arrangement that has gained heightened interest in literature is 
dollarisation, which is also discussed below. 
 
2.2.1.6.1 Regional Payments Agreements 
Williamson (1980:13) describes regional payments agreements6 as a type of arrangement 
whereby a number of countries with inconvertible currencies set up a multi-lateral clearing 
arrangement to handle payments for their reciprocal trade. The arrangement ensures that 
payments due or made between member countries would be handled in the same way 
irrespective of who the trading partner is, thus eliminating the incentive to discriminate in 
trade.  
 
Gonzalez del Valle (1980:207) cites the main objectives of such arrangements as being: the 
facilitation of the settlement of overall reciprocal foreign exchange positions among the 
participating countries on a multi-lateral basis; the reduction of the cost of monetary transfers 
eligible for clearing; and the minimisation of the use of official foreign exchange reserves for 
the settlement of intra-regional balances. 
 
                                                
6 Also known as payments unions. 
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Regional payments systems require a clearing-house where all intra-area transactions are 
reported by the central banks of member countries. The central banks could act as the 
clearing-house or appoint a similar agent to handle the transactions. It is the responsibility of 
the central banks to acquire any claims that may be due to their respective countries and 
present them to the clearing-house, which in turn makes periodic calculations of the net 
balances due or owed by each country and arranges for settlement to be made in reserves and/ 
or credit (Williamson, 1980:18). 
 
Chang (2000a:4) identifies two ways in which such an agreement could economise on 
currency flows and the associated transaction costs. Firstly, if the periodic settlement of the 
accounts were done on a net basis whereby transactions of equal value cancel each other, then 
the amount of each settlement would only reflect the difference between accumulated sales 
and purchases during the settlement period. This would be cheaper than a decentralised 
system where all transactions are paid individually and therefore, all sales and purchases 
involve an international currency flow. 
 
Alternatively, the central bank of a deficit country could transfer a reserve currency at the end 
of the settlement period to pay for the bilateral trade between member countries. This is 
preferred to a decentralised system where each central bank would need to maintain enough 
international reserves to finance bilateral payments continuously during the period. These two 
features imply that each central bank can safely reduce its holdings of reserve assets (Chang, 
2000a:4). 
 
According to Gonzalez del Valle (1980:207), by minimising the use of official foreign 
exchange reserves, regional payments systems support trade liberalisation in an area that 
suffers from a chronic shortage of liquid international reserves. This is achieved through the 
direct central bank interchanges of reciprocal holdings of foreign exchange claims. 
Williamson (1980:18) argues that foreign exchange shortages would normally encourage 
bilateralism given that no country would be willing to use up their limited reserves to finance 
a deficit with one of its weak-currency neighbours rather than finance imports from hard-
currency countries.  
 
Bilateralism could however, be considered as the polar opposite of regional economic 
integration as it discourages intra-regional co-operation and may seriously jeopardise the 
18 
 
overall volume of trade. Thus, by ensuring that additional exports have the same value 
regardless of their intended recipient within the area, multilateral clearing eliminates the 
incentive for bilateralism. Similarly, it ensures that additional imports have the same cost 
regardless of their source within the area (Williamson, 1980:18). 
 
An added advantage of regional payments systems in cases where a member country cannot 
settle its account is that the union could provide credit to cover part of the net imbalances in 
its trade with other members. In some cases, the creditor central banks could provide interim 
financing which earns interest at mutually agreed rates and which must be repaid at short 
fixed intervals (Williamson, 1980:18). 
 
According to Gonzalez del Valle (1980:208), interim financing in a clearing house is 
intended to avoid the waste involved in too frequent settlements of bilateral or multilateral 
accounts. It is thus considered to be a temporary investment of foreign exchange by the 
creditor central banks, which can be fully converted into usable international currencies, earn 
interest at reasonable commercial rates and is not subject to automatic refinancing. 
 
According to Chang (2000a:15), if the reason for regional monetary integration is coping 
with financial instability and crises, then regional payments systems may be of little value to 
the countries. In as much as regional funds for balance of payments support may help 
prevent/ cushion the impact of financial crises, the importance of international contagion 
(itself derived from the financial integration) and the size of the international liquidity that 
would be necessary are formidable obstacles7. 
 
Latin America has three clearing and payments arrangements, the Central American Clearing 
House, the payments system of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the 
Caribbean Community Multilateral Clearing Facility; established in 1961, 1965 and 1977, 
respectively. All these arrangements were designed to facilitate private and official monetary 
transfers among participants on a multilateral basis. The approach adopted by members of the 
different Latin American clearing houses was to restrict credit to amounts and payment 
periods compatible with the overall volume of transactions between the parties involved, on 
                                                
7 For example, regional payments systems played no essential role in helping deal with the sequence of crises 
that hit the Latin American countries.  
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condition that the financing was not used as regular export credit or as global balance-of-
payments support (Gonzalez del Valle, 1980:207). The SADC countries do not have a 
clearing-house although COMESA does have one.  
 
Chang (2000a:8) however notes that the importance of regional payments systems and of 
regional funds for balance of payments support is decreasing with time for individual 
countries as they are finding less need for official international reserves as they switch to 
more flexible exchange rate regimes. Furthermore, due to the increased integration of 
international financial markets and the development of financial technologies, it has become 
easier for international payments to be channelled via private institutions. 
 
2.2.1.6.2 Agreements for Balance of Payments Financing 
According to Chang (2000a:8), there are cases where a group of countries set up an 
institution that facilitates a common pool of international reserves mainly for balance of 
payments support, but which can also serve as a form of investment. Williamson (1980:13) 
describes this as reserve pooling, whereby member countries acquire liquid claims on an 
agent through depositing some part of their reserves with the agent8 while the agent holds 
liquid claims on third parties. The agent can either invest the funds in marketable securities or 
extend credit to member countries to support trade and, in some circumstances, to assist 
member central banks that may require loans to finance balance-of-payments deficits (Chang, 
2000a:9).  
 
According to Williamson (1980:13), the credit may be short term or medium term; automatic 
or subject to some sort of discretionary control; provided that the payments imbalances of 
members are reasonably desynchronised. In this way, the arrangement ensures that the 
liquidity of members’ deposits are not jeopardised and that the agent does not violate the 
customary principles of fractional reserve banking. Chang (2000a:9) likens such regional 
institutions to the arrangement under the International Monetary Fund (IMF), giving the Latin 
American Reserve Fund (FLAR) as a leading example of such an arrangement. 
 
                                                
8 Which continue to form part of their overall reserves. 
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Williamson (1980:20) emphasises that member countries should implement a set of rules that 
limit the right to draw on the reserves to prevent individual countries from adopting policies 
likely to generate deficits. Without binding limits, a reserve pool would enable deficit 
countries to draw on the real resources of surplus countries, particularly when the loans carry 
a concessional interest rate. There are a number of possible ways to mitigate such risks; 
member countries can set fairly-mechanical rules similar to those used in the European 
Payments Union (EPU) or the low-conditionality facilities of the IMF. Alternatively, the 
countries could have the institution manage the reserve pool, which in turn would lay down 
explicit policy conditions similar to the high-conditionality drawings from the IMF. Lastly, 
the countries could maintain a strong consensus on policy obligations similar to that of the 
European Monetary System (EMS). 
 
According to Chang (2000a:10), reserve pools, through the provision of balance-of-payments 
support, may help achieve financial stability in the face of financial and exchange rate crises. 
The availability of a sufficiently large “war chest” of international reserves may prevent 
speculative attacks on the currency or the financial system of individual countries by 
increasing the amount of reserves that each country may have access to9. This however, is 
only viable on condition that all members do not simultaneously require access to more than 
their respective shares of resources. Lastly, reserve pooling could also aid in the reduction of 
financial instability by allowing participating countries better access to foreign creditors than 
if the countries had acted individually. 
 
In practice however, Chang (2000a:10) points out that developing countries may find it 
difficult to expand the effective size of their pool, particularly in contrast with institutions 
such as the IMF, that include developed countries as members. This is because developing 
countries do not have the capacity to provide convertible currencies on demand, in contrast 
with the advanced countries that can grant enough international currency to shore up IMF’s 
operations when required. Thus, the implicit promise that one of the members of a reserve 
pool in developing countries will have access to enough international liquidity to transfer to 
the pool in case of need is not feasible. 
 
                                                
9 According to Chang (2000a:11), sufficiently large refers to a chest roughly the size of M2 money supply in 
order to enable the countries to cover the potential short-term net liabilities of the financial system. 
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The African Union (AU) established an African Monetary Fund (AMF) in September 2009, 
which together with the African Central Bank and African Investment Bank, are expected to 
promote deeper monetary integration in the continent. The AMF’s objectives include: 
i. The correction of imbalances in the balance of payments (BoP) of the RECs of the AU 
with the rest of the world; 
ii. The contribution to the removal of restrictions on current payments between the 
member states; 
iii.  The settlement of current payments between member states in order to promote intra 
African trade; and  
iv. The coordination of the position of member states on international monetary issues 
(African Union, 2008:5).  
 
The AMF aims to provide short- and medium-term loans to member states (or to the RECs) 
for the financing of their overall BoP deficits with countries outside Africa, resulting from 
trade in goods and services, transfers and capital movements. The AMF also aims to issue 
guarantees in order to strengthen the borrowing capabilities of member states or the RECs 
from other financial sources to finance the overall deficits in their BoPs (African Union, 
2008:5). 
 
2.2.1.6.3 Monetary Unions 
Monetary unions can be either partial or complete, with the extreme involving the use of a 
common currency within the region. Williamson (1980:24) notes that partial monetary 
integration arrangements can possibly play a strategic role in the gradual evolution to full 
monetary integration. The sub-sections below review the different types of monetary unions. 
 
2.2.1.6.3.1 Exchange Rate Co-ordination (Currency Convertibility) 
Williamson (1980:13) describes exchange rate co-ordination as a type of partial regional 
monetary integration where participating countries agree to pursue common policies that 
limit the extent to which the exchange rates between their national currencies can diverge. 
Under this arrangement, member countries retain their individual currencies, which would be 
convertible either at market-determined rates (limited currency convertibility) or at pre-
determined rates (full currency convertibility). Exchange rate co-ordination is adopted to 
facilitate trade by minimising the disadvantages brought about by the use of multiple 
currencies within a trade area. 
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Within a limited currency convertibility arrangement, there are no exchange restrictions with 
respect to the national currencies in the region and no common policy towards third 
countries; individual countries can still formulate different policies towards non-member 
countries (Ogunkola, 2005:17). Exchange rate co-ordination in such an arrangement implies 
central bank intervention to limit deviations from the agreed upon rates between member 
currencies. Member countries need to agree on the structure of and margins around the 
central rates. They also need to agree on the intervention mechanism when exchange rates 
deviate from the margins, and the division of responsibility of intervention between the 
country whose currency is at the ceiling and the one whose currency is on the floor, prior to 
the implementation of such an arrangement (Williamson, 1980:13). 
 
With full currency convertibility, on the other hand, members convert their currencies at 
fixed exchange rates and the combined value of their currencies, relative to the rest of the 
world, may be adjusted occasionally or be allowed to float freely (Ogunkola, 2005:17). Co-
ordination in such an arrangement requires ensuring that the rates posted by all participating 
countries remain constant relative to each other and that central rates are defined by member 
countries in terms of the same unit. Participating countries may also limit the freedom of 
individual countries to change the central rate. This could be achieved either through setting 
restrictions on the size of changes that are permissible or setting a requirement that all 
member countries mutually agree on any changes before they are implemented. Alternatively, 
the countries may make use of an agreed upon formula to determine the extent to which the 
central rate may be changed (Williamson, 1980:13). 
  
Exchange rate co-ordination requires a degree of harmonisation of the monetary policy of 
individual countries through cooperative intervention in their exchange markets10 and a 
degree of cooperation in fiscal policy. Member countries would still retain a substantial 
amount of autonomy over most areas of economic and financial policies (Ogunkola, 
2005:18). However, Machlup (1977:22) warns against the risks associated with the retention 
of policy autonomy by individual countries. Similarly, Al-Jarhi (1980:31) warns that 
exchange rate unification could present difficulties arising from internal political pressures 
and from external factors such as the domination of foreign currencies. 
                                                
10 i.e. the buying or selling of foreign currency in exchange for domestic currency to keep the exchange rate 
from fluctuating 
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According to Machlup (1977:22), if monetary authorities in individual countries retain power 
to influence domestic money supply and aggregate spending11, or to restrict the free inter-
convertibility of currencies12, then exchange rate co-ordination could be rendered practically 
worthless. Thus, full currency convertibility works if and only if countries are prepared to 
give up their autonomy over credit policy.  
 
The arrangement also calls for certain preconditions in the economies of participating 
countries to be met, such as approximate external balance and readiness to eliminate all 
exchange and other restrictions on external transactions without undue pressure on the 
foreign exchange reserves. The European Monetary System (EMS) was an example of such 
an arrangement. 
 
2.2.1.6.3.2 Monetary Co-ordination 
Monetary co-ordination is another type of partial regional monetary integration which 
Williamson (1980:23) describes as an arrangement where participating countries agree to 
pursue common monetary policies while retaining the use of their national currencies. Where 
the countries maintain floating exchange rates, monetary co-ordination would entail focusing 
on a target of some concept(s) of money supply or a target for domestic credit expansion 
(DCE). On the other hand, where countries maintain fixed exchange rates, monetary co-
ordination implies targeting domestic credit expansion given that the countries cannot 
influence monetary policy13.  
 
The objectives for monetary co-ordination are two-fold, to promote cyclical stabilisation and 
to support a common exchange rate policy vis-à-vis non- members. A common exchange rate 
policy would enable member countries to avoid intra-area changes in central rates. This 
requires member countries to have a common rate of DCE and hence, not to sterilise reserve 
changes in this respect. Cyclical stabilisation is of particular importance in achieving greater 
regional stability where monetary policy has strong spill over effects on conjunctural 
conditions in member countries, e.g. in the case of the Organisation for Economic Co-
                                                
11 In pursuit of any national goals other than exchange rate stability. 
12 In pursuit of the maintenance of fictitious stability of official exchange rates. 
13 See the discussion in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3. 
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operation and Developed (OECD) member countries and IMF member states (Williamson, 
1980:23).   
 
However, taking into account that policy acts only with a significant lag, having strong spill 
over effects does not automatically mean that monetary co-ordination would be appropriate 
for a group of countries. It is possible that a crude form of co-ordination requiring all 
countries to expand or contract simultaneously could increase instability (Williamson, 
1980:19). 
 
2.2.1.6.3.3 Parallel Currency Union 
Parallel currency unions are a form of partial monetary integration whereby a common 
currency is issued within the region that circulates alongside the national currencies of the 
participating countries (Williamson, 1980; Frankel, 1999; Ogunkola, 2005). A currency union 
represents the strongest commitment to a fixed exchange rate as possible and most countries 
form/ join one with the hope of gaining maximum credibility for their monetary policy by 
adopting the strongest commitment to inflation targeting (Frankel, 1999:3).  
 
For the arrangement to work there must be an irrevocable commitment to a permanently fixed 
exchange rate between the union currency and the national currencies as well as full, less 
costly convertibility. In addition, there should not be any restrictions on the use of the parallel 
currency in transactions, foreign or domestic (Williamson, 1980:24). 
 
National central banks are maintained but their existing autonomy in monetary and credit 
management is reduced in favour of the union monetary authority, which is jointly exercised 
by the member countries (Ogunkola, 2005:18). Furthermore, the arrangement requires the ex 
ante harmonisation of monetary policies of member countries, which in turn requires equally 
correct growth rate preconditions, the same (real) income elasticities of demand for money, 
and constant real exchange rates (Williamson, 1980:24).  
 
The currency could play one of two roles:  
i. It could function as a vehicle currency to facilitate international transactions. In such an 
arrangement the parallel currency would be extended to replace national currencies in 
their domestic roles only if and when the member countries reached a decision that they 
could safely dispense with internal exchange rate changes; alternatively 
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ii. The currency could be freely accessible from the start to anyone holding any of the 
national currencies. When over fifty percent of the total regional money supply is 
converted voluntarily into the parallel currency, then the remaining currencies in 
circulation would be called in through a compulsory conversion operation. 
 
The second option calls for exchange rate co-ordination where the countries would be 
required to undergo a series of stages in which the permissible bands for exchange rate 
changes are narrowed progressively, until the final stage of irrevocably locked exchange rates 
is reached. The currencies would thus, by default merge into one (Williamson, 1980:24).  
 
There are a number of ways of determining the value of the parallel currency; it may be 
valued in terms of a basket of the currencies of the participating countries. In such an 
arrangement, should an individual require the parallel currency, they would need to purchase 
all the currencies according to the weights assigned to them in the basket14. The individual 
would then exchange the basket of currencies for the parallel currency with an agent, who 
would in turn acquire claims on the respective central banks and liabilities to the commercial 
banks (Williamson, 1980:23). 
 
Alternatively, an agent could accept the individual currencies, rather than a basket, at the 
prevailing exchange rates and express its claims on national central banks in the parallel 
currency, rather than in national currencies. This would therefore prevent the process of 
conversion from exerting pressure in the exchange markets. Similarly, should individuals 
wish to convert their bank deposits into the parallel currency, all that would be required is 
redenomination, without actual transactions occurring (Williamson, 1980:23). 
 
The parallel currency could also be valued in terms of a unit external to the area such as the 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR), with the possibility of making discretionary changes in the 
value of the currency (to keep it fairly constant in terms of the member currencies or in 
pursuit of payments balance for the entire region). Lastly, the currency could have a stable 
real value, which could be determined through assigning units of each currency in the basket 
in proportion to the prevailing inflation in the respective countries (Williamson, 1980:23). 
                                                
14 This could however exert exchange-market pressure if the demand to convert the national currencies does not 
correspond to the proportional composition of the parallel currency. 
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It is possible to reverse the commitment to a currency union15. Panama and the Organisation 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) are examples of currency unions; they use the United 
States dollar as a parallel currency (Frankel, 1999:3). The CMA arrangement in the southern 
African countries of Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa is another example of a 
currency union, with the South African Rand (ZAR) as the parallel currency.  
 
2.2.1.6.3.4 Complete Monetary Unions 
This is an arrangement that involves the establishment of a regional currency with a common 
external exchange rate and common monetary and credit policies. Ultimately, a complete 
monetary union would require the establishment of a regional central bank that would be 
responsible for issuing the common currency, holding and managing the external assets of the 
member countries in a common pool, and determining monetary, credit and some aspects of 
the fiscal policies of the countries (Williamson, 1980; Yuen, 1999; Ogunkola, 2005).  
 
Rather than replacing all currencies within the region with a completely new one, the 
participating countries could opt to recall all the national currencies save for one, which 
would become the common currency (Williamson, 1980:23).  
 
The common central bank of a monetary union is required to facilitate monetary stability and 
the full and unlimited convertibility of the union currency against any external currency to 
which it would be pegged immutably (Ogunkola, 2005:18). The central bank could also 
assume other roles that traditionally are assigned to national central banks, such as serving as 
a lender of last resort for financial entities of member countries and, perhaps, providing 
clearinghouse services for the region (Chang, 2000a:12).   
 
The Communauté Financière d’afrique (CFA) franc zone is an example of a complete 
monetary union in developing countries. The CFA zone comprises fourteen countries divided 
into two different zones, one West African and the other Central African. Each zone has its 
own central bank though they use the same currency; the CFA franc, created in 1948. The 
currency is pegged to the French franc with unlimited convertibility, which is guaranteed by 
                                                
15 For example, the union between the Czech and Slovak korunas experienced a smooth reversal while on the 
other hand; the Former Soviet Union had a considerably rougher separation. 
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the unlimited overdraft facilities given to the zone members at the French Treasury. This is 
on condition that at least sixty five percent of their gross foreign exchange reserves are kept 
in a Treasury deposit; implicitly making the French government lender of last resort in the 
CFA zone (Chang, 2000a:12). 
 
2.2.1.6.4 Dollarisation 
Dollarisation is a type of monetary integration arrangement whereby small countries adopt 
the currency of a larger, more stable country as a substitute for their national currencies. This 
kind of arrangement is usually adopted in order to benefit from the fiscal discipline of, as 
well as to gain monetary policy credibility from the larger country (Calvo, 1999; Masson and 
Pattilo, 2003; Araujo and Leon, 2003).  
 
Dollarisation can either be full or partial, with the latter occurring when a foreign currency is 
used in any of the three classical roles of money, i.e., as a unit of account, means of 
payments, or store of value. The most relevant being the first two roles (Calvo, 1999; Araujo 
and Leon, 2003). Most countries are partially-dollarised either on the asset side (e.g. bank 
deposits) or on the liability side. Partial dollarisation may also occur in cases where the 
national currency may still be in use for small transactions or be issued to consumers as small 
change (Calvo, 1999:1). 
 
2.2.1.7  Political Union 
Economic integration requires the establishment of institutions and common policies to align 
the different objectives and forms of government regulations that may exist owing to 
different preferences of member countries. Since the region pursues common policies 
towards non-members in areas such as trade, production factors, economic sectors and 
monetary stability, it requires a central authority to exercise control over these matters. This 
implies that member countries should be willing to give up a degree of their sovereignty to 
regional institutions that would guide and stimulate the integration process, with the end goal 
of transforming the individual member states into regions of one nation (Haseeb and Makdisi, 
(1980; Molle, 2001; Van der Haegen and Viñals, 2003). 
 
Similarly, Williamson (1980:15) states that an economic union requires standardised policy 
regarding capital flows vis-à-vis the rest of the world, as a complement to liberalised capital 
movements within the area. Harmonised external exchange controls are a necessity within an 
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integration area in order to prevent residents in the countries with tighter controls from 
evading these controls by moving their funds through the countries with less stringent 
controls. 
 
2.3  COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
The Economic Commission for Africa (2004:11) points out that the potential gains from 
regional economic integration are mostly realisable in the long term, while, on the other hand, 
the costs are observable in the short term and are definite. As such, countries are advised not 
to assess the viability of regional economic integration on a short-term basis but rather, to 
also consider the potential long-term benefits. The subsections below review the potential 
benefits of regional economic integration. 
 
2.3.1 Benefits of Regional Economic Integration 
The benefits associated with regional economic integration are not a given for every regional 
group and may be unevenly distributed among the member countries due to differing 
resource endowments, these are reviewed below. 
 
2.3.1.1  Fosters Economic Growth and Development 
The benefits of regional economic integration for developing countries are associated with 
the role that integration can play in fostering economic growth and development, particularly 
industrial development (McCarthy, 2003:606). Regional integration is seen as a 
geographically extended version of import-substituting industrialisation, whereby a single 
market larger than that of the national economy is created, which allows room for scale 
economies in production, more competition, and thus greater efficiency (Schiff, 2003:4).  
 
Countries tend to substitute regional production for imports from outside the region. 
Consumers within the region could benefit from a reduction in import prices if the pre-union 
tariffs in a particular country are higher than the CETs implemented. The elimination of intra-
union tariffs implies that importers would incur less importation costs, which then lead to 
higher returns to owners of the abundant factor (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991; McLeod, 2003).  
 
In addition, the free movement of factors of production is expected to encourage the optimum 
allocation of labour and capital. Producers should be able to move their capital from places of 
low return to places of higher return, where production would be most economical. This, 
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combined with an enlarged market of factors of production ought to result in new production 
possibilities that would in turn permit new, more modern or more efficient uses of factors 
(Lundahl and Peterson, 1991:303). The growth in production and investment in participating 
countries would in turn foster development within the region (McCarthy, 2003:606). 
Furthermore, consumers would benefit from the reduced prices in the region, thus improving 
their welfare (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991:162). 
 
2.3.1.2  Trade Creation Effects 
Regional integration is beneficial when it results in trade creation, which occurs when there is 
a shift in production from high cost producers within the region and from the rest of the 
world to relatively low cost producers within the region (Corden, 1972; Lundahl and 
Peterson, 1991, Piazolo, 2001). Trade creation leads to efficiency in production due to 
specialisation. Union members benefit from the reduction in the real cost of goods previously 
produced domestically, which will now be imported cheaper from a partner country16. 
Similarly, consumers experience a gain in their consumer surplus due to a reduction in the 
cost of final goods, which enables them to consume more goods17 (Corden, 1972:461-471).  
 
Furthermore, a shift in trade from goods originating from outside the RIA that are subject to 
tariffs to cheaper goods produced within the RIA could have the welfare effect of lowering 
world prices. In addition, trade creation could potentially improve the terms of trade of 
participating countries if a RIA has a significant share in the world market (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2004:11). Lastly, the increased opportunities to export low-skill 
intensive goods can have poverty reducing impacts when a country is abundant in a factor, 
for instance unskilled labour (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991:171). 
 
Trade creation requires that there be a large economic area and a large portion of overall trade 
between partner countries as opposed to external trade with third countries. According to 
Lundahl and Peterson (1991:172), the following generalisations apply: (i) the larger the 
economic size of the integrated area and the more the number of countries comprising the 
union, and (ii) the greater the share of intra-regional trade in the members’ total trade; the 
greater the scope of trade creation as opposed to trade diversion. 
                                                
16 This is known as the production effect. 
17 This is known as the consumption effect. 
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Furthermore, trade creation requires that there be higher pre-union tariffs (which imply 
greater production and consumption distortions), as well as lower tariffs after the formation 
of the union as opposed to higher tariffs (which create a scope for trade diversion). Similarly, 
there must be competitive economies in the member states for there to be opportunities to 
take advantage of gains from specialisation. If the economies produce a less diversified range 
of products, there will be reduced opportunities to substitute products of one member for 
another; making it possible for a high cost producer to dominate the market (Winters, 1991; 
Haarlov, 1997; Carim, 1997).  
 
Hirsch (2005:4) however notes that RIAs have not succeeded in improving the terms of trade 
of their member countries in developing countries. This is because they lack the necessary 
conditions for trade creation to take place. Although the volume of trade has increased, their 
relative share in world trade has decreased because most developing countries trade in 
primary commodities, whose prices have been declining overtime, with the exception of oil.  
 
2.3.1.3  Increased Market Size and Competition 
Countries can also benefit from regional economic integration in the long term through the 
effects of increased competition in their economies resulting from integrated markets. Trade 
liberalisation implies that domestic producers would have to compete with other producers 
from the region, which would force them to be more efficient in production. Efficiency in 
production would result in a reduction in production costs, which ultimately would lead to a 
fall in consumer prices (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004).  
 
Trade liberalisation also implies increased market size for domestic producers, which would 
enable them to take advantage of economies of scale, thus increasing the productivity of the 
available resources and making them more competitive regionally and globally. Similarly, 
economies of scale have the potential to attract more investment to the region, thus fostering 
economic growth in the long-run (Jaber, 1970; Corden, 1972; Mutambara, 2001).  
 
2.3.1.4  Other Benefits of Regional Economic Integration 
Other (non-economic) benefits of regional integration include enhancing the international 
bargaining power of individual countries in multilateral agreements. Globalisation has put 
pressure on countries to increase the size of their negotiating strength through membership in 
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regional groupings. Countries may also partake in regional integration to reduce the risk of 
conflict within the region by increasing the interdependence between members and to avoid 
spill over effects of unrest in neighbouring countries (Schiff and Winters, 2003:6).  
 
Regional integration also creates a larger political community that will ‘lock in’ trade 
reforms, constrain discretionary actions by government and could, in particular, in the 
absence of intra-regional lobbying and alliances, restrict the ability of powerful political 
interest groups to retard economic growth (McCarthy, 2003:606). Regional integration could 
also facilitate the joint supply of specific regional public goods such as infrastructure and 
negotiated shared access to natural resources e.g. water (Schiff and Winters, 2003:6). The 
subsection below reviews the costs associated with regional economic integration. 
 
2.3.2  Costs of Regional Economic Integration 
Regional economic integration also comes with costs to some of the participating countries. 
Consumers who may have to pay higher than world market prices for goods purchased 
regionally in keeping with a preferential trade agreement incur some of the costs of regional 
economic integration. Other costs of integration are at national level, some countries may 
find themselves marginalised when production relocates to the least cost producer within the 
region. The subsections below review the costs associated with regional economic 
integration. 
 
2.3.2.1  Trade Diversion and Trade Suppression Effects 
Regional integration in developing countries is more likely to lead to trade diversion, which 
occurs when there is a shift in trade from relatively low cost producers from outside the 
region to high cost, less efficient producers within the region in response to the removal/ 
reduction in tariffs between members of a RIA. Trade diversion is harmful if only one 
country produces a commodity prior to integration, or if production originates in that country 
once the common external tariff (CET) is in place. This form of specialisation implies that 
production on a global scale would not be at the least-cost hence; there would be a loss in 
income to the rest of the world (Corden, 1972; Lundahl and Peterson, 1991; McCarthy, 1999; 
Piazolo, 2001).  
 
However, the effects on incomes of member states of this form of specialisation are unclear. 
If intra-regional specialisation results in a reduction in the price of the goods, then trade 
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diversion will have cost-reduction effects for the regional producer who enjoys profits from 
increased sales to its trading partners (Corden, 1972: 468). If, on the other hand, they 
experience increased costs of production then member countries would also encounter a loss 
in incomes. Thus, trade diversion would have welfare costs to the community of having to 
pay higher than world market prices for goods (McCarthy, 1999:380).  
 
Piazolo (2001:25) asserts that the larger the differences in production costs between the 
producers within the region and from the rest of the world, the more harmful trade diversion 
would be for the importing countries in the region. The governments of the importing 
countries would lose their tariff revenue, either directly through tariff cuts among members or 
indirectly through a shift away from imports from non-members that are subject to tariffs. 
The cost of this loss depends on how easily members can switch to alternative ways of raising 
funds, but it can be high on countries that rely heavily on tariffs. 
 
In some cases, regional integration may result in trade suppression, which occurs when there 
is a shift in trade from relatively low cost producers from outside the region to high cost, 
newly established domestic producers in response to the removal/ reduction in tariffs 
(Corden, 1972: 468).  
 
2.3.2.2  Polarised Development 
Developing countries consider trade integration beneficial if the growth in production and 
investment exceed the welfare costs of trade diversion. However, output growth in the region 
maybe polarised, with the larger and more industrialised economies benefiting from 
increasing returns to scale and greater competition while the smaller and less developed 
countries experience economic decline characterised by industrial closures and growing 
unemployment (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991; McCarthy, 1999; 2003; McLeod, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, free capital mobility leads to a convergence of interest rates in member 
countries. As such, funds tend to flow towards those members whose ex ante investments are 
large compared to domestic savings. This results in a concentration of investments in those 
member countries in which the marginal productivity of capital and productivity growth is 
highest (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991:303). 
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Similarly, labour mobility may exacerbate the problem of income disparities among member 
countries. Encouraging labour to migrate to areas of higher productivity to mitigate 
unemployment implies that those countries with no capacity to produce at least cost will not 
develop. Yet most developing countries participate in regional integration with the aim of 
increasing domestic income levels and employment, and to gain faster economic growth 
through expanded local production (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991:303). 
  
Regional economic integration within the SADC region is likely to be polarised, with South 
Africa benefitting at the expense of the smaller countries. Mayer and Thomas (1997:329) 
note that the structural characteristics of the SADC economies are more competitive than 
complementary, with economies (with the exception of South Africa) producing a similar 
range of primary products and competing for export markets. The absolute dominance in size 
and level of development of the South African economy, its substantial trade surplus with the 
other SADC countries and their dependence on South African infrastructure strengthen the 
likelihood of polarised development in the region (McCarthy, 1999; 2002; Khamfula and 
Tesfayohannes, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, there is a possibility that conflict could arise if the production of some goods 
relocates to places where there is comparative advantage within the region. These factors 
provide the main obstacles to successful regional integration and economic development in 
the SADC region. Lundahl and Peterson (1991:5) advise that there be a regional mechanism 
implemented to compensate the disadvantaged countries for the loss in tariff revenue, lest the 
integration arrangement collapse. They suggest that the countries that benefit should 
compensate the disadvantaged countries through a transfer of financial resources18. 
Alternatively, countries could implement measures to encourage industrial production in the 
less developed countries. This would ensure that regional integration plays a more active role 
in the economic development of the relatively poorer countries in the region.  
 
  
                                                
18 For example, the revenue sharing agreement in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) whereby South 
Africa compensates the smaller countries for the loss in revenue. 
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2.3.2.3  Overlapping Membership in Integration Arrangements 
Authors such as Kritzinger-van Niekerk and Moreira (2002), Lee (2002), Masson and Pattilo 
(2003), Khandelwal (2004), and Jakobeit et al (2005), among others, have discussed the issue 
of overlapping membership of African countries in RIAs. According to Khamfula and 
Tesfayohannes (2004:40), the main potential cost associated with overlapping membership in 
RIAs is policy conflict. Conflicting regulations of preferential trade arrangements make it 
difficult for members of more than one regional body to implement preferential tariffs to 
some of its trade partners. For example, Swaziland being a member of both COMESA and 
SACU cannot implement preferential tariffs for other COMESA countries nor introduce free 
trade for imports from them in terms of the COMESA FTA without prior consent from the 
other SACU members (Kritzinger-van Niekerk and Moreira, 2002; Oosthuizen, 2006). 
 
This requirement has also attributed to the stalemate in the SADC- EC economic partnership 
agreement (EPA), in which South Africa has an independent preferential trade arrangement 
with the EU under the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) (Jakobeit et 
al, 2005:65). Kritzinger-van Niekerk and Moreira (2002:3) further highlight the potential 
problems that may arise should COMESA and SADC become customs unions in the future. 
They caution that it may be impossible for any country to belong to more than one RIA, 
unless each RIA adopts a common external tariff (CET) when they become customs unions 
(CUs) and the same CU regulations.  
 
The consensus is that, countries will eventually have to choose one RIA to belong to, 
especially when these groups reach the stage of monetary union. It would be impossible for 
any country to belong to more than one monetary union. The eastern and southern African 
countries therefore need to resolve the issue of over-lapping memberships in regional bodies 
before it impedes their economic integration efforts. The subsection below reviews other 
factors that hinder the success of regional economic integration in developing countries. 
 
2.4 FACTORS HINDERING MARKET INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Market integration has not been as successful in developing countries in comparison to the 
experience of the European countries because it involves countries with a low and similar 
level of development and resource endowment, which leaves little scope for inter- or intra-
industry specialisation. The similarity in production and trade patterns among these countries 
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also makes it harder to exploit economies of scale. Hence, for these countries, industrial 
development and diversification rather than the removal of trade barriers, will enhance intra-
regional trade (Jaber, 1970; Mayer and Thomas 1997; Mutambara, 2001; Shams, 2003). The 
SADC countries are no exception, the industrial sector in the region is under-developed and 
production lacks complementarity19. There is need to transform the industry in the region to 
enhance their production capacity. 
 
Schiff (2003:4) cites government intervention in developing markets as another hindrance to 
regional integration. For integrating countries to exploit economies of scale, specialisation 
should be determined by market forces. However, in most developing countries governments, 
and not markets, determine the nature of production. Thus, these countries fail to realise 
economies of scale because goods are not produced at least cost. Furthermore, the high 
transportation costs, low level of economic development, lack of knowledge and inadequate 
managerial skills and foreign exchange controls, among other factors prevalent in developing 
countries, also limit the potential benefits of trade liberalisation (Jaber, 1970:263).  
 
Cobham and Robson (1992:2) also note that the European countries are more integrated with 
respect to trade, financial and other factor flows than the African countries, and also have 
more organised financial markets. On the other hand, African countries and sub-regions are 
small relative to European ones, in terms of indicators such as the gross domestic product 
(GDP), trade flows, and money supply. There are also greater disparities between the African 
countries than there are with the European countries at the macroeconomic level. These 
differences have led to suggestions that African countries should rather attempt simpler, 
cheaper, more productive, and more cost-effective models of economic integration.  
 
Lundahl and Peterson (1991:5) suggest that developing countries should rather pursue 
production and development integration, which involves an initial modification of existing 
instruments and institutions, and more importantly, the creation of new ones, to enable the 
market to function efficiently and to promote other policy objectives in the union. According 
to Lee (2002:4), development integration requires more state intervention than market 
integration. The member states are required to first and foremost make a political 
                                                
19 This has adverse implications for monetary integration, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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commitment to integration, which will lay the foundation for cooperation. The political 
commitment is expected to help member states work toward implementing policies that will 
help with problems created by the unequal distribution of benefits from the process of market 
integration. 
 
Economic integration in developing countries could also be undertaken through the co-
ordination of the investment decisions in participating countries in order to create 
complementary production structures from which trade flows would follow. Regional 
groupings could choose priority sectors for development such as agriculture, industry, power, 
transportation, or training, and identify specific, concrete projects in each sector that could be 
implemented on a community basis, with possible financial support from abroad. If 
successful, a single investment area could necessitate a customs union in future20 (Dajani, 
1980; Davies, 1994; Diouf; 1995).  
 
According to Dajani (1980:28), partial monetary integration would be more relevant than full 
monetary integration in such a scenario given that its purpose would be the facilitation of the 
exchange of the limited number of goods produced within the region. Nonetheless, it is the 
goal of the African Union to deepen regional economic integration within the African 
countries. It is essential to identify the fundamental factors that guided the EU’s integration 
process as they could provide useful lessons for other regional economic communities 
(RECs) to apply in their quest for economic integration.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
McCarthy (2002), Masson and Pattilo (2003), and Arroyo (2003) among others, note that 
RECs need to bear in mind that the implementation of a full monetary and economic union is 
likely to be a gradual process that requires a significant degree of convergence and 
integration before that status is realised. Hence, RIAs are advised not to rush the 
implementation of a monetary union.  
 
SADC countries are at the early stages of undertaking the process of regional economic 
integration and as such are a long way from implementing monetary integration. At present 
                                                
20 This is the reverse of the EU experience. 
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regional integration results in polarised development in the SADC countries, with South 
Africa benefitting the most as the largest economy. This is due mainly to South Africa being 
more industrialised than the rest of the countries and hence, scale economies imply that 
production is at the least-cost there. This however, implies that South Africa will continue to 
grow at a faster rate than the rest of the member states. A disparity in income levels indicates 
that a group of countries may not be suitable for monetary integration, which requires 
economic convergence in member countries21.  
 
The discussion on economic integration highlighted a number of factors that hinder the 
integration process in developing countries. The implication drawn is that if the SADC 
countries are to be successful in regional integration, they need to restructure their 
economies. This will be a lengthy and costly process for some of the countries however, if 
implemented correctly; it will benefit the whole region in the long run and would make it less 
costly for the region to have a common currency. Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical 
framework of monetary integration. 
  
  
                                                
21 The need for economic convergence in a group of countries wishing to form a monetary union is elaborated 
on in Chapter 5. 
38 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 
 
3.1 NTRODUCTION 
The focus of the present study is to evaluate the implications of monetary integration for 
regional economic integration and development within the SADC region. However, before an 
assessment of the suitability of the SADC countries for monetary integration can be 
undertaken, it is important to gain an understanding of the theory of monetary integration. 
Thus, the present chapter provides a review of the theory, beginning with a discussion of the 
arguments supporting the need for monetary integration in the pursuit of regional economic 
integration.  
 
The discussion on the costs and benefits associated with monetary integration are centred on 
the implications of adopting a fixed exchange rate system between the member countries. 
Thus, Section 3.2 evaluates the pros and cons of adopting either of the two extreme exchange 
rate regimes, i.e., either a fixed or a flexible exchange rate system. Section 3.3 reviews the 
theory of the impossible trilogy in international trade, which asserts that the simultaneous 
pursuit of full capital mobility, independence of monetary policy, and a fixed exchange rate 
system is impossible in an environment of free trade.   
 
Section 3.4 discusses the theory of optimum currency areas, which prescribes structural 
conditions that when present in the economies of countries wishing to form a monetary 
union, minimise the costs of giving up the exchange rate as an adjustment tool. Section 3.5 
presents an alternative consideration for the need for monetary integration, which argues that 
small countries whose independent monetary policies have not been effective in determining 
economic performance may be better off surrendering monetary policy to a regional 
authority.  
 
Section 3.6 discusses the need for convergence in macroeconomic stability indicators in 
addition to meeting the preconditions prescribed by the OCA theory. Section 3.7 then reviews 
the theory of economic convergence and the sources of economic growth stipulated by the 
theory. The section also provides an explanation on why it is necessary for integrating 
countries to achieve real economic convergence alongside nominal convergence. Section 3.8 
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presents a discussion on the need for a fiscal policy framework within a monetary union, 
while Section 3.9 highlights the need for financial integration within member states. Lastly, 
Section 3.10 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2  THE CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM 
The arguments for monetary integration are centred on the debate on the desirability of fixed 
versus flexible exchange rates, which ultimately depends on the nation involved and the 
conditions under which it operates. The section begins with a review of the debate over the 
appropriate exchange rate mechanism, which ultimately influence the arguments for 
monetary integration. The arguments for flexible exchange rates are discussed in Section 
3.2.1 below, while Section 3.2.2 considers arguments for fixed exchange rates. Lastly, 
Section 3.2.3 makes a comparison between fixed and flexible exchange rates. 
 
3.2.1 The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates  
The subsections below review the advantages of a freely floating exchange rate system, 
which are mainly associated with greater market efficiency and the availability of more 
effective policy instruments for the achievement of domestic policy objectives. Each 
argument in favour of flexible exchange rates is presented together with a comparison of the 
effects of fixed exchange rates.   
 
3.2.1.1  Market Efficiency 
Domestic adjustment to correct disequilibrium in a nation’s balance of payments (BoP) is 
more efficient under a flexible exchange rate system than a fixed exchange rate system. In 
general, a nation’s prices and wages are relatively rigid downwards and factors are immobile 
among the countries. It is argued that when a country is hit by a negative demand or supply 
shock, the only instrument to avoid higher inflation or unemployment is the change in the 
flexible exchange rate. This is because, under a freely floating exchange rate system, a deficit 
or surplus in a nation’s BoP is corrected automatically by a depreciation or appreciation of 
the nation’s currency, respectively. The economy will revert to both internal and external 
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equilibrium, without any government intervention and loss or accumulation of reserves22 
(Friedman, 1953; Horváth and Komárek, 2002; Salvatore, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, the excess demand for (supply of) foreign exchange that arises from fixing 
the exchange rate results in a deficit (surplus) in a nation’s BoP, which is correctable only 
through a change in economic variables other than the exchange rate. However, the country 
will still experience either inflation or unemployment. This is inefficient, may lead to policy 
mistakes and requires the use of adjustment policies, e.g. monetary policy that would not be 
available to achieve purely domestic objectives (Friedman, 1953; Mundell, 1961; Horváth 
and Komárek, 2002; Salvatore, 2004).  
 
In addition, under a flexible exchange rate system, only the exchange rate needs to change to 
correct disequilibrium in the BoP, while a fixed exchange rate system requires that all 
internal prices be perfectly flexible for BoP equilibrium to be attained. It is argued that it is 
more efficient to rely on changing only one price (i.e., the exchange rate) than changing all 
internal prices to bring about an adjustment in the BoP. Furthermore, in practice, internal 
prices are generally sticky downwards and therefore, highly inflexible (Salvatore, 2004: 705). 
 
The smooth and continuous adjustment in the exchange rate to correct BoP disequilibria 
results in stabilising speculation under a flexible exchange rate system, which in turn 
dampens fluctuations in the exchange rate. On the other hand, the maintenance of a fixed rate 
when it is out of equilibrium under a fixed exchange rate system is likely to result in 
destabilising speculation and may eventually force the nation to make large discrete changes 
in its exchange rate which could be costly. 
 
Furthermore, flexible exchange rates reflect the degree of competitiveness of a nation in 
various commodities when the equilibrium rates are translated into domestic prices. Fixed 
exchange rates, on the other hand, are often not in equilibrium with the rest of the world and 
thus, distort the pattern of international trade and prevent the most efficient allocation of 
resources. For example, an undervalued exchange rate may lead a nation to export more of a 
                                                
22 Where internal prices and wages are not rigid or factors are fully mobile, there is little economic difference 
between these ways and the change in the exchange rate to adjust the economy. However, it is argued that the 
latter provides a less painful means of adjustment (Horváth and Komárek, 2002:8). 
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commodity than would be justified at the equilibrium exchange rate. The commodity may be 
relatively cheaper than competitive foreign commodities at the undervalued exchange rate, 
even though it may be relatively more expensive at the equilibrium exchange rate. This 
results in an inefficient allocation of world resources and reduces the benefits from 
international specialisation in production and trade (Salvatore, 2004: 705). 
 
3.2.1.2  Policy Advantages 
Another argument in favour for a flexible exchange rate system is that monetary policy is not 
constrained by a predetermined level of the exchange rate. Monetary policy sets interest rates 
in order to achieve domestic equilibrium (i.e., price stability), while the nominal exchange 
rate adjusts to balance the external accounts23. When price stability is achieved and is 
expected to be maintained, interest rates are then set by the monetary authorities with the 
objective of smoothing the business cycle (i.e., a counter-cyclical monetary policy can then 
be an option). Thus, the nation does not need to concern itself with the use of domestic policy 
to maintain external balance (Baqueiro et. al, 2003: 221).  
 
On the other hand, monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate system is targeted toward the 
achievement of external balance, leaving only fiscal policy at the disposal of domestic 
authorities to achieve internal balance and other purely domestic objectives such as full 
employment with price stability, economic growth and equitable distribution of income. 
(Salvatore, 2004: 706). 
 
In addition, flexible exchange rates enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy in the 
pursuit of domestic objectives. For example, an anti-inflationary policy that improves the 
trade balance will result in an appreciation of the domestic currency. This in turn encourages 
imports and discourages exports, thus further reducing domestic inflationary pressures. 
 
Different nations have different trade-offs between inflation and unemployment. Flexible 
exchange rates allow each nation to pursue domestic policies aimed at attaining its own 
desired inflation-unemployment trade-off. On the other hand, under fixed exchange rates, 
different inflationary rates in different nations result in differing BoP pressures. The more 
                                                
23 Under such a regime, monetary policy is the nominal anchor of the economy. 
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inflationary nations face BoP deficits, while the less inflationary ones face BoP surpluses. 
The BoP pressures would restrain or prevent each nation from achieving its optimum 
inflation-unemployment trade-off. 
 
Furthermore, flexible exchange rates prevent governments from manipulating the official 
exchange rate in order to benefit a particular sector in the economy at the expense of another 
or to achieve an economic objective that could be attained by less costly means. For example, 
developing countries tend to maintain an over-valued exchange rate in order to encourage 
imports, especially of capital equipment needed for development. This, however, discourages 
exports of agricultural and traditional commodities and results in an excess demand for 
foreign exchange, which in turn prompts government to exercise exchange and trade controls. 
However, controls introduce many distortions and inefficiencies into the economy. Ceteris 
paribus, it is more efficient to allow the exchange rate to determine its equilibrium and 
provide a subsidy to the industrial sector (Salvatore, 2004: 706). 
 
3.2.2 The Case for Fixed Exchange Rates  
The subsections below discuss the advantages of a fixed exchange rate system, which include 
reduced uncertainty in international trade and finance, greater price discipline and stabilising 
speculation. The arguments for fixed exchange rates are presented together with replies from 
advocates for flexible exchange rates, as well as empirical evidence in support of the 
arguments.   
 
3.2.2.1 Reduced Uncertainty 
Fixed exchange rates eliminate fluctuations in the exchange rate, which discourage 
specialisation in production and the flow of international trade and investments. Advocates 
for fixed exchange rates argue that, the excessive fluctuations in the exchange rate associated 
with a flexible system may be costly in terms of higher frictional unemployment if they result 
in frequent attempts at reallocating domestic resources among the various sectors of the 
economy.  
 
Furthermore, the tendency of the exchange rate to overshoot its equilibrium value in the short 
run has in most instances, resulted in continuous fluctuations in the rate. This occurs in 
situations where economies face further disturbances before the exchange rate reaches its 
equilibrium rate. The constant volatility in the exchange rates of most nations is evidence of 
43 
 
overshooting, subsequent correcting, but always fluctuating value of the rate (Salvatore, 
2004: 534). 
 
However, advocates for flexible exchange rates argue that the uncertainty and instability 
surrounding the large discrete changes in par values that periodically become necessary under 
a fixed exchange rate system are more damaging and disruptive to the smooth flow of 
international trade and investments than the uncertainty inherent in flexible exchange rates. In 
addition, the uncertainty associated with flexible exchange rates generally can be hedged 
against, while on the other hand, that associated with fixed rates cannot. However, this does 
not apply to the case of a truly fixed exchange rate, such as the gold standard (Salvatore, 
2004: 707). 
 
3.2.2.2  Stabilising Speculation 
Destabilising speculation occurs when speculators purchase a foreign currency when the 
exchange rate is rising, in the expectation that the rate will rise even more, and sell the 
foreign currency when the exchange rate is falling, in the expectation that the rate will fall 
even more. The process amplifies fluctuations in exchange rates resulting from the business 
cycles, and in turn, the uncertainty and risks involved in international transactions. This 
reduces the international flow of trade and investments. The opposite occurs under stabilising 
speculation.  
 
Advocates for fixed exchange rates argue that speculation is likely to be more destabilising 
under a flexible than a fixed exchange rate system. However, advocates for flexible exchange 
rates argue that the reverse is true, stating that destabilising speculation is less likely to occur 
when exchange rates adjust continuously than when they are prevented from doing so until a 
large discrete adjustment is necessary. Speculators would then sell a currency that they expect 
to be devalued and buy one that they expect to be revalued. Their expectations are usually 
self-fulfilling. However, this process does not occur under a truly fixed exchange rate system 
where exchange rates are always kept fixed and BoP adjustments are achieved by other 
means. In this case, speculation is likely to be stabilising. The same process occurs under 
truly flexible exchange rates (Salvatore, 2004: 707). 
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3.2.2.3  Price Discipline 
The anchor argument for a fixed exchange rate system states that fixed exchange rates instil 
price discipline on a nation at a much faster rate than would occur under a flexible exchange 
rate system. Fixing the exchange rate imposes an automatic mechanism that regulates the 
amount of money and hence, sets interest rates accordingly. This in turn implies the 
abandonment of an independent monetary policy but it also fosters credibility in economic 
policies as the concerned nation would import the monetary policy of the anchor country, 
along with its credibility (Baqueiro et. al, 2003: 221). 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the role of the exchange rate as the nominal anchor of the 
economy is easier for the public to understand than the more abstract concept of a monetary 
policy anchor. Hence, theoretically price stability is achieved faster under this arrangement 
than under a flexible exchange rate system (Baqueiro et. al, 2003: 221). 
 
In addition, a fixed exchange rate arrangement instils price discipline in situations where a 
government is prone to running continuously large and ever growing fiscal deficits. A 
government typically has three possible ways through which it can finance its fiscal deficit: it 
can borrow funds either domestically (i.e. issue bonds to the public) or from abroad (e.g. 
from the international monetary fund), it can deplete its foreign exchange reserves, or it can 
print money (i.e. borrow from the central bank). 
 
A government that has borrowed a lot in the past would have accumulated a heavy debt, and 
will have difficulties borrowing further, either domestically or internationally, because of 
doubts about its capacity to service its debt. Similarly, reserve losses cannot continue 
indefinitely as the government will eventually exhaust its stock of foreign exchange reserves. 
Thus, the government will have only the option of printing money, which is known as 
seigniorage. 
 
The policy of printing money to finance the deficit is pursued by many governments that are 
unable to enact adequate tax programs or administer them effectively to raise the required 
revenue. In addition, taxation, especially in developing countries, is associated with high 
collection costs and distorting effects. As such, governments resort to financing the deficit 
through monetary expansion (Aghveli and Khan, 1977).  
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However, seigniorage has a self-perpetuating effect on inflation. This is because the 
government’s nominal revenues are generally fixed in the short run hence, their real value 
falls in the face of rapid inflation, while its spending commitments are mostly in real terms. 
This implies that nominal expenditure rises concomitantly with price increases. As inflation 
persists, government expenditure rises faster than revenue; forcing the authorities to increase 
their issuance of money even further. In the extreme case, the self-perpetuating process of 
inflation could lead to hyperinflation, which could cause serious economic instability. 
Therefore, even if in the long run government revenues match government expenditures, the 
lag structure in the government's budgetary mechanism creates a deficit in real terms as well 
as in nominal terms in the presence of inflation (Aghveli and Khan, 1977). 
 
Thus, a nation with higher inflation rates than the rest of the world is likely to face persistent 
BoP deficits. Given that deficits cannot continue indefinitely, the nation will therefore, need 
to restrain its excessive rate of inflation. In contrast, a flexible exchange rate system does not 
instil similar price discipline since any BoP imbalances are corrected automatically through 
changes in the exchange rate, making it possible for domestic authorities to over-stimulate the 
economy for political reasons (Salvatore, 2004: 711).  
 
3.2.2.4  Negative Effects of Exchange Rate Depreciation 
Economic literature states that fixed exchange rates are more appropriate for developing 
countries, which face difficulties allowing the nominal exchange rate to adjust freely. It is 
argued that the advantages of flexible exchange rates are not attainable in developing 
countries due to a lack of credibility in their institutions. Thus, these countries ought to adopt 
fixed exchange rates to solve the credibility problem (Guillaume and Stasavage, 1999; 
Baqueiro et. al, 2003). 
  
This particular argument against flexible exchange rates is based on the hypothesis that for 
some countries, nominal exchange rate depreciations have negative effects and as such, these 
countries actively try to minimise exchange rate fluctuations. There are two main reasons for 
depreciation to have negative effects, the “original sin” hypothesis and high exchange rate 
pass-through. 
 
The “original sin” hypothesis, which was first advanced by Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(1999), asserts that depreciations are costly in situations where the domestic currency cannot 
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be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term even domestically. When the government is 
unable to borrow through these afore mentioned means, it will borrow in foreign currency. 
However, the high volatility associated with flexible exchange rates results in international 
investors demanding a risk-premium in lending. Similarly, the currency exposure restricts the 
ability of monetary policy to accommodate a negative terms of trade shock through nominal 
depreciation and hence, drive interest rates up.  
  
The second reason for the negative effects associated with depreciation is exchange rate pass-
through. Depreciation/ devaluation results in an increase in both the domestic-currency price 
of imported final goods as well as imported inputs and hence, putting upward pressure on 
domestic prices. If domestic inflation is largely determined by import prices and the exchange 
rate, i.e., there is a high level of exchange rate pass-through, the increase in prices could 
outweigh the positive effect of an improvement in international competitiveness that arises 
from the depreciation. This may prompt authorities to devalue again. 
 
The greater the depreciation or devaluation, the greater is its inflationary impact on the 
domestic economy and the less effective are changes in the exchange rate as a method of 
correcting for BoP deficits. The authorities may, therefore, be inclined to minimise the effect 
of an adverse shock on the domestic price level by raising interest rates rather than allowing 
the exchange rate to depreciate (Baqueiro et. al, 2003: 223). In addition, depreciation may 
result in an increase in the value of foreign debt to domestic assets24, which in turn may lead 
to an increase in the number of illiquid and bankrupt firms (especially banks) (Plümper and 
Troeger, 2007:6).  
 
Both situations imply that monetary policy would effectively be constrained and that it plays 
an accommodating role to achieve exchange rate stability. The authorities, therefore, seek to 
stabilise their currencies by pegging the exchange rate to a key currency or basket of 
currencies. As a result, the flexible exchange rate becomes a de facto peg or soft peg (Calvo 
and Reinhart, 2002; Baqueiro et. al, 2003; Plümper and Troeger, 2007).  
 
 
                                                
24 especially where global capital markets prefer denominating debt to a key currency. 
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3.2.3 Comparison between Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
This subsection makes a comparison between the adjustments necessary under fixed versus 
flexible exchange rates in the face of shocks. The adjustment processes necessary in each 
scenario are illustrated in the examples presented in the subsections below. Traditionally, it is 
argued that flexible exchange rates provide much more insulation to the domestic economy 
from external shocks (e.g. an exogenous change in the nation’s exports) than do fixed 
exchange rates. This argument particularly applies to an economy in which large components 
of its exports are commodities because it is exposed to terms of trade shocks and would 
therefore benefit by allowing the exchange rate to absorb them.  
 
On the other hand, if the economy experiences minimal exposure to external shocks, then it 
would benefit from the stability offered by adopting a fixed exchange rate system. It is argued 
that the arrangement is more suited for an economy subject to large internal shocks (e.g. an 
autonomous increase in investments) (Baqueiro et. al, 2003; Salvatore, 2004).  
 
3.2.3.1  An Exogenous Change in the Nation’s Exports 
Mundell (1961:658) uses a two-country model with country A and country B, to assess the 
adjustment processes required under both fixed and flexible exchange rate systems in the face 
of a shift in global demand away from goods produced by country B towards those of country 
A. The two countries are initially at full employment and balance of payments equilibrium. 
The model assumes that money wages and prices are rigid downwards in the short run 
without causing unemployment, and that monetary authorities act to prevent inflation. 
 
The decline in the demand for goods produced in country B results in a decline in output 
produced in that country. Assuming that domestic spending in country B does not decline at 
the same rate as the fall in output, then the country would experience a current account deficit 
and possibly a budget deficit too. The current account of a nation comprises exports less 
imports. Hence, if country B’s exports decline while its imports do not change, it will 
experience a deficit in its current account. Similarly, assuming that the amount of taxes 
collected is proportional to the level of output produced; a decrease in output results in a 
proportional decrease in taxes. However, social security payments increase with an increase 
in unemployment (brought about by the fall in domestic production), hence domestic 
spending increases. As such, country B would be faced with a budget deficit as well (Horvath 
and Komarek, 2002:9). 
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Under a fixed exchange rate system, country B cannot devalue its currency in order to gain 
competitiveness in its export market. Hence, the automatic adjustment necessary requires a 
reduction in its real income to bring it back to equilibrium. This is attained through a 
reduction in the domestic money supply that arises when monetary authorities exchange 
domestic money balances for foreign exchange at the central bank in order to meet the excess 
demand for foreign currency in the economy. Under a fractional-reserve banking system, this 
subsequent loss of reserves leads to a reduction in the domestic money supply by a multiple 
of the trade deficit. If the monetary authorities do not sterilise the reduction in the money 
supply, interest rates would rise. 
 
The increase in interest rates in turn would discourage domestic investment and through the 
multiplier process, result in a fall in domestic income. The reduction in income leads to a fall 
in imports, which in turn leads to a reduction in the trade deficit. In addition, the increase in 
domestic interest rates attracts foreign capital inflow, which aids in financing the deficit. 
Furthermore, the reduction in the money supply and income in country B tends to reduce 
domestic prices relative to prices in country A, further improving the trade balance. The 
opposite occurs in country A (Salvatore, 2004: 608). 
 
If however, the two countries were members of an optimum currency area25, then monetary 
adjustments in the BoP will not be possible and hence, the required reduction in real income 
in country B will not be attainable through the terms of trade. Therefore, country B would 
have to reduce its output and employment (Mundell, 1961:658). 
 
If country A chose not to increase its output in response to the increase in demand for its 
goods, then the excess demand that arises will exert inflationary pressure on domestic prices. 
However, if prices in country A rose faster than those in country B, then its economy would 
partially absorb the burden of adjustment for country B. If, on the other hand, country A 
tightened its monetary policy to restrain the inflationary pressures, then all the burden of 
adjustment would fall on country B. Thus, under fixed exchange rates, country B would have 
no choice but to live with the recessionary effects of the shift in demand away from its goods 
(Mundell, 1961:658).  
                                                
25 The theory of optimum currency areas is discussed in Section 3.4. 
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There are alternative mechanisms that could necessitate the required adjustment in the two 
countries. To begin with, adjustment could be achieved through migration of labour and/or 
capital from country B to country A. This would eliminate the excess labour demand in 
country A; wages would remain constant while unemployment and inflation vanish. 
Alternatively, wages need to be flexible in both countries. A fall in real wages in country B 
and a rise in country A would clear labour markets in both countries. Lastly, fiscal transfers 
could be implemented whereby country A increases its taxes (in order to decrease its 
aggregate demand) and transfers the additional revenue to country B. The current account 
deficit in country B would persist but country A would finance it (Mundell, 1961:659)26.  
 
Furthermore, if the countries maintained their national currencies, their central banks could 
set up a mechanism that would ensure that the burden of international adjustment fell on the 
surplus country (country A), which would then inflate until unemployment in country B is 
eliminated. If on the other hand, the countries had a common currency and a single central 
bank, the level of inflation would be determined by the willingness of central authorities to 
allow unemployment in deficit countries (country B). However, the currency area would not 
be able to prevent simultaneously unemployment and inflation (Mundell, 1961:659).  
 
If, on the other hand, the two countries maintain flexible exchange rates, then country B 
could respond to the recession by means of monetary expansion and depreciation of its 
national currency. This would stimulate demand for its goods and return the economy to 
desired levels of employment and output more rapidly than would happen in the case under 
the automatic mechanisms of adjustment on which a fixed rate country must rely. Similarly, a 
contractionary monetary policy and an appreciation of the national currency in country A 
would curb the inflationary pressures and stabilise the economy (Frankel, 1999:12).  
 
Rajan (2004:4) argues that flexible exchange rates are particularly more appropriate for 
developing countries given that their economies are more susceptible to large external 
shocks, such as changes in foreign interest rates, terms of trade and regional spill over effects. 
A greater degree of exchange rate flexibility would thus provide a less costly mechanism by 
which relative prices adjust in response to such shocks. The financial crises experienced in 
                                                
26 These alternative adjustment mechanisms formed the basis of the theory of optimum currency areas. 
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Latin American and East Asian countries in the 1990s are examples of cases where the 
gradual adjustments required under fixed exchange rates prolonged the necessary response to 
external shocks and thus, proved to be costly. 
 
Furthermore, most developing countries have diversified trade structures that are mainly 
dependent on the United States (US), Japan, Europe and intra-Asian trade. Such economies 
are more suited to maintain flexible exchange rates. This proposition is explored further in 
the discussion on the theory of optimum currency areas in Section 3.4. Mundell (1961:659) 
however, argues that if the two countries do not constitute an optimum currency area, then 
adjustment under flexible exchange rates would not simultaneously bring both countries back 
to equilibrium. The countries would be able to curb either inflation in country A or 
unemployment in country B. 
 
3.2.3.2  An Autonomous Increase in Investments 
An autonomous increase in investments will, through the multiplier process lead to an 
increase in national income, which will in turn lead to an increase in imports. Under fixed 
exchange rates, ceteris paribus, the increase in imports will result in a deficit in the BoP. The 
nation will have to live with the deficit, which may be financed through international reserves 
in the short term. However, under flexible exchange rates, the deficit in the BoP will prompt 
a depreciation in the national currency, which in turn will stimulate exports. The increase in 
exports will reinforce the initial increase in income (Salvatore, 2004:712).  
 
In general, a fixed exchange rate system is more suitable for a small open economy that 
trades mostly with one or a few larger economies, and in which disturbances are more of a 
monetary nature. On the other hand, a flexible exchange rate system is more suitable for a 
large, relatively closed economy with diversified trade and a different inflation- 
unemployment trade-off than its main trading partners, and facing primarily disturbances 
originating from the real sector abroad. 
 
Salvatore (2004: 705) notes that the debate over the appropriate exchange rate mechanism 
between trading partners is essentially a debate over what amounts to an optimum currency 
area, i.e. how large an area covered by permanently fixed exchange rates can be before the 
benefits of fixed rates are overcome by their disadvantages.  
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3.3 THE IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY PRINCIPLE 
The theory of the impossible trilogy27 provides additional arguments for the need for 
monetary integration when pursuing regional economic integration. This principle asserts that 
only two of the following three features are mutually compatible: full capital mobility, 
independence of monetary policy, and a fixed exchange rate (Wyplosz, 1997:4). In other 
words, the principle implies that the simultaneous pursuit of financial market integration, 
monetary policy independence and exchange rate stability, amidst trade liberalisation, are 
incompatible. Van der Haegen and Viñals (2003:8) refer to the principle as the “inconsistent 
quartet”, explicitly including free trade as contributing to the inconsistency.  
 
The principle has its origins in the interest parity condition stipulated by the Mundell-
Fleming model of a small open economy, which asserts that under full capital mobility, the 
domestic interest rate is always at par with the world interest rate. Ceteris paribus, any 
difference between the rates will lead to massive capital flows in favour of the nation with the 
higher interest rates. This will continue until the rates equalise (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1994: 
168).  
 
The interest parity condition implies that any differences between the domestic and world 
interest rates are equal to the expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate. 
Algebraically, the condition is expressed as: 
it –it* = Et (et+1) – et          (3.1) 
Where: i is the domestic interest rate, i* is the world interest rate, e is the expected rate of 
depreciation of the exchange rate (in logs), and t is an index of time.  
 
If for instance, interest rates are 5% in the domestic market and 3% in global markets, and 
given that complete capital mobility implies that expected asset returns in the domestic and 
global market remain at par, the implication therefore, is that global currency markets expect 
the domestic currency to depreciate by 2% during that period. Thus, the interest parity 
condition implies that assets denominated in a currency expected to depreciate must offer an 
exactly compensating higher yield (Wyplosz, 1997:4). 
 
                                                
27 Also known as the inconsistent trinity. 
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The above condition implies that a small open country, with full capital mobility, that decides 
to peg its exchange rate, i.e. 
Et (et+1) = et = e0         (3.2)  
Where: e0 is the peg, must set its domestic interest rate to be exactly equal to the rate in the 
country to which it pegs its currency.  
 
If for instance, the country were to conduct an independent contractionary monetary policy, 
the rise in interest rates would attract huge capital inflows that would result in a BoP surplus. 
To prevent the exchange rate from appreciating, the central bank would have to buy the 
excess foreign currency in the market. This would in turn, increase the money supply in 
circulation28 and negate the initial monetary contraction. This would continue until the 
domestic interest rates revert to equilibrium with the world market rates. Thus, independent 
monetary policy is ineffective under fixed exchange rates and perfect capital mobility 
(Dornbusch and Fischer, 1994: 168).  
 
This therefore, implies that monetary policy in the small open country will effectively be 
determined by the anchor country. Conversely, a country that wishes to conduct an 
independent monetary policy, that is, raising or lowering interest rates for domestic 
stabilisation purposes, must allow its exchange rate to fluctuate in the market. Then, et in the 
interest parity equation becomes endogenous29 (Wyplosz, 1997:4).  
 
However, increased globalisation implies that financial markets are steadily becoming more 
and more integrated internationally. The move towards full financial integration therefore, 
forces the choice down to giving up either on exchange rate stability or on monetary 
independence. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the inconsistency.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
28 This however could be inflationary. 
29 This reasoning ignores risk aversion, which gives rise to a risk premium term.  
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Figure 3.1: The Impossible Trinity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Frankel (1999:8) 
 
Each of the sides of the triangle depicts an attraction for a small open country: monetary 
independence, exchange rate stability, and full financial integration. As explained above, only 
two of the three goals are mutually compatible with free trade. The move towards full 
financial integration tends to push countries towards the lower part of the triangle (Frankel, 
1999:8). In order to achieve domestic price stability, priority would need to be given to either 
a nominal domestic anchor, e.g. an inflation target (which requires monetary independence), 
or an external anchor, e.g. an exchange rate target (which requires exchange rate stability) 
(van der Haegen and Viñals, 2003:8).  
 
Thus, the decision to adopt a common currency is the outcome of constrained optimisation, 
the constraint being the impossible trilogy: given free capital mobility, the choice is between 
freely floating exchange rates and monetary unification. However, wide, long-lasting 
fluctuations in the exchange rate are incompatible with fully open markets and the complete 
removal of border posts. Thus, monetary union tends to dominate a free float (Wyplosz, 
1997:7).  
 
The EU countries encountered the impossible trinity during the process of economic 
integration. The countries attempted to stabilise their intra-regional exchange rates by 
adopting a fixed exchange rate mechanism under the European Monetary System (EMS), 
where they fixed their currencies to the Deutsche Mark because German was larger in relative 
economic size, and had a strong reputation for fighting inflation and keeping its currency 
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strong. The smaller countries thus, were able to import monetary credibility and stability 
from German (Arroyo, 2003:74).  
 
However, the subsequent freeing of capital flows between the member countries resulted in 
the loss of monetary independence in each of them, except Germany whose central bank, the 
Bundesbank, was effectively setting monetary policy for the region. To overcome the 
inconsistency and hence, regain some influence over their monetary policies, the EU 
countries opted for monetary integration (Wyplosz, 1997:6). The move towards monetary 
integration subsequently resulted in the adoption of the euro. Figure 3.2 below illustrates how 
the EU countries solved the impossible trinity. 
 
Figure 3.2: The European Solution to the Impossible Trinity 
European Union/ Euro Area 
 
         
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mongelli (2008:11) 
 
Figure 3.2 shows that the EU member states maintain irrevocably fixed exchange rates within 
the union (in the form of using a common currency, the Euro). In addition, there is free 
capital mobility within the common market as well as monetary policy independence vis-a-
vis the rest of the world (even though there is no policy autonomy at country level within the 
union). Thus, the Eurozone was able to achieve simultaneously exchange rate stability (by 
using a common currency), full financial integration and monetary policy independence, and 
hence, overcome the impossible trinity. 
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The implications of the principle of the impossible trinity for the SADC countries are, 
therefore, that: as the countries deepen regional economic integration, with the complete 
removal of borders and freeing of capital flows, they would be required to make a decision on 
the degree of exchange rate flexibility. As explained above, flexible exchange rates are 
incompatible with fully open markets; hence, the countries would need to adopt a fixed 
exchange rate system.  
 
South Africa is the dominant country in the SADC region, with a strong currency and a 
reputation for fighting inflation. The non-Common Monetary Area (CMA) SADC countries 
could benefit from fixing their national currencies to the South African Rand (ZAR). 
Presently, only the CMA countries import monetary credibility and stability from South 
Africa. However, free capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate mechanism within the 
SADC region implies that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) would effectively 
determine monetary policy for the region. This however, may not be acceptable to the non-
CMA countries.  
 
3.4 THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS 
According to Salvatore (2004: 712), an optimum currency area (OCA) or bloc refers to a 
group of nations whose national currencies are linked through permanently fixed exchange 
rates and the conditions that would make such an area optimum. In turn, the currencies of 
member nations float jointly with respect to currencies of non-member nations. Regions of 
the same nation constitute an optimum currency area, as they share the same currency. 
 
The OCA theory, developed by Mundell and McKinnon in the 1960s30, has evolved over the 
years. There are four major streams of literature on the OCA theory. The first stream of 
literature was developed during the 1960s-1970s period, also known as the “pioneering 
phase”. This particular stream of literature tried to find the crucial economic characteristics 
that determine where the (illusionary) borders for a currency area ought to be drawn, and to 
initiate the analysis on the resulting benefits and costs. The literature came up with the so-
called traditional OCA criteria, which define what constitutes an OCA (Horvath and 
                                                
30 This was a period characterised inter alia by the Bretton Woods fixed (but adjustable) exchange rate regime, 
capital controls in many countries and the incipient process of European integration. 
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Komarek, 2002:7). These criteria and the criticisms often raised will be discussed in Section 
3.4.2.  
 
The second stream of literature was developed during the 1970s, also known as the 
“reconciliation phase”. This particular phase saw the OCA properties being analysed and 
weighed against one another to gauge their relative importance. Of particular significance, 
this phase brought a new “meta-property”, the similarity of shocks, and gave more structure 
to the analysis of the costs and benefits of a currency area (Mongelli, 2002:7). Section 3.4.3 
will adequately review this phase of OCA theory.  
 
The third phase, known as the “reassessment phase of OCA literature” occurred during the 
1980s-early 1990s period. This literature is in favour of currency unions and argues that there 
are greater benefits of currency areas and less costs associated with the loss of domestic 
monetary policy autonomy (Mongelli, 2002:7). Section 3.4.4 will review this phase and bring 
out its contributions to the OCA theory.  
 
Lastly, the fourth phase, also known as the “empirical phase” of OCA literature, spans from 
the late 1990s to the present. The empirical phase of the OCA literature grew along with the 
developments in econometric techniques. The literature under this phase investigates the 
degree to which countries meet the OCA criteria. Furthermore, it assumes that any single 
country fulfils completely the requirements to make it an optimal member of a monetary 
union. As such, it does not search for characteristics identified as important for choosing the 
participants in a currency union. Rather, it focuses mainly on assessing the costs and the 
benefits of monetary integration (Horvath and Komarek, 2002:7).  
 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997:762) stipulate that, although the OCA theory covers only a 
subset of characteristics worth considering when evaluating the desirability of a currency 
union against a fixed exchange rate system, it is the workhorse of analyses related to 
monetary integration. This section begins with a review of the benefits and costs associated 
with an optimum currency area in Section 3.4.1. This is followed by a discussion on the OCA 
theory in Section 3.4.2. 
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3.4.1 Benefits and Costs of an Optimum Currency Area 
A monetary union maintains permanently fixed exchange rates among members, although 
they may vary jointly with respect to other currencies. Hence, a monetary union constitutes 
an OCA. Thus, the following discussion in essence, outlines the costs and benefits associated 
with monetary integration. 
 
3.4.1.1  Benefits of an Optimum Currency Area 
The case for the formation of an OCA is to some extent, the case for fixed as opposed to 
flexible exchange rates. This is because some of the benefits from forming an OCA are 
obtainable from the looser form of economic relationship provided by a fixed exchange rate 
system. The subsections below review the benefits associated with the formation of an OCA. 
 
3.4.1.1.1 Eliminates Uncertainty 
The formation of an OCA eliminates the uncertainty that arises when exchange rates are not 
permanently fixed, thus stimulating specialisation in production as well as the flow of trade 
and investments among member regions/ nations. Furthermore, an OCA encourages 
producers to view the entire area as a single market and to benefit from greater economies of 
scale in production (Salvatore, 2004: 713). 
 
An OCA also assures trade partners that free markets would continue to exist within the 
region and that intra-union economic relations would not be jeopardised by exchange controls 
or exchange rate adjustments (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991). This is preferred to a flexible 
exchange rate system, which has traditionally been associated with volatility and 
overshooting of the exchange rate. The latter creates a lot of uncertainty and discourages 
trade and investment (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991; Salvatore, 2004: 713).  
 
3.4.1.1.2 Fosters Price Stability 
According to Salvatore (2004: 713), with permanently fixed exchange rates, an OCA is likely 
to experience greater price stability than if exchange rates fluctuate between the member 
countries. This is because random shocks in different regions/ nations within the area tend to 
cancel each other out. Any residual disturbance would be relatively smaller when the area is 
increased. Furthermore, the greater price stability encourages the use of money as a store of 
value as well as to effect economic transactions and in the process, discouraging inefficient 
barter deals that arise under more inflationary circumstances.  
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3.4.1.1.3 Reduces Risks and Transactions Costs 
Permanently fixed exchange rates within an OCA reduce the different types of risks that 
traders are exposed to, such as credit, payment and exchange rate risks (Lundahl and 
Peterson, 1991; Bayoumi and Ostry, 1995; Ogunkola, 2005). Frankel (1999:10) however, 
argues that nowadays, forward exchange markets and/or other credit instruments are used to 
hedge against credit and payment risks, hence the argument does not hold much weight. 
Salvatore (2004: 713) however, points out that an OCA still saves on the cost of official 
interventions in foreign exchange markets involving the currencies of member nations and 
the cost of hedging.                      
 
An OCA offers further reductions in transactions costs associated with exchanging one 
currency for another to pay for imports of goods and services and when citizens travel 
between member nations (where a common currency is adopted). Furthermore, Ogunkola 
(2005) points out that most developing countries are characterised by exchange rate policies 
that are generally unstable and unpredictable, having the potential of destabilising RIAs. 
Hence, the use of a common currency is the most appropriate tool for addressing problems 
associated with currency convertibility and exchange rate risk in these countries. 
 
The elimination of currency risk reduces country risk premia, which in turn leads to a 
reduction in the cost of issuing debt. The interest rates in developing countries are embedded 
with premia that cater for exchange rate, devaluation, currency and in some countries, 
sovereign or default risks. An OCA reduces and in some cases, eliminates some types of risk.  
 
Sovereign risk reflects the possibility of a developing country’s default on its foreign debt, 
either by government on official debt or domestic residents on their individual obligations. 
There are several ways through which sovereign risk may be reduced; through the 
elimination of devaluation risk, which in turn eliminates the risk of currency mismatch in 
assets (which are usually denominated in domestic currency) and liabilities (which are 
usually denominated in foreign currency), and thus leads to a reduction in default risk. 
Similarly, the elimination of the use of capital controls to defend the value of the domestic 
currency (which may force domestic borrowers to default on their foreign debts) leads to a 
reduction in default risk (Chang, 2000b:8). 
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Exchange rate stability that arises from membership in an OCA increases investor 
confidence, which in turn secures more stable capital inflows. Furthermore, exchange rate 
stability results in reduced costs of borrowing, which combined with more stable capital 
inflows, would result in lower fiscal costs of servicing the public debt and, in a higher level 
of investment and economic growth (Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Araujo and Leon, 2003). 
 
An OCA may eliminate exchange rate, currency and devaluation risks but the sovereign/ 
default risk may persist. Eliminating devaluations prevents the central bank from acting as 
lender of last resort to domestic banks. This implies that if domestic banks have foreign 
debts, there is a possibility of bank runs and therefore, sovereign risk would increase (Chang, 
2000b:8). Similarly, the elimination of devaluations implies that the domestic economy 
cannot benefit from the expansionary economic effects of devaluation, which could possibly 
improve fiscal revenue and thus, reduce default risk. Despite these possibilities, interest rates 
would still decline in response to the elimination of the other risks (Berg and Borensztein, 
2000:13).  
 
However, the reduction in the cost of issuing debt creates the incentive to run larger fiscal 
deficits. Thus, member nations need to put in place mechanisms to constrain national fiscal 
policy to counter such risks. These can be in the form of fiscal policy rules, which are 
specifiable in terms of upper ceilings on the level of deficit and debt of each country. The 
union could then have monetary penalties for non-complying countries31 (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2004; Drábek, 2005). 
 
3.4.1.1.4 Provides a Credible Nominal Anchor for Monetary Policy 
A central bank that wants to fight inflation can gain credibility for its monetary policy by 
fixing its exchange rate to a more stable  or “hard” currency that exhibits strong monetary 
discipline, or even giving up its currency altogether (i.e., dollarisation). The commitment 
prevents the central bank from undertaking an expansionary monetary policy without 
jeopardising the viability of the exchange rate peg. In turn, when economic agents perceive 
future levels of inflation to be low, they will set their wages and prices accordingly, thus 
                                                
31 The need for a fiscal policy framework within a monetary union is elaborated on in Section 3.8. 
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ensuring that the country is able to attain a lower level of inflation for any given level of 
output (Frankel, 1999:11). 
 
Monetary integration may also facilitate long periods of financial and exchange rate stability 
where national currencies are pegged to a stable currency. This was observed in the case of 
the peg between the Communauté Financière d’afrique (CFA) and French francs, where the 
exchange rate between the two currencies was fixed for more than forty-five years (Chang, 
2000a:14). 
 
However, pegging the exchange rate between regional currencies and currencies outside the 
region may be problematic; competitiveness of the member states may deteriorate if regional 
costs of production rise relative to costs in the anchor country. Similarly, competitiveness 
may deteriorate vis-à-vis third countries if the anchor currency appreciates against the 
regional currencies. For example, a series of real appreciations in the French franc resulted in 
a severe slowdown in growth and large current account deficits in the CFA zone, prompting a 
massive devaluation in their currency in 1994 (Chang, 2000a:14).  
 
3.4.1.2  Costs of an Optimum Currency Area 
The disadvantages to an individual nation of joining an OCA include loss of autonomy over 
its monetary and exchange rate policies, loss of seignorage revenue as well as the lender of 
last resort option. All these policies are crucial for stabilisation purposes to a nation facing 
particular economic problems that do not affect the rest of the member nations. 
 
3.4.1.2.1  Loss of Monetary Policy Independence 
The greatest disadvantage of an OCA is that each individual member nation cannot use 
independent stabilisation and growth policies in the pursuit of national macroeconomic goals 
such as maintaining full employment, accelerating economic growth, counteracting 
fluctuations in business activity or keeping price levels more stable than they are abroad. 
 
For example, a member of an OCA undergoing a recession may require expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies to stimulate its economy and reduce an excessive unemployment rate, 
while members that are more prosperous might require contractionary policies to curb 
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inflationary pressures32. The greater flow (arbitrage) of capital and labour from regions/ 
nations of excess supply (where returns and earnings tend to be low) to regions/nations of 
excess demand (where returns and earnings are higher) minimises the costs of the recession. 
It does not however eliminate interregional/ international differences within the OCA 
(Salvatore, 2004: 714).  
 
In the extreme case, a depressed nation may be better off seceding from the OCA in order to 
address their special problems. However, this may not be feasible for a depressed region 
within the national framework. Rather, the central government provides aid, such as 
investment incentives, to depressed regions (Salvatore, 2004: 714).  
 
3.4.1.2.2  Loss of Exchange Rate Policy Independence 
An OCA maintains permanently fixed exchange rates or in the extreme case, a common 
currency between its member countries. As such, member countries cannot manipulate the 
exchange rate when experiencing domestic balance of payments problems. This implies that 
differences in member countries’ current account balances could persist and possibly result in 
problems of internal balance33. However, the overall balance of payments for the region can 
be maintained through the automatic adjustment of the external exchange rates (Lundahl and 
Peterson, 1991:300). 
  
Similarly, members of an OCA forgo the possibility of using intra-group nominal exchange 
rate changes to exploit exchange rate illusion and, hence, to increase intra-group real 
exchange rate changes and the level of employment34. Furthermore, the countries forgo the 
possibility of reconciling real exchange rate changes that occur, even in the absence of 
nominal exchange rate changes, with the maintenance of domestic price level stability in each 
member country. This is the only reason why monetarists may not always prefer currency 
unions to a system of flexible exchange rates (Vaubel, 1978:320).  
 
                                                
32 See the example given in Section 3.2.3.2 on the adjustment processes necessary in the face of internal shocks. 
33See the example given in Section 3.2.3.1 on the adjustment processes necessary in the face of external shocks. 
34 This cost was derived using the Keynesian framework, which assumes that there is a long run exchange rate 
and money illusion, and hence a trade-off between inflation and unemployment as argued by the Phillips Curve 
model. 
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Monetarists believe that no genuinely economic cost is involved in forgoing those nominal 
exchange rate changes, which are due to differences in national propensities to inflate. To 
them, the problem is purely political and due to ‘Phillips Curve Illusion’ on the part of 
governments. They argue that a trade-off exists only between unemployment and inflation; 
thus, harmonisation of inflation rates for monetary integration poses only a problem of 
transition (Vaubel, 1978:320). 
 
3.4.1.2.3  Loss of Seignorage Revenue 
Another cost to individual member nations of an OCA is the loss of seignorage revenue. A 
country with fiscal problems cannot print new currency to finance its deficit without 
jeopardising the peg or, where there is a common currency, the value of the currency 
(Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1994; Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Mundell, 2000; Masson and 
Pattilo, 2003).  
 
3.4.1.2.4  Eliminates Lender of Last Resort Option 
An independent central bank, acting as a lender of last resort, has the autonomy to print 
domestic currency in order to funnel liquidity assistance on short notice to banks and other 
financial institutions in trouble. This prevents bank runs when there is a loss of confidence in 
the financial system. Such an institution is crucial in a system of banks with fractional 
reserves in order to reassure bank depositors and short-term creditors that their claims on the 
banks would be honoured if they attempt to liquidate them (Chang, 2000b:5). However, such 
an act conflicts with a commitment to fix the exchange rate and encourages speculators to 
attack the peg (Chang and Velasco, 2000). 
 
This line of argument does not however apply to the OCA as a whole given that the exchange 
rates are fixed or rather disappear within the area, whereas the exchange rate between the 
common currency and currencies of countries outside the region need not be fixed. Thus, if 
the common currency is not bound to keep a fixed parity against international vehicle 
currencies such as the US dollar or the euro, then the regional central bank can stand ready to 
assist financial institutions experiencing a crisis without worrying about the exchange rate 
implications of liquidity assistance. This stance could also deter speculative attacks on the 
exchange rate (Chang, 2000a:19). 
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To summarise, an OCA should aim at maximising the benefits from permanently fixed 
exchange rates and minimising the costs. Nations, therefore, form a currency area in 
expectation that current and future benefits exceed costs. However, it is extremely difficult to 
measure the net benefits accruing to each member nation (Mongelli, 2008:7).  
 
In general, an OCA is likely to be more beneficial under the following conditions: (1) greater 
mobility of resources among the member nations, (2) greater structural similarities, and (3) 
the more willing nations are to coordinate their fiscal, monetary and other policies (Salvatore, 
2004: 714). These conditions make up the OCA criteria, which when present, make joining 
an OCA more advantageous to member nations than maintaining national currencies.  
 
3.4.2 The Traditional OCA Theory 
There has been minimal advancement in the OCA theory since the seminal works of Mundell 
(1961), Mckinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) that introduced the traditional OCA criteria. 
Despite being advanced over 50 years ago, the OCA theory attracted much attention only in 
recent years due to the impetus provided by the debate over European monetary unification. 
The traditional OCA theory generally asserts that the stronger the linkages between member 
nations of an OCA, the greater the potential gains to be realised (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997:762).  
 
Furthermore, the literature stipulates that the presence of the OCA criteria make the 
adjustment of the exchange rates between the national currencies unnecessary as an 
absorption mechanism when member nations are exposed to shocks. This would therefore, 
minimise the costs of joining an OCA (Araujo and Leon, 2003:149). The subsections below 
review the early OCA criteria and the criticisms raised on them. 
 
3.4.2.1  A High Degree of Factor Mobility 
A foundation of the OCA literature was already present in Friedman (1953) who makes an 
argument for the need for flexibility in nominal prices and wages between and within 
countries, which reduces the need for nominal exchange rate adjustments. Friedman (1953) 
points out that in such an environment, the transition towards adjustment following a shock is 
less likely to be associated with sustained unemployment in one country and/or inflation in 
another. However, nominal wages and prices are normally rigid downwards and thus, are not 
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a reliable adjustment mechanism. As such, adjustment may require flexibility in the exchange 
rate. 
 
However, an OCA maintains permanently fixed exchange rates between member nations. 
Mundell (1961:661) therefore, suggests that the costs of an OCA are minimised when factors 
of production (especially labour) can move freely within the area. The argument is that if 
productivity or other shocks affect one nation/ region, resulting in a decline in its output and 
real wages, factors of production may migrate to places of excess demand within the currency 
area. The movement of factors of production avoids the need to adopt distinct monetary 
policies by individual countries when shocks affect member countries differently.  
 
However, Horvath and Komarek (2002:11) note that labour may not be as flexible in practice 
as is predicted by Mundell (1961). Economic agents face strong information barriers such as 
the duration of a crisis; as such, they will not be quick to relocate to places of high demand in 
response to an economic shock. In addition, there are high costs associated with migration. 
Thus, there may not be sufficient labour migration to bring the countries back to equilibrium. 
Chipeta and Mkandawire (1994:15) further note that factors such as formal immigration 
restrictions, social services and pensions that are not available to migrants, and language and 
cultural differences hinder the mobility of labour, especially in developing countries.  
 
The costs of giving up the exchange rate as a policy instrument are reduced further when 
there is free mobility of capital within the region. For example, if there is a temporary shift in 
demand from one union member to another, a high degree of capital mobility facilitates the 
financing of the transitory current account deficit in the former nation. The deficit nation can 
either borrow from the surplus nation or de-cumulate net foreign assets that can be reverted 
when the effects of the shock are over. This process acts as a partial substitute for an 
exchange rate adjustment (Mundell, 1961; Arroyo, 2003; Mongelli, 2008). 
 
In addition, free capital mobility ensures that the slightest difference in interest rates induces 
equilibrating capital movements across partner countries thus, easing the financing of 
external imbalances and fostering an efficient allocation of resources (Mongelli, 2008:6). 
Furthermore, free capital mobility ensures that in the short-run, banks in the negatively 
affected nation can sustain the purchasing power of their customers with loans obtained 
through short-term borrowing via inter-branch and inter-bank transfers, or from the integrated 
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capital market. Similarly, firms in the deficit nation that are divisions of firms located in the 
surplus nation can borrow from their parent companies. The two processes enable the ease of 
inter-regional payments adjustment (Arroyo, 2003: 86). 
 
However, Mongelli (2008:6) notes that capital mobility should not be a substitute for a 
permanent adjustment when necessary because it only serves to facilitate the adjustment 
process in the short term. The temporary capital flows may induce a postponement of real 
adjustment and render it more difficult at a later stage, or even result in a destabilisation of 
capital movements. 
 
3.4.2.2  A High Degree of Trade Openness 
The weight of tradable goods in the cost of living is high in open economies hence; the 
exchange rate has a significant impact on the cost of living. Any changes in the exchange rate 
are transmitted more rapidly to the price of tradables and hence, the domestic cost of living. 
As such, consumers tend to be very aware of changes in the exchange rate and therefore, 
there is little money and/or exchange rate illusion by wage earners. As a result, nominal 
wages and prices tend to react quickly to a devaluation of the currency, making it less 
effective (McKinnon, 1963; Arroyo, 2003). 
 
Thus, the advantages of fixed exchange rates increase with economic openness, while those 
of flexible rates decline (Frankel and Rose, 1996:14). McKinnon (1963:7) therefore, notes 
that a high degree of trade openness prior to forming an OCA increases the benefits and 
reduces the costs of doing away with the exchange rate as an adjustment tool.  
 
3.4.2.3  A High Degree of Product Diversification 
Kenen (1969) notes that nations ought to have highly diversified economies prior to forming 
an OCA; product diversification ensures that an economy has a degree of insulation against a 
variety of shocks. If a nation that produces a variety of goods were hit by a shock, the 
subsequent changes in the prices of the goods would also vary differently. Hence, if the shock 
is specific to a good or industry, there is a possibility that the economy as a whole will not be 
as adversely affected as that particular good or industry (Araujo and Leon, 2003:150).  
 
Similarly, if trade between members of an OCA is highly diversified, the law of large 
numbers implies that the probability and the size of changes in each country’s terms of trade 
66 
 
is reduced when hit by an economic shock (Vaubel, 1978; Bayoumi and Ostry, 1995). 
Analogously, if two nations have different but specialised productive sectors, the effect of 
economic shocks on each of these economies tends to be more asymmetrical (Araujo and 
Leon, 2003:150). Thus, ceteris paribus, more diversified economies are likely to face less 
frequent terms of trade shifts and therefore, have less need for frequent changes in the 
exchange rate for macroeconomic adjustment (Kenen, 1969; Vaubel, 1978; Chipeta and 
Mkandawire, 1994; Bayoumi and Ostry, 1995; Araujo and Leon, 2003).  
 
3.4.2.4  Trade Interdependence 
The traditional OCA criteria were extended over time to include the trade interdependence 
criterion, which requires that nations wishing to form an OCA trade highly with one another. 
A high degree of trade interdependence in a group of countries increases the incentives for 
them to stabilise their exchange rates including, by using a common currency. 
  
If an area trades extensively with an external partner (or other countries using its currency), 
its combined share of trade with the external partner and intra-area trade may be high enough 
to justify the adoption of the partner’s currency even though intra-regional trade might be too 
low for the region to adopt a common currency. However, this is only feasible if the trading 
partner issues a strong and stable currency (Arroyo, 2003:109). 
 
3.4.2.5  Weaknesses in the Early OCA Theory 
A major weakness in the traditional OCA theory is that the boundaries of states rarely 
coincide exactly with optimum currency areas. Similarly, changes in boundaries that cause 
changes in currency domains rarely reflect shifts in optimum currency areas (Goodhart, 
1995:452).  
 
Another drawback of this string of literature is that the OCA properties were difficult to 
reconcile due to the lack of a unifying framework and the unclear empirical content of most 
properties (Tavlas, 1994; Mongelli, 2002). This limitation is referred to as the “problem of 
inconclusiveness” of the traditional OCA criteria. An evaluation of an OCA based on 
selected criteria may give different recommendations as to where borders can be drawn for a 
currency area. For example, a country might be quite open in terms of reciprocal trade with a 
group of partner countries. This may suggest that a fixed exchange rate regime, or even a 
currency union, would be preferable for that country and its main trading partners. However, 
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the same country might display a low mobility of factors of production vis-à-vis these trading 
partners, suggesting instead that a flexible exchange rate arrangement might be desirable. 
 
The traditional OCA theory is also criticised for the “problem of inconsistency” in the criteria 
for determining an OCA. For example, the openness criterion and the diversification in 
production criterion exhibit an inconsistency when considered together. The openness 
criterion recommends a fixed exchange rate system or monetary integration between small 
open economies and their main trading partners. However, based on the diversification in 
production criterion, the same small economies are more likely to be less differentiated in 
production than larger ones. Hence, a flexible exchange rate system would be more 
appropriate between them (Tavlas, 1994). 
 
3.4.3 The Reconciliation Phase 
This phase of the development of the OCA theory moved away from the analysis of the OCA 
criterion, which may be inconclusive, to the analysis of the costs and benefits of monetary 
integration. Authors such as Corden (1972), Ishiyama (1975), and Tower and Willet (1976) 
analysed the costs and benefits of an OCA. 
 
Ishyama (1975) notes that OCAs cannot be defined based on a single property and thus, each 
country needs to weigh the pros and cons of being a member of an OCA from the point of 
view of its own self-interest and welfare. Differences in wage increases and inflation rates due 
to different social preferences and conflicting national demand management policies may be 
more important than several other OCA properties, such as differences in exposure to micro-
shocks (most of which are temporary). 
 
Furthermore, the loss of autonomy over monetary and exchange rate policy in an OCA 
implies forsaking national expenditure switching policies (that is, changes in the exchange 
rate in the form of a devaluation or a revaluation)35. To the extent that nominal prices and 
wages are rigid downwards, the loss of exchange rate policy therefore, implies a cost to a 
nation.  
 
                                                
35 For example, a devaluation switches expenditures from foreign to domestic commodities and can be used to 
correct a deficit in the nation’s BoP (Salvatore, 2004: 626). 
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A nation that experiences an adverse demand shock to its exports will need to rely on 
expenditure absorption policies (such as fiscal tightening or expansion) to restore 
equilibrium. The nation would also need to rely on changes in the real exchange rate, which 
are brought about by flexibility in nominal prices and wages in the presence of some shocks 
and imbalances. Flexibility in nominal prices and wages in turn reduces the amount of 
absorption policy required. Therefore, there is a trade-off between real exchange rate 
flexibility (which is market based and operates rapidly) and the amount of expenditure 
absorption policy (which is less rapid) (Corden, 1972; Mongelli, 2002). 
 
Weaknesses in the early OCA theory led to the revaluation of the properties and the 
introduction of a “meta-property”, the requirement of a similarity in shocks and business 
cycles. This property is also referred to as the “catch all” OCA property because it captures 
the interaction between several OCA properties (Mongelli, 2002:9) and is presented below.  
 
3.4.3.1  Similarity of Shocks and Business Cycles 
The “catch all” OCA property states that countries exposed to similar shocks or possessing 
mechanisms for the absorption of asymmetric shocks may find it optimal to form an OCA. To 
elaborate, if the incidence of supply and demand shocks and the speed with which individual 
economies adjust (taking into consideration the policy responses) are similar across partner 
countries, then the need for monetary policy autonomy is reduced and the cost of losing direct 
control over the nominal exchange rate is reduced. In other words, countries whose output 
and prices vary together are likely to experience the least costs of losing autonomy over their 
exchange rates (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994; Trautwein, 2004; Bayoumi and Ostry, 
1995; Mongelli, 2008).  
 
In reconciling the traditional OCA properties, the “meta-property” states that shocks to the 
economies of member nations are likely to be symmetric and business cycles synchronous 
when trade between them is intensive and largely intra-industrial. In such circumstances, the 
benefits of an OCA are likely to outweigh the costs and individual countries can afford not to 
use the exchange rate as a shock absorber. If, on the other hand, trade is intensive but largely 
inter-industrial, the costs of monetary integration are likely to outweigh the benefits, unless 
wage and price flexibility, factor mobility, fiscal transfers and/or other alternative adjustment 
mechanisms are strong enough to replace exchange rate variability as shock absorbers 
(Trautwein, 2004:3). 
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3.4.4 The Reassessment Phase 
This phase in the development of the OCA theory witnessed the crumbling of the analytical 
framework behind the theory. Literature that emerged during this period determined that 
there is no ready-to-use theory for assessing the costs and benefits of economic and monetary 
union. Several economists disputed the perceived greatest cost associated with monetary 
integration, viz, the loss of monetary policy independence. Some economists argued that, to 
the extent that monetary policy is not implemented properly as a stabilisation tool, the loss of 
monetary policy independence was not a substantial cost36. 
 
Other economists argue that even countries facing similar shocks may require different policy 
responses due to differences in their initial economic positions, degree of price and wage 
flexibility, tax structures, trade responsiveness and preferences. Similarly, individual nations 
may have different preferences for inflation and may be worse off by forming an OCA 
(Mongelli, 2002:15). 
 
Furthermore, some economists argue that countries do not necessarily need to have similar 
inflation rates before forming an OCA. A country that is prone to high inflation and breaking 
low inflation promises can immediately gain a low-inflation credibility by joining a monetary 
union with a country with a strong reputation for fighting inflation, which would effectively 
set monetary policy for the union. Therefore, there are fewer costs (in terms of loss of 
monetary policy independence) and more benefits (in terms of credibility gains) of monetary 
integration for a high-inflation country37 (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989; Goodhart, 1989; 
Rogoff, 1996).  
 
Lastly, others argue that differences in labour market institutions could lead to divergent 
developments in wages and prices, even in the presence of similar shocks. The degree of 
centralisation of wage bargaining determines the extent to which supply shocks affect 
economic activity. The more centralised wage bargaining is, the more internalised will be the 
inflationary effects of wage increases and hence, changes in real wages will be contained and 
                                                
36 See for example Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Guillaume and Stasavage (1999), Calvo and Reinhart, 
(2002), Masson and Patillo (2004), Balogun (2007), and Corsetti (2008).  
37 The condition requiring a similarity in inflation in member countries would thus, be met ex post. 
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the negative supply shocks will have a shorter duration. Therefore, negative supply shocks 
will be less disruptive to economic activity (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; De Grauwe, 2000). 
 
3.4.5 Specialisation versus Endogeneity Of OCA Criteria  
According to Frankel (1999), countries sharing a high level of either reciprocal trade (i.e., 
high degree of openness) or income correlation38, but preferably both properties, will find it 
beneficial to have a common currency. Figure 3.3 below illustrates the trade off between 
these two properties, using a downward sloping OCA line.  
 
Figure 3.3: Two Key OCA Properties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Frankel (1999) 
 
The graph shows the combination of openness and correlation of incomes beyond which the 
advantages from a common currency would dominate for a group of partner countries. Below 
the OCA line, the advantages from monetary independence dominate.  
 
There is a consensus in literature that reciprocal trade and income correlations increase 
among members of an OCA in response to a reduction in transportation costs and volatility in 
the exchange rate. However, there is disagreement concerning the extent to which these 
properties change. There are two opposite paradigms, with two different implications; the 
                                                
38 This criterion captures diverse other properties over time. 
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Endogeneity of OCA Hypothesis, which states that there is a positive link between income 
correlation and trade integration, and the Krugman Specialisation Hypothesis, which 
postulates that trade integration results in specialisation in production, which in turn leads to 
less diversified economies. These hypotheses are discussed below. 
 
3.4.5.1  Endogeneity of OCA Hypothesis 
The traditional OCA theory is criticised for assuming that a country’s structural 
characteristics remain unaltered following monetary integration. Some economists point out 
that an OCA may inherently trigger changes in the structure of the member economies that 
will facilitate meeting the OCA criteria. They argue that regardless of the stage of 
development and economic structures, monetary integration can deepen intra-regional trade, 
economic and financial integration, as well as business cycle synchronisation among member 
nations (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Frankel, 1999; Rose, 2000; Horvath and Komarek, 2002; 
Arroyo, 2003; Carrere, 2004; Balogun, 2008; Mongelli, 2008).  
 
When countries deliberately link their national currencies to those of some of their most 
important trading partners, there is an increased propensity of partner countries to import 
from each other due to the elimination of exchange rate volatility. Similarly, their monetary 
policies become closely-linked due to the disciplining effect of the monetary and exchange 
rate arrangement. This could result in high trade and income linkages between member 
nations rather than the linkages arising from an aspect of economic structure that is invariant 
to exchange rate regimes (Frankel and Rose, 1996:25). The endogeneity of OCA hypothesis 
is illustrated using Figure 3.4 below. 
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Figure 3.4: Endogeneity of OCA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Frankel and Rose (1996) 
 
Figure 3.4 depicts an example with two possible scenarios for a group of countries that starts 
at area 1, on the left of the OCA line as independent states. In the first scenario, we assume 
that production in these countries is fairly diversified and they share similar shocks and 
preferences for low inflation, their economies are quite open, they share high price and wage 
flexibility and labour mobility, and they share some forms of fiscal integration. If these 
countries form a “union”, e.g. the EU, both trade integration and income correlations are 
likely to rise, and they will gradually move to area 2. If the countries were to form a currency 
area, such as the European economic and monetary union (EMU), the extent of trade 
integration and income correlations will increase even further and they will end up at area 3, 
which is beyond the OCA line. Net positive benefits are expected from the EMU. 
 
The endogeneity of OCA hypothesis, therefore, implies that if a country fails to meet the 
OCA criteria ex ante but manage to ex post it could still join an EMU. However, for a group 
of countries (such as in the second scenario) that score poorly on the OCA criteria mentioned 
above, they should wait before monetary unification. The relevant OCA line for this group of 
countries may be further to the right, such as OCA Line’ (Mongelli, 2008:29).  
 
3.4.5.2  The Specialisation Hypothesis 
The specialisation hypothesis is rooted in trade theory and economies of scale, which 
postulate that as countries become more integrated (and their openness rises) when they share 
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a common currency, they will also specialise in the production of those goods for which they 
have comparative advantage. Hence, members of a currency area will become less diversified 
and more vulnerable to supply shocks. Similarly, their incomes will become less correlated 
(Krugman, 1993; Mongelli 2008). The specialisation hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 3.5 
below. 
 
Figure 3.5: The Effects of Specialisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mongelli (2008:29) 
 
Figure 3.5 depicts the effects of monetary integration on a group of countries, which are 
initially above the OCA line at area 1. An increase in integration among the countries due to 
sharing a single currency will move a member nation from area 1 to area 2 (more openness 
less correlation). Hence, a region may fail to meet the OCA criteria ex post even if it met 
them ex ante. 
 
A paradox therefore arises concerning the effects of monetary integration on a group of 
countries. If the crucial aspect is diversification, then the countries can resolve the problem 
by expanding the domain of an OCA since larger geographical entities are more diversified. 
If, however, the countries are not sufficiently diversified, then they should not share a 
common currency. Instead, they should break up into smaller currency areas whose exchange 
rates float against each other. However, this will result in even less diversified units, which 
will break up into even smaller entities. This process will continue until the world comprises 
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fully specialised individuals. This presents an unstable system with no interior solution. 
However, such a paradox does not exist in reality (Frankel, 1999). 
 
3.4.5.3  Exogeneity of OCA Properties 
There is an emerging hypothesis that the OCA properties may be exogenous to some 
countries. The theory asserts that members of a union that score below others (or below a 
certain benchmark) for some OCA criteria could experience more peer pressure to undertake 
structural reforms in order to improve their performance. The pressure comes from 
institutional forces.  
 
For example, within the European countries, the execution of the three stages of EMU and in 
particular, the run-up to the launch of the euro intensified ongoing structural reforms, such as 
those fostered and monitored by the European Commission, the European central bank, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other organisations. 
Studies conducted on EU integration found a causal link between institutional integration and 
economic integration (proxied by trade deepening). In particular, it was determined that 
institutional integration granger-caused economic integration, while at the same time 
economic integration also granger-caused institutional integration (but with a lower intensity) 
(Mongelli, 2008:18). 
 
3.5 AN ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERATION TO MONETARY INTEGRATION 
The theory of optimum currency areas (OCAs) postulates that countries with large 
asymmetric shocks are poor candidates for forming a monetary union because they require 
monetary policy autonomy for macroeconomic stabilisation. However, in economies where 
independent monetary policies have not been effective in determining macroeconomic 
performance indicators, literature suggests that the countries would be better off surrendering 
monetary policy to a regional authority (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994; Guillaume and 
Stasavage, 1999; Masson and Patillo, 2004; Balogun, 2007; and Corsetti, 2008).  
 
Some arguments for surrendering policy autonomy include restraining monetary authorities  
that misuse national monetary policy rather than employ it to facilitate domestic stabilisation, 
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e.g. using monetary policy to monetise public debt (which is inflationary39), would be better 
off surrendering monetary policy to a regional authority.  
 
There are circumstances whereby the misuse of national monetary policy results in 
asymmetric demand shocks between countries. In such cases, monetary unification with other 
countries less prone to such pressures may be beneficial to the profligate countries as they 
would be required to surrender policy autonomy to a supra-national body that would practice 
prudent monetary policy. The countries would therefore, not require autonomy over demand-
management instruments to offset the demand shocks (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994:7).  
 
In economies where money is neutral, monetary policy is ineffective in offsetting domestic 
disturbances. Hence, even if countries experience large, asymmetric shocks, the use of 
domestic monetary policy may not facilitate stabilisation. Thus, such countries do not stand 
to lose out by surrendering national monetary policy to a regional authority.  
 
In addition, structural factors such as a high degree of specialisation in production between 
the countries (which is associated with asymmetric shocks and favours flexible exchange 
rates) may influence the nature of disturbance between countries wishing to form a monetary 
union. However, flexible exchange rates imply that the rate fluctuates each time there are 
changes in the market for its dominant export commodity, thus subjecting consumers to 
fluctuations in their purchasing power. The consumers would, therefore prefer a fixed 
exchange rate system or monetary integration, which would insure their purchasing power 
(Kenen, 1969; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994; Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1994; and Araujo 
and Leon, 2003).    
 
Flexible exchange rates present additional problems in developing countries where other 
factors such as political instability can greatly increase the likelihood that a country will 
devalue its currency independently of whether economic considerations warrant such a move. 
In addition, few of these countries have political institutions characterised by significant 
checks and balances to hinder the reversal of legal central bank independence. Thus, 
                                                
39 See the discussion on the arguments for fixed exchange rate systems in Section 3.2.2.3 of Chapter 3. This was 
the instance in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s when the monetisation of the fiscal deficit led to hyperinflation.   
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participation in international arrangements may be the most effective way to promote 
credibility (Guillaume and Stasavage, 1999; Baqueiro et. al, 2003).  
 
There are extreme cases where an environment of low credibility simply results in a 
devaluation-inflation spiral. For instance, when a nation is hit by a negative supply shock, it 
may prompt the monetary authorities to devalue the exchange rate in an attempt to regain 
international competitiveness. However, devaluation increases both the domestic-currency 
price of imported final goods as well as imported inputs and hence, puts upward pressure on 
domestic prices. If domestic inflation is largely determined by import prices and the exchange 
rate, the increase in prices could outweigh the effect of the initial improvement in 
competitiveness, thereby prompting policymakers to devalue again.  
 
The accommodation of the monetary authorities to maintain a target level of income or 
employment following the supply shock is a crucial contributing factor to the devaluation-
inflation spiral. If the quantity of money were kept stable, forces are released that bring the 
movements of prices and of the exchange rate to a standstill and adjust prices and rates of 
exchange to one another, as asserted by the theory of purchasing power parity.  
 
However, in an environment of low credibility or where money supply reacts passively to any 
inflationary pressures, it is possible for exchange rate depreciation to play a key role in 
sustaining the inflationary spiral regardless of whether the process is actually initiated by 
internal rather than external factors. The expansion in money supply would result in an 
increase in demand, which in turn would lead to a further increase in prices and an 
appreciation in the real exchange rate. Thus, further inducing a depreciation in the nominal 
exchange rate. The process could end up turning into a devaluation-inflation spiral40 
(Dornbusch, 1988; Chhibber and Shafik, 1990; Burdekin and Burkett, 1996; and Nindi, 
2007).  
 
                                                
40 This was the case during the German and Zimbabwean hyperinflations in the early 1990s and 2000s 
respectively. 
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Lastly, the option to retain fiscal policy autonomy may entice countries that value policy 
autonomy to join a monetary union41. However, fiscal policy may be an imperfect substitute 
for monetary policy given that its effects take longer to impact on the economy. Furthermore, 
there is a possibility that some union members may free-ride on other countries by issuing 
debt beyond their ability to service it hence, forcing other members to bail them out 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994:7)42. This however, can be avoided by adopting regulations 
that limit the fiscal autonomy of member countries, such as the arrangement under the CFA 
franc zone and the stability and growth pact (SGP) of the Eurozone43. 
 
Accordingly, an alternative approach to evaluating the desirability of monetary integration 
has been suggested that is based on the assumption that countries would weigh the 
advantages of maintaining monetary policy independence against the costs of surrendering 
autonomy to a regional authority. If it is ascertained that independent monetary policies have 
not been effective in determining macroeconomic performance indicators, the implication is 
that the concerned countries would be better off surrendering monetary policy autonomy to a 
regional authority (Guillaume and Stasavage, 1999; Masson and Patillo, 2004; Balogun, 
2007; Corsetti, 2008). 
 
3.5.1 The Theory of Dollarisation 
Literature suggests that dollarisation may provide an alternative to monetary integration in 
some developing countries44. Small countries tend to adopt the currency of a larger, more 
stable country to benefit from its fiscal discipline and gain monetary policy credibility. 
Dollarisation, especially when carried out through a Treaty with the anchor country, has the 
advantage of effectively lowering uncertainty in the small countries and increasing both the 
predictability and credibility of monetary policy. This is because dollarisation signals more 
than just the adoption of a foreign currency, but also an irreversible commitment towards low 
                                                
41 This is the case in the United States, where state and local governments can accumulate large fiscal deficits in 
periods of recessions. 
42 The EU countries are currently experiencing a similar problem with the sovereign debt crisis. 
43 This is discussed in Section 3.8. 
44 See Masson and Pattilo (2003); Buiguit and Valev (2005); Aziakpono et. al (2007); and Johns (2009) for 
discussions relevant to SADC countries, and Calvo (1999); Berg and Borensztein (2000); Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2000); and Araujo and Leon (2003) among others for discussions relevant to Latin American countries. 
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inflation, price stability, fiscal responsibility and transparency (Calvo, 1999; Berg and 
Borensztein, 2000; Chang, 2000b; Araujo and Leon, 2003; Masson and Pattilo, 2003).  
 
In countries experiencing rapid inflation, individuals tend to switch their currency holdings to 
a stronger, more stable currency to protect themselves against the loss of purchasing power. 
This is known as unofficial dollarisation. In some instances, the governments of these 
countries validate unofficial dollarisation by allowing residents to open bank accounts 
denominated in the foreign currency and by including the currency in circulation and in their 
own monetary statistics (Chang, 2000b:2). The subsections below review the advantages and 
disadvantages of dollarisation. This is followed by a comparison between dollarisation and 
monetary integration. 
 
3.5.1.1  Advantages of Dollarisation 
The advantages of dollarisation are discussed in the subsections below, some of which are 
similar to those of monetary integration. 
 
3.5.1.1.1 Elimination of Risk Premia  
According to Berg and Borensztein (2000:5), the elimination of currency risk that comes with 
dollarisation reduces country risk premia, which in turn results in a reduction in interest rates. 
The interest rates in developing countries tend to be embedded with premia that cater for 
exchange rate, devaluation, currency and in some countries, sovereign or default risks. By 
doing away with the use of the domestic currency, dollarisation eliminates the risk of 
currency devaluation. As such, there is a possibility that the cost of foreign credit would be 
reduced and thus, stimulate investment and economic growth45 (Chang, 2000b:8). 
 
The stability in the exchange rate due to dollarisation increases investor confidence, which in 
turn would secure more stable capital inflows (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:5). Similarly, 
exchange rate stability results in reduced costs of borrowing, which combined with more 
stable capital inflows, would result in lower fiscal costs of servicing the public debt and, in a 
higher level of investment and growth (Araujo and Leon, 2003:155). 
 
                                                
45 However, for those borrowers that previously opted to take out loans in domestic currency who would now be 
forced to borrow in foreign currency, dollarisation would be costly. 
79 
 
Dollarisation also eliminates the risk of currency crises, which can be a major source of 
financial instability, especially in countries with a large proportion of their bank assets and 
liabilities denominated in foreign currency. Currency crises can have devastating effects on 
the economy, for example the incidence of recessions experienced by Mexico in 1995 and 
Asian countries in 1998 (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:13)46. 
 
Sovereign risk reflects the possibility of a developing country’s default on its foreign debt, 
either by government on official debt or domestic residents on their individual obligations. 
There are several ways through which sovereign risk may be reduced, firstly the elimination 
of the devaluation risk eliminates the risk of currency mismatch in assets (which are usually 
denominated in domestic currency) and liabilities (which are usually denominated in foreign 
currency), and thus leads to a reduction in default risk. Secondly, dollarisation eliminates the 
use of capital controls to defend the value of the domestic currency, which may force 
domestic borrowers to default on their foreign debts (Chang, 2000b:8). 
 
Dollarisation may eliminate exchange rate, currency and devaluation risks but the sovereign/ 
default risk may persist (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:13). Eliminating devaluations prevents 
the central bank from acting as lender of last resort to domestic banks. This implies that if 
domestic banks have foreign debts, there is a possibility of bank runs and therefore, sovereign 
risk would increase (Chang, 2000b:8). Similarly, the elimination of devaluations means that 
the domestic economy cannot benefit from the expansionary economic effects of devaluation, 
which could possibly improve fiscal revenue and thus, reduce default risk. Despite these 
possibilities, interest rates would still decline in response to the elimination of the other risks 
(Berg and Borensztein, 2000:13).  
 
3.5.1.1.2 Stability and Integration 
Dollarisation signals more than just the adoption of a foreign currency, but also signals an 
irreversible commitment towards low inflation, price stability, fiscal responsibility and 
transparency (Calvo, 1999; Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Araujo and Leon, 2003). In addition, 
dollarisation promotes closer economic and financial integration with the anchor country and 
                                                
46In the case of SADC countries, the effects of a currency crisis are observable in the recent economic collapse 
in Zimbabwe.  
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the global economy as a whole. It leads to greater integration in trade volumes and price 
levels and thus in the goods markets of the dollarised economies and the anchor country. This 
in turn would accelerate the rate of income convergence of these economies (Berg and 
Borensztein, 2000:5).  
 
The elimination of currency risk strengthens the soundness of the financial systems of the 
dollarised economies, making them more attractive to the rest of the world and thus, 
strengthening their integration with international financial markets. In addition, dollarisation 
makes the imposition of capital controls more difficult as it would be possible to convert all 
assets to hard cash. This would therefore, make financial integration much easier and 
insulation of the domestic financial institution more difficult (Berg and Borensztein, 
2000:15)47.  
 
3.5.1.1.3 Elimination of Economic Contagion 
Developing countries are highly vulnerable to external factors, hence the prevalence of 
economic contagion. According to Calvo (1999:2), imperfect information, especially 
information about the macro-economy and the financial sector, is the leading cause of 
contagion in developing countries. These countries cannot afford the costs of information 
gathering and monitoring of macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, some of these countries 
are also characterised by frequent government intervention, which increases uncertainties 
about economic performance in the face of regime changes and in the extreme case, 
economic collapse.  
 
Dollarisation offers a solution to these problems. Given that once dollarised the small country 
adopts the monetary policy of the anchor country, dollarisation would effectively increase its 
size and thus lower uncertainty and increase incentives to learn about its specific 
macroeconomic conditions (Calvo, 1999:2). Similarly, by eliminating exchange rate risk, 
dollarisation limits the incidence and magnitude of crises and contagion (Berg and 
Borensztein, 2000:14). 
 
                                                
47 It is however difficult to quantify these effects, especially for the factors that require institutional changes in 
response to greater financial integration. 
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However, dollarisation does not eliminate the risk of contagion due to external crises. As 
such, investors may still flee due to problems of sustainability of the domestic fiscal position 
or the soundness of the financial system arising from external crises. Similarly, large swings 
in capital flows from abroad may cause fluctuations in the business cycles of developing 
countries even when they do not involve balance of payments crises, thus causing investors to 
flee (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:13).  
 
3.5.1.2  Disadvantages of Dollarisation 
The disadvantages associated with dollarisation are discussed in the subsections below, some 
of which are similar to the disadvantages of monetary integration. 
 
3.5.1.2.1 Loss of Seignorage Revenue 
One of the main costs associated with dollarisation is the loss of seignorage revenue for the 
dollarised economy. When a country adopts a currency of another country, the stream of its 
seignorage revenue will flow to the central bank of the anchor country. The magnitude of the 
loss of seignorage revenue depends on the ability of the dollarised state to negotiate a 
revenue-sharing agreement with the anchor country (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000; Berg 
and Borensztein, 2000; Chang, 2000b).  
 
Dollarisation carries two implicit costs to the domestic monetary authorities, the “stock” and 
“flow” costs. The “stock” cost (which is incurred at the onset of a dollarised system) is due to 
the need for the domestic monetary authorities to “purchase” the stock of the national 
currency held by the public and banks in order to withdraw the currency from circulation and 
replace it with the foreign currency. This process would effectively return all the seignorage 
that had accrued over the years to the consumers and banks hence, the monetary authorities 
give up the revenue (Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Chang, 2000b). 
 
Most developing countries are however, unlikely to have sufficient foreign currency reserves 
at the time of dollarisation to purchase all the domestic currency in circulation. If the country 
were credit constrained and cannot borrow the funds, it would have to generate current 
account surpluses to accumulate them. However, if the optimal policy of the country entails 
running current deficits, then it would have to forego substantial amounts of investments in 
order to generate surpluses. Similarly, even if the country were able to borrow the required 
foreign currency, it would substantially increase the amount of its external debt. This may 
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increase its risk of debt crisis hence; its risk premium will increase and thus result in an 
increase in domestic interest rates (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:17).  
 
The “flow” cost is implicit in the nature of dollarisation. By adopting a foreign currency, 
monetary authorities would no longer be able to print new currency to satisfy any increases in 
domestic money demand and hence, they lose the “flow” of future revenue earnings from 
seignorage (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:15). Flow seignorage refers to the amount of 
resources that the dollarised economy would have to transfer to the anchor country annually 
to receive the foreign currency (Chang, 2000b:4).  
 
However, the loss in seignorage revenue is only from the inability of monetary authorities to 
print new currency; it would still be possible to earn seignorage revenue from reserve 
requirements on banks (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:15). According to Chang (2000b:5), the 
loss in seignorage revenue may be beneficial in cases where it forces irresponsible 
governments of the dollarised states to choose sound policies. 
 
3.5.1.2.2 Loss of Monetary Policy Autonomy 
Dollarisation implies relinquishing domestic monetary and exchange rate policy to the anchor 
country. In situations where economic shocks affect the dollarised and anchor economies 
asymmetrically, the loss of autonomy over monetary policy may have potentially devastating 
effects for the dollarised economy (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000; Berg and Borensztein 
2000; Araujo and Leon, 2003).  
 
The anchor country would formulate stabilisation policy to respond to the state of its business 
cycle (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000:1). However, large shocks may require excessive 
exchange rate adjustments in the dollarised economy. Since devaluation of the exchange rate 
would not be possible, the dollarised economy may need to lower nominal wages and prices 
of certain goods, which may not be feasible in countries without causing a substantial 
recession, especially in economies with less flexible mobility in their labour markets48. 
Similarly, such a prolonged deflation, if unplanned, would result in high real interest rates 
and large transfers from debtors to creditors. The rise in real interest rates would in turn limit 
                                                
48 This is the case in many developing countries. 
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the extent to which real interest rates are required to fall in order to stimulate domestic 
demand that is necessary to mitigate the decline in output (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:18). 
 
3.5.1.2.3 Eliminates the “Exit Option” 
In addition to eliminating the possibility of devaluing the national currencies, dollarisation 
makes it very difficult for the dollarised countries to exit from the arrangement due to the 
high cost of reintroducing the national currencies in the economy (Araujo and Leon, 
2003:155). Reintroducing a national currency is likely to be a lengthy and complex process, 
particularly in cases where the new currency is weaker than the foreign currency it would be 
replacing. In addition, it would be difficult to replace a foreign currency in cases where a 
legal arrangement between the dollarised economy and the anchor country stands (Berg and 
Borensztein, 2000:18).  
 
Due to the difficulty of exiting from a dollarisation system, countries that have introduced 
their own currencies did so under exceptional circumstances, such as at independence, and in 
most cases, they were replacing a weak, inconvertible currency rather than a strong one. 
Botswana is an example of a country that is an exception to this generalisation as it 
successfully managed to introduce its own currency in 1976 after existing from the Rand 
Monetary Arrangement (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:18). 
 
3.5.1.2.4 Limits the Lender of Last Resort Function 
An independent central bank, acting as a lender of last resort, has the autonomy to print 
money and thus, prevent bank runs when there is a loss of confidence in the financial system. 
Such an institution is crucial in a system of banks with fractional reserves in order to reassure 
bank depositors and short-term creditors that their claims on the banks would be honoured if 
they attempt to liquidate them (Chang, 2000b:5). However, under dollarisation, the central 
bank loses the ability to inject liquidity into the financial system through money creation, and 
thus cannot serve as lender of last resort (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000:1). 
 
Although the central bank of a dollarised economy would not be able to perform the role of 
lender of last resort, there are alternative ways of fulfilling this role. The monetary authorities 
could create a stabilisation fund to provide short-term liquidity in the economy or assistance 
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to small banks in crisis (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:21). Alternatively, the government could 
secure contingent lines of credit from international banks49 that could be drawn only in the 
event of a banking crisis (Chang, 2000b:6). Lastly, the authorities could sign a treaty with the 
anchor country for seigniorage sharing (Calvo, 1999:3).  
 
However, the above options can neither guarantee the whole payments system nor back all 
bank deposits should a sudden bank run occur in the whole economy given that a dollarised 
economy does not have the ability to print money, which is the only way to guarantee that all 
claims in domestic currency are honoured (Berg and Borensztein, 2000:21). 
 
3.5.2 Monetary Integration versus Dollarisation 
The costs and benefits associated with either monetary integration or dollarisation are similar. 
Both monetary arrangements offer potential benefits of increasing credibility of monetary 
policy of the participating countries, instilling fiscal discipline, eliminating transaction costs 
as well as reducing risk and uncertainty in trade. Similarly, both arrangements are associated 
with the loss of monetary policy independence and seignorage revenue by individual 
countries for domestic purposes. In addition, they limit the lender of last resort function of 
national central banks to prevent bank runs. However, there are distinct differences between 
the two monetary arrangements. A comparison between these arrangements is made below. 
 
To begin with, monetary policy within a monetary union is determined collectively by 
member states and is implemented by the union central bank. Each member state has a say on 
the pace of monetary policy, which is determined through voting. On the other hand, 
monetary policy in a dollarised country is that of the anchor country. A dollarised state has no 
say in the pace of national monetary policy because by adopting a foreign currency, it 
effectively surrenders policy determination to the anchor country.  
 
Members of a monetary union may have an agreement in place for sharing seignorage 
revenue50; while on the other hand, dollarisation does not guarantee such an agreement. 
However, it is possible for the anchor and dollarised economies to negotiate one through a 
                                                
49 Which are cheaper under dollarization because there would be no risk of devaluation-related bankruptcies. 
50 For example the arrangements within the EU and the CMA members. 
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treaty (Calvo, 1999; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000; Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Chang, 
2000b; Araujo and Leon, 2003).   
 
In addition, the relationship between members of a monetary union is that of parity, with 
countries having the power to vote in the decision-making process. With dollarisation 
however, the relationship is that of hierarchy between the anchor and the dollarised countries 
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000; Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Araujo and Leon, 2003). 
 
Monetary integration is sustainable as long as there is a hegemonic country or related ties and 
commitments among the participating states, which can influence each member to stick to the 
monetary arrangement. On the other hand, dollarisation may be unsustainable if the anchor 
country establishes an agreement for seignorage sharing, in order to compensate the 
dollarised country against political risks (Araujo and Leon, 2003:158). 
 
Lastly, monetary integration provides a lesser commitment to price stability than dollarisation 
because it allows devaluation of the common currency to correct for external imbalances 
(Araujo and Leon, 2003:158). A dollarised economy, on the other hand,  may be powerless to 
respond to external shocks that are asymmetric to the anchor country, particularly because of 
the high cost of later reverting to a more flexible regime (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000; 
Berg and Borensztein 2000; Araujo and Leon, 2003).  
 
On the other hand, dollarisation provides large credibility gains because monetary policy is 
determined by the anchor country, which usually has a strong commitment towards low 
inflation (Chang, 2000b:10). In contrast, under a monetary integration arrangement, political 
pressure can be exerted by member countries to devalue. The more responsive the central 
bank is to political pressures, the weaker its commitment to price stability would be (Araujo 
and Leon, 2003:158).  
 
3.6 CONVERGENCE IN MACROECONOMIC STABILITY INDICATORS 
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) established by members of the EU set several macroeconomic 
convergence (MEC) criteria, which stipulate the maximum allowable levels of key 
macroeconomic indicators that have to do with fiscal discipline, as well as monetary and 
financial stability. The treaty aimed to centralise EU members’ macroeconomic policies and 
to reduce exchange rate margins.  
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The treaty further set several conditions for joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
and included a detailed timetable for the adoption of a single currency. The underlying notion 
of convergence in macroeconomic stability indicators is that unless countries enter the union 
with similar inflation rates and fiscal positions, the single currency will be unsustainable 
(Wyplosz, 1997:6).  
 
When the European Union introduced the Euro in 2002 not all member countries satisfied all 
the convergence criteria. Rossouw (2006:8) points out that such non-compliance did not put 
in jeopardy the continued existence of the European Union, the Euro as a single currency or 
the functioning of the European Central Bank. Thus, assessment of the continued progress 
towards the convergence criteria by participating countries is a better indication of a 
commitment to unification, rather than actual compliance at any given period in time. The 
convergence criteria therefore ought to be considered as goals that integrating countries 
should aim to achieve, even after monetary unification, rather than conditions that should 
always be applied, even before unification. The MEC criteria set by the EU countries are 
reviewed in the subsections below. 
 
3.6.1 Inflation Rate 
The inflation condition is one of three conditions that deal with monetary convergence. The 
EU set the prerequisite that each country had to have its inflation rates converging close to 
(not exceeding 1.5% of) the average rate of the three member nations with the lowest rate. 
 
Large differences in economic growth, inflation rates, or budget deficits among members 
make monetary integration difficult. The argument is that a country suffering from rising 
inflation would be under pressure to devalue, which would make a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement difficult for such a country (Jenkins and Thomas, 1997:8). If member countries 
display persistent inflation differentials, the costs incurred by not employing the exchange 
rate as an adjustment tool for macroeconomic stabilisation will be larger than the benefits of 
monetary integration (Khamfula and Tesfayohannes, 2004:39).  
 
The desirability of monetary union among a group of countries can be assessed by 
considering the degree of divergence in the inflation rates of the countries. Honohan and 
Lane (2003:4) note that divergent inflation rates are harmless if the variations are due to 
differing initial price levels of the countries. Thus, convergence towards a common price 
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level will entail divergent inflation rates in the interim. If countries have different baskets of 
goods, the basket average will differ even when individual prices are the same. Similarly, 
when the long-run relative price level across countries is a function of relative incomes, 
relative wealth levels or relative productivities, a faster growing country tends to have 
temporarily higher inflation in the transition to its new long-run equilibrium relative price 
level51. All these sources of inflation differentials are harmless to a monetary union.  
 
Divergent inflation rates are a cause for concern when there is a possibility of non-
convergence in the long term due to the possibility of sustained high inflation in some 
countries. For instance, transport costs and the border effect could be the cause of inflation 
differentials in a common market where tariffs, trade quotas and other informal trade barriers 
have been eliminated (Allington et al, 2004; Engel and Rogers, 2004). Studies such as 
Masson (2006), and Longo and Sekkat (2004) indicate that transport costs (partly because of 
poor infrastructure and conflict) are high in African countries.  
  
Allington et al (2004:3) provide another explanation of the price dispersion in trading 
partners, suggesting that highly traded goods contain significant non-traded components that 
frustrate price convergence. The prices of finished goods incorporate the input costs such as 
rent, shipping costs, labour costs, and insurance premiums from non-traded goods. These 
factors may affect the prices of non-traded intermediate goods and hence, the degree of price 
dispersion for traded final goods52. 
 
Inflation differentials are also a cause for concern if they are a reflection of underlying weak 
intra-regional adjustment mechanisms to shocks. In such a situation, the region will be 
characterised by frequent and prolonged relative price misalignments or alternating 
overheating and recession. For example, if there are short-run supply rigidities in the region, 
a positive aggregate demand disturbance will lead to an increase in domestic inflation and a 
real exchange rate change. Price misalignments imply that even the temporary price increases 
could trigger persistence mechanisms that continue to operate when the original shock has 
disappeared or supply responses have kicked in. In such a scenario, the countries would still 
                                                
51 This is known as the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. 
52 See also Honohan and Lane (2003:4). 
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face temporary asymmetric shocks to relative price levels from a variety of sources even 
when convergence occurs in the long run (Honohan and Lane, 2003:5). 
 
Lastly, inflation differentials could persist if members of a monetary union trade at different 
levels with third countries. Countries that import a substantial amount of goods from outside 
the union may experience imported inflation if the exchange rate of the regional currency 
depreciates. Thus, countries that import from non-members would face higher inflation than 
those that import from member countries (Honohan and Lane, 2003:6).  
 
3.6.2 Interest Rates 
Long-term nominal interest rates on government debt must not exceed more than two points 
the average interest rate of the three countries with the lowest inflation rate. The inclusion of 
this criterion is a way of taking advantage of the forward-looking character of financial 
markets, because expectations about future inflation, exchange rates and fiscal policy are 
embodied in the interest rate premium (Jenkins and Thomas, 1997:8). 
 
3.6.3 Exchange Rate 
The average exchange rate must not fall by more than 2.25% of the average of the EMS for at 
least two years prior to joining the monetary union without any measures to stop the free flow 
of foreign exchange. This criterion was designed to rule out a last devaluation push 
immediately prior to full integration in order to gain a competitive advantage or to amortise 
excessive public debt (Jenkins and Thomas, 1997:8). 
 
3.6.4 Deficit-to-GDP and Debt-to-GDP Ratios 
The two ratios are inter-linked. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the EU requires that the deficit-
to-GDP ratio for each country should not exceed 3%; while on the other hand, the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio should not exceed 60%. The argument is that budget deficits hinder stable 
exchange rates, which thus become a stumbling block on the path to an irreversible fixed 
exchange arrangement. Thus, there is a need to keep budget deficits at minimum levels. 
These convergence criteria, therefore effectively instil fiscal discipline throughout the union 
(Jenkins and Thomas, 1997:8). 
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3.7 THE THEORY OF REAL ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE 
Literature on monetary integration often refers to convergence in macroeconomic stability 
indicators, because they make up part of the conditions considered as essential for monetary 
integration under the OCA theory. However, for developing countries with substantial 
regional inequalities, regional integration requires that the countries also attain real economic 
convergence. 
 
McCarthy (2002:8) notes that developing countries need to attain convergence around a 
higher level of economic growth to enable them to “catch-up” with industrialised nations. 
Furthermore, they need to attain convergence around a higher level of regional average per 
capita income to reduce the inequalities in per capita income levels in their respective 
regions. Convergence in per capita income levels would also ensure that the benefits of 
regional economic integration are realised more evenly among the countries. 
 
Alberola et al (2003:27) further state that economic integration ought to be complemented by 
adequate structural settings in the participating countries to encourage real convergence in the 
integrating economies. A combination of increased openness, macroeconomic stability, as 
well as adequate structural settings should result in an environment that is conducive to 
attracting a continuous flow of capital and to consolidating the functioning of the economy, 
which in turn would be conducive to sustainable growth and real economic convergence 
between the integrating countries. Figure 3.6 below illustrates the inter-linkages between 
economic integration, macroeconomic stability, adequate structural settings and, economic 
growth and convergence.  
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Figure 3.6: Bases for Real Convergence and Growth 
           
 
       
     
           
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Alberola et al (2003:26) 
 
The theory of economic convergence asserts that there are two types of economic 
convergence, micro- and macro- economic convergence. Macroeconomic convergence 
(divergence) is defined as a tendency of the disparity in aggregate variables such as income 
or output across economies to narrow (widen) over time. Microeconomic convergence, on the 
other hand, is defined as a tendency towards the equalisation of income of identical factors 
across economies (Rassekh, 1998:86).  
 
The convergence hypothesis explains the two types of economic convergence in its 
classification of the main sources of economic convergence, viz, diffusion of technology, 
differing capital- labour ratios (as per the neo-classical growth model) and globalisation. This 
hypothesis is reviewed below. 
 
3.7.1  The Convergence Hypothesis 
This hypothesis asserts that there is a tendency for low-income economies to grow much 
faster than high-income economies, with growth in high-income economies eventually 
slowing down. Thus, low-income economies would eventually “catch-up” with high-income 
economies (Jenkins and Thomas 1997; Rassekh, 1998). According to Jenkins and Thomas 
(1997:7), although economic convergence amongst all the countries in the world has not 
Economic Integration 
Trade & capital 
Openness 
Growth & real 
convergence 
Macroeconomic Stability Structural Setting 
Discipline Vulnerability 
Basis for sustainable 
growth 
Attractive, stable 
environment 
91 
 
occurred, it does occur within smaller groups known as “convergence clubs”53. The sources 
of economic convergence are discussed in the subsections below. 
 
3.7.1.1  Diffusion of Technology 
Hume (1758) first postulated that the diffusion of technology fosters economic convergence 
between countries. The theory asserts that the transfer of technology and low wages from 
more advanced (leader) economies to less advanced (follower) economies provides the latter 
with an impetus to grow faster than the former.  
 
The argument is that leader economies experience diminishing returns to manufacturing, 
which prompts them to relocate their production from advanced to follower economies that 
offer cheaper provisions and labour. The follower economies will in turn experience higher 
rates of growth until diminishing returns set in. Manufacturing companies will then relocate 
to other countries whose economies are not well developed where they will experience 
increasing returns to manufacturing. The process will therefore, continue until all follower 
economies “catch-up” with the leader economies, thus achieving economic convergence 
(Hume, 1758; Gerschenkron, 1952; and Abramovitz, 1986). 
 
The opportunities inherent in industrialisation in the follower countries vary directly with the 
backwardness of the country. When leader economies replace old technology, the increase in 
their productivity is limited by the degree of improvement in the technology, while for the 
follower economies; the increase in their productivity is determined by their relative 
backwardness. The more technologically-backward the follower economies, the greater the 
leap in their productivity. Thus, follower economies tend to “catch-up” faster if they are 
initially more backward (Gerschenkron, 1952; and Abramovitz, 1986).  
 
By imitating technology developed by leader economies, follower economies avoid the high 
costs associated with errors incurred during technological innovation. Therefore, the larger 
the productivity gaps between the economies, the higher the potential for growth in 
productivity and, ceteris paribus, the faster the expected growth rate of the follower 
economies (Abramovitz, 1986:386). 
                                                
53These are a group of countries whose poorer members are able to “catch-up” in income levels with the richer 
ones. 
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The necessary conditions for follower economies to take advantage of their relative 
backwardness and experience rapid growth include an adequate pool of technical and 
managerial skills, stable political and financial institutions, and public policies conducive to 
productive entrepreneurial activities (Rassekh et al, 2001:148). Furthermore, follower 
economies should be endowed with usable resources and should not have any barriers to 
industrialisation (Gerschenkron, 1952:6).  
 
Japan is an example of a follower economy that paved the way for economic growth by 
ensuring it had adequate institutions to take advantage of technological innovations. On the 
other hand, India and South American countries were unable to take advantage of their 
backwardness because they did not reform their institutions (Rassekh, 1998:87).  
 
3.7.1.2  Neo-Classical Growth Models 
Neo-classical growth models such as Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), 
assert that regional incomes differ because of differing capital-labour ratios and that, a 
country’s growth rate is inversely related to its initial level of per capita income.  
 
The Solow growth model is the most commonly referred to of the neo-classical models in 
discussions of economic growth and convergence. The model was developed on the 
assumption of diminishing returns to capital and predicts that rich countries (with high levels 
of capital) experience low marginal returns to capital and vice versa for poorer countries that 
have low levels of capital. As such, capital flows from rich countries to poorer ones, enabling 
their economies to grow at a faster rate than rich countries and therefore, “catch-up”54 
(Solow, 1956; Rassekh, 1998 and; Kim, 1998)55.  
 
3.7.1.3  The Effect of Globalisation 
The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) trade model comprises of four theorems; the Factor Price 
Equalisation (FPE) theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the Rybczynski theorem and 
the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theorem. The FPE theorem is mostly used to provide an 
                                                
54 This is in contrast to predictions of endogenous growth models, such as by Romer (1986), Lucas (1986) and 
Barro (1989), which do not predict economic convergence. The models predict that differences in per capita 
incomes between countries will persist indefinitely even when they have the same savings and population 
growth rates. 
55 The Solow Growth Model is presented in Box A.1 of Appendix A. 
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explanation for the source of economic convergence. The theorem asserts that free trade in 
commodities results in the equalisation of relative commodity prices in trading partners; 
which would in turn lead to the equalisation of real factor prices and possibly, in national 
incomes (Kim, 1998; Bajona and Kehoe, 2006).  
 
The FPE theorem explains how countries producing the same goods, using the same 
technology and facing the same relative product prices would end up with an equalisation in 
their factor prices56. There are incidences in which the FPE process leads to a divergence 
rather than a convergence in incomes. In a situation where one region/nation is endowed with 
more of every factor on a per capita basis than the other, the FPE outcome ensures that free 
trade keeps per capita income in that region/nation always higher than in the other 
region/nation. Furthermore, the integration of goods and capital markets implies that goods 
produced at least cost flow from rich countries (which have predominantly industrialised 
economies) to poor countries (which have predominantly agricultural economies), reducing 
the incentives to accumulate capital in poor countries. The latter would instead intensify 
production on primary products, which are labour-intensive (Kim, 1998; Bajona and Kehoe, 
2006).  
 
The primary products from the developing countries have inelastic demand and thus, often do 
not substantially increase the markets for the poor economies or their levels of production and 
employment. Furthermore, their wages and export returns per unit of product are low since 
the supply of unskilled labour is almost unlimited. The elimination of the source of 
productivity improvement in developing countries would therefore, result in the widening of 
the income gap between the rich and poor countries. Thus, by promoting the equalisation of 
factor incomes, the FPE process prevents the equalisation of per capita incomes (Myrdal, 
1956:51). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
56 Box A.2 of Appendix A presents the FPE theorem. 
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3.8 FISCAL POLICY FRAMEWORK 
In addition to the MEC targets, there is need for a framework for the coordination and 
multilateral surveillance of the fiscal policies of member nations of a monetary union. There 
are three main reasons cited in economic literature to justify the need for constraining fiscal 
policies under a monetary union as well as the imposition of binding fiscal limits on member 
countries. These arguments are discussed below. 
 
Firstly, economic literature argues that a currency union should have an appropriate fiscal-
monetary policy mix, which requires a degree of coordination of national fiscal policies. This 
is particularly relevant when either there is no common regional budget or that budget is too 
small to influence the region’s overall fiscal stance.  
 
Secondly, binding fiscal limits are necessary to reinforce the anti-inflationary policy, as well 
as strengthen the credibility of the region’s common central bank. This is particularly 
important when the central bank has recently been set up and has yet to establish its 
credibility for fighting inflation.  
 
Lastly, fiscal limits may be required to offset the possible deficit bias that may arise in some 
nations due to being part of a monetary union. Literature argues that membership of a large 
and credible monetary union may create incentives to certain members to run large deficits 
and borrow excessively because the union provides access to a larger pool of savings. 
Furthermore, they may take advantage of the benefits from the monetary credibility and fiscal 
discipline of the partner countries, and from the market perception that the common 
institutions or the other member countries will bail them out in the case of a debt crisis 
(Jenkins and Thomas, 1997; Arroyo, 2003).  
 
This could lead to excessive government borrowing and higher real interest rates throughout 
the union. Similarly, it could shift resources from the fiscally prudent nations to the profligate 
ones in an unfair way. The argument is based on the assumption that the constraints imposed 
by market forces might not enforce sufficient and timely discipline to reckless nations by 
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charging them higher interest rate premiums; markets will either be too slow and weak or too 
sudden and disruptive57 (Arroyo, 2003:112). 
 
For countries that have, in the past, run high and persistent budget deficits and thus, have 
high volumes of public debt, there are additional political incentives for adopting fiscal policy 
rules. Tying the hands of national governments into a binding supranational agreement 
imposes fiscal discipline on the member countries. Similarly, for the countries with a strong 
national currency and low inflation, an appropriate framework for fiscal disciple assures its 
residents that joining a monetary union would not result in their country adopting a weaker 
currency and higher inflation (Arroyo, 2003:114). 
 
However, critics of the fiscal policy rules under a monetary union argue that they restrain the 
capacity to use independent national fiscal policies to compensate for asymmetric shocks58. 
Considering that members of a monetary union give up autonomy over their monetary and 
exchange rate policy, it is imperative that they retain their ability to use their national fiscal 
policy as an adjustment tool (Arroyo, 2003:14). Box A.3 of Appendix A presents a case study 
on the EU’s fiscal policy framework, which may be a guideline for other regions wishing to 
form a monetary union. 
 
3.9 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
The nature and level of financial development in individual countries plays an important role 
in the outcome of monetary integration, which is not frequently cited in economic literature. 
On the other hand, there is extensive research on the role financial development plays in 
contributing to economic growth. The “finance-led” economic literature59 on growth asserts 
that financial development improves total factor productivity and, ultimately, economic 
growth through the functions inherent to the system, which include mobilising savings, 
allocating capital, monitoring borrowers and transforming risk (Garcia-Herrero et. al, 2003: 
334). 
 
                                                
57 To combat this, the EU included a “no bail out” clause in the Maastricht Treaty, which prohibits the 
assumption of the liabilities of one member nation by another or the EU budget. 
58 This is particularly relevant for regions that suffer from a high incidence of such shocks. 
59 cf., Levine (1991), King and Levine (1993). 
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There is increasing research on the role financial integration plays in fostering financial 
development. Economic literature states that opening up the financial system to the rest of the 
world fosters financial development, particularly for small economies (Garcia-Herrero et. al, 
2003: 336). Of particular relevance to this study is the literature on the inter-relationship 
between the state of financial development and openness to international trade and capital 
(i.e., financial integration), as well as the nature of the transmission of monetary policy in 
potential union members, which ultimately affects their suitability for monetary integration. 
 
Improving the breadth and depth of the internal market by increasing intra-regional financial 
integration renders the region less vulnerable to potentially disruptive developments in the 
global economy and smoothes the adjustment to asymmetric shocks. This in turn, reduces the 
costs associated with the loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment tool (Arroyo, 2003:86).  
 
On a different note, the depth and structure of the financial system60 and, the size and 
openness of the economy influence the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy, as well as 
the importance of different transmission mechanisms. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 
3.7 below. 
 
  
                                                
60 The depth and structure of the financial system refers to whether the financial system comprises mainly of 
banks or a variety of institutions, whether it is run publicly or privately, and whether it offers a variety of 
products.  
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Figure 3.7: Factors that Influence the Transmission of Monetary Policy 
 
 
 
 
     
        
 
          
       
 
         
 
 
 
Source:  Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel (2002:8) 
 
Figure 3.7 shows that the extent to which changes in the short-term interest rate by the central 
bank are transmitted into changes in market rates and prices depends on the structure of the 
financial system as well as the size and degree of openness of the economy. The more 
diversified the financial institutions and products, the quicker and easier monetary policy is 
transmitted to the economy. In turn, the level of financial development as well as the balance 
sheet positions of household and firms determines the extent to which changes in market rates 
and prices influence consumption and investment decisions. When households and firms are  
not constrained financially but can exercise their choice both inter-temporarily and across 
goods and services, they are more responsive to changes in market rates and prices and 
hence, changes in monetary policy are more effective on the economy. 
 
Differences in the structure of financial systems across countries entail differences in the 
importance of transmission mechanisms in each country (Montiel, 1991; Loayza and 
Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002; Buigut, 2006). If the financial system of a particular country is 
shallow (i.e., dependent on a few financial institutions) and poorly diversified (i.e., there are 
limited alternative products), it implies that the financial institutions can exercise 
monopolistic power in the determination of market rates and prices, independent of central 
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bank actions. In such a scenario, the asset price channel is not that important because 
capitalisation of the stock market would be low, and the interest rate channel would be weak 
due to the monopolistic power held by the banks (Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002: 9).   
 
Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel (2002: 9) further note that the exchange rate channel tends to be 
irrelevant in financially under-developed economies because such economies tend to impose 
exchange controls on foreign transactions. In such a scenario, the credit channel is likely to 
dominate due to the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that are characteristic of 
shallow financial systems. 
 
Montiel (1991) and Buigut (2006) note that a similar monetary policy action in a monetary 
union comprising countries with divergent financial systems is likely to result in varying 
changes in output and prices across countries and possibly widen cyclical variation between 
countries. This is because the transmission of the policy action will vary across union 
members, depending on the relative importance of each transmission channel. As such, 
monetary integration requires that the transmission mechanisms across member states be 
similar, which in essence translates to that monetary integration requires a similarity in the 
financial systems of member states.  
 
3.10 CONCLUSION 
The chapter comprised discussions on the theoretical frameworks of monetary integration, 
which include the arguments for the need for a fixed exchange rate between trading partners, 
the impossible trinity principle as well as the theory of optimum currency areas. In addition, 
the need for monetary integration in a group of countries pursuing regional economic 
integration was highlighted in the review on the Impossible Trinity Principle. The discussion 
provided further support for a fixed exchange rate system between integrating countries. 
 
The review on the theory of optimum currency areas discussed the theoretical benefits and 
costs of OCAs, and hence, monetary integration. Furthermore, the OCA criteria that are a 
necessary condition for monetary integration to be beneficial were identified, which include a 
high degree of trade openness, a high degree of trade inter-dependence, a high degree of 
product diversity, and a high degree of mobility of the factors of production. If these 
conditions were present, then individual countries would have alternative adjustment 
mechanisms for domestic stabilisation when facing asymmetric shocks. This in turn implies 
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that giving up autonomy over their monetary and exchange rate policy would not be costly. 
Thus, monetary integration would be beneficial to the countries. 
 
In addition, the need for convergence in macroeconomic stability indicators prior to monetary 
integration was highlighted in this chapter. It was ascertained that members of a monetary 
union also needed to achieve a degree of convergence in their inflation rates, interest rates, 
exchange rates as well as their levels of debt to reduce the costs of losing national monetary 
policy autonomy to effect domestic stabilisation. 
 
The discussion on the need for a fiscal policy framework further highlighted the fact that 
members of a monetary union also require a degree of harmonisation in their fiscal policies 
for the union to be sustainable. Fiscal policy coordination is necessary to reinforce the anti-
inflationary policy of the union central bank, to offset the possible deficit bias that may arise 
in some nations as well as to maintain an appropriate monetary-fiscal policy mix within the 
union. 
 
Lastly, the discussion on financial development reinforced the need for members of a 
monetary union to be financially integrated, which among other things, enables the smooth 
adjustment to asymmetric shocks. This in turn reduces the costs associated with the loss of 
the exchange rate as an adjustment tool. In addition, similar financial systems among union 
members imply a similarity in the importance of transmission mechanisms in each country. 
Hence, a union monetary policy action would have the desired results in member states and 
therefore, reduce the likelihood of cyclical variation between countries. The current nature of 
the importance of different transmission mechanisms in the SADC countries is investigated in 
Chapter 7. 
 
In conclusion, countries wishing to form a monetary union need to have a binding fiscal 
policy framework as well as adequately developed financial sectors, in addition to meeting 
the OCA criteria and the MEC targets. Furthermore, the countries require a degree of real 
economic convergence, which would ensure that the benefits of regional economic 
convergence are realised more evenly among the countries. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EXTENT OF INTEGRATION WITHIN THE SADC COUNTRIES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter assesses the extent to which the SADC countries are integrated based on the 
OCA criteria discussed in Chapter 3. The chapter begins with a review of empirical studies 
conducted on the degree to which the SADC countries meet the OCA properties in Section 
4.2. It was noted that there has been limited research on monetary integration within the 
SADC countries. Furthermore, most of the empirical studies conducted focused on either the 
extent of financial integration (cf. Nielsen et al, 2005; Aziakpono, 2006; Aziakpono et al, 
2007) or the nature of the response to shocks in the member countries (cf. Grandes, 2003; 
Khamfula and Huizinga, 2004; Buiguit and Valev, 2006; Obinyeluaku and Viegi, 2009). 
 
Some empirical studies focused on the degree of macroeconomic convergence within the 
member countries (cf. Jenkins and Thomas, 1997; Agbeyegbe, 2003; Johns 2009). However, 
most studies on convergence are of a theoretical and comparative nature (cf. Maruping, 2005; 
Rossouw, 2006; Kweka et al, 2006; Jefferis, 2007). Section 4.3 assesses the applicability of 
the OCA criteria to the SADC member states. The problem of the inconclusiveness of the 
traditional OCA criteria discussed in chapter three was found to exist in the case of the SADC 
countries. In light of this observation, other relevant criteria for determining the suitability of 
monetary integration are considered in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 highlights the challenges 
facing the SADC countries in achieving economic convergence. Section 4.6 considers the 
possibility of approaching monetary integration through either dollarisation or an extension 
of the CMA arrangement. Lastly, Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
The review of each study highlights what the study investigated before discussing the 
methods of analyses used in the study and its findings. The studies differ in terms of the 
aspects of the OCA theory they consider, the period of analyses, as well as, the sample of 
countries included in the study. As such, it is difficult to compare the findings of the studies. 
However, the review on the studies has been categorised under the headings of the OCA 
properties that the studies considered, to highlight the aspects of the OCA theory 
investigated. 
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It is essential to note the findings and recommendations of other researchers on the suitability 
of monetary integration within the SADC countries. It is apparent that a region-wide 
monetary union is not feasible at the onset of the union; hence, a collective consideration of 
available literature should indicate which countries would form the union at onset. A 
summary of the literature reviewed below is presented in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
 
4.2.1 Intra-Regional Financial Integration 
The sample of countries included in the studies conducted to test the degree of financial 
integration in the SADC countries differs. Nielsen et al (2005) investigated the degree of 
financial integration in the CMA countries, while Aziakpono (2006) considered the SACU 
countries. Only one study by Aziakpono et al (2007) has so far considered financial 
integration within the SADC countries as a whole. These studies are discussed below. 
 
Study by Nielsen et al (2005) 
Nielsen et al (2005) investigated the degree of financial integration in the CMA countries 
using the concept of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). Based on arbitrage conditions, UIP 
states that the interest rate differential between two countries should equal the expected 
change in the exchange rate. Thus, a higher domestic interest rate indicates an expected 
devaluation of the domestic currency, while a lower domestic rate than the reference interest 
rate indicates an expected appreciation of the domestic currency (Holtemöller, 2003; Nielsen 
et al, 2005). 
 
The sample included Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland (the CMA countries), as 
well as Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe (for comparative analysis). The study investigated 
the impact of foreign interest rates (i.e., South African rates) on domestic rates (i.e., rates of 
the LNS countries, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe) using both the money market rates and 
credit market rates in these countries. Monthly data was used in the analyses from January 
1994-December 2004 for the LNS countries and January 1995-December 2004 for Botswana 
and Zambia, while data for Zimbabwe excluded the series for 2004 to avoid distorting the 
results with extremely high rates. 
 
The results indicated that the markets for Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (the LNS 
countries) were integrated financially with that of South Africa, while those for Botswana, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe were not. In addition, the rates in the LNS countries showed a 
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tendency of convergence towards those of South Africa, while Botswana, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe displayed large discrepancies and no tendency towards convergence.  
 
It was therefore, concluded that the scope for the LNS countries to exercise an independent 
monetary policy under the CMA arrangement was very limited and as such, they could not 
use monetary policy for domestic stabilisation purposes (Nielsen et al, 2005:720). It was 
however, noted that as long as the currencies of the LNS countries were pegged to the ZAR 
and South Africa pursued a policy of stable and low inflation, then the impact of South 
African monetary policy will be transmitted to the LNS countries speedily and these 
economies will encounter economic growth. It was further noted that the LNS countries, have 
in the past, benefitted from the CMA arrangement in the form of lower prices, economy on 
trading costs, and a large increase in trade volume and cross-border financial transactions 
(Nielsen et al, 2005:710). 
 
Study by Aziakpono (2006) 
Aziakpono (2006) used the concept of interest rates pass-through to measure the degree of 
financial integration amongst the SACU countries for the period January 1990- September 
2004 using monthly interest rate data. In addition, the study determined whether both the 
arbitrage condition and the South African Dominant Hypothesis (SADH) existed in the 
SACU region. 
 
The premise of the study was that interest rate parity exists in a highly integrated financial 
market hence; similar assets should yield the same return irrespective of the country of 
domicile and the currency in which they are denominated, provided there is free capital 
mobility. It is assumed that interest rate parity arises either from the presence of arbitrage 
opportunities or from the use of interest rates as policy instruments. Under the former 
assumption, it is argued that given a high degree of capital mobility, two countries’ financial 
assets should be substitutes for each other and hence, arbitrage equates one country’s interest 
rates with those of the other, plus the forward premium on the two currencies (Aziakpono, 
2006:2). 
 
Under the latter assumption, it is argued that co-movement in interest rates is due to policy 
convergence, which occurs when a smaller country (financial unit) aligns its interest rates 
(policy) with that of a dominant economy (financial unit) to gain credibility. Alternatively, 
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convergence can occur within the framework of an EMU where monetary policy is 
coordinated from a central point (Aziakpono, 2006:3). 
 
The study therefore investigated the response of official interest rates as well as retail interest 
rates (deposit and lending rates) in the smaller SACU countries to changes in the official 
interest rate in South Africa. In addition, the study examined the response of retail interest 
rates in the smaller SACU countries to changes in market interest rates in South Africa. 
 
The results showed that a degree of integration existed in the financial systems of each of the 
smaller SACU countries with that of South Africa. However, there was a hierarchy in the 
level of integration, with Namibia at the top, followed by Swaziland, then Lesotho, and lastly, 
Botswana. Furthermore, the results suggested that the prevailing integration between the 
financial systems was mainly a result of policy convergence, rather than market convergence, 
which implied limited arbitrage opportunities between the countries. The lack of arbitrage 
opportunities was attributed to the poor institutional development and lack of investment 
opportunities in the smaller countries, which has resulted in an asymmetric flow of funds to 
South Africa. Lastly, the results confirmed the dominant role of South Africa in SACU region 
(Aziakpono, 2006:15-21). 
 
Study by Aziakpono et al (2007) 
Aziakpono et al (2007) investigated the state and potential development of financial and 
monetary integration in the SADC countries for different periods, i.e. using rolling time 
windows. In particular, the study determined the nature and underlying causes of banking 
market integration among SADC countries using principal component analysis (PCA) and 
interest rate pass-through analysis for monthly interest rate series.  
 
It was noted that cointegration analysis may not be appropriate during a process where 
nominal convergence is taking place because inflation rates would be aligning in anticipation 
of a monetary union. As such, a long-run relationship may not exist between the variables. 
Therefore, they propose the use of principal component analysis to test for co-movements in 
interest rates, adding that this method can also identify groups of countries for which interest 
rates move in the same direction (Aziakpono et al, 2007:3).  
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Thus, the study applied PCA to central bank (monetary policy) interest rates, deposit and loan 
interest rates, respectively for the SADC countries. This was done in order to ascertain the 
progress and development of financial integration over time. In addition, the study 
determined the driving forces of banking market integration, with particular interest in the 
role of an efficient pass-through of national monetary policy onto bank interest rates and the 
role, if any, of a common or dominant monetary policy (Aziakpono et. al, 2007:4). 
  
The results of the study showed that the degree of financial integration was increasing in 
some but not all SADC countries. Banking market integration was driven predominantly by 
increasing monetary integration, although a genuine banking market integration process was 
also observable in some countries. However, the results indicated that integration was not 
developing uniformly in all countries, but rather concentrated on a “convergence club” with 
the CMA countries in its centre and dominated by South Africa (Aziakpono et. al, 2007:28). 
 
The study therefore concluded that a few non-CMA SADC countries, namely Seychelles, 
Zambia and Botswana, were potential first candidates for a CMA enlargement. However, an 
expansion required more policy coordination and nominal convergence, as well as addressing 
financial market imperfections. Furthermore, it was concluded that the rest of the countries 
were still far from consideration for the eligibility for monetary integration from a pure 
financial integration point of view (Aziakpono et al, 2007:29). 
 
4.2.2 Similarity of Shocks and Business Cycles 
Studies to investigate the nature of shocks and business cycles within an OCA consider 
different aspects of the economies. In the case of the SADC countries, Grandes (2003), and 
Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) considered the degree of correlations in the exchange rates, 
while Buiguit and Valev (2005) investigated the degree of correlations of shocks to output 
and inflation. On the other hand, Obinyeluaku and Viegi (2009) considered the relevance of 
fiscal and monetary policy in the determination of inflation in selected SADC countries.  
 
The response of the SADC countries to shocks to each of these variables differs. Hence, 
different recommendations were offered by each study. The above-mentioned studies are 
reviewed below and the findings of each study are highlighted in each review.  
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Study by Grandes (2003) 
Grandes (2003) investigated whether or not the SACU countries form an OCA by testing the 
existence of a long-run relationship between the bilateral real exchange rates (RER) of the 
SACU countries vis-à-vis that of South Africa using cointegration techniques. The study used 
quarterly data for the period 1990-2001. The assumption was that correlations in the real 
exchange rate reflect common fundamental trends in economic variables such as long run 
productivity growth and the tradability of domestically produced goods. Hence, stationarity 
in the exchange rates implied that the countries faced symmetric shocks.  
 
The Generalised Purchasing Power Parity (G-PPP) approach was applied to test the 
applicability of the long-run relationship among all bilateral RER. The G-PPP postulates that 
though bilateral real exchange rates are generally non-stationary, they will exhibit common 
stochastic trends if the fundamental variables (i.e. the forcing variables) are sufficiently inter-
related. When interpreted in terms of optimum currency areas, the RER between two 
countries comprising the domain of a currency area should be stationary. Similarly, in a 
multi-country scenario, the forcing variables will be sufficiently inter-related, so that the real 
exchange rates themselves will share common trends. Hence, within a currency area there 
ought to be at least one linear combination of the various bilateral real exchange rates that is 
stationary (Grandes, 2003:10).  
 
The results of the study found the existence of common long-run trends in the bilateral RERs; 
suggesting that the countries form an OCA. It was concluded that further microeconomic 
efficiency gains could still be attainable if these countries formed a complete monetary union. 
However, they still faced a level of divergence in terms of trade shocks, a lack of export 
diversification and the predominance of inter-industrial trade patterns, among other things, 
which all are not conducive to the successful implementation of a full monetary union. 
 
Study by Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) 
Khamfula and Huizinga (2004:703) made use of a Generalised Auto-Regressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model to estimate correlations of unanticipated components of 
bilateral real exchange rates of nine SADC countries against the South African rand. They 
analysed the conditional short- and long-run real exchange rate (RER) disturbances between 
South Africa and the member countries for the period 1980-1996 using both monthly and 
quarterly data.  
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Their argument was that the main economic cost of a monetary union resulted from the loss 
of nominal exchange rate flexibility as a tool for RER adjustment between regions exposed to 
asymmetric shocks. Since goods and factor prices are normally sticky downwards, RER 
adjustment is achieved more easily if nominal exchange rates rather than regional price levels 
change. Thus, the importance of flexible exchange rates would be highest in the presence of 
strongly asymmetric shocks to or pronounced differences in shock-absorbing mechanisms of 
the countries pondering monetary union (Khamfula and Huizinga, 2004:701).  
 
The results of the short- and long-run analyses suggested that the conditional variances of the 
RER disturbances between South Africa and most fellow SADC members were comparable. 
It was suggested that Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe could be the initial members of the monetary union. Tanzania and 
Zambia had extraordinarily high RER variability, which could potentially expose the union to 
much higher variation of relative prices, thus destabilising the union. Thus, the two countries 
had to achieve a manageable degree of RER variability before their ascension to the union. It 
was recommended that the countries fix their currencies to the rand at predetermined rates in 
an effort to stabilise their RER variability. 
 
However, the results from the estimations indicated relatively low degrees of symmetry of 
both short- and long-run RER shocks across most of the SADC countries. As such, it was 
concluded that the SADC region as a whole was not ready to start a monetary union. It was 
observed that the countries were “simply too different to form an optimal currency area” and 
that the costs of such a union far exceeded the benefits (Khamfula and Huizinga, 2004:712).  
 
The study recommended that the countries reduce trade barriers in an attempt to stimulate 
regional growth, which would in turn promote increased economic co-operation. However, it 
is worth noting that with the implementation of a SADC FTA in 2008 (which is not yet fully 
functional); it is too early for the member countries to realise the dynamic effects of the trade 
liberalisation scheme. Consequently, the implication is that it is too early, if at all, for the 
countries to respond symmetrically to RER shocks. Lastly, it was suggested that future 
research could be conducted from the angle of estimating a Structural Vector Auto-
Regressive (SVAR) model for SADC members that would allow the identification of both 
monetary and real shocks. Buiguit and Valev (2006) conducted a study along those lines; and 
this is reviewed below. 
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Study by Buiguit and Valev (2006) 
Buiguit and Valev (2006:12) applied Blanchard and Quah’s (1989) two-step statistical 
method in SVAR analysis to identify separate demand and supply shocks from the GDP and 
inflation data of a sample of eastern and southern African (ESA) countries for different 
sample periods.  
 
The results from the impulse response functions showed, on average, small impulse responses 
for most countries. The impulses seemed to dissipate quickly by the second or third year. 
Only those countries that experienced major civil strife showed a marked difference in size 
and speed of adjustment. However, Buiguit and Valev (2006:12) expected the shocks to the 
economies to reduce as these countries stabilised. Thus, they concluded that monetary 
integration was feasible for some of the ESA economies.  
 
Results from the variance decomposition analysis showed that demand shocks accounted for 
a high proportion (over 80%) of the price level variability across most economies. However, 
few countries showed wide variations, with some countries less than 10%. Therefore, it was 
concluded that structural supply and demand shocks did not contribute to output changes and 
price variations in the same way across the ESA countries.  
 
No evidence to support ESA-wide monetary integration was found, and thus it was suggested 
that a tri-polar route to monetary integration be followed, which is based on the countries that 
exhibited a greater degree of symmetry. The first monetary union would consist of the SACU 
countries, together with Mozambique and Zambia. The second would be an EAC monetary 
union, which could gradually expand to include Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. The third 
monetary union would be an Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) monetary union. 
 
Study by Obinyeluaku and Viegi (2009) 
Obinyeluaku and Viegi (2009) investigate the relevance of fiscal and monetary policy in the 
determination of inflation in 10 SADC countries61 using VAR analysis for the period 1980-
2006. The aim of the study was to ascertain the extent to which fiscal policy actions influence 
inflation in the SADC countries, with the assumption that if it were significant, then 
                                                
61 Angola, DRC, Mozambique and Namibia were excluded due to data unavailability. 
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surrendering monetary policy to a regional authority would not provide price stability within 
the region. 
 
Three different phenomena were analysed in the study. To begin with, the study analysed the 
nature of the responses by national fiscal authorities to shocks in government liabilities and 
primary surpluses using impulse response analysis. The study also investigated the source of 
the positive response of future surpluses to current surpluses to ascertain if lower nominal 
income was the main source. The implication is that a fiscal dominant regime would exhibit 
lower national income in response to a positive shock. Lastly, the study made use of variance 
decomposition techniques to determine whether fiscal or monetary policy best explained 
inflation variability in the SADC countries (Obinyeluaku and Viegi, 2009:9). 
 
The study showed that fiscal policy dominated monetary policy in the determination of 
inflation in Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. On the other hand, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania exhibited a monetary dominant 
regime. Based on the results obtained for Lesotho and Botswana, it was noted that even 
countries with independent monetary policy could still exhibit a fiscal dominant regime. 
Thus, it was emphasised that it is essential for the SADC countries to coordinate their 
monetary and fiscal policies in order to attain price stability (Obinyeluaku and Viegi, 
2009:14). 
 
4.2.3 Endogeneity of OCA Properties 
There has been very little research testing the theory of the endogeneity of the OCA 
properties in the SADC countries, with one notable study by Carrere (2004) on this matter. 
The study is similar to studies conducted by Frankel and Rose (1996) and Rose (2000) who, 
like Carrere (2004), make use of gravity models to investigate the extent to which increased 
trade between countries results in correlations in shocks to their economies.  
 
Study by Carrere (2004) 
Carrere (2004) investigated the impact of regional trade agreements and the use of a common 
currency within Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1962-1996 using a gravity 
model. The West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) are the only regional groupings that are also 
109 
 
currency unions. Thus, the impact of using a common currency was measured only for these 
two regional groupings. 
 
A basic gravity model presents the flow of trade between a pair of countries as being directly 
proportional to their national income and inversely proportional to the distance between 
them. The model can be augmented with several variables to measure the effects of different 
factors on trade. The effects of a currency union were captured using the volatility of the 
bilateral nominal exchange rate between the currency area and the rest of the world. The 
rationale was that the exchange rate was expected to be stable within a currency union. 
Volatility was measured by the standard deviation of the first-difference of the monthly 
bilateral exchange rate for the year preceding the current period being observed.  
 
The use of a common currency was found to increase trade between member countries of the 
two regional groupings by more than double the initial level. The results of the study were, 
however, inconclusive as to whether membership in a regional body increases trade between 
SADC countries. In addition, the study did not investigate the impact of a currency union on 
trade within the SADC region. 
 
4.2.4 Macroeconomic Convergence 
A number of researchers (cf. Maruping, 2005; Rossouw, 2006; Kweka et al, 2006; Jefferis, 
2007; among others) have done a comparative analysis on the performance of 
macroeconomic stability indicators in the SADC countries. The studies differ in the period of 
analysis and in some cases, on the subset of countries that comprise the convergence club in 
the region. 
 
Maruping (2005:142) compared the extent of macroeconomic convergence in the SADC 
countries for the period 2001-2004 and found that the SACU countries and Mauritius were 
the most convergent in their inflation rates, while post conflict countries of Angola and the 
DRC showed a significant decline in their inflation rates. It was noted that the DRC, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, which depend highly on aid, were above target level for 
the fiscal deficit-GDP ratio. The implication is that their fiscal deficits would be 
unsustainable were donor support not available or drastically reduced. Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe also recorded extremely high levels of fiscal deficit-GDP ratios. The high budget 
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deficits in Swaziland were due to the expansionary fiscal policies undertaken during this 
period, while Zimbabwe experienced an economic crisis. 
  
Rossouw (2006:159) analysed the extent of macroeconomic convergence in the SADC 
countries by 2004 and found that the SADC countries had made significant progress in 
attaining the set MEC targets, leading to the conclusion that the region was on track to its 
goal for monetary integration. Kweka et al (2006:255), on the other hand, investigated the 
extent of macroeconomic convergence for the period 1980-2005 and found considerable 
variability in the attainment of the MEC targets.  
 
The variability was due to the inherent differences in socio-economic structures of these 
countries. The stronger economies such as Botswana and South Africa met the targets earlier 
than the set deadlines, while the weaker countries such as Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia 
showed variability in certain targets. The latter countries, which have a high dependency on 
external aid, were behind target in their budget deficits, savings/investment ratios and 
external reserves, although they did comply with the targets for inflation rates, GDP growth 
rates and money supply indicators. 
 
Jefferis (2007:98) investigated the extent of macroeconomic convergence for the period 
1990-2002 and found a degree of convergence in the SADC countries, further noting that not 
all the countries converged. The results from the analysis indicated that a convergence club 
consisting of Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania 
around the South African rates existed in the region.  
 
Although the above studies reported different trends in the degree of convergence in the 
SADC countries, they all indicated that the SACU countries displayed convergence. On the 
other hand, convergence in the non-SACU SADC countries varied, with some more stable 
economies such as Mauritius displaying a degree of convergence. Below are reviews of 
empirical studies conducted to determine the extent of convergence in the SADC countries. 
 
Study by Agbeyegbe (2003) 
Agbeyegbe (2003) uses the methodology of time varying analysis to establish economic 
convergence on nine, non-CMA member countries of SADC. The parameters investigated 
were inflation and the exchange rate. The analysis is based on the methodology developed by 
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Hall et al (1992) who advocate for the use of the time varying parameter approach to measure 
convergence given that it is a gradual and on-going process. They point out that analyses such 
as the standard method of testing for cointegration in non-stationary variables are limited in 
that they assume structural stability. As such, the tests are unable to correctly detect whether 
or not convergence occurs over a period of time. 
 
The results of the cointegration tests on the exchange rates suggested no evidence of 
convergence. The results from the time varying analysis also showed differing degrees of 
non-convergence among the non-CMA currencies to the rand exchange rate with the 
exception of the Malawian Kwacha. Similarly, results from tests for inflation convergence 
suggested non- convergence in the inflation rates of the non-CMA countries to the average of 
the CMA countries. It was concluded that chances were quite low that the SADC member 
countries could satisfy some form of Maastricht-type convergence criteria (Agbeyegbe, 
2003:9).  
 
Study by Johns (2009) 
Johns (2009) investigated the extent of the pass-through of monetary policy in ten SADC 
countries using an interest rate pass-through model. The pass-through model is similar to that 
of Aziakpono et al (2007) as well as that of Aziakpono and Wilson (2008), who made use of 
the rolling window approach. The countries included in the sample were Botswana, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and 
Zambia. The study made use of monthly interest rate data for the period 1990-2007. In 
addition, two interest rates were analysed namely, the bank rate and the lending rate. 
 
The results of the short-run pass-through analysis indicated that the interest rate adjustment 
was sluggish in Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia 
particularly from 1999 onwards, while South Africa showed an improvement in its 
adjustment from 1993, and Botswana and Malawi from 2002 onwards. Lastly, Swaziland was 
found to have a quicker and more stable pass-through over the entire estimation period in 
comparison with the rest of the countries (Johns, 2009:44).  
 
The results of the long-run analysis indicated that the pass-through for Botswana, Malawi, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia tended to move together. Thus, a level of 
convergence was identified in these countries. On the other hand, the analysis identified a 
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pattern of divergence for Madagascar and Tanzania in the long term. Lastly, long-run pass-
through analysis could not be conducted for Lesotho for 1998 onwards as the study found no 
cointegrating relationship between its lending rate and the banking rate.  
 
The results from the estimates of the mean adjustment lag indicated that the speed of 
adjustment was relatively low and stable for Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. 
On the other hand, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia had a diverging speed of 
adjustment. It was noted that although the results from the long-run pass-through analysis for 
Zambia indicated that the pass-through was high, it took longer for it to be accomplished. 
This was attributed to the rigidity in its domestic market due to market imperfections. 
 
The study therefore, concluded that a convergence group consisting of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and, to some extent, Zambia existed. It was 
suggested that these countries could form an intermediate monetary union, which would be 
an extension of the CMA arrangement.  
 
4.2.5 Real Economic Convergence 
There has been limited research on the extent of economic convergence in the SADC 
countries, with one notable study by Jenkins and Thomas (1997), who found evidence of a 
convergence club around the SACU countries. The study is reviewed below. 
 
Study by Jenkins and Thomas (1997) 
Jenkins and Thomas (1997) investigated the degree of macroeconomic convergence between 
SADC countries using three measures of convergence over the period 1960-1990, using 
convergence in real per capita GDP as an indicator of real economic convergence. The σ-
convergence approach, the β-convergence test, as well as Quah (1996)’s approach were used 
in the analysis. Quah (1996) made use of a Markov chain-type methodology to estimate the 
probability that relatively poorer (richer) countries will raise (lower) their per capita income 
in the next period and thereby converge. Although the analysis is descriptive, and therefore 
does not explain convergence/divergence, it does shed light on how poorer countries behave 
relative to richer ones (Jenkins and Thomas, 1997:14). 
 
The σ-convergence approach is a measure of dispersion, which attempts to determine 
whether the dispersion in income levels of a group of countries diminishes over time using 
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the standard deviations (σ) of per capita income (Jenkins and Thomas, 1997:11). The 
coefficient of variation (CV) may also be used as a proxy for dispersion (Rassekh, 1998:97). 
The analysis focuses on how the entire cross section behaves rather than whether a single 
economy shows convergence. Thus, a declining σ or CV over time would imply convergence 
in the economies in question. 
 
Quah (1996: 1365) however cautions that the σ-convergence approach should be interpreted 
as an indication of the average behaviour of the sample rather than that of the entire 
distribution because the σ or CV of cross sectional data may approach a constant, but never 
reach zero when the economies are exposed to shocks. Furthermore, the σ or CV values may 
appear to be declining in a period where some economies display non-convergence, while 
some may even have diverged. 
 
The β- convergence test attempts to determine whether countries with lower income levels 
grow faster than high-income countries during a sample period, after controlling for the 
variables that influence growth. Convergence is said to occur when the β- coefficient of a 
regression of (time-averaged) growth rates on initial levels of per capita income is negative 
(Jenkins and Thomas, 1997; Rassekh et al 2001). 
 
Quah (1993), and Bernard and Durlauf (1996), among others, cite criticisms of the β- 
convergence test. Quah (1993:433) applies Galton’s Classical Fallacy to argue that a negative 
β- coefficient does not necessarily imply convergence, pointing out that a situation may arise 
where low-income economies grow much faster than high-income economies; leaving as 
much dispersion at the end of the period as at the beginning, though in the opposite direction. 
This would still produce a negative β though the dispersion in income data may not have 
diminished over time. 
 
Bernard and Durlauf (1996:167), on the other hand, argue that an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression can still produce a negative β even when some economies do not converge. 
They demonstrate that diminishing income differences between some pairs of economies 
produce a negative β. Thus, an analysis of a group of countries may provide a misleading 
impression that the whole sample is converging. 
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In all the three measures, no evidence of real convergence was found to occur within the 
SADC countries. However, the analysis indicated that convergence occurred within the 
subset of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries while a degree of 
divergence occurred for the rest of the countries62. Jenkins and Thomas (1997:23) attributed 
the convergence in the SACU countries to the similar domestic economic policies, driven in 
part by the currency union in the CMA countries, as well as to the relative openness to 
international trade in these countries. They concluded that the region was not ready for 
monetary integration, warning that premature attempts at monetary integration could have 
political costs. A failed attempt at monetary integration could generate political 
disagreements and recriminations that could weaken the prospects for integration in other 
sectors.  
 
4.2.6 Other Relevant Criteria 
It is important to consider the degree of monetary policy autonomy in potential members of a 
monetary union prior to integration as an indication of the potential costs to member states of 
joining the union. A high level of policy autonomy implies higher costs of monetary 
integration. Aziakpono (2008) conducted a study along these lines on the SACU countries.  
 
Study by Aziakpono (2008) 
Aziakpono (2008) investigated the degree of financial and monetary autonomy and 
interdependence between South Africa and the other SACU countries for the period January 
1990- May 2005 using monthly data. More specifically, the study made use of cointegration 
and error correction models, as well as long-run causality analysis (based on weak exogeneity 
tests) to assess the extent to which the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has played its 
role as an anchor for monetary policy and has influenced the financial markets in the SACU 
countries.  
 
The study analysed several behaviours of interest rates, beginning with the response of 
market interest rates (i.e., deposit, lending, money market and Treasury bill rates) in each of 
the SACU countries to changes in domestic central bank rates. The study also analysed the 
response of market interest rates and official interest rates in the other SACU countries to 
                                                
62 This is in-line with studies conducted by Wang et al (2007:15), and Masson and Pattilo (2003:67), who found 
evidence of a convergence club comprising of the CMA countries. 
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changes in the official interest rate in South Africa, as well as the response of market interest 
rates in the other SACU countries to changes in market interest rates in South Africa. 
 
The study was similar to that of Aziakpono (2006) but analysed more interest rates in an 
attempt to focus on the question of monetary and financial autonomy, and to that of Nielsen 
et al. (2005) who made use of rolling unit root tests and a moving regression. The study made 
use of the interest parity condition for the analyses, with the assumption that in a common 
monetary area where exchange rate risk is absent, the test of interest rate parity is reduced to 
a test of the co-movements between interest rates. A low β value would therefore be an 
indication of independence/policy rigidity or existence of market imperfections, hence low de 
facto integration. In contrast, in the case of within-country analysis, a high β value implies a 
high response of domestic interest rates to domestic policy stance vis-à-vis the central policy 
rate hence, policy independence and vice versa (Aziakpono, 2008:197). 
  
The results from the tests for cointegration indicated that all the market interest rates in South 
Africa and Namibia were strongly cointegrated with the official rate, while those for 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland showed a weak relationship. The results for South Africa 
conformed to expectations that, as per CMA arrangement, the economy led monetary policy 
formulation and therefore would have more policy autonomy than the other SACU countries. 
Similarly, the results for Lesotho and Swaziland conformed to expectations that the 
economies would have less policy autonomy. However, it was not expected that Botswana 
would have less independent monetary policy since it was not an official member of the 
CMA. The results further suggested that the influence of domestic policy in Namibia was 
very strong (Aziakpono, 2008:203-7). 
 
In addition, the results from the investigation of the relationship between the market interest 
rates and official rates in the other SACU countries to changes in the official interest rate in 
South Africa showed a very strong response of the former to the latter. This indicated that the 
SARB overwhelmingly influenced policy stance and the money market behaviours of all the 
member states. Lastly, the results from the weak exogeneity test suggested a presence of two-
way causal relationship between interest rates in Namibia and South Africa, while causality 
ran solely from South Africa to the other member states (Aziakpono, 2008:207-8). 
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The results from the analyses confirmed the dominant role of South Africa in the SACU 
region. It was therefore, concluded that a monetary unification, with the SARB as the sole 
central bank and the ZAR as a common currency was feasible. It was however, noted that the 
extent to which a monetary union would help to improve the efficiency of the domestic 
financial system would vary from country to country and was dependent on the prevailing 
situation in each country. For countries with relatively inefficient domestic monetary policy 
transmission, such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, a single central bank was likely to 
improve the transmission of monetary policy. On the other hand, for a country such as 
Namibia with more effective domestic policy, it could slightly slow down the monetary 
transmission in the economy (Aziakpono, 2008:209). 
 
4.3 APPLICATION OF THE OCA PROPERTIES TO THE SADC COUNTRIES 
The suitability of the SADC countries for monetary integration is assessed in this subsection 
based on the traditional OCA properties, which include the extent of openness to trade with 
the world, the level of trade interdependence in the region, and the extent of diversification in 
the production structures of the economies. 
 
Trade Openness 
The openness criterion may also be assessed using the degree of openness vis-à-vis the 
countries with which it intends to share a single currency, the share of tradable versus non-
tradable goods and services in production and consumption, the marginal propensity to 
import, and the degree of international capital mobility. Although these concepts may 
overlap, they are not necessarily synonymous (Mongelli, 2008:6).  
 
Using the ratio of foreign trade over GDP, Table 4.1 below presents an evaluation of the 
degree of trade openness of the SADC countries. The table indicates that overall, the SADC 
countries are highly open, with an average openness ratio of 67%. Angola, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Swaziland and Zimbabwe display exceptionally high degrees of openness, 
exceeding 100%. On the other hand, South Africa and Tanzania had ratios below the regional 
average. 
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Table 4.1: Trade Openness of SADC Countries (in per cent of GDP), 2010* 
 Ratio Degree of Openness 
Angola 100.18 Extremely High 
Botswana 72.37 Very High 
DRC 64.73 High 
Lesotho 157.69 Extremely High 
Madagascar** 81.65 Very High 
Malawi 77.83 Very High 
Mauritius 116.23 Extremely High 
Mozambique 68.48 High 
Namibia  76.75 Very High 
South Africa 54.83 High 
Swaziland 123.02 Extremely High 
Tanzania 63.84 High 
Zambia 79.13 Very High 
Zimbabwe 126.25 Extremely High 
SADC Average 67.41 Very High 
Source: Own calculations using data is from the World Bank database (2010). 
Notes: i.  *Openness is defined as the ratio (exports + imports)/ GDP.  
ii. ** Latest available data is for 2009. 
iii. The regional ratio is a trade-weighted average. 
 
Product Diversification 
Table 4.2 below shows the nature of production in the SADC countries. The data indicates 
that there is limited diversification in the exports of the member states and therefore, the 
countries do not meet this OCA criterion.  
 
Most SADC countries produce primary and “first stop processing” goods that comprise 
mainly of minerals, fresh- and processed food, and clothing. Particularly, Angola, Botswana, 
the DRC, Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia rely predominantly on a primary product. The 
dependency on primary production makes the member states vulnerable to terms of trade 
losses when there is a sharp decline in commodity prices.  
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Table 4.2: Main Exports and Imports of the SADC Countries (2009) 
 Main Exports (USD, millions) Some Main Imports (USD, millions) 
Angola Mineral fuels, oils &distillation products (98);  
Minerals (1) 
Machinery (20); transport equipment (12); iron and 
steel (10); electronic equipment (10) 
Botswana Minerals (77) [diamonds]; clothing (3); fresh 
food (3) 
Mineral fuels, oils &distillation products (13); 
machinery (10); vehicles (10); minerals (8) 
DRC Minerals (73) [diamonds]; petroleum (17); wood 
products ( 4) 
Machinery (14); Petroleum (8); electronic 
equipment (7); vehicles (6) 
Lesotho Clothing (63); minerals (33) Textiles (23); electronic equipment (22); vehicles 
(11); machinery (8); pharmaceuticals (8); cotton (7) 
Madagascar clothing (39); coffee, tea, mate& spices (9); Fresh 
food (8); Mineral fuels, oils & distillation 
products (4) 
minerals (20); machinery (16); chemicals (10); 
electronic equipment (8);  
Malawi tobacco-related products (64); coffee, tea, mate& 
spices (7); sugar –related products (6); fresh fruit 
and seed (5) 
Mineral fuels, oils &distillation products (10); 
vehicles (9); machinery (9); fertilisers (8); 
electronic equipment (7); 
Mauritius clothing (42); fresh food (13); sugar –related 
products (12); minerals (4) 
Mineral fuels, oils &distillation products (16); 
machinery (9); electronic equipment (6); fresh food 
(6); vehicles (5) 
Mozambique Minerals (40) [unwrought aluminium]; Mineral 
fuels, oils &distillation products (17); tobacco-
related products (8) 
Mineral fuels, oils &distillation products (15); 
Minerals (12); vehicles (12); machinery (11); 
cereals (7) 
Namibia Minerals (53) [zinc, gold and diamonds]; Fresh 
food (17); chemicals (16);  
Machinery (14); electronic equipment (14); ores 
(13); Mineral fuels, oils &distillation products (8); 
basic manufactures (6); textiles (6); vehicles (5) 
South Africa Minerals (36); Mineral fuels, oils &distillation 
products (11); vehicles (9); machinery (7) 
Mineral fuels, oils &distillation products (21); 
machinery (16); electronic equipment (11); vehicles 
(7); basic manufactures (6) 
Swaziland Sugar-related products (21); essential oils, 
perfumes, cosmetics, toiletries (13); Processed 
food (11); clothing (12); machinery (6); wood- 
related products (6) 
Minerals (15); textiles (10); tobacco-related 
products (9); machinery (7); electronic equipment 
(6); basic manufactures (5) 
Tanzania minerals (46); coffee, tea, mate& spices (7); Mineral fuels, oils &distillation products (23); 
machinery (14); vehicles (12); electronic equipment 
(7);  
Zambia minerals (79) [copper, cobalt and related 
products]; sugar- and tobacco related products (2 
each)  
Machinery (15); mineral fuels, oils &distillation 
products (14); minerals (9); vehicles (7); electronic 
equipment (5); fertilisers (5) 
Zimbabwe Minerals (26); printed books, newspapers, etc 
(19); plants & trees (15); tobacco-related products 
(12); cotton (5) 
Vehicles (15); mineral fuels, oils &distillation 
products (13); machinery (9); electronic equipment 
(7); cereals (6) 
Source: International Trade Centre (2011). 
Notes: i. The percentage shares of national exports/imports are in round brackets. 
ii. The main exports/ imports are in square brackets. 
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Trade Interdependence 
Table 4.3 below shows the level of trade interdependence of the SADC countries. The data 
indicates that there are low levels of trade flows between each member state and the rest of 
the SADC states and hence, the countries do not meet this OCA property.  
 
Table 4.3: SADC Intra/Inter-Regional Trade (as a percentage of total trade for 2006)  
                                                             Trade Conducted With: 
 Rest of 
SADC 
X             M 
Rest of 
Africa 
X         M 
ASEAN 
 
X         M 
EU 
 
X         M 
MERC 
 
X         M 
NAFTA 
 
X           M 
Rest of the 
World 
X             M 
Botswana 11.3 88.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.2 74.9 4.1 0.0 0.1 1.8 1.2 10.8 4.6 
Lesotho** 27.6 82.2 0.0 0.0 - - 1.1 0.5 - - 79.1 0.2 0.1 17.1 
Malawi 34 59.6 7.2 2.6 1.1 1.7 39.6 14.8 0.3 0.2 8.3 3.5 12.4 17.4 
Mauritius 6.5 8.6 2.6 2.6 1.1 7.8 60.7 34.5 0.0 1.1 8.6 2.2 18.1 43.2 
Mozambique 35.7 40.7 0.7 0.4 1.3 4.2 6.5 26.3 0.0 1.2 0.3 3.9 72.5 23.3 
Namibia 33.5 83.7 0.9 0.1 2.9 0.7 45.0 5.9 0.0 0.5 6.2 1.6 12.1 7.5 
South Africa 10.4 2.8 2.9 3.5 2.4 5.4 31.8 34.6 1.0 3.7 11.5 8.7 39.7 41.2 
Swaziland** 76.8 95.9 4.3 0.0 - - 1.6 0.5 - 0.0 7.5 0.1 7.2 3.4 
Tanzania 5.3 13.7 8.5 5.2 1.9 6.6 23.4 17.5 0.0 0.6 1.7 3.8 44.5 52.5 
Zambia 29.1 59.8 1.3 2.2 0.1 0.7 12.7 12.8 - 0.2 0.5 2.5 50.4 21.8 
SADC 
Combined* 
11.6 12.9 3.0 3.2 - - 30.1 28.6 0.7 2.8 9.5 7.3 43.6 45.2 
Source: Own calculations using statistical data from TIPS database 
Notes: i. * SADC Combined refers to the combined trade of reporting members i.e. the combined total trade    
for the 10 members currently reporting trade data to the TIPS database. 
ii. **Most recent data available is for 2003 for Lesotho and 2004 for Swaziland. 
iii. X denotes exports, and M denotes imports 
iv. Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe were excluded from the analysis because they do not report 
data to UNCOMTRADE or TIPS. 
 
The data indicates that more than 50% of the imports to Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia are from the SADC region. On the other hand, with the 
exception of Swaziland, these countries export less than 50% of their products to the rest of 
the SADC countries. In addition, the data indicates that South Africa and Tanzania trade 
minimally with the rest of the SADC countries. Overall, the data indicates that there is an 
imbalance of intra-SADC trade flows. The low levels of intra-regional trade can be attributed 
partly to the near homogenous nature of production in member states as seen in Table 4.2 
above, which shows that most countries export predominantly raw materials and import 
manufactures. As such, there is no complementarity in production, which necessitates trade 
between the member states.  
 
Furthermore, other factors such as the poor quality of infrastructure, high tariff protection, 
restrictive import licensing requirements, and other restrictive non-tariff barriers contribute to 
the low levels of intra-regional trade between the member states (Kritzinger-van Niekerk and 
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Moreira, 2002:36). In addition, the over-lapping membership in regional groupings 
introduces duplication of effort and thus, hinders intra-regional trade (Geda and Kebret, 
2007:376).  
 
The low levels of trade interdependence give little support for a region-wide monetary union 
in the SADC region. However, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia 
import more than 50% of their goods from South Africa, while Mozambique imports over 
40%. Hence, it can be argued that Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia can benefit 
from a reduction in transaction costs if they adopted the ZAR as a means of exchange. 
Presently, only the LNS countries do not incur transaction costs in trade with South Africa as 
the CMA arrangement stipulates that there should be no transaction costs in conversion of the 
national currencies of the LNS countries to the ZAR and vice versa (Oosthuizen, 2006; Wang 
et al, 2007). 
 
In summary, the evaluation of the performance of the SADC countries based on the 
traditional OCA properties gives inconsistent recommendations regarding the suitability of 
the countries for monetary integration. For example, the member states display a high level of 
trade openness (which implies that the region is suitable for monetary integration), while also 
having low levels of product diversification (which implies that a flexible exchange rate 
arrangement is more desirable, hence, they are not suitable for monetary integration).  
 
Similarly, the assessment of the suitability of the SADC countries for monetary integration 
based on the traditional OCA properties presents the problem of inconclusiveness of the 
properties. For example, the member states are highly open (which implies that they are 
suitable candidates for monetary union) yet they display low levels of factor mobility (which 
implies that they have limited alternative adjustment mechanisms in the face of shocks hence, 
giving up the exchange rate instrument would be costly). 
 
In addition, the high dependency of the rest of the SADC countries on South African imports 
suggests that the countries would be suitable for a “Rand” monetary union yet the lack of 
diversification in production suggests that the countries may require frequent changes in the 
exchange rate for macroeconomic adjustment hence surrendering the exchange rate 
instrument would be costly. The suitability of the SADC countries for monetary integration is 
thus further assessed using additional properties in the subsection below. 
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4.3.1 Macroeconomic Convergence in the SADC Countries 
The suitability of SADC countries for monetary integration can also be assessed by 
examining the level of macroeconomic convergence within the regional grouping. The 
convergence criteria for the SADC countries comprise a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) agreed upon by the Ministers of Finance of the member countries, which states that 
the countries need to converge on stability-oriented economic policies set on three 
progressive targets, the first of which was set for 2008, the second for 2012 and the final 
target for 2018. These targets are summarised in Table 4.4 below. 
 
Table 4.4: Macroeconomic Convergence Targets for the SADC Countries 
Criterion 2008 2012 2018 
Inflation Rate Single digits 5% 3% 
Budget Deficit 5% or less of GDP 3% of GDP as anchor, with a 
range of 1% 
3% of GDP as anchor, with 
a range of 1% 
Government Debt Less than 60% of GDP Less than 60% of GDP Less than 60% of GDP 
Foreign Reserves 3 months’ import cover More than 6 months’ import 
cover 
More than 6 months’ import 
cover 
Central Bank credit to 
the government 
Less than 10% of the 
previous year’s tax income 
Less than 5% of the previous 
year’s tax income by 2015 
Less than 5% of the 
previous year’s tax income 
Source: Rossouw (2006:384). 
 
According to SADC Bankers (2009), the SADC member states opted to make inflation 
convergence their primary objective as they considered it a more appropriate and realistic 
convergence target. A broad-based body of macroeconomic indicators could be targeted once 
progress is made with market integration, to include the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP, 
the ratio of public sector debt to GDP, and the external balances of the economy. 
 
Researchers have noted that South Africa, being the dominant country in the region that also 
has a strong currency and a reputation for fighting inflation, would especially need to be 
persuaded to join the SADC monetary union as the regional currency may not be as strong as 
the ZAR. Similarly, the monetary union may not have the same anti-inflationary bias as the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB). Hence, macroeconomic conditions designed to entice 
South Africa, and the CMA in general, to partake in a regional monetary union were 
proposed. These conditions stipulate that: 
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i. The inflation rate of any country wishing to join the SADC monetary union should not 
be more than 1.5% higher than the average of the CMA countries;  
ii. The exchange rate should not be more than 5% higher or lower than that of the CMA 
countries; and 
iii. The long-term interest rate should not be more than 2% higher than the average 
observed in the CMA countries (Agbeyegbe, 2003:5). 
 
The performance of the SADC countries based on the macroeconomic convergence targets is 
assessed below. 
 
Inflation Performance 
Table 4.5 below shows the trend in inflation rates of the SADC countries, while Table 4.6 
shows the descriptive statistics for the data.  
 
Table 4.5: SADC Inflation Rates 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Angola 268.4 116.1 105.6 76.57 31.02 18.53 12.2 12 12 
Botswana 8.5 6.6 8 9.2 7 8.6 11.6 7.1 13 
DRC 514 360 32 13 4 21 13 17 17 
Lesotho 6.1 6.9 11.9 5.9 5.1 3.5 6 8 11 
Madagascar 12 7 16.3 -1.7 13.9 18.4 10.8 10.3 9 
Malawi 29.6 27.5 14.8 9.6 11.5 15.4 13.9 8 9 
Mauritius 4.7 5.3 5.6 3.9 5.6 3.9 11.9 8.7 10 
Mozambique 11.4 21.9 9.1 13.8 9.07 11.1 9.4 8 10 
Namibia  9.3 9.3 11.3 7.3 3.9 2.2 5.1 6.7 10 
South Africa 5.4 5.7 9.2 5.8 1.4 3.4 4.7 7.1 10 
Swaziland 7.3 7.5 11.7 7.4 3.4 4.8 5.3 8.1 14 
Tanzania 5.9 5.1 4.6 3.5 4.1 4.3 6.2 7 10 
Zambia 25.9 21 38 17 17.5 18.3 9.1 10.7 12 
Zimbabwe 55.9 71.9 133.2 365 350 585.8 1 281.8 2 4411 - 
Source: Own table derived from data taken from SADC Bankers (2009). 
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Table 4.6: SADC Inflation Descriptive Statistics (2000-2008) 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Angola 87.7 44.0 325.0 12.0 102.6 
Botswana 9.0 9.0 13.0 7.0 2.2 
DRC 110.1 17.0 514.0 4.0 189.4 
Lesotho 7.8 6.0 34.0 -10.0 11.5 
Madagascar 10.8 11.0 19.0 -1.0 5.7 
Malawi 15.0 14.0 30.0 8.0 7.2 
Mauritius 6.3 5.0 10.0 4.0 2.3 
Mozambique 11.4 13.0 17.0 7.0 3.2 
Namibia  5.8 6.0 10.0 2.0 2.8 
South Africa 5.1 6.0 10.0 -1.0 3.4 
Swaziland 8.1 7.0 14.0 3.0 3.8 
Tanzania 6.1 5.0 10.0 5.0 1.7 
Zambia 17.6 18.0 26.0 9.0 5.7 
Zimbabwe 3 349.6 292.0 2 4411.0 56.0 8 516.6 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table 4.5 indicates that the SADC countries experienced varying levels of inflation year-on-
year. Table 4.6 shows that Zimbabwe had the highest rate of inflation in the region, with an 
average rate of inflation of 3 349.63% during this period when the country experienced 
economic meltdown and hyperinflation. Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo also 
experienced hyperinflation during this period, attaining an average rate of 87.67% and 
110.11%, respectively, due to the political turmoil they experienced during this period. 
However, the data indicates that inflation in Angola and the DRC declined significantly in 
recent years, attaining minimum rates of 12% and 4% respectively. Similarly, inflation in 
Zimbabwe declined to single digit levels in 2009 when the country abandoned the use of its 
national currency as a means of exchange63.  
 
Furthermore, the mean values in Table 4.6 indicate that on average Angola, the DRC, 
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe failed to attain the SADC target of single digit inflation, 
while Madagascar and Mozambique, were barely above target. In contrast, the CMA 
countries, Botswana, Mauritius and Tanzania managed to attain single digit average rates of 
inflation, which they maintained during most of the period as indicated by their median 
values. South Africa attained the lowest inflation rates on average of 5.11%, while Lesotho at 
some point in time attained a -10% disinflation. 
                                                
63 It is important to note that the data for Zimbabwe covers the period during which the country experienced 
economic turmoil that led to the collapse of the national currency. At present, the country uses a system of 
multiple-currencies and the economy is slowly turning around. This makes it very difficult to assess the 
implications of the country joining the regional monetary union. 
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Figures 4.1 below, shows the inflation trends in the SADC countries between the years 2000- 
2008. 
 
Figure 4.1: Inflation Trends in the SADC Countries (2000-2008) 
   
Source: Derived using Eviews 7  
 
The extremely high inflation rates for Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe make it difficult to 
observe the trends in inflation in the rest of the SADC countries. Thus, Figure 4.2 below 
excludes data from these countries. Figure 4.2 shows that there is evidence of a degree of 
convergence in the inflation rates of the SADC countries.  
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Figure 4.2: Inflation Trends in the SADC Countries (excluding Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe; 2000-2008) 
 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7  
 
The inflation performance of the member states is further assessed in terms of the divergence 
of the inflation rates of the rest of the countries from that of the CMA average in Table 4.7 
below. 
 
Table 4.7: SADC Inflation Differentials vis-a-vis CMA Average (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Angola 97.4 93.7 89.6 91.4 88.8 81.2 56.7 37.7 6.3 
Botswana 17.4 -11.4 -37.8 28.3 50.7 59.6 54.5 -5.3 13.5 
DRC 98.6 97.9 65.5 49.2 13.8 83.5 59.4 56.0 33.8 
Madagascar 41.5 -5.0 32.4 488.2 75.2 81.1 51.2 27.4 -25 
Malawi 76.3 73.3 25.5 31.2 70.0 77.4 62.1 6.6 -0.25 
Mauritius -49.5 -38.7 -96.9 -69.2 38.4 10.9 55.7 14.1 -12.5 
Mozambique 38.4 66.4 -21.2 52.2 61.9 68.7 43.9 6.6 -12.5 
Tanzania -19.1 -44.1 -139.7 -88.6 15.9 19.2 14.9 -6.8 -12.5 
Zambia 72.9 65.0 70.9 61.2 80.3 81.0 42.0 30.1 6.25 
Zimbabwe 87.4 89.8 91.7 98.2 99.0 99.4 99.6 99.9  
Source: Own table derived from data taken from SADC Bankers (2009). 
 
Agbeyegbe (2003:5) asserts that for South Africa and the rest of the CMA countries to be 
convinced to join a SADC monetary union, the inflation rates of the non-CMA member states 
should not be 1.5% higher than the CMA average. The data in Table 4.7 above shows that the 
non-CMA countries overall do not meet this criterion. The negative percentages indicate 
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instances where the inflation levels of the respective countries were below the CMA average. 
Tanzania and Mauritius had the most instances where their inflation was lower than the CMA 
average, followed by Mozambique, Madagascar and Botswana. 
 
On the other hand, Angola, the DRC, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe on average had levels 
of inflation that were more than 50% higher than the CMA average. The consistently high 
inflation differentials between these countries and the CMA average may be a cause for 
concern for a SADC monetary union. As Honohan and Lane (2003:5) note, the divergent 
inflation rates may be a reflection of underlying weak intra-regional adjustment mechanisms 
to shocks. As such, the countries may still face temporary asymmetric shocks to relative price 
levels from a variety of sources even when convergence occurs in the long run. 
 
The inflation differentials could also be attributed to the different rates at which these 
countries trade with third countries. Table 4.3 above indicates that, while the LNS countries 
import more than 80% of their goods from the rest of the SADC countries, South Africa in 
particular, the non-CMA countries with high inflation differentials import a substantial 
amount of goods from third countries. Hence, they suffer from imported inflation, which 
contributes to the inflation differentials.  
 
In summary, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 as well as Figure 4.2 indicate that inflation in the SADC 
countries is declining, hence, showing signs of convergence. However, Table 4.7 indicates 
that, with the exception of Botswana, inflation in the non-CMA countries continues to be well 
above the CMA average. This implies that a region-wide SADC monetary integration would 
be unsustainable as the relatively higher inflation rates in the non-CMA countries may make 
it difficult for them to maintain a fixed exchange rate over an extended period and will 
eventually opt to float.  
 
Furthermore, the CMA countries (South Africa in particular) will not be keen on undertaking 
monetary integration with high inflation countries, as this would jeopardise the value of its 
currency and counter its anti-inflationary bias. Thus, a monetary union that includes the CMA 
countries and the rest of the SADC countries may be unsustainable. 
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Exchange Rate 
Table 4.8 below shows the trend in nominal exchange rates of the SADC national currencies 
against the United States dollar (USD) over the period 2000-2008. 
 
Table 4.8: SADC Exchange Rates against the USD 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Angola 16.9 32.0 58.9 79.1 85.6 80.8 80.2 75 75.2 
Botswana 5 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 7 
DRC 50 313.6 409.3 372.5 444.1 431.3 5 076.2 502.9 639.3 
Lesotho 7 9 11 8 6 6 7 7 8 
Madagascar 1 353 1 318 1 366 1 238 1 869 2 003 2 142 1 874 1 708 
Malawi 60 72 77 97 109 118 136 140 141 
Mauritius 26 29 30 28 27 29 32 31 28 
Mozambique 15 21 24 24 23 23 25 26 24 
Namibia  7 9 11 8 6 6 7 7 8 
South Africa 7 9 11 8 6 6 7 7 8 
Swaziland 7 9 11 8 6 6 7 7 8 
Tanzania 800 876 967 1 038 1 089 1 129 1 252 1 245 1 196 
Zambia 3 111 3 611 4 399 4 733 4 779 4 464 3 603 4 003 3 746 
Zimbabwe 55.1 55.0 55.0 826.4 5 729.3 27.4 250 30 000 4 894 167 
Source: Own table derived from data taken from the IFS database for the IMF (2010). 
 
Table 4.8 shows that a high level of divergence in the exchange rates of the SADC countries. 
The SACU countries are at one extreme, maintaining very strong exchange rates against the 
US dollar throughout the period, while the rest of the countries had very weak exchange 
rates. The data indicates the importance of the exchange rate in the SADC countries as a 
stabilisation tool for macroeconomic policies, especially in the DRC, Madagascar, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, which are the countries that maintained extremely high exchange 
rates. As McCarthy (2002:26) observes, this implies that removing the exchange rate from 
each member state’s portfolio of policy instruments will restrict their ability to manage 
external shocks. 
 
Agbeyegbe (2003:5) further proposes that for South Africa and the rest of the CMA countries 
to be convinced to join a SADC monetary union, the exchange rates of the non-CMA 
member states should not be more than 5% higher or lower than the CMA average. This 
proposition was considered in Table 4.9 below. 
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Table 4.9: SADC Exchange Rates vis-a-vis CMA Average (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Angola 58.8 71.9 81.3 89.9 92.9 92.6 91.3 90.7 89.3 
Botswana -40.0 -50.0 -83.3 -60.0 -20.0 -20.0 -16.7 -16.7 -14.3 
DRC 86.0 97.1 97.3 97.9 98.6 98.6 99.8 98.6 98.7 
Madagascar 99.5 99.3 99.2 99.4 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.6 
Malawi 88.3 87.5 85.7 91.8 94.5 94.9 94.9 95.0 94.3 
Mauritius 73.1 68.9 63.3 71.4 77.8 79.3 78.1 77.4 71.4 
Mozambique 53.3 57.1 54.1 66.7 73.9 73.9 72.0 73.1 66.7 
Tanzania 99.1 98.9 98.9 99.2 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.3 
Zambia 99.8 99.8 99.7 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.9 
Zimbabwe 87.3 83.6 80.0 99.0 99.9 78.0 97.2 100 100 
Source: Own table derived from data taken from the IFS database for the IMF (2010). 
 
Table 4.9 shows that with the exception of Botswana that maintained a stronger exchange 
rate than the CMA average throughout the period, all non-CMA SADC countries maintained 
exchange rates that were over 50% higher than the CMA average. In the extreme case, 
Angola, the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe had, on average,  
exchange rates that were over 90% higher than the CMA average. The data emphasises the 
importance of the exchange rate as a policy tool for these countries. This implies that the non-
CMA countries are not ready to implement a permanently fixed exchange rate mechanism 
with the CMA countries and therefore, are not ready for monetary integration. 
 
Nominal Interest Rate 
Table 4.10 shows the long-term interest rate on government debt for the SADC countries, 
while Table 4.11 shows the difference between the interest rates of the rest of the SADC 
states and the CMA average. 
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Table 4.10: SADC Nominal Interest Rates (%; 2000-2008) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Angola -61 -6 -11 -3 28 25 4 13 -9 
Botswana 3 9 13 13 10 4 0 1 0 
DRC -57 -45 26       
Lesotho 11 7 3 13 6 7 3 5 6 
Madagascar 18 17 9 21 10 7 16 32 32 
Malawi 17 24 -13 37 19 15 12 19 15 
Mauritius 18 13 14 14 14 16 13 13 13 
Mozambique 6 7 17 19 14 10 8 11 10 
Namibia  -9 3 3 14 9 5 2 3 0 
South Africa 5 6 5 10 5 5 4 4 4 
Swaziland 14 6 5 8 5 4 2 2 4 
Tanzania 13 12 10 7 5 -4 10 7 6 
Zambia 7 18 20 17 10 9 9 6 8 
Zimbabwe 8 -22 -39 -59 -21 -1    
Source: Own table derived from data taken from the IFS database for the IMF (2010). 
 
Table 4.11: SADC Nominal Interest Rates vis-a-vis CMA Average (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Angola 108.61 191.67 136.36 475.0 77.68 79.0 31.25 73.08 138.89 
Botswana -75.0 38.89 69.23 13.46 37.50 -31.25 - -250 - 
Madagascar 70.83 67.65 55.56 46.43 37.50 25.0 82.81 89.06 89.06 
Malawi 69.12 77.08 130.78 69.59 67.10 65.0 77.08 81.58 76.67 
Mauritius 70.83 57.69 71.43 19.64 55.36 67.19 78.85 73.08 73.08 
Mozambique 12.5 21.43 76.47 40.79 55.36 47.50 65.63 68.18 65.0 
Tanzania 59.62 54.17 60.0 -60.14 -25.0 231.25 72.5 50.0 41.67 
Zambia 25 69.44 80.0 33.82 37.50 41.67 69.44 41.67 56.25 
Zimbabwe 34.38 125.0 110.26 119.07 129.76 625.0 - - - 
Source: Own table derived from data taken from the IFS database for the IMF (2010). 
Note:  The DRC was excluded due to insufficient data. 
 
According to Agbeyegbe (2003:5), the nominal interest rates for the rest of the SADC 
countries should not be more than 2% higher than the average observed in the CMA 
countries. Table 4.11 however indicates that none of the countries had interest rates close to 
the CMA average. The negative values indicate instances where the respective interest rates 
were lower than the CMA average. Only Botswana and Tanzania had a few instances where 
their interest rates were lower than the CMA average. 
 
On the other hand, Angola and Zimbabwe had the highest interest rate differential vis-a-vis 
the CMA average followed by Malawi, Madagascar and Mauritius. The disparity in the 
interest rates of the non-CMA members implies that the financial markets of these countries 
are not integrated with those of the CMA countries hence; the countries are not ready for 
monetary integration.  
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Deficit-to-GDP and Debt-to-GDP Ratios 
Table 4.12 below shows data on the fiscal balance of the SADC countries. The requirement 
for monetary integration is that the fiscal deficit of each country should not exceed 3% of its 
GDP by 2012.  
 
Table 4.12: SADC Deficit-to-GDP Ratio (2000-2008) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Angola 5 14 29 57 81 100 113 127 143 
Lesotho - -3 -4 1 8 4 13 9 - 
Mauritius -1 -4 -4 -3 -3 -2 -3 -2 - 
South Africa -2 -1 -2 -3 -2 0 1 2 - 
Tanzania 81 85 86 91 95 100 107 115 127 
Zambia - 2 -2 1 2 -5 2 -1 - 
Source: Own calculations derived from data taken from the World Bank (2010). 
Note: i. Botswana, the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe do not report on these   
variables to the World Bank.  
ii. Namibia and Swaziland have several missing variables hence they were excluded.  
 
Table 4.12 indicates that of the countries that report data on their fiscal balance, only Angola 
and Tanzania had deficit levels that are extremely high, exceeding 100% of GDP during the 
period 20005-2008. The rest of the countries, on the other hand, had favourable ratios 
implying that they would meet the required target. Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa 
and Zambia had negative deficit-to-GDP ratios for some periods, indicating periods were 
these countries had budget surpluses. 
 
Table 4.13 below shows the level of public debt of the SADC countries. It is required that the 
public debt of the member states should not exceed 60% of their GDP. 
 
Table 4.13: SADC Debt-to-GDP Ratio (2000-2007) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Angola 103 94 76 62 47 41 23 21 
Botswana 7 7 8 6 5 4 4 3 
DRC 272 246 181 198 173 146 127 123 
Lesotho 86 84 98 71 59 48 43 41 
Mauritius 38 38 40 48 38 50 41 63 
Mozambique 171 120 120 83 84 69 42 39 
South Africa 19 20 23 16 13 13 14 15 
Swaziland 18 20 27 20 18 17 15 14 
Tanzania 76 66 70 68 69 55 30 30 
Zambia 177 168 177 155 138 75 21 24 
Zimbabwe 52 35 18 61 102 124 - - 
Source: Own table derived using data from the World Bank (2010). 
Note:  Madagascar, Malawi and Namibia do not report data on these variables to the World Bank.  
 
131 
 
The data indicates that the debt-to-GDP ratio in Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia was initially very high but has been declining over the years. The DRC 
is the only country that has not managed to reduce its debt levels, while Zimbabwe’s debt 
levels appeared to be rising over the years. On the other hand, Botswana and South Africa, 
the strongest economies in the region, showed consistently low levels of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, with Botswana reporting the lowest levels relative to all the SADC countries. 
 
4.4 OTHER RELEVANT CRITERIA 
An evaluation of the economic performance of the member states is conducted so as to 
determine the implications for economic convergence. The assumption is that if the poorer 
economies are growing at a faster rate than the richer ones, then the SADC economies are 
converging. However, if there were a disparity in their economic performance then they 
would have different and possibly conflicting priorities in terms of national macroeconomic 
objectives. This implies that individual countries would still require the use of national 
monetary and exchange rate policy to stimulate their economies. Thus, the countries would 
not be suitable for monetary integration at present. 
 
4.4.1 Economic Performance of SADC Countries 
Table 4.14 below shows the economic performance of the SADC countries since 1990 using 
the economic size and growth performance of the member countries. The table indicates that 
there is a large disparity in the GDP levels of the SADC countries, with South Africa having 
real GDP levels that were over hundred times greater than the rest of the countries. Angola, 
Tanzania and Botswana were the second, third and fourth largest performers, respectively.  
 
Furthermore, the economies show a significant divergence in their growth rates. During the 
period 1990-1994, there was slow growth in the member states, with Zambia, the DRC and 
Angola experiencing negative growth rates, while Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland 
and Mauritius performed better than the rest of the countries. During the period 1995-1999, 
Angola, Botswana, Malawi, and Mozambique grew faster than the rest of the countries. 
These countries, with the exception of Malawi, consistently showed positive growth during 
the periods 2000-2004 and 2005-2008. 
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Table 4.14: Annual Average GDPs (USD mil.) and Annual Average Growth Rates (%) 
      1990-1994    1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2008 
 GDP  Growth GDP Growth GDP Growth GDP Growth 
Angola 7 308.26 -11.7 7 926.18 7.58 10 569.06 7.88 19 511.34 19.1 
Botswana 3 717.70 4.7 4 870.7 7.19 6 826.71 6.18 8 296.91 3.50 
DRC 6 320.94 -8.58 4 965.48 -2.36 4 483.50 1.38 5 701.20 6.45 
Lesotho 594.29 4.36 723.54 4.02 830.74 3.06 986.39 3.68 
Madagascar 3 148.0 0.006 3 426.9 3.22 3 933.6 2.62 4 733.59 5.73 
Malawi 1 290.79 0.67 1 593.94 7.94 1 689.07 1.56 2 073.01 5.30 
Mauritius 3 022 057 5.15 3 855.14 5.00 4 863.89 5.24 5 703.35 4.60 
Mozambique 2 639.39 1.73 3 549.21 8.50 5 115.84 7.72 7 214.74 8.06 
Namibia  2 899.86 4.38 3 530.02 3.20 4 235.29 3.03 5 423.08 4.60 
South Africa 109 866.88 0.20 122 564.68 2.58 141 975.69 3.61 172 716.21 5.01 
Swaziland 1 085.91 3.90 1 268.87 3.54 1 549.87 2.20 1 744.28 2.80 
Tanzania 6 994.20 2.52 8 046.91 3.98 10 333.46 6.56 13 904.33 7.15 
Zambia 3 021.28 -0.36 3 027.20 2.30 3 538.95 4.28 4 482.48 5.90 
Zimbabwe 6 795.14 2.72 7 900.99 1.64 6 716.15 -5.44 5 618.11 -6.00 
Source: Own calculations using data from SADC bankers (2010) and the World Bank (2010). 
Note:  GDP is at current market prices. 
 
In general, most economies showed positive growth rates, although Angola, Mozambique and 
Tanzania grew faster, on average, than the rest of the member states. Growth in South Africa 
however, has remained slow, even though it is the largest economy in the region, while 
Mauritius maintained almost the same growth rate throughout the period.  
 
In conclusion, it appears that although the SADC countries display positive growth rates 
although there is no evidence of convergence in their economies. The richer countries 
continue to maintain GDP levels that are much higher than the poorer countries. This implies 
that the macroeconomic objectives of the richer and poorer countries will differ. The poorer 
countries will prioritise policies aimed at poverty reduction and stimulating economic growth, 
while the richer countries are more intent on improving their competitiveness. As such, the 
relative importance of domestic policy instruments differs between these countries. 
Therefore, the members states ought to take precautions against premature converge in 
macroeconomic stability indicators. 
 
4.4.2 Level of Economic Convergence 
The level of real economic convergence is measured using the standard deviation of per 
capita income of the individual countries (cf. Quah, 1996; Jenkins and Thomas, 1997; and 
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Rassekh, 1998). Figure 4.3 below displays the standard deviation of the log of per capita 
income of the SADC countries, while Figure 4.4 displays that of the subset of the SACU 
countries for the same period.  
 
Figure 4.3: Standard Deviation of per capita GDP for the SADC countries (2000-2008) 
 
Source: Derived using data from the World Bank (2010) 
 
Figure 4.3 indicates that the standard deviation in the per capita GDP of the SADC countries 
has been increasing from 2000 to 2007. The values of the standard deviation are greater than 
one, indicating that the divergence in the performance of the economies increased over the 
years. However, there was a slight decline in the standard deviation in 2008. This coincides 
with the launch of the SADC FTA in 2008.  
 
It is hoped that the decline in the standard deviation would continue in the future. The SADC 
FTA opens up the South African market to exports from the smaller countries, which offers 
an opportunity for growth in these countries provided they are able to take advantage of the 
technological progress in South Africa and therefore “catch up” with the richer countries64. 
However, the necessary changes to foster economic growth in the poorer countries are of a 
structural nature and will therefore; take time to reflect in the incomes of the member 
countries. 
                                                
64 Provided the poorer countries ensure they have the adequate institutions to take advantage of technological 
innovations in South Africa (Gerschenkron, 1952; Rassekh et al, 2001). 
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Figure 4.4: Standard Deviation of per capita GDP for the SACU countries (2000-2008) 
 
Source: Derived using data from the World Bank (2010). 
 
Figure 4.4 indicates that income levels in the SACU countries diverged from 2000 to 2005, 
although to a lesser extent than the SADC countries combined. However, the standard 
deviation in their incomes displayed a downward trend from 2006, implying that their 
incomes were converging.  
 
It is important to note that Quah (1996) points out that the σ-convergence approach should be 
interpreted as an indication of the average behaviour of the sample rather than that of the 
entire distribution. For example, Kweka et al (2006:256) found that some countries with low 
GDP such as Tanzania were experiencing positive growth rates and thus “catching up” with 
good performers such as Botswana. This was observed in Table 4.14 above, where countries 
such as Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania grew significantly, while poorer countries such 
as Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia showed low levels of growth.  
 
4.4.3 Level of Financial Development 
There are three main indicators of financial depth cited in literature, which are: the ratio of 
liquid liabilities (or M2) relative to nominal GDP, the ratio of commercial bank credit to the 
private sector relative to nominal GDP, and the ratio of private sector credit relative to liquid 
liabilities. The first indicator, the ratio of liquid liabilities to nominal GDP, is a measure of 
the size of the financial system in an economy. The ratio is an indicator of the extent to which 
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the commercial banks are able to mobilise deposit money relative to the size of the economy 
(Beck et. al, 2000:6). 
 
The second indicator, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP, is a measure of the size and 
efficiency of the financial system. The ratio is an indicator of the important role played by the 
financial sector, particularly commercial banks, in financing the economy. There are two 
underlying assumptions behind this measure; the first one is that credit to the private sector 
generates larger increases in investment and productivity than credit to the public sector 
(Beck et. al, 2000:7). The second assumption is that central banks are less likely to identify 
profitable investments, monitor managers, facilitate risk management and/or mobilise savings 
(hence, the potential substitutability between public and private credit, particularly for less 
developed countries) (Garcia-Herrero et. al, 2003: 340). The third indicator, the ratio of 
private sector credit to liquid liabilities, is a measure of the efficiency of the financial system. 
The ratio is an indicator of the extent to which commercial banks are able to use deposit 
money from the economy to lend to the private sector.  
 
The data in Table 4.15 below indicates that the financial systems in most of the SADC 
countries are shallow. The data indicates that the domestic commercial banks are inefficient 
in financing the economies of the member states. Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe had 
extremely high average ratios in some periods, which Mckinnon and Pill (1997), and 
Kaminsky and Reihnart (1999) caution could be an indication of financial crises. This 
assertion applies to the latter group of countries, which individually experienced economic 
turmoil at different times during the period under consideration. 
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Table 4.15: Average Ratios of Private Sector Credit to GDP (%) 
      1990-1994    1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Angola 3 426 447.59 0.06 0.11 0.04 
Botswana - 11.79 - 0.09 
DRC - 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Lesotho - - 0.22 0.22 
Madagascar - - 0.42 0.03 
Mauritius - 0.36 0.09 0.00 
Mozambique 2 425.59 144.71 15.61 0.14 
Namibia  - - 0.01 - 
South Africa 0.93 0.34 0.05 0.02 
Swaziland 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.02 
Tanzania - - - 0.67 
Zambia - 0.31 0.15 0.06 
Zimbabwe 644.14 444.91 155.12 2 864.73 
Source: Own calculations using data from SADC bankers (2010); IFS (2011) 
 
From 4.16 below, it was observed that on average, the financial systems in Mauritius and 
South Africa are most efficient in mobilising deposit money relative to the size of the 
economy, followed by the financial systems in Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and Botswana, 
respectively. In addition, the data indicates that the financial system in Madagascar has 
steadily grown over the years, implying an improvement in financial development. Angola, 
the DRC, Mozambique and Zimbabwe had ratios that were too high in some periods, further 
affirming the occurrence of financial crises in these countries. 
 
Table 4.16: Average Ratios of Liquid Liabilities to GDP (%) 
      1990-1994    1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Angola 26 481 454.02 22.51 16.83 25.93 
Botswana 21.25 19.90 21.89 - 
DRC 947 531 215.95 0.30 3.78 11.01 
Lesotho 34.16 34.77 31.89 39.45 
Madagascar 0.00 0.00 18.14 19.78 
Malawi 20.44 15.84 15.48 7.22 
Mauritius 67.59 76.61 80.34 29.57 
Mozambique 23 833.49 17 276.20 24 061.83 29.43 
Namibia  28.23 39.47 29.69 - 
South Africa 45.03 50.84 55.55 66.50 
Swaziland 24.23 21.83 20.74 11.20 
Tanzania 15.58 16.50 15.84 32.21 
Zambia 15.05 17.53 14.26 20.83 
Zimbabwe 0.00 0.00 0.00 548 805.38 
Source: Own calculations using data from SADC Bankers (2010); IFS (2011) 
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Table 4.17: Average Ratios of Private Sector Credit to Liquid Liabilities (%) 
      1990-1994    1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Angola 8.50 19.86 22.66 - 
Botswana 66.39 59.91 73.31 46.64 
DRC 5.80 8.09 13.75 32.92 
Lesotho 44.59 53.94 31.70 27.40 
Madagascar - - 39.98 52.99 
Malawi 54.17 28.88 28.79 39.28 
Mauritius 55.30 66.71 69.61 64.00 
Mozambique 49.13 69.87 56.84 56.02 
Namibia  81.04 95.92 106.56 - 
South Africa 122.68 122.59 116.40 123.67 
Swaziland 71.07 64.44 68.66 92.76 
Tanzania 35.00 24.90 42.43 63.79 
Zambia 40.09 43.03 47.96 51.02 
Zimbabwe - - - 12.05 
Source: Own calculations using data from SADC Bankers (2010)  
 
From Table 4.17 above, it was observed that Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and 
Namibia showed a consistent increase in the efficiency of their financial systems, while the 
rest of the countries had mixed patterns. Of particular interest is that private sector credit was 
consistently in excess of liquid liabilities in South Africa, while that in Namibia exceeded 
liquid liabilities from the year 2000. On the other hand, it was assumed that the excess credit 
was extended from external sources of funds. The increases in efficiency in Angola, the DRC 
and Zambia are once again considered with caution, as the too rapid growth in private credit 
may be an indication of financial crises. 
 
In summary, the three measures of financial development indicate that Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa are improving in both the size and efficiency of their 
financial systems, while Malawi is slow in improving the efficiency of its financial system. 
The financial systems in the rest of the SADC states are still under-developed.  
 
An additional measure of financial development is the degree of banking sector concentration 
in a country, which gives an indication of the level of competition in the financial sector. The 
measure makes use of an index ranging from 0-1, calculated as the assets of the three largest 
banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks in a particular country (Beck et. al, 2000). 
An index close to one indicates a high bank concentration, which implies that the three 
largest banks own most of the assets in the banking sector. As such, competition in the sector 
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is relatively low and these banks can exercise monopolistic power in the determination of 
market rates and prices independent of central bank actions. Figure 4.18 below, shows the 
degree of banking sector concentration in the SADC countries. 
 
Table 4.18: Bank Concentration (1991-2004) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Botswana 1 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Lesotho - - - - 1 - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 
Madagascar - - - 1 1 - - 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Malawi - - - - - 0.9 0.9 1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Mozambique - - - - - 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 1 
Namibia  - 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 
South Africa 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Swaziland - - - - - - 1 - 1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 1 
Tanzania - - - - - 1 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Zambia - 1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Source: Beck et. al (2000); Johns (2009) 
 
Table 4.18 shows that banking sector concentration in most of the SADC countries is high, 
which is an indication that competition within the banking sectors of these countries is 
relatively low. Hence, the financial systems in the SADC countries are shallow. The 
implication drawn from the data is that the banking sector exercises monopolistic power in 
the determination of market rates and prices, which in turn hinders the transmission of 
monetary policy in these countries.  
 
Lastly, Table B.4 in Appendix B shows the structure of the financial markets as well as the 
monetary policy instruments used in the SADC countries. The information shows that the 
financial markets in most of the member states are shallow and under-developed. This 
implies that the transmission of monetary policy will be inefficient in the member states. It is 
therefore, assumed that monetary integration between the SADC countries will result in 
varying changes in output and prices across countries. Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 indicate that 
the SADC countries have divergent output level and the respective growth rates. From this, it 
can be assumed further that monetary integration is likely to widen cyclical variation between 
countries.  
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4.5 LESSONS AND CHALLENGES FOR MACROECONOMIC CONVERGENCE 
Cobham and Robson (1992), McCarthy (2002), Masson and Pattilo (2003), Arroyo (2003), 
and Maruping (2005) identify some lessons from the EU’s experience with respect to 
economic and monetary integration that are relevant to developing nations. These lessons are 
discussed below. 
 
To begin with, Maruping (2005:145) notes that for macroeconomic convergence to work 
there must be key determinants in place, such as a consensus on the convergence criteria, the 
implementation modalities, as well as a commitment to agreed obligations. Presently, 
however, the main macroeconomic objectives of SADC countries differ due to a difference in 
the relative importance of each policy in the country. The poorer countries such as Malawi 
and Zambia focus on poverty reduction and macroeconomic reforms for stabilisation. While 
the richer countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa are intent on 
building competitiveness for their external sector and attracting inward and outward 
investment. This influences each country’s commitment towards achieving the 
macroeconomic convergence targets and harmonising policies (Kweka et al, 2006:253).  
 
A more appropriate approach would be to allow for variable speed, geometry and depth of 
MEC in the countries (Maruping, 2005; and Drábek, 2005). Consideration needs to be given 
for instance, to the level of unemployment at which policy convergence would be acceptable 
on political grounds. McCarthy (2002:19) further points out that premature adherence to 
convergence targets in a group of countries, such as the SADC countries, that are exposed to 
asymmetric external shocks would be a bad policy. As long as the SADC countries do not 
have effective alternative mechanisms for adjustment, it would not be in the interest of 
macroeconomic stabilisation to expect convergence in interest rates and exchange rates. 
 
In addition, Drábek (2005:163) points out that the countries may need to agree on rules that 
allow for more flexibility in the interpretation of the MEC targets should they find them to be 
unrealistic. Granted, changing the targets may damage the credibility of policy in the region. 
However, adhering to wrong targets may adversely affect macroeconomic stabilisation in the 
region. Thus, careful consideration needs to be given to the targets and their speed of 
implementation. 
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Another lesson drawn from the EU experience is that macroeconomic convergence requires 
that there be efficient product and factor markets in place. Convergence in inflation rates 
when some countries maintain restrictions on capital flows while others do not, will give rise 
to interest rate differentials maintained through restrictions on the movement of capital across 
borders. In turn, the differences in interest rates would lead to different incentives to 
investment and hence, different growth paths (Drábek, 2005:160).  
 
Furthermore, the low interest rates and high-expected rates of return65 could contribute to 
overly optimistic income expectations and a “wrong” incentive structure of investment in 
some of the countries. This may result in overheating economies and a loss of 
competitiveness. The affected economies may be forced to undergo a prolonged deflation to 
regain competitiveness (Tavlas, 2008:11).  
 
The countries with high interest rates may on the other hand, experience higher inflation 
rates. Thus, according to Drábek (2005:161), product and factor markets need to function 
reasonably well in order to ensure sustainability of macroeconomic policies and to meet 
convergence targets. While it may be possible to harmonise some elements of 
macroeconomic performance, it would not be possible to harmonise all of them in countries 
whose markets are not integrated completely economically.  
 
The SADC countries face challenges in achieving macroeconomic convergence given that a 
number of the member states continue to have serious debt problems as well as its 
management66. According to Kweka et al (2006:242), member countries ought to adopt 
common targets towards reducing external debt and/or aid surges to a sustainable level in 
order to achieve macroeconomic convergence. They argue that a reduction in both the budget 
deficit and current account deficits would make it possible for countries to stabilise the 
external debt-to-GDP-ratio. The intuition is that an increase in the government budget deficit 
is associated with larger deficits of current international payments, implying a faster build-up 
of both government budget deficit and external debt. Thus, a reduction in the government 
deficit will lead to a reduction in the external debt-to-GDP-ratio. 
                                                
65 Due to the low area-wide inflation rate maintained by the regional central bank. 
66 Of the SADC countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania 
and Zambia are listed as part of the world’s 40 heavily indebted poor countries.  
141 
 
However, Drábek (2005:163) argues that the high fiscal deficits prevalent in some of the 
SADC countries are unsustainable in the absence of donor support. The solution to the debt 
problem thus requires not only domestic adjustment, but also an agreement with external 
donors. Until the latter is attained, it will be difficult for the SADC countries to achieve 
convergence.  
 
4.6 AN ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERATION TO MONETARY INTEGRATION  
There have been studies that have suggested extending the Common Monetary Area (CMA) 
to include all SADC countries and thus, have the South African Rand (ZAR) circulated as a 
common currency within the region67. The US dollar is another currency that is a means of 
exchange in a number of SADC countries, namely the DRC, Zambia and presently in 
Zimbabwe68 when their national currencies collapsed. The DRC and Zambia are partially 
dollarised, while Zimbabwe uses a system of multiple currencies, which includes both the 
ZAR and the US dollar. 
 
This section considers the possibility of approaching monetary integration within the SADC 
region through either dollarisation (which may entail substituting the national currencies of 
the member states for either the USD or the ZAR) or a “Rand” monetary union (which may 
entail an extension of the CMA arrangement). A comparison between dollarisation within the 
SADC region and an extension of the CMA arrangement is therefore, carried out in this 
section.  
 
To begin with, both monetary arrangements offer potential benefits of increasing credibility 
of monetary policy of the participating countries as well as instilling fiscal discipline. The 
non-CMA SADC countries could benefit from using either the USD or the ZAR, as these are 
strong currencies with reputations for fighting inflation. Thus, the member states could 
benefit from importing monetary policy credibility from the anchor country. Presently, only 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (the LNS countries) benefit from importing policy 
credibility from the SARB under the CMA arrangement.  
 
                                                
67 See Masson and Pattilo (2003), Buiguit and Valev (2006) and Aziakpono et. al (2007). 
68 Which uses multiple currencies, including the ZAR. 
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However, both arrangements entail the loss of autonomy over monetary policy. The anchor 
country will effectively determine monetary policy for the SADC region as a whole. Under a 
dollarisation system, the SADC countries will completely relinquish monetary policy 
autonomy and thus, have no say in the pace of national monetary policy; while on the other 
hand, there is a possibility of amending the CMA arrangement to allow monetary policy to be 
determined collectively by the member states. Under the current CMA arrangement, the 
SARB is the only central bank that engages actively in discretionary monetary policy, while 
policies in the LNS countries are managed along the line of the SARB policy. The SARB 
consults the governors of the central banks of the LNS countries before setting monetary 
policy but has no obligation to include the LNS countries in the monetary policy decision 
process (Aziakpono, 2008:191). 
 
In addition, both arrangements entail the loss of seignorage revenue for the smaller SADC 
states. Under the current CMA arrangement, South Africa compensates the LNS countries for 
forgone seignorage based on a pre-determined formula (Wang et al, 2007:8). However, there 
is on-going dispute concerning the revenue sharing formula, which implies that such an 
arrangement may not be sustainable within a larger group of countries. Dollarisation, on the 
other hand, does not guarantee an agreement whereby the anchor country compensates the 
dollarised state for forgone seignorage. It is however, possible for the anchor country and the 
dollarised state to negotiate such an arrangement through a treaty (Calvo, 1999; Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, 2000; Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Chang, 2000b; Araujo and Leon, 2003). 
However, given the current problems faced by the CMA countries concerning revenue 
sharing, South Africa may not be in a position to compensate all the SADC states for forgone 
seignorage revenue. Hence, both arrangements are undesirable in this aspect.  
 
The SADC FTA presents further problems for the smaller SADC countries as the 
arrangement calls for the reduction and eventual removal of intra-regional tariff and non-
tariff barriers on goods and services. This implies that the smaller SADC countries will incur 
a reduction in revenue in the form of customs duties currently charged on goods imported 
from other SADC member states. In addition, the SADC FTA is likely to result in polarised 
development. South Africa, which is predominantly industrialised, is endowed with more of 
every factor on a per capita basis than the smaller SADC countries. Thus, increased regional 
integration implies that production will relocate from the smaller SADC countries to least-
cost producers in South Africa. This implies that the smaller countries will incur further 
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reductions in revenue in the form of export revenue; while on the other hand, their imports 
from South Africa will rise.  
 
This in turn implies that there will be a widening in both the current account and budget 
deficits of the smaller SADC countries. In addition, the elimination of the source of 
productivity improvement in the smaller SADC countries is likely to widen the income gap 
between South Africa and its fellow SADC members, which counteracts the aim of regional 
integration. 
 
An added disadvantage with both monetary arrangements is that the smaller SADC countries 
would be powerless to respond to external shocks that are asymmetric to the anchor country. 
Under the current CMA arrangement, monetary policy in the LNS countries is designed to 
ensure that the exchange rate peg within the CMA is maintained through sufficient foreign 
reserves and that interest rates are kept at levels that prevent any distortions to the fixed 
exchange rates. Hence, there is limited or no scope for discretionary monetary policy 
(Nielsen et al, 2005; Oosthuizen, 2006; Aziakpono, 2008). Table 4.3 indicates that South 
Africa trades extensively with the EU and the rest of the world, which implies that it is 
vulnerable to shocks from these countries. Similarly, the US is a large open economy that 
trades extensively with other economies. This in turn, implies that the smaller SADC 
countries are susceptible to economic contagion from the rest of the world. However, with no 
autonomy over national monetary policy, the smaller SADC countries are likely to endure 
economic recession. 
 
In summary, an extension of the CMA arrangement is more favourable than dollarisation 
within the SADC region. However, a “Rand” monetary union has disadvantages that may not 
be acceptable to some of the SADC member states. An important matter is the issue of 
sovereignty; the non-CMA SADC members may not be willing to surrender monetary policy 
autonomy to the South African Reserve Bank. Hence, the member states may have to revise 
the CMA arrangement to allow all central banks to have a say in the conduct of monetary 
policy. 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to ascertain the implications of a monetary union within the 
SADC countries. The approach of the chapter was to first review available literature on the 
feasibility of monetary integration within the SADC countries before an assessment was 
carried out on the extent to which the SADC countries meet the OCA properties. 
 
A common finding of the studies carried out on the SADC countries is that a region-wide 
monetary union is not feasible at present. However, a number of studies suggest an extension 
of the CMA arrangement as an alternative approach to monetary integration. There is 
however, no consensus on which countries should be allowed to join the CMA arrangement. 
Buiguit and Valev (2006) suggest that Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia could be the first 
countries to join the CMA, while Aziakpono et. al (2007) suggest that Botswana, the 
Seychelles and Zambia could be initial members, and Johns (2009) suggest that the CMA 
could include Botswana, Malawi and Zambia.  
 
It is important to note that the studies considered different aspects of the economies, and in 
some studies, some countries were not included in the sample due to the lack of sufficient 
data. Furthermore, the assessment of the extent to which the SADC countries meet the 
traditional OCA properties led to the conclusion that Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zambia are suitable candidates for an extension of the CMA.  
 
However, Malawi and Zambia showed a high disparity in their inflation and exchange rates 
vis-a-vis the CMA countries. This implies that they could potentially destabilise the CMA if 
admitted prematurely. We may therefore conclude, based on previous studies and the 
assessments conducted in this chapter, that an extension of the CMA arrangement could 
include Botswana and Mozambique.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EXPERIENCE 
WITH MONETARY INTEGRATION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 set out the theoretical framework of regional economic integration, which included 
a review of the textbook stages of the integration process. The discussion also outlined the 
different types of monetary integration arrangements available, ranging from regional 
payments agreements, which are the simplest form of monetary arrangements and require 
minimum commitment, to full economic and monetary unions, which entail giving up 
national currencies for a union currency with a common central bank.  
 
Chapter 3 reviewed the theoretical frameworks related to monetary integration, which 
included an outline of the economic properties that should be present in member states prior 
to joining a monetary union. The present chapter reviews the experience of the European 
Union (EU) with regional economic integration, considering the path followed by the EU 
countries from the onset of economic integration until the implementation of an economic 
and monetary union (EMU) in Section 5.2. Thus, this section reviews how the European 
countries put the theory of regional economic integration into practice. The problems they 
faced during their quest for economic integration are considered and the subsequent steps 
taken to address them are reviewed. It is important for countries desiring to pursue regional 
economic integration to study and learn from the EU experience, paying particular attention 
to how they addressed the problems they faced during their quest for an EMU. 
 
Section 5.3 reviews the experience of the EU peripheral countries with economic integration 
with the core countries. The former group comprises countries that generally have weaker 
fundamentals than the latter. Thus, their experience with monetary integration is particularly 
relevant to the SADC region, which is characterised by both strong and weak countries. The 
section also discusses the causes of the current sovereign debt crisis, drawing lessons from 
the factors that led to the crisis and the measures the EU has taken to address it. 
 
The issues discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 are taken into consideration in Section 5.4, in the 
application of the EU experience with monetary integration to the SADC countries. The 
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section also provides a preliminary road map that the SADC countries can follow towards 
monetary integration. Lastly, Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 THE EU’S COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRATION PROCESS 
The process of economic integration within the European countries took over 50 years, with 
the culmination of a full economic and monetary union. The EU integration process was 
characterised by a gradual deepening of economic and monetary co-operation, which began 
with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. The ECSC 
was a common market for a limited number of products, with France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg as founding members. 
 
Mongelli (2008:16) makes use of the Balassa (1961) index of institutional integration to trace 
the main stages of EU economic integration. The index was built by assigning scores (from 
the time a decision started being actually implemented) to the level of integration recorded at 
each stage of integration. Scores from 0 to 25 were assigned to the degree of regional 
integration achieved over time in the development of, respectively, a FTA/CU (considered 
jointly), a common market, an economic union, and an area with full economic integration. 
By summing up the scores achieved in each moment in time, an index of institutional 
regional integration was obtained, which ranges between 0 (no economic integration at all) 
and 100 (full economic integration, including monetary and financial integration). 
 
Figure 5.1 below illustrates the evolution of the whole index as well as the evolution of the 
main steps toward monetary and financial integration. The index was applied to the original 
six EU members, i.e., Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Luxemburg (LU), Italy 
(IT) and the Netherlands (NL), for the period 1957-2007.  
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Figure 5.1: Index of Institutional Integration for the EU-6 
 
Source: Mongelli, (2008:17) 
 
From Figure 5.1 above, we can see that the EU FTA was formed over a number of years, 
with tariff reduction occurring progressively from 1957 to 1968, the onset of a customs union 
(CU). The common market was then formed in 1993, with the launch of the European single 
market, while the monetary union was formed in 1999. Presently, the Euro area, with a single 
monetary policy, can be classified somewhere between a monetary union and a full economic 
union. 
 
It can also be observed that EU institutional integration went through several phases, ranging 
from rapid early growth from the late 1950s to the late 1960s driven mainly by real economic 
integration, to a period of modest increase during the 1970s and early 1980s. From the late 
1980s to the late 1990s there was rapid growth driven mainly by monetary and financial 
integration, while the recent period has been a period of modest growth. 
 
On the other hand, there has been gradual growth in the sub-index of monetary and financial 
integration, with the exception of the late 1970s until the launch of the EMS, where there was 
a setback due to the partial re-introduction of capital controls. There was a period of rapid 
growth from the early 1990s, which was driven by the liberalisation of capital markets, and a 
similar leap in 1999, at the launch of the EMU (Mongelli, 2008:17). 
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5.2.1 The “Snake” System and the resultant European Monetary System 
A notable phase in the EU economic integration process was the implementation of the 
“Snake in the dollar tunnel system” in 1971, which was established following the monetary 
crises earlier in the year that resulted in the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system. 
Under the “snake” system, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Italy, Canada and France 
agreed to allow their currencies to fluctuate within a 4.5% band vis-à-vis the United States 
dollar (USD), while the EC member states elected to prevent their currencies from fluctuating 
beyond a 2.5% band vis-à-vis other member currencies. The participating states agreed that if 
a member's currency fluctuated beyond the band, its central bank was responsible for 
sufficient intervention to move its rate back within the acceptable range. In addition, the 
member states agreed to provide one another with intervention support for their currencies, 
which would no longer be in USD (Salvatore, 2004; Mongelli, 2008).  
 
The crises affected some countries more than it did others; as a result, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom (UK) could not maintain such a narrow band and 
continually left the snake to re-join later. The lack of convergence of the economic and 
monetary policies of France and Germany, in particular, gave rise to diverging developments 
in inflation rates. This in turn fuelled pressures in the foreign exchange markets. 
 
 In 1973, the “snake” decoupled from the dollar. Continued foreign exchange unrest 
compelled the member states to work towards monetary co-operation. This resulted in the 
establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) in March 1979 with the aim of 
gaining closer monetary cooperation, which was supposed to result in monetary stability 
within Europe. Box C.1 of Appendix C presents a case study of the EMS. 
 
Notable features of the EMS include the fact that there were still some capital account 
restrictions remaining and that there was no agreement to eliminate national policy 
differences. As such, fiscal policies continued to diverge substantially in the 1980s. For 
example, Germany preferred a stability-oriented policy, while France pursued an 
expansionary policy. In addition, there were still significant inflation differentials in some 
countries. With fixed nominal exchange rates, this resulted in continued misalignments that 
required frequent adjustment of the official parities. Furthermore, full nominal convergence 
had not been achieved between participating countries as such; differentials in budget deficits 
and public debt were also substantial. Consequently, the EMS, like the snake, had to cope 
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with many adjustments of official parities in its early stages. The re-alignments often 
occurred in the wake of financial market turmoil, which periodically brought up questions 
about the sustainability of the ERM (Kondonassis and Malliaris, 1994; Salvatore, 2004). 
 
5.2.2 The European Economic Monetary Union 
The economic and monetary union (EMU) was implemented in three stages, which are 
discussed in this subsection. Stage One of EMU commenced in July 1990, with the goal to 
strengthen both monetary and non-monetary co-operation within the existing framework. At 
that time, all remaining capital account restrictions were removed in most of the member 
states except in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, who were allowed a transitional period 
until 1992. However, stage one of EMU was characterised by crises in the EMS, which 
influenced the economic integration process. Box C.2 in Appendix C presents a case study on 
the crises within the EMS.  
 
The crises revealed a major weakness in the EMS in attempting to keep exchange rates 
among member nations within narrowly defined limits without at the same time integrating 
their monetary, fiscal and other policies. Following the crises, the Maastricht Treaty was 
ratified in 1992, which stipulated convergence criteria69 that were designed to foster 
macroeconomic stability in the member states. In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP)70 was implemented to ensure fiscal discipline on member nations. The EU countries 
also agreed to adjust value-added taxes and excise duties (Alberola et al, 2003; Salvatore, 
2004).  
 
Stage Two of EMU commenced in 1994 and had two main goals, preparation for the 
establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the achievement of economic 
convergence. In preparation for the ECB, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was 
established with two main objectives: (i) to strengthen central bank cooperation and monetary 
policy coordination (including the assessment of progress in the fields of economic and legal 
convergence) and (ii) to monitor the functioning of the EMS and to oversee and promote the 
development of the ECU. To achieve economic convergence, the EU member states 
                                                
69 See Section 3.4.6 in Chapter 3. 
70 See Box 3.3 in Chapter 3. 
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committed themselves to reducing excessive budget deficits and hence, fulfilling the 
convergence criteria by 1999, which would be the start of stage three.  
 
Stage Three of EMU entailed the launch of the monetary union. The value of the Euro in 
terms of the currencies of the participating countries was decided at the end of 1998 and the 
exchange rates of the member currencies became irrevocably fixed. The Euro was a unit of 
account (i.e. it was traded in the financial markets, securities were issued in Euros and official 
statistics in the euro area were quoted in Euros) and not an actual physical circulating 
currency until 2002. From January 1999, the exchange rate of the Euro fluctuated in terms of 
other currencies but the value of each participating currency remained rigidly fixed in terms 
of Euros (Salvatore, 2004:720). 
 
The EMS became the European Monetary Union at the beginning of 1999, with the 
introduction of the Euro and a common monetary policy by the ECB. An exchange rate 
mechanism II (ERMII) similar to the one under the EMS was set up to curb excessive 
volatility and possible misalignments among the currencies of the EU countries that were not 
part of the Euro. When the euro was first introduced in circulation, the currency circulated 
alongside national currencies for the first six months, thereafter, national currencies were 
phased out and the Euro became the sole legal tender in the participating countries 
(Kondonassis and Malliaris, 1994; Alberola et al, 2003; Salvatore, 2004; Mongelli, 2008). 
 
5.3 THE EURO ZONE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS  
The subsection below reviews the economic activity in the EU peripheral countries71  prior to 
EU entry and highlights the factors that led to the current sovereign debt crisis. The 
economies of the peripheral countries are characterised traditionally by weak fundamentals. 
As such, their economic progress has been constrained by their propensity for economic 
instability (even after EU accession), which has periodically induced crises and reversals of 
their progress.  
 
The factors that led to the EU sovereign debt crisis are especially relevant to the SADC 
region, which is characterised by both strong and weak countries. It is crucial that the SADC 
                                                
71 The EU peripheral countries include Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
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countries avoid forming an EMU with member states that have weak fundamentals lest they 
end up facing a similar crisis in future. The causes of the debt crisis are reviewed below. 
 
5.3.1 Causes of the Sovereign Debt Crises  
Harrison (2010a) notes that the causes of the EU sovereign debt crises date back to the 
formation of the EMS in 1979. At the time of the creation of the currency union, the core 
countries relaxed the fiscal requirement stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty (1992)72 to 
accommodate Belgium and Italy (which are part of the core countries) that had national debt 
exceeding 60% of GDP. Belgium had a huge amount of debt that was over 100% of GDP, 
while Italy had a history of political instability and changed governments almost every year. 
As such, they could not contain their spending, which resulted in their economies 
accumulating large fiscal deficits that weakened their national currencies.  
 
The fiscal condition thus stipulated that countries that had national debt that was “60% of 
GDP or approaching that value” could join the currency area. This clause however implied 
that any other country that long suffered domestic instability, which prevented it from 
meeting the pre-requisites for EU entry, had to be included in the currency union73. For 
example, of the peripheral countries, Greece, Spain and Portugal had fiscal, currency and 
monetary problems that emanated from political instabilities that ended in 1974, 1975 and 
1976, respectively (Harrison, 2010a; 2010d).  
 
Many of the EU peripheral countries joined the union at a time when the integration process 
was accelerating, particularly in the monetary sphere. Confidence in the economic 
performance of the peripheral countries surged when they joined the EU as it was expected 
that the stability and wealth of Europe’s northern members74 would diffuse throughout its 
periphery. Similarly, it was expected that the stronger institutional and economic frameworks 
of the northern countries would prevail over those of the peripheral countries (Dadush and 
Stancil, 2010:1). 
 
                                                
72 See Section 3.6 of Chapter 3. 
73 The Euro countries did however, attempt to prevent the “free-riders” (i.e., Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) 
from weakening the Euro with an inflationary economic policy by introducing the SGP (see Box 3.1 in Chapter 
3). 
74 i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
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Prior to EU entry, some of the peripheral countries had a history of domestic instability. 
However, during the 1990s (in preparation for EU entry), the inflation and interest rates of 
the peripheral countries converged with those of the core countries. Similarly, long-term 
government bond yield spreads of the peripheral countries vis-à-vis the core countries (which 
indicate the perceived risk of lending to the peripheral countries instead of the core countries) 
fell from 550 basis points in 1980 to 1990 to just 10 in 1999 (Dadush and Stancil, 2010; 
(Harrison, 2010a). 
 
Due to the low interest rates prevailing in the region, the peripheral countries (especially 
Greece, Ireland and Spain) experienced an increase in domestic spending partly financed by 
foreign lending. The increase in demand led to a rise in both prices and wages, particularly in 
service and non-tradable sectors, which in turn led to a rise in the price of non-tradables 
relative to tradables and attracted even more investment in the former. For example, from 
1997 to 2007, the price of services in the peripheral countries rose by an average annual rate 
of 1.5% more than that of goods, compared to a difference of 0.5% in the core countries 
(Dadush and Stancil, 2010:1).  
 
Similarly, wages increased by an average annual rate of 5.9% in the peripheral countries 
compared to 3.2% in the core countries. As such, the economies of the peripheral countries 
shifted from manufacturing and industrial sectors toward services and housing construction. 
During the period 1997 to 2007, 4% of the GDP of the peripheral countries shifted from 
industry to financial services, real estate and business in contrast to a 2% shift in the core 
countries (Dadush and Stancil, 2010:1-2).    
 
However, these increases were not matched by improvements in productivity, where unit 
labour costs rose by 32% in the peripheral countries during this period, while the core 
countries incurred a 12% increase in costs. Consequently, countries such as Austria, Germany 
and the Netherlands were primary exporters, while Greece, Portugal and Spain were net 
importers. As a result, the latter group of countries ran large current account deficits, while 
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands were accumulating capital account deficits to match 
the current account deficits in Greece, Spain and Portugal. Banks in the former group of 
countries were lending to the latter group of countries and to countries in Eastern Europe. As 
such they became excessively exposed as they were under capitalised ((Dadush and Stancil, 
2010; Harrison, 2010e). 
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The use of a common currency did not result in deeper economic integration and a 
harmonisation of the economies of the peripheral European countries with those of the core 
countries. Rather, it resulted in an unbalanced Eurozone with its members having divergent 
fiscal and economic policies. The lack of harmonisation in the member states led to wildly 
differing growth rates and economic outcomes. A single monetary policy designed to slow 
growth in the core European countries however exacerbated the problems in the peripheral 
countries (Harrison, 2010a).  
 
On the one hand, Greece (which saw the most dramatic decline in interest rate and inflation 
rates) enjoyed sustained growth over many years on the back of strong capital inflows. Net 
foreign assets fell from approximately -5% of GDP in 1995 to -100% in 2007. Similarly, 
housing and construction bubbles further fuelled strong GDP growth in Ireland and Spain. 
From 1997 to 2007, housing prices rose at an average annual rate of 12.5% in Ireland and 8% 
in Spain, compared to 4.6% in the USA during its bubble. Over the same period, construction 
as a share of gross output rose from 9.8% to 13.8% in Spain and from 7.9% to10.4% in 
Ireland. In the USA, the ratio only increased from 4.6% to 4.9% (Dadush and Stancil, 
2010:1).  
 
On the other hand, output growth in Greece, Ireland, and Spain encouraged private debt to 
build up. From 1997 to 2007, domestic credit increased by an average of 155%, compared to 
an average increase of only 27% in the core countries. In Portugal and Italy, where export 
sectors were already suffering from declining productivity and labour market inflexibility, 
growth improved only briefly before reverting back to being the lowest in Europe. 
Nevertheless, these countries also saw private sector balance sheets weaken, with household 
savings rates dropping 4.7% in Portugal and 5.7% in Italy from 1997 to 2007 (Dadush and 
Stancil, 2010:2). 
 
The single monetary policy in the Eurozone aggravated the situation for the crisis countries. 
Figure 5.1 below shows how the financial sector balances in the Eurozone changed between 
2006 and 2009. The figure shows how Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain were the 
only countries in the Eurozone that had budget surpluses in 2006. However, the bursting of 
the property bubble at the onset of the global financial crises resulted in Spain and Ireland 
incurring very large budget deficits by 2009 (Harrison, 2010e). 
 
With no autonomy over interest rates, Greece, Spain, and Ireland were limited in their ability 
to deal with the property bubbles. Similarly, Italy and Portug
economic growth, would have benefited from looser monetary policy. 
(2010:3) notes that policy interest rates over 2001
too high for Germany but between 300 and 400 basi
Ireland. These divergences added to the widening competitiveness gaps by stimulating 
economic growth and wages in the latter countries.
 
Figure 5.2: Sectoral Financial Balances in the Eurozone
 
Source: Harrison (2010c) 
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Furthermore, governments in the peripheral countries increased their spending in response to 
the lower borrowing costs and increases in domestic demand during this period. Per capita 
public spending rose by an average of 76% and government’s contribution to GDP rose by 
3.5% during this period. In contrast, average per capita spending in the core countries 
increased by 34%, while the government’s contribution to GDP remained constant (Dadush 
and Stancil, 2010:3). 
 
Figure 5.2 below shows the changes in government’s contribution to GDP in Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain between 1998 and 2008. Once again, the figure highlights the fact 
that Spain and Ireland recorded surpluses in their government budget throughout most of the 
2000s, prior to the onset of the global financial crises.  
  
Figure 5.3: Fiscal Positions of the EU Crisis Countries 
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Source: Harrison (2010e) 
 
Given that countries such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal had most to gain from the low and stable inflation rates that the EMU offered, they 
had strong incentives to achieve and maintain nominal stability. Consequently, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain cheated in the annual reports on their economic performance in order to 
gain admission into the Eurozone. The dishonesty therefore, meant that these countries 
entered the EU when they were not ready for monetary union. As the global economic crisis 
took its toll, the lack of macroeconomic stability in these countries subsequently led to the 
sovereign debt crises as their economies could not sustain the strict monetary and exchange 
rate policy of the EMU (Harrison, 2010a). 
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The global financial crisis exposed the weaknesses in the post-union growth models of the 
peripheral countries. Tax revenues in these countries dropped drastically as output growth 
slowed, thus revealing that the expanded state sector was unaffordable. As the domestic 
recessions deepened, the loss of competitiveness in the peripheral countries made resorting to 
export markets extremely challenging. In addition, rising borrowing costs and ballooning 
public debt (which increased by an average of 20% of GDP from 2007 to 2009) further 
restricted public spending when it was needed most (Dadush and Stancil, 2010:3). 
 
5.3.1.1 Lessons Drawn from the EU Sovereign Debt Crises 
The discussion on the root causes of the EU crises brings out important lessons for 
integrating countries, which are discussed in this subsection. To begin with, the discussion in 
Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 pointed out that regional economic integration can result in 
polarised development in member states. In addition, the discussion above shows that the 
Eurozone also experienced polarised development75 between the core and peripheral 
countries, which in turn destabilised the monetary union.  
 
An important lesson drawn from the crises in the Eurozone is that countries that differ greatly 
in their economic performances should not integrate at the more advanced levels, such as 
monetary union. The larger and more industrialised economies are likely to benefit from 
increasing returns to scale and greater competition and investments, while the smaller and 
less developed countries experience economic decline. As noted in Chapter 2, the SADC 
region is likely to experience polarised development with most industries and investments 
relocating to South Africa while the smaller countries are marginalised (Lundahl and 
Peterson, 1991; McCarthy, 1999, 2003; McLeod, 2003). Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 in Chapter 4 
indicate that the SADC countries have divergent output levels and the respective growth 
rates. This trend is likely to continue as the region pursues deeper economic integration and 
hence, will result in polarised development. The assumption therefore, is that monetary 
integration between the SADC states when they have divergent economic performances is 
likely to destabilise the union. 
                                                
75 See Figure C.1 in Appendix C, which shows the differences in the sectoral imbalances in the EU countries, 
which were a direct result of a monetary policy that was geared to slow-growth core Europe and hence, foster 
harmonisation in the economies of the peripheral countries to the core countries. However, in the case of Spain 
and Ireland, for instance, the monetary policy resulted in a property bubble that turned previously large 
government budget surpluses in 2006 to huge deficits in 2009 (Harrison, 2010e).  
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As already mentioned in Chapter 2, a currency union requires the ex ante harmonisation of 
monetary policies of member countries, which in turn requires equally correct growth rate 
preconditions, the same (real) income elasticities of demand for money and constant real 
exchange rates (Williamson, 1980:24). However, the analyses in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4 in 
Chapter 4 indicate that presently the SADC countries do not meet these requirements.  
 
Of particular concern are the divergent macroeconomic performances and growth rates of the 
member states. It would be prudent of the member states not to form a currency union 
comprising of countries that lack harmonisation in their economic performances. The 
experience of the Eurozone has shown that a common currency may neither result in the ex 
post harmonisation of the economies of participating countries nor deeper economic 
integration. Rather, it resulted in an unbalanced Eurozone with its members having divergent 
fiscal and economic policies, which in turn led to wildly differing economic outcomes. 
 
Another important lesson drawn from the EU financial crisis is that a currency union 
comprising countries that lack harmonisation in their fiscal and economic regimes requires a 
pre-funded fiscal transfer mechanism. The funds should be available to support member 
states as an automatic stabiliser against the divergent fiscal and economic regimes. However, 
the SADC countries are still faced with the debt problem, which makes it difficult for them to 
set aside funds for BoP support prior to monetary union. Hence, they are advised to ensure 
they meet the pre-conditions for monetary integration.   
 
Lastly, it was noted in Chapter 4 that the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania 
and Zambia are included in the group of the world’s 40 heavily indebted poor countries. 
Polarised development within the monetary union is likely to increase further their debt as 
they experience economic decline and their fiscal deficits rise. However, according to the 
principle of the Impossible Trilogy, countries cannot simultaneously pursue an independent 
monetary policy, free capital mobility and fixed exchange rates (Wyplosz, 1997; Frankel, 
1999; van der Haegen and Viñals, 2003)76. Hence, members of a currency area experiencing 
debt problems cannot devalue to regain competitiveness or manipulate monetary policy, as 
they do not have autonomy over it. Furthermore, if there were a fiscal policy framework in 
                                                
76 See Section 3.3 in Chapter 3. 
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place similar to the SGP of the Eurozone, the use of fiscal policy would have to conform to 
the set framework. The currency area may therefore need to either monetise the debt, allow 
sovereign default to occur, implement internal devaluation in the affected economies or break 
up.  
 
Monetisation implies that the union central bank would have to exercise its role as lender of 
last resort to guarantee debt obligations with a potentially unlimited supply of liquidity. 
However, as noted in Section 3.2.2 of Chapter 3 monetisation of public debt is inflationary 
and thus, may jeopardise the anti-inflationary credibility of the central bank. The EU opted to 
bail out the member states facing debt problems rather than risk the credibility of the ECB. 
However, a bail out implies that the monetary union has funds available for BoP support. 
This may not be possible in the case of the SADC region given that a number of the member 
states are poor, highly indebted and depend on donor support. As such, they may not be able 
to contribute to the fund.   
 
Internal devaluation, which refers to across the board wage and price cuts in the affected 
nations, is another option the currency area could take. The EU resorted to internal 
devaluation and austerity measures (i.e. policies of deficit cutting, lower spending, reduction 
in social benefits and at times, increased taxes) to mitigate the crisis. These measures were 
adopted in an effort to avoid the massive creditor losses associated with sovereign default. 
However, these measures have been criticised for being politically unstable as internal 
devaluation results in a long and difficult depression, while austerity measures are associated 
with short-term declines in standards of living (Harrison, 2010c). 
 
A break up, on the other hand, entails the exit of the indebted countries from the union. 
However, such a move is likely to destabilise the union currency. The countries that exit from 
the union would have to revert to their national currencies, which would no longer be in 
circulation and that is very costly. In addition, the countries are likely to experience bank runs 
that would lead to a collapse of their new currencies, which in turn would feed into higher 
inflation. At the same time, the national banks and the sovereign states are likely to be 
considered high risk in the capital markets and would be avoided, thus pushing the domestic 
interest rates higher. This would exacerbate the debt problems and may have spill-over 
effects to the region. Thus, a break-up is the worst alternative for union members (Harrison, 
2010c; Thin, 2011). 
160 
 
5.4 APPLICATION OF THE EU PROCESS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION TO 
THE SADC REGION  
This section attempts to extract valuable lessons for the SADC countries from the experience 
of the EU countries with economic integration. It is important to note that EU integration was 
a gradual process initiated more than 50 years ago, whereas the SADC countries wish to 
reach the status of EMU within a much shorter period. In addition, there are differences in the 
sequence of integration followed by the two regions. The European countries pursued trade 
integration first, with the implementation of a common market. The pursuit of nominal 
convergence followed later and lastly, structural reforms were implemented. There were 
however, considerable instances of overlapping in the processes and each aspect of 
integration did not occur at a uniform pace.  
 
The SADC countries, on the other hand, are attempting to accomplish all three at the same 
time. This presents some problems in following the EU model. However, the essential steps 
taken by the EU countries still provide valuable lessons for the SADC countries that are 
considered in this section.  
 
5.4.1 Road Map to Monetary Integration for the SADC Countries 
Section 5.2 above reviewed the steps to monetary union followed by the EU countries. Based 
on these steps, the subsection below thus makes recommendations on the path that the SADC 
countries could take to arrive at the status of EMU, drawing lessons from the EU experience. 
 
5.4.1.1  Exchange Rate Coordination 
To begin with, the SADC countries require a fixed exchange rate mechanism (ERM) that will 
enable them to gain stability in the exchange rates between the member currencies as well as 
to encourage convergence of economic and monetary policies77. The adoption of an ERM 
implies that the SADC countries need to agree on the currency to which the national 
currencies would be tied to, as well as the central rate for each currency that would be used to 
monitor its fluctuations relative to other member currencies. The Community already has a 
subset of countries belonging to a similar arrangement within the CMA. Thus, the non-CMA 
countries could fix their currencies to the South African Rand. 
                                                
77 Presently, the member states have different exchange rate systems as shown in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
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The member states also need to agree on the structure of and margins around the central rates 
as well as the intervention mechanism when exchange rates deviate from the margins. 
However, caution needs to be exercised on the choice of an appropriate band for exchange 
rate changes. The experience of the EU with the EMS showed that high capital mobility 
under a narrow-band exchange rate system could delay inflation convergence in member 
countries. 
 
Arroyo (2003: 72) notes that a positive interest rate differential in some of the integrating 
countries could attract massive capital inflows, which would cause the authorities in the 
respective countries to cut their interest rates prematurely in an effort to keep their exchange 
rates within the prescribed band. However, in some cases the relatively higher interest rates 
would be a reflection of the higher inflation rates and unbalanced fiscal- monetary policy 
mixes in these economies. Thus, cutting the interest rates prematurely may at times delay, 
rather than foster the convergence of the inflation rates to other member countries78. 
 
It has also been noted that a narrow-band, adjustable exchange rate system is inappropriate 
for countries with divergent macroeconomic performances and without appropriate 
institutional commitments. An environment of high capital mobility exposes the systems to 
speculative attacks, even when reinforced by foreign exchange intervention agreements and 
short-term financial facilities between participating banks. Such speculative attacks have 
resulted in crises and the collapse of the narrow-band system in the past79 (Cobham and 
Robson, 1992; Arroyo, 2003; Masson and Pattilo, 2003).  
 
In addition, it has been noted that a pegged exchange rate system, even one with wider bands 
and timely realignments, requires a high degree of macroeconomic convergence and strong 
policy commitments to avoid speculative attacks on the peg. As seen in Sections 4.3.1 and 
4.4 in Chapter 4, the SADC countries have divergent macroeconomic performances. In 
addition, most of the member central banks lack policy credibility. A combination of these 
                                                
78 This was the experience of Italy, Portugal and Spain with the core EMS countries during the period 1987 to 
1992. 
79 This was the case with the EMS and emerging market economies in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
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factors could delay inflation convergence within the region as well as expose it to speculative 
attacks.  
 
Integrating countries are also cautioned against implementing an exchange rate band that is 
too flexible as they may end up not benefitting from the disciplinary effects and possible 
positive impacts associated with exchange rate stability on intra-regional trade and financial 
integration (Arroyo, 2003: 74).  
 
Drawing from the EU experience in choosing an appropriate exchange rate mechanism, the 
countries considered the recommendations made by the “monetarists” and “economists”. On 
the one hand, the “monetarists” believe that the best strategy for achieving exchange rate 
stability, and eventually monetary integration, is to subject the integrating economies to the 
nominal discipline of an exchange rate stabilisation scheme80. Such a discipline enables a 
faster pace of macroeconomic convergence, in addition to stimulating commercial and 
financial integration, which would in turn increase the cyclical synchronisation of the 
economies and therefore, reduce the likelihood and size of asymmetric shocks (Cobham and 
Robson, 1992; Arroyo, 2003). 
 
The “economists”, on the other hand, warn against the premature pegging of the currencies 
and advocate for achieving a higher degree of convergence and trade integration before 
implementing monetary integration81. However, there have been cases where the premature 
stabilisation of the exchange rate delayed convergence or even provoked exchange rate 
crises.  
 
An appropriate balance between the two approaches may thus be an optimal solution. The EU 
took this hybrid approach when they eventually adopted a combination of the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 and the new European Monetary System (EMS) of 1993, with more flexible 
stipulations such as wider exchange rate bands and achieving deeper integration in the goods, 
services, capital and labour markets. Lastly, for exchange rate coordination to work, the 
member states also need to agree on the division of responsibility for the necessary 
                                                
80 The EU countries followed the monetarists’ recommendations in the early 1970s when they implemented the 
Monetary Snake, which preceded the EMS’ exchange rate system of 1979.  
81 This is in contrast with the EU experience where in some periods the imposition of an exchange rate 
mechanism resulted in accelerated convergence. 
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adjustment between a country whose currency is at the ceiling and the one whose currency is 
on the floor should the exchange rate reach the limit of its range (Arroyo, 2003: 72). 
 
5.4.1.2  Harmonisation of Policies 
Exchange rate coordination implies that the SADC countries would require a degree of 
harmonisation in their monetary, fiscal and credit policies. Harmonisation in national 
monetary policies would ensure cooperative intervention in foreign exchange markets to keep 
the exchange rate from fluctuating, while harmonisation of national fiscal policies imposes 
fiscal discipline on member nations.  
 
Lastly, coordination in credit policy is required in order to provide short- and medium-term 
balance-of-payments (BoP) support to deficit members. The provision of BoP support to 
deficit members requires that there be a mode of financing within the region. Such financing 
would require that the member states contribute a quota determined by the Community into 
the fund. However, a number of the SADC countries are highly indebted and depend on aid 
to support their fiscal deficits. As such, these countries may not be able to contribute to the 
fund. Hence, BoP support may not be available within the SADC region.  
 
The African Union has set up the African Monetary Fund (AMF) in 2009 with the objective 
to provide BoP support at continental level to individual member states or RECs. It is yet to 
be determined whether it will have sufficient resources to bail out deficit nations. Although it 
is highly likely that the pooling of resources will be difficult at continental level given that 
most of the other African countries are faced with similar problems to the SADC countries. 
 
5.4.1.3  Institutional Framework 
The SADC countries require an adequate regional institutional framework to maintain policy 
discipline and to ensure the observance and endurance of market principles. It was 
established in Chapter 2 that exchange rate coordination works if and only when participating 
countries give up policy autonomy to a supra-national body that will determine policy for the 
region.  
 
Presently, the SADC region does not have a regional central bank; however, there is a 
Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) of member states. The CCBG is responsible 
for formulating, implementing and co-ordinating appropriate financial and monetary policies 
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that are transparent, consistent to the macroeconomic convergence (MEC) targets and 
minimise the spill over effects on other member countries (McCarthy, 2002; Kweka et al, 
2006). In addition, the CCBG facilitates the interconnection of payments and clearing system, 
as well as harmonises banking and financial supervision practices in the SADC countries 
(Kweka et al, 2006:243). South Africa is responsible for finance and investment within the 
region, and as such, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of South Africa has the mandate to 
chair the CCBG (Rossouw, 2006:384). 
 
Similarly, relevant institutions are required whose mandate is the design and monitoring of 
the implementation of policy objectives and strategies for macroeconomic objectives 
(Maruping, 2005:145). The SADC countries set up a Committee of Ministers for Finance and 
Investment (CMFI), which is responsible for establishing and reviewing procedures and 
targets with which to monitor the implementation of the MEC program and provide advice on 
corrective actions. It is the CFMI’s responsibility to evaluate and monitor annual 
convergence programmes submitted by the member states, to make appropriate 
recommendations or amendments and to issue a communiqué to the member states explaining 
their assessments and recommendations (Kweka et al, 2006:243). 
 
5.4.1.4  Parallel Currency Union 
Once the SADC countries implement exchange rate coordination, they would need to 
undergo a series of stages whereby the allowable bands for exchange rate changes are 
narrowed progressively, until the final stage of irrevocably locked exchange rates is reached. 
Should they decide to fix their national currencies to the ZAR; the permissible bands would 
be reduced until the currencies of the non-CMA members are at par with the ZAR. Hence, by 
default the latter group of countries would join the CMA arrangement. 
 
National central bank autonomy over monetary and credit policy is reduced within a currency 
union in favour of a union monetary authority, which is jointly exercised by the member 
states (Ogunkola, 2005:18). In the case of the CMA arrangement, the Reserve Bank of South 
Africa determines monetary policy for the CMA countries. However, the rest of the SADC 
countries may not be willing to surrender completely autonomy over their national policy to 
the SARB. Hence, the participating countries may have to establish a union authority in 
which all countries would have a say in the determination of policy. 
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5.4.1.5  Monetary Union 
A currency union within the SADC region ought to be established if and only when the 
member states meet the preconditions for monetary integration discussed in Chapter 3. 
Should the member states ever get to that point, then they would have to decide when and 
how the ZAR would replace the national currencies of member states in their domestic roles. 
Williamson (1980:24) suggests that, when over 50% of the total regional money supply is 
converted voluntarily into the parallel currency, then the remaining currencies should be 
called in through a compulsory conversion operation. From then on, the ZAR would become 
the common currency in the SADC region. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The review of the steps followed by the European countries to an economic and monetary 
union indicate that it may not be feasible for the SADC countries to achieve the status of an 
EMU in the short time frame given. The discussion on the possible road map that the SADC 
countries could take indicates that the required changes in the economic structures of the 
member countries are gradual and hence, require a drawn period to effect. 
 
Similarly, the discussions on the EMS crisis as well as the current EU crisis highlighted the 
importance of harmonisation in the policies of participating countries prior to monetary 
union. Based on the analyses of the economic performances of the SADC countries in 
Chapter 4, it is clear that the SADC countries are currently divergent. It is therefore, advised 
that the member countries do not rush into monetary integration when they lack 
harmonisation in their economies. 
 
In addition, the discussion on the root causes of the European sovereign debt crises 
highlighted the dire effects that polarised development in a monetary union could have. The 
SADC states are highly likely to be polarised. To avoid the likelihood of experiencing 
problems similar to the sovereign debt crises in the EU, there is need for product 
diversification within the region, which may foster economic growth in all the member states 
and possibly encourage real economic convergence. A monetary union among countries with 
similar economic performances is likely not to experience sovereign debt problems. 
 
  
166 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
METHODS, PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with a review of the theoretical framework behind the methods, 
procedures and techniques used in the analyses. The analyses attempt to determine the 
relative effectiveness of independent monetary policy instruments in determining economic 
performance of the SADC states. The intuition is that prospective members of a monetary 
union weigh the advantages of maintaining monetary independence against the costs of 
surrendering autonomy to a regional authority.  
 
If independent policy were found to be significant in determining macroeconomic 
performance in any country, the implication is that the respective country would not be 
willing to join the monetary union since it entails relinquishing monetary policy autonomy to 
a regional authority. If, on the other hand, independent monetary policies have not been 
effective in determining macroeconomic performance indicators, the implication is that they 
would be better off surrendering monetary policy autonomy to a regional authority 
(Guillaume and Stasavage, 1999; Masson and Patillo, 2003; Balogun, 2007; Corsetti, 2008).  
 
Section 6.2 thus begins with a review of the theory of monetary policy and the transmission 
mechanisms through which it works. Section 6.3 discusses the different factors that affect the 
transmission of monetary policy. The section also includes a discussion on factors that are 
characteristic of developing countries, which make the transmission of monetary policy 
particularly difficult in these countries.  
 
Section 6.4 outlines the model used in the analyses, while Section 6.5 provides a description 
of the techniques of data analyses used in the regressions. Lastly, Section 6.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
6.2 MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS 
The goals of monetary policy include the achievement of price stability (which is the primary 
goal of most central banks), economic growth, a high level of employment, domestic 
financial stability, interest rate stability and foreign exchange market stability. Monetary 
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authorities do not have direct control over these goals but can act on certain policy 
instruments that are under their direct influence to achieve these goals. These instruments 
include open-market operations, reserve requirements, tax rates, government purchases, and 
the discount rate of the central bank. 
 
Changes in monetary policy are usually in response to domestic and external shocks, which 
may hinder the attainment of policy goals. These changes are effected through the policy 
instruments, which do not however exert any direct influence on policy goals but rather, they 
work through various transmission mechanisms. There are five transmission mechanisms of 
monetary policy: The interest rate channel, the asset price channel, the exchange rate channel, 
the monetary and credit channel, and the expectations channel. These transmission 
mechanisms affect different variables and markets at various speeds and intensities (Loayza 
and Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002; Garcia, 2003, Buigit, 2006).  
 
Figure 6:1 below illustrates the relationship between central bank monetary policy rules and 
the transmission mechanisms. Monetary policy actions (both current and expected) are 
determined by the monetary policy rule that the central bank has chosen to follow. These 
policy actions are channelled through one of the transmission mechanisms in the money and 
asset markets. Changes in the money and asset markets affect domestic demand and net 
exports and ultimately, aggregate demand. In turn, changes in aggregate demand affect prices 
of both domestic goods and imported goods and ultimately, aggregate output and prices. 
Finally, the resultant changes in current and projected output and prices feedback to monetary 
policy rules (Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002; Garcia, 2003). The subsections below 
provide a description of each transmission mechanism. 
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Figure 6.1: Monetary Policy Rules and Transmission Mechanisms 
 
 
 
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel (2002:2) 
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monetary policy. The transmission works through changes in the central bank policy rate, 
which in turn lead to changes in the bank lending and deposit interest rates. In turn, changes 
in the lending and deposit rates affect the consumption and investment decisions of 
households and firms, and ultimately aggregate output and prices. The transmission of 
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nominal and real interest rates82, short- and long-term real interest rates83, or  aggregate 
demand on the one hand, and output and prices on the other84 (Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel, 
2002:4).  
 
A change in the policy rate results in similar changes in other short-term interest rates. For 
example, a rise in the policy rate will lead to increases in other short-term interest rates (even 
if some are slow to adjust). However, the response of long-term interest rates to changes in 
the policy rate is ambiguous. In general, long-term interest rates are determined by an average 
of current and expected future short-term rates. As such, changes in long-term rates depend 
on the direction and extent of the impact of the official rate change on expectations of the 
future path of interest rates. If for example, an increase in the policy rate generates 
expectations of lower future interest rates, then there is a possibility that long-term rates will 
fall in response to the rise in the policy rate (BOE, 2010:3).  
 
If the rise in interest rates is a reflection of higher inflation expectations, then the real interest 
rate will not change. Similarly, the perceived marginal cost of new borrowing will not 
change. However, the impact on existing loans depends on the terms of the contract. With 
floating rate contracts, average rates will change in line with marginal rates. With fixed rate 
contracts on the other hand, average rates change more slowly over time as old contracts 
come up for renegotiation. This changes the average interest rates and would therefore; alter 
the cash flow and balance sheet positions of borrowers. In turn, the changes in the cash flow 
and balance sheet positions of borrowers would lead to a reduction in investment and 
consumer expenditure and thus, reduce aggregate demand (BIS, 2008:10). 
 
Lastly, the expectations augmented Phillips curve can be used to explain changes in 
aggregate demand, output and prices in response to changes in monetary policy. Assuming 
that initially unemployment, output and prices are at their natural levels, an expansionary 
policy would trigger portfolio adjustments by economic agents and in the short run, raise 
aggregate demand and prices. It is argued that employers would recognise an increase in their 
own product before they perceive the general price increase. Hence, they will interpret the 
                                                
82 As explained by theories based on price and wage rigidities. 
83 As explained by the rational expectations hypothesis of term interest rates. 
84 As explained by the Phillips curve and temporary nominal price rigidities. 
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price rise as an increase in relative prices and therefore, increase production at the more 
favourable prices. They would also increase money wages to entice the required additional 
labour. 
 
 Similarly, employees would be slow to adjust their perception of the general price rise and 
would perceive the increase in money wages as an increase in real wages. As a result, they 
would increase labour supply. Thus, the expansionary policy would result in an increase in 
prices, output, money wages and employment. However, in the long run when economic 
agents adjust their price perceptions according to reality, unemployment and output will 
revert to their natural levels and only prices and other nominal variables will remain 
unaffected. 
 
Economic literature states that it is the real rather than the nominal interest rate that affects 
consumer and business decisions (Mishkin, 1996; Brzoza-Brzezina, 2001). As such, it is 
possible for monetary policy to stimulate the economy, even when nominal interest rates are 
at a floor of zero. A monetary expansion will raise the expected price level as well as 
expected inflation, which in turn may lower real interest rates, even when the nominal interest 
rate is fixed. In turn, the fall in real interest rates will stimulate investment spending, thereby 
increasing aggregate demand and output (Mishkin, 1996:35). 
 
6.2.2 The Asset Price Channel 
The asset price mechanism works through changes in the market value of securities, such as 
bonds and equities. An increase in the money supply has portfolio balance effects on 
consumers, who may choose to spend their excess money holdings on bonds. An increase in 
the demand for bonds will lead to an increase in their prices, which in turn will lead to a fall 
in interest rates. If all other things remain equal (especially inflation expectations), a decrease 
in interest rates will also lead to an increase in the price of other securities, such as equities 
(BIS, 2008; BOE, 2010).  
 
There are two channels through which higher equity prices can increase aggregate demand; 
through an increase in the wealth of consumers and through an increase in the net worth of 
firms (BIS, 2008; BOE, 2010). Tobin’s q Theory of investment provides an explanation as to 
how the valuation of equities affects the transmission of monetary policy. The theory defines 
q as the market value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital. If q is high, it 
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implies that the market value of firms is high relative to the replacement cost of capital, and 
that new plant and equipment capital is cheap relative to the market value of firms, and vice 
versa if q is low. As such, firms can issue equity and get a high price for it relative to the 
replacement cost of capital. Therefore, investment spending will increase, as firms will be 
able to buy a lot of plant and equipment with only a small issue of equity. In turn, the 
increase in investment will lead to an increase in aggregate demand and output. If, on the 
other hand, q is low and firms want to buy capital, it is cheaper to buy an existing firm at low 
cost and acquire old capital. However, investment spending and aggregate demand will not 
increase (Mishkin, 1996:36). 
 
An alternative transmission channel is through changes in the wealth of consumers, which 
affects consumption. The wealth of consumers comprises human capital, real capital and 
financial wealth, which includes stocks. An increase in stock prices leads to an increase in the 
value of the financial wealth of consumers. If consumers perceive the rise in equity prices as 
permanent, then there will be an increase in consumption, which in turn leads to an increase 
in aggregate demand (Mishkin, 1996; Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002; BIS, 2008).  
 
6.2.3 The Exchange Rate Channel 
The exchange rate channel works through changes in aggregate demand and supply. A 
monetary expansion induces a fall in domestic nominal interest interests. Assuming 
uncovered interest parity, if there is a subsequent fall in domestic real interest rates, then 
deposits in the local currency become relatively less attractive than deposits in foreign 
currency. This will lead to a fall in deposits in local currency relative to other currency 
deposits and hence, capital outflow. In turn, capital outflow will lead to a nominal 
depreciation in the local currency (Mishkin, 1996; BIS 2008). 
 
Devereux and Engel (2003:766) note that a nominal depreciation in the exchange rate has 
negligible expenditure-switching effects in the short run. If domestic prices are pre-set in 
local currency terms, consumer prices would be unresponsive to exchange rate changes and 
as such, depreciation would have no effect on aggregate demand and output. On the other 
hand, if nominal prices are pre-set in the currency of the producer, a nominal depreciation in 
the exchange rate implies that the domestic price of imports will increase and hence, result in 
inflation. 
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In the long run and assuming sticky prices, a nominal depreciation will lead to a real 
depreciation in the exchange rate, which in turn will result in an increase in the price of 
tradables relative to non-tradables. Furthermore, the depreciation leads to an increase in net 
exports and ultimately, an increase in aggregate demand. On the other hand, a real 
depreciation raises the domestic price of imported finished goods and thus, leads to inflation. 
Similarly, the increase in the domestic price of imported inputs leads to a reduction in 
aggregate supply and output, resulting in an increase in domestic prices of goods (Loayza and 
Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002:5). 
 
The BIS (2008:15) notes that the exchange rate channel is an important transmission 
mechanism in developing countries for several reasons. To begin with, the influence of the 
exchange rate channel in small open economies tends to be large due to the high dependency 
of these economies on primary production and the export of commodities. In addition, the 
exchange rate often constitutes a key variable for private sector expectations about inflation. 
Lastly, exchange rate changes produce large balance sheet effects in those economies where 
households and firms have foreign currency assets and liabilities. 
 
6.2.4 The Monetary Aggregate and Bank Credit Channels 
The classical monetarist view emphasises the role of narrow or broad monetary aggregates in 
determining asset, goods and factor prices, which influence inflation in the long-run. In 
general, an increase in the monetary aggregate will increase the cash holdings of consumers 
in their portfolios beyond their desired levels. To dispose of the excess money, consumers 
would increase their demand for goods and services, which leads to an increase in domestic 
aggregate demand. In turn, the increase in aggregate demand will stimulate output growth. 
However, if output does not increase to match the increase in aggregate demand, there would 
be higher inflation (Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002; BIS, 2008). 
 
Balogun (2008:18) notes that unrestrained increases in money supply would have a negative 
effect on output. Expansionary monetary policy either in response to an inability of the 
monetary authorities to adopt an appropriate monetary stabilisation framework in the face of 
deep internal economic distortions, a lack of fiscal discipline and / or autonomy to restrain 
fiscal authorities would have adverse effects on output. 
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Of late, the focus is on the role of credit rationing by financial institutions through non-
pricing mechanisms, such that the terms on which credit is available include variables 
additional to the interest rate. The credit mechanism works through two channels: the bank-
lending channel and the balance sheet channel. The mechanism focuses on the role of credit 
rationing85 by financial institutions through non-pricing mechanisms, such that the terms on 
which credit is available include variables additional to the interest rate (Loayza and 
Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002; BIS, 2008).  
 
The bank- lending channel emphasises the special role played by banks in the financial 
system in providing credit to certain borrowers that have no access to credit markets86. It is 
believed that banks are especially capable of solving asymmetric information problems in the 
market and hence, are able to grant credit to seemingly risky borrowers. Increases in the 
money supply increase bank reserves and bank deposits, as well as the net worth of firms 
(through higher equity prices). This leads to a reduction in adverse selection and moral 
hazard, and in perceived loan risks (through lower real interest rates). This in turn increases 
the quality of bank loans available, which leads to a rise in investment and consumption 
expenditure, and ultimately, aggregate demand and output (Mishkin, 1996; Loayza and 
Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002).  
 
The balance sheet channel, on the other hand, focuses on how the net worth of firms 
influences credit rationing. In general, there are severe adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems associated with lending to firms with low net worth because they have less 
collateral for their loans. The low net worth implies that these firms have less equity stake in 
their firms, which may encourage them to engage in risky investment projects. Hence, 
financial institutions would be averse to lending to such firms for risk of default. An 
expansionary monetary policy will have the effect on firms of increasing their net worth, 
improving their cash flow (through lower nominal interest rates), and decreasing the burden 
of nominal debt contracts (by raising inflation). This will lead to a reduction in adverse 
                                                
85 Credit rationing is a result of information asymmetries between financial institutions on the one hand, and the 
firms and consumers on the other, in determining price and output levels (Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002; 
BIS, 2008). 
86 The extent to which bank lending behaviour affects the transmission of monetary policy largely hinges on 
whether bank loans and deposits are “special” (in terms of having no perfect substitutes) (Mishkin, 1996; ECB, 
2008). 
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selection and moral hazard thus, making banks more willing to supply credit. The increase in 
lending will in turn lead to a rise in investment spending, aggregate demand and output 
(Mishkin, 1996; Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002). 
 
The balance sheet channel also works through changes in consumer spending on durable 
goods and housing. The mechanism depends on consumers' desire to spend rather than on 
lenders' desire to lend. Consumer durables and housing are very illiquid assets because of the 
asymmetric information about their quality. As such, if consumers experienced an income 
shock and had to sell their assets, they would expect a loss since they would not be able to get 
the full value of the assets in a distress sale. Hence, if there was a higher likelihood of finding 
themselves in financial distress, consumers will hold less illiquid durable and housing assets 
and more liquid financial assets (Mishkin, 1996:38). 
 
The balance sheet of the consumer influences their estimate of the likelihood of suffering 
financial losses. According to Mishkin (1996:38), when consumers have a large amount of 
financial assets relative to their debts, their estimate of the probability of financial distress is 
low, and they will be more willing to purchase consumer durables or housing. Hence, an 
expansionary monetary policy that leads to an increase in stock prices will increase the value 
of the financial assets of consumers, which in turn will decrease the likelihood of financial 
distress and lead to a rise in consumer durable expenditure and ultimately, aggregate output. 
  
There are instances where monetary policy is used to influence the amount of credit granted 
to government (especially monetary authorities) by borrowing from the public through the 
issue of public debt instruments. Such policy tends to “crowd-out” private sector borrowing 
and can have adverse effects on aggregate demand and output. For example, if monetary 
authorities aim to reduce the gap between actual consumption and its efficient level (which 
may vary with time depending on the state of the economy), then increasing credit issued to 
government, especially that which is financed through the issue of public debt instruments, 
can critically stifle credit issued to the private sector. However, this will lead to a reduction in 
aggregate demand and ultimately, output (Balogun, 2008:18). 
 
6.2.5 The Expectations Channel 
Lastly, the expectations channel is based on the anticipations of the private sector about the 
future stance of monetary policy. Although it is not a standalone channel, the expectations 
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channel has considerable significance for the effectiveness of all other transmission 
mechanisms. It works through all variables that have inter-temporal implications, i.e., the 
static interest rate, asset price, exchange rate, monetary and credit aggregates. Thus, all other 
transmission mechanisms are affected by economic agents’ expectations about future shocks 
to the domestic economy and how the authorities would respond to them (Loayza and 
Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002; BIS, 2008).  
 
For example, to the extent that private sector wage and price expectations are forward-
looking, they can speed up the adjustment of nominal demand to a change in central bank 
policy and affect the transmission lag to inflation. Similarly, announcements of future central 
bank policy that are not supported by changes in current policy could exert real effects on the 
economy by modifying market expectations. In turn, changes in market expectations trigger 
current changes in money and asset markets and ultimately, in output and prices (Loayza and 
Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002:6).  
 
The BIS (2008:20) notes that the perceptions of the private sector about central bank policy 
are crucial in determining the effectiveness of the expectations channel. High perceptions 
about the credibility and predictability of central bank policy lead to greater anticipated 
effects of monetary policy and vice versa. Similarly, a higher degree of commitment by the 
central bank to vary the policy rate consistently can enhance the role of the expectations 
channel 
 
6.3 MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
The transmission of monetary policy is difficult in most developing countries because the 
financial systems in these economies are under-developed. Given that most developing 
countries lack organised securities markets and that a typical financial structure has a limited 
portfolio of assets87, open market purchases by the central bank are not very effective in 
changing aggregate demand. This leaves monetary authorities with four policy instruments; 
the required reserve ratio (which affects the money supply), the interest rate, the amount of 
credit extended by the central bank to the commercial system and the exchange rate. 
 
                                                
87 Individuals hold their wealth either in the form of domestic currency, demand and time deposits with the 
banking system, foreign currency, loans borrowed from commercial banks, or land and physical capital. 
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However, Montiel (1991:84) notes that foreign currency holdings tend to be limited by 
capital controls and restrictions on the holding of foreign exchange. In some cases, parallel 
markets for foreign exchange emerge in response to such regulations. Hence, the use of 
monetary policy may require intervention in the parallel market for foreign exchange. 
Similarly, these countries tend to impose official restrictions on the interest rates paid and 
charged by financial institutions. Thus, monetary policy in such cases would be in the form of 
administered interest rates.   
 
6.4 INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INDEPENDENT MONETARY 
POLICY IN THE SADC COUNTRIES 
Balogun (2007) argues that an alternative approach to considering the desirability of 
monetary integration among a group of countries is to weigh the advantages of maintaining 
monetary policy independence against the costs of surrendering autonomy to a regional 
authority. If independent monetary policy is effective in determining economic performance 
in any country, the implication is that monetary union would be costly for that country. This 
is because a union monetary policy would be set to meet the overall objectives of the region, 
which may not necessarily be in line with the national objectives of that country. If, on the 
other hand, national monetary policy is ineffective in determining economic performance, it 
is argued that the country could benefit from monetary integration, which entails having a 
union central bank determining monetary policy on its behalf.  
 
However, Montiel (1991) and Buigut (2006) argue that a similar monetary policy action in 
countries with different transmission channels is likely to result in varying changes in output 
and prices across countries and possibly widen cyclical variation between these countries. 
Hence, when considering monetary integration, it is important to determine the relative 
importance of each transmission mechanism in potential union members. If the countries 
respond differently to a similar monetary policy shock, the implication is that they are not 
suitable for monetary integration. In this light, the present study made use of VAR analysis to 
determine the impact of monetary policy shocks on output and inflation in selected SADC 
countries. To our knowledge, there is no study that has been conducted along these lines.  
 
The VAR approach has been criticised in literature as being devoid of any economic content. 
It is argued that the complete lack of a-priori information in the basic VAR model leads to 
losses in efficiency (Frohn, 1999; Enders, 2004). In addition, the structural VAR approach 
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addresses only the effects of unanticipated changes in monetary policy and does not consider 
the more important effects of the systematic portion of monetary policy or the choice of 
monetary policy rule (Bernanke et. al, 2003: 2).  
 
Another issue is that the VAR approach uses a small amount of information in order to allow 
for intensive testing and estimation (Bernanke et. al, 2003; Frohn, 1999). However, the data 
used in the model is unlikely to incorporate all the information sets used by central banks, 
financial market participants, or other observers. This implies that, to the extent that central 
banks and the private sector have information not reflected in the VAR analysis, the 
measurement of policy innovations is likely to be contaminated. In addition, impulse 
responses can be observed only for the included variables, which generally constitute only a 
small subset of the variables that the researcher and policymakers are interested in (Bernanke 
et. al, 2003: 3).  
 
However, the VAR approach is widely used in literature to measure the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on macroeconomic variables (cf. Bernanke et. al, 2003; van Aarle et. al, 2003; 
Haug et. al, 2005; Buigut, 2006; Hung, 2007). This is because the identification of monetary 
policy shocks requires only a credible identification of those shocks and does not require 
identification of the remainder of the macroeconomic model. In general, the models deliver 
empirically plausible assessments of the dynamic responses of the variables to policy 
innovations. The analytical framework behind the VAR approach is discussed in the next 
sub-section. 
 
6.4.1 Model Specification 
A basic bivariate first-order VAR model treats each variable, {} and {}, as endogenous to 
the model. For example, given the following bivariate system: 
 = 	 −  +  +  +      (6.1) 
 = 	 −  +  +   +        (6.2) 
Where:  and   are stationary variables;  and  are white noise disturbances with 
standard deviations of  and , respectively; {} and {} are uncorrelated white noise 
processes; and the ’s and ’s are coefficients.  
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Equations (6.1) and (6.2) constitute a structural VAR model, which incorporates feedback as 
the variables are allowed to affect each other, e.g., − is the contemporaneous effect of a 
unit change of  on , while  is the effect of a unit change in  on . Similarly, if  
 is not equal to zero, then  has an indirect contemporaneous effect on , and if  is 
not equal to zero, then  has an indirect contemporaneous effect on . 
Equations (6.1) and (6.2) can be expressed as reduced form equations using matrix algebra: 
 1  1  
 = 
	
	 + 
   
 + 
       (6.3) 
or 
 =  Γ	 + Γ +           (6.4) 
Where:  
 =  1  1 ,     =  
,    Γ	 = 
	
	,    Γ = 
γ γγ γ,   = 
  
Pre-multiplication of equation (6.4) by  yields a VAR model in standard form: 
 = 	 +  +            (6.5) 
Where:  
	 =  Γ	  
 = Γ  
 =   
Equation (6.5) can be re-written as: 
 = 	 +  +  +        (6.6) 
 = 	 +   +  +        (6.7) 
 
Equations (6.6) and (6.7) constitute a VAR in standard form. The regression residuals can be 
expressed in terms of the pure shocks as: 
 = ( − ) (1 − )"                    (6.8) 
 = ( − ) (1 − )"          (6.9) 
 (Enders, 2004: 265). 
 
The present study is in line with the approaches used by Buiguit (2006) and Hung (2007). 
The former makes use of a VAR model to investigate the effectiveness of the interest rate 
channel in the EAC countries, while the latter uses a VAR model to investigate the 
effectiveness of all monetary transmission mechanisms in Vietnam. In line with Hung (2007), 
the present study makes use of a basic VAR model to analyse the impact of money supply 
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shocks to output and inflation in each of the SADC countries. The model is then extended to 
analyse alternatively, the impact of the interest rate channel, the credit channel and the 
exchange rate. The asset price channel is not considered because it was established that most 
of the capital markets in the SADC countries are under-developed88, which implies that the 
asset price channel is not an important transmission mechanism in the member states, if at all 
it exists in some countries. Hence, for comparative purposes, it was excluded. 
 
The present study makes use of the following basic VAR expressed in the reduced form: 
∆$ = ΓΔ$ + ⋯ + Γ'∆$() +         (6.10) 
Where: 
• Ζ+, = (Y+,, π+, , M+,, ), and is a vector of endogenous variables for each country, i, for 
each period, t. Y is defined as real output, π is the inflation rate, and M is defined as money 
supply(M2). In the extended model, Ζ+, = (Y+,, π+, , M+,, and eitherR+, , Credit+, , or NER+, ). 
Where: R is the interest rate, Credit is defined as domestic credit to the private sector, and 
NER is the nominal exchange rate; 
• Γ’s are k x k dimensional coefficient matrices; and 
• ∆ is a difference operator 
 
The study considers the appropriateness of a vector error correction model (VECM) over a 
VAR model. Cointegration tests are performed between the variables and if they are 
cointegrated, then the following vector error correction model (VECM) is estimated: 
 ∆Ζ = ΓΔΖ+ + ⋯ + Γ'ΔΖ+') + ΠΖ+ + ε+      (6.11) 
Where: Π =  @AB; α and β are k x r dimensional matrices. The α represents the speed of 
adjustment to disequilibrium, the β is the matrix of long-run coefficients, and the term ABC 
represents the r cointegrating relationships. If $is a vector of I(1) variables, then ∆Ζare 
stationary and it follows that ΠC must also be stationary for ~I(0) to be white noise 
(Buiguit, 2006:6). Hence, if the variables are not cointegrated, i.e., the rank of Π  is zero, then 
it implies that the variables are not cointegrated. In this case, a VAR model is estimated. On 
the other hand, if there is a cointegration relationship between the variables, then a VECM is 
estimated. 
 
                                                
88 See Table B.3 in Appendix B. 
180 
 
6.4.1.1  Explanation of Variables 
Economic literature stipulates that the interest rate channel is the most important transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. Hence, the study investigates the relevance of this 
mechanism in the SADC countries in transmitting monetary policy actions. The credit 
channel was included to test the assertion that this transmission mechanism is likely to 
dominate in financially under-developed economies due to the moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems that are characteristic of shallow financial systems (Loayza and Schmidt- 
Hebbel, 2002:9). It was determined in Section 4.4.3 that the financial systems in the SADC 
countries are generally shallow and under-developed. As such, it is worth investigating if the 
assertion holds for the SADC countries. Thus, the effectiveness of the bank-lending channel 
in transmitting monetary policy is also investigated.  
 
Lastly, the exchange rate channel is included in the analyses to test the hypothesis that the 
channel is an important transmission mechanism in small open economies due to the high 
dependency of these economies on primary production and the export of commodities (BIS, 
2008:15). However, Loayza and Schmidt- Hebbel (2002: 9) argue that the exchange rate 
channel tends to be irrelevant in financially under-developed economies because such 
economies tend to impose exchange controls on foreign transactions. It was determined in 
Section 4.3 that most SADC countries have open economies that rely on primary production 
and the export of commodities, while in Section 4.4.3 it was ascertained that the financial 
systems in the SADC countries are generally shallow and under-developed. It is therefore 
worth investigating the importance of this mechanism in the member states. 
 
Theoretically, an expansionary monetary policy stimulates consumption and investment 
expenditure, resulting in an increase in aggregate demand and output. Therefore, ceteris 
paribus, an increase in the monetary aggregate and/ or a reduction in the policy rate should 
stimulate output in each country. However, increases in money supply are inflationary and 
therefore are expected to lead to a rise in prices.  
 
Increases in credit to the private sector, on the other hand, is expected to stimulate output but 
result in a rise in prices. This is because increases in the money supply lead to a reduction in 
the adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with the credit market, which in 
turn will make banks more willing to supply credit. The increase in lending will in turn lead 
to a rise in investment spending, aggregate demand and output (Mishkin, 1996; Loayza and 
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Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002). However, monetary expansion is inflationary, hence the negative 
relationship with prices.  
 
Lastly, in theory a nominal depreciation in the exchange rate would have no effect on 
aggregate demand, output and inflation in the short run if domestic prices are pre-set in local 
currency terms. On the other hand, if nominal prices are pre-set in the currency of the 
producer, a nominal depreciation in the exchange rate implies that the domestic price of 
imports will increase and hence, result in inflation (Devereux and Engel, 2003:766). In the 
long-run however, a nominal depreciation will lead to a real depreciation in the exchange 
rate, which in turn will result in inflation and a reduction in output (due to the fall in 
aggregate supply in response to an increase in the price of imports) (Loayza and Schmidt- 
Hebbel, 2002:5). 
 
6.5 METHODS OF DATA ANALYSES 
This sub-section discusses the techniques of data analyses employed in the study, giving 
reasons for the choice of techniques used. An important starting point in data analyses is to 
determine the order of integration of the variables hence, the discussion begins with a review 
of the theory of stationarity in variables and the tests employed to detect the presence of unit 
root processes in the data. This is followed by a review of the theory of cointegration between 
variables as the study considers the appropriateness of a VECM over a VAR model in the 
analyses. In analysing the data using the VAR model, the study makes use of variance 
decomposition analysis, impulse response functions and Granger causality tests. These 
techniques are also reviewed below. 
 
6.5.1 Univariate Unit Root Tests 
Econometric theory asserts that running estimations with non-stationary variables can 
produce spurious regressions with no important economic meaning. If two variables are 
trending overtime, a regression of one on the other could have a high R2 even if the two are 
totally unrelated. For example, given a simple regression equation of the form: 
 = 	 +  +          (6.12) 
Where: { } and {} are two series, 	 and  are regression coefficients and {} is an 
error term. 
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If the intercept term, 	 is removed from the expression, and equation (6.12) is expressed in 
terms of the error term, such that: 
 =  −           (6.13) 
 
Assuming { } and {} are independent random walk models of the form: 
 =  +            (6.14) 
 =  +               (6.15) 
Granger and Newbold (1974) impose the initial conditions 	 = 	 = 0 so that: 
 = E F −FG  E FFG           (6.16) 
And 
H)F =    for all I ≥ 0          (6.17) 
 
Equations (6.16) and (6.17) are a violation of the assumptions of the classical linear 
regression model of zero mean of the error terms and a finite variance. This is because the 
variance in equation (6.16) becomes infinitely large as t increases, while the mean of the error 
term is . As such, any t-statistics, F-statistics, or R2 values are unreliable. Therefore, 
hypothesis tests about the regression parameters will not be valid. Granger and Newbold 
(1974), therefore note that the regression equation (6.12) is meaningless as the model is 
embedded with permanent errors. No important economic meaning can be attached to results 
with errors. 
 
The stationarity or otherwise of a series can strongly influence its behaviour and properties. 
Granger and Newbold (1974), note that if the underlying residual series has a stochastic 
(permanent) trend, then any error in period t will not decay hence, any deviation from the 
model will be permanent. This implies that the persistence of shocks will be infinite for non-
stationary series. 
  
When considering monetary integration, stationarity in the variables included in the study is 
particularly important because the persistence of shocks in some of the countries implies that 
the union will be prone to asymmetric shocks. The discussion on the OCA theory in Section 
3.4 of Chapter 3 highlighted the need for union members to be either exposed to similar 
shocks or possess mechanisms for the absorption of asymmetric shocks in order to minimise 
the costs associated with giving up the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism. Therefore, 
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if the union members do not have alternative adjustment mechanisms in place, then 
asymmetric shocks will persist and possibly de-stabilise the union. 
 
Thus, it is essential that prior to running regressions, the order of integration of the variables 
has to be determined and if the variables are found to be non-stationary, they should be 
differenced accordingly89. However, Sims (1980) and Sims et. al (1990) suggest that 
variables in a VAR model should not be differenced even if they contain a unit root. They 
argue that differencing “throws away” information concerning the co-movements in the data, 
yet the goal of VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships between variables, and not 
to determine the parameter estimates. This is particularly true when the variables are 
cointegrated. In addition, the authors recommend that it is not necessary to de-trend data in a 
VAR because the form of the variables ought to mimic the true data generating process, 
particularly when estimating a structural VAR. They argue that a trending variable can be 
approximated by a unit root with drift. 
 
However, Enders (2004:358) points out that it is preferable to difference the variables if they 
are not cointegrated. The author argues that all the tests lose power when one extra lag of 
each variable is included in each equation because n2 more parameters will be estimated. In 
addition, tests for Granger causality conducted on I(1) variables do not have the standard F-
distribution when the VAR is in levels. However, the F-distribution can be used to test for 
Granger causality when first differences are used. Lastly, if the VAR has I(1) variables, the 
impulse responses at long forecast horizons will be inconsistent estimates of true responses 
because they do not decay. On the other hand, if the VAR is estimated in first differences, the 
estimates will be consistent because the impulse responses will decay to zero.  
 
In addition, Enders (2004:167) notes that it is important to determine the components of a 
trend because they have important implications for the appropriate transformation necessary 
to attain a stationary series. This is because a non-stationary series that contains a trend with a 
stochastic component will not be made stationary by de-trending since the stochastic portion 
                                                
89 However, this depends on whether the series is trend or difference stationary. A trend stationary series can be 
transformed into a stationary series by removing the deterministic trend (i.e., de-trending), while a series with a 
unit root (i.e., a difference stationary series) requires differencing. A trend can have a deterministic component 
only or, both a deterministic and a stochastic (permanent) component. 
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will not be eliminated. Similarly, differencing a trend stationary series can introduce a non-
invertible unit root process into the moving-average (MA) component of the model. 
 
The sub-sections below review the Phillips-Perron (1988) and the Dickey-Fuller test with 
generalised least squares de-trending (DF-GLS) unit root tests, which are the models used in 
the study to test the presence of unit roots in the variables. The use of unit root tests was 
chosen over stationarity tests based on the finding by Nelson and Plosser (1982) that 
important macroeconomic variables tend to be difference stationary rather than trend 
stationary. Autoregressive unit root tests are based on testing the null hypothesis that K = 1 
(i.e., difference stationary) against the alternative hypothesis that K < 1 (i.e., trend 
stationary). The tests are called unit root tests because under the null hypothesis, the 
autoregressive polynomial of  has a root equal to zero, i.e., K() = (1 − K) = 0. On the 
other hand, stationarity tests are based on testing the null hypothesis that  is trend stationary 
against the alternative that it contains a unit root.  
 
6.5.1.1 The Phillips-Perron Test 
The Phillips-Perron (PP, 1988) tests control for serial correlation when testing for a unit root 
such that it does not affect the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. The PP tests were 
chosen over the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF, 1981) tests because they tend to be more 
powerful than the ADF tests and are robust to general forms of heteroskedasticity in the error 
term. In addition, the user need not specify a lag length for the test regression. On the other 
hand, caution has to be exercised in the specification of the lag length, p, in the ADF test 
because if p is too small, then traces of serial correlation will remain in the error terms, which 
will bias the test. If p is too large, then the power of the test will suffer. 
 
The PP test is based on the statistic:  
MNO =  MO PQRSRT
 U − V(SRQR)WXY(OZ)[SR\ ]U X         (6.18) 
Where: @^ is the estimate of α, MOis the t-ratio of α, se(@^) is the standard error of the 
coefficient, @^, _	 is an estimator of the residual spectrum at frequency zero, 	 is a consistent 
estimate of the error variance in a non-Augmented DF test equation, and s is the standard 
error of the test regression. 
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However, both the PP and ADF tests have been criticised for their low power in making a 
distinction between highly persistent stationary processes and non-stationary processes. In 
other words, the tests have very low power against stationary, i.e., I(0) alternatives that are 
close to being non-stationary, i.e., I(1) processes. For example, the tests are poor at deciding 
if K = 1 or K = 0.95 and may declare such a time series stationary (Gujarati, 2003; Enders, 
2004). In addition, the power of the tests depends on the time span of the data, more than the 
mere size of the sample. For example, the power of the tests is greater when the sample size 
is n=30 over a span of 30years than when n=100 over a span of 100days (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
Lastly, the tests have been criticised for their severe size distortion (in the direction of over-
rejecting the null). This can occur when the series has a large negative moving average root 
or when the model is specified to include, for example, a drift and trend when the true model 
is a random walk. A conclusion that the time series is stationary at the 5% level of 
significance may be wrong because the true level of significance is larger in this case ( 
Gujarati, 2003).  
 
Lastly, the power of the tests diminish as deterministic terms are added to the test regressions, 
i.e., tests that include a constant and trend in the test regression have less power than tests that 
only include a constant in the test regression. Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (ERS, 1996) 
propose the use of alternative tests that have substantially higher power especially when K is 
close to unity. The present study makes use of the (ERS, 1996) test known as the Dickey-
Fuller test with Generalised Least Squares De-Trending (DF-GLS). This test is described in 
the next sub-section. 
 
6.5.1.2 The Dickey-Fuller Test with Generalised Least Squares De-Trending (DF-GLS)  
The DF-GLS test de-trends the data using a procedure known as GLS de-trending before the 
ADF test regression is estimated. The test then omits the deterministic trend in its 
specification. The hypotheses are evaluated using the same t-ratio as in the ADF test: 
 MO =  @^ (c(@^))"          (6.19) 
Where: @^ is the estimate of α, and se (@^) is the standard error of the coefficient, @^. 
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The DF-GLS t-ratio follows a Dickey-Fuller distribution in the constant only case. However, 
the asymptotic distribution differs when you include both a constant and trend. Hence, the 
critical values differ in the latter case (Eviews Help, 2010).  
 
6.5.2 Cointegration Tests 
The essence of cointegration is that if there exists a linear combination of non-stationary 
variables that is stationary, then the variables are said to be cointegrated.  
For example, given a set of economic variables in the long run: 
A + A +  … +  Aee = 0        (6.20) 
 
If A and  denote the vectors (A, A, … , Ae) and (, , … , e)B, then the components of the 
vector  are said to be integrated of order d, b,  denoted ~gh(i, ), if: 
• All components of  are integrated of order d; and  
• There exists a vector A = (A, A, … , Ae) such that the linear combination 
 A + A + … +  Aee is integrated of order (d - b), where  > 0. This vector is 
called the cointegrating vector. 
 
Cointegration implies that a long-run relationship exists between the {}and {} sequences, 
however, this relationship need not be generated by market forces or the behavioural rules of 
individuals. The long run relationship may be causal, behavioural, or simply a reduced-form 
relationship among similarly trending variables (Enders, 2004:322). The presence of a long 
run relationship between the {}and {} sequences implies that the variables do not drift too 
far apart from each other over time (Maddala and Kim, 1998:26).  
 
This is particularly important when considering the transmission of monetary policy within a 
currency union. When macroeconomic variables are cointegrated, it implies that the effects of 
shocks are temporary and will therefore dissipate over time. Hence, on condition that there is 
economic convergence among union members, a union monetary policy action is likely to 
have similar effects on the economies of member states. Thus, their business cycles are likely 
to be synchronised in the long run. Monetary integration will be beneficial for such a group 
of countries. 
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On the other hand, if the variables are not cointegrated, it implies that they will drift apart 
over time. Hence, the effects of shocks will be permanent. This in turn implies that the 
countries are likely not to achieve economic convergence; hence, their business cycles will be 
asymmetrical. In addition, a common monetary policy action is likely to have asymmetrical 
effects on member states and therefore widen the cyclical variations. For such a group of 
countries, monetary integration would be costly. 
 
The present study makes use of the Johansen (1988)’s maximum likelihood approach  to test 
for the presence and number of cointegration relationships in the models. The maximum 
likelihood is given by: −2lmnopqr ∝ t E ln (1 − vF)eFG  
Where: 
• vwF represents the estimated values of the eigenvalues (characteristic roots) obtained 
from the Π matrix, and  
• Τ is the number of usable observations. 
 
The trace statistic, λtrace, tests the null hypothesis that the number of distinct cointegrating 
vectors is less than or equal to r against a general alternative (Maddala and Kim, 1998). The 
trace statistic is equal to zero when all λi = 0. The further away the estimated roots 
(eigenvalues) are from zero, the more negative is the ly(1 − vwF) value, and the larger the 
trace statistic. The trace statistic is specified as: 
vzq{Y(|) = −Τ E ly(1 − vwF)eFGz)                  (6.21) 
 
Cointegration can also be determined using the maximum eigenvalue test statistic, λmax, 
which tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is r against the 
alternative of r +1 cointegrating vectors (Maddala and Kim, 1998). The maximum eigenvalue 
test statistic is specified as: 
vpqr(|, | + 1) = −Τ ly(1 − vwz))          (6.22) 
 
Maddala and Kim (1998:21-2) note that caution needs to be exercised in specification of the 
deterministic trends to be included in the VECM. This is because the asymptotic distributions 
of test statistics vary according to the different specifications of the deterministic trends in the 
VAR model. For example, when there are deterministic cointegration relationships among 
variables, deterministic trend terms in the VAR model, will not be present in the VECM. On 
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the other hand, if there are stochastic cointegration relationships, deterministic trend terms 
appear in the VECM.  
 
There are a number of criticisms in the literature on the Johansen (1988) procedure for testing 
for cointegration. To begin with, Ho and Sorenson (1996) note that the Johansen procedure is 
sensitive to misspecification of the lag length and size distortions in the tests for the second 
and subsequent cointegrating vectors when the ratio of data point to the number of parameters 
is small. 
 
Cointegration tests based on unit root tests with low power have also been criticised for their 
tendency to find spurious cointegration with probability approaching one asymptotically 
(Gonzalo and Lee, 1995; Elliot, 1998). However, this limitation applies to all cointegration 
tests and is not unique to the Johansen procedure. Campbell and Perron (1991) note that this 
limitation inherent in the cointegration tests implies that it may be difficult to distinguish 
processes that exhibit cointegration from those that do not. Furthermore, it may be difficult to 
estimate precisely the exact number of cointegrating relationships. However, Maddala and 
Kim (1998:184) argue that for the purposes of VAR analysis, cointegration relationships need 
not have any economic interpretations since they are only applied to determine the 
restrictions of the VAR system. 
 
6.5.3 Variance Decomposition 
Enders (2004: 280) notes that the structural form of a VAR model is over-parameterised and 
is therefore, not useful for short-term forecasts. However, it is possible to decompose the 
forecast errors in terms of the {} sequence to obtain the inter-relationships among the 
variables in the system. The forecast error variance decomposition shows the proportion of 
the movements in a sequence due to its “own” shocks as opposed to shocks to other variables 
in the system. Using the structural VAR in equations (6.1) and (6.2), if the   shocks explain 
none of the forecast error variance of {} at all forecast error horizons, it is said that the {} 
sequence is exogenous. Hence, {} evolves independently of the  shocks and of the {} 
sequence. On the other hand, if   shocks explain all forecast error variance in the {} 
sequence, at all forecast horizons, then {} is entirely endogenous. 
 
189 
 
When evaluating the importance of monetary transmission mechanisms, variance 
decomposition analysis shows how much of the innovations in output and inflation is due to 
their “own” shocks and how much can be attributed to monetary policy shocks. Enders 
(2004: 280) notes that it is typical for a variable to explain almost all of its forecast error 
variance at short horizons and smaller proportions at longer horizons. This occurs when  
shocks have little contemporaneous effect on , but affect the {} sequence with a lag. 
Hence, in the present study, if a great proportion of the forecast error variances in output and 
inflation are due to their “own” shocks even at longer horizons, the implication is that the 
relevant channel is not an important transmission mechanism in the particular country.  
 
As noted above, the structural VAR is over-parameterised, which implies that it is under-
identified and cannot be estimated. For example, equations (6.1) and (6.2) contain ten 
parameters (i.e., 	,  , 	, , , , , and two standard deviations () and 
()). On the other hand, the VAR model in standard form in equations (6.6) and (6.7) 
produces only nine parameters (i.e., 	,  , , 	, , and the calculated values 
var(), var(), and cov(, )). Thus, it is not possible to identify the structural system. 
Sims (1980) proposes the use of a recursive system to restrict the structural system such that 
one of the parameters, e.g.,  = 0. The system then becomes: 
 = 	 −  +  +  +      (6.23) 
 = 	 +  +  +         (6.24) 
 
 becomes: 
 = 1 −0 1   
 
Pre-multiplication of equations (6.23) and (6.24) yields: 
  = 
1 −
0 1  
	
	 + 
1 −
0 1  
   
 + 
1 −
0 1  
  (6.25), 
which is simplified to: 
  = 
	 −	
	  + 
 −   −    
 + 
 −
  (6.26) 
 
Estimating the system using OLS yields the following: 
 = 	 +  +   +       (6.27) 
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 = 	 +  +   +         (6.28) 
Where: 	 =  	 − 	 
  =   −  
  =   −  
  	 =  	   
             =    
  =  
 
The relationship between the residuals and the pure shocks becomes: 
 =  −                      (6.29) 
 =            (6.30) 
 
Since  = 0, the system has nine parameter estimates, i.e. 	,  ,  ,  	, , , 
var(), var(), and cov(, ) that can be substituted into the nine equations above to 
simultaneously solve for 	,  ,  	,  ,  ,  , , () and (). From equations 
(6.29) and (6.30), it is observed that both  and  shocks have a contemporaneous effect 
on , while only  shocks have a contemporaneous effect on . In other words,  has a 
contemporaneous effect on  , while  affects the {} sequence with a one-period lag. This 
triangular form of decomposing residuals is known as the Choleski decomposition. The 
approach is used to orthogonalise the underlying shocks to the VAR model before impulse 
responses (discussed in the following sub-section) and forecast error variance decompositions 
are computed (Enders, 2004: 275). 
 
However, the Choleski method of analysing impulse responses has been criticised for being 
sensitive to the ordering of the variables in the VAR (Pesaran and Shin, 1997; Enders, 2004). 
For example, the method used in equations (6.29) and (6.30) necessitates that all of the one-
period forecast error variance of  is due to . However, if the ordering were reversed, all 
of the one-period forecast error variance of  will be due to .  
 
Pesaran and Shin (1997) propose the use of a generalised impulse response analysis, which is 
invariant to the order of the variables in the VAR. They show that the size and magnitude of 
responses are more accurate using the generalised method, although the approach produces 
similar results to the Choleski decomposition approach when the ordering is the same. On the 
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other hand, Enders (2004: 280) notes that the effects of alternative ordering in the Choleski 
method are reduced at longer forecasting horizons. In addition, if the correlations among the 
various variables are small, alternative orderings should yield similar variance 
decompositions.  
 
Other methods of variance decomposition include the Blanchard and Quah (1989) approach, 
which was a reconsideration of the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) approach, the Sims-
Bernanke (1986) decomposition approach, and the Hodrick-Prescott (1997). The Sims-
Bernanke (1986) has the advantage of being invariant to the ordering of the variables in the 
model, which eliminates the process of trying to figure out the most appropriate ordering. On 
the other hand, the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) has the advantage of using the same method to 
extract the trend from a set of variables hence; the variables will have the same stochastic 
trend. This is in contrast to the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) approach, which when applied 
separately to the same variable yields different trends. 
 
The Blanchard and Quah (1989) approach first estimates a bivariate VAR model with the 
underlying identifying assumption that one of the shocks has no long run effects (the demand 
shock), while the other does (the supply shock) (Garrat et al., 2006:18). However, this 
approach has been criticised for assuming that demand shocks are always temporary, which is 
not always the case. In practice, these shocks can sometimes have long lasting effects. The 
approach also assumes that any difference-stationary variable can be decomposed into 
permanent and temporary components. However, this assumption requires that at least one of 
the variables in the analysis be non-stationary, which is not always the case (Tavlas, 
2008:18). 
 
In addition, when the VAR model has three or more variables, there is a possibility of the 
presence of more than one permanent or temporary shock in the system. This poses further 
identification problems since a combination of stationary shocks will themselves be 
stationary (Garrat et al., 2006:18). Furthermore, the approach is limited by its ability to 
identify at most only as many types of distinct shocks as there are variables in the model 
(Enders, 2004:310). Lastly, the model assumes that the relationships among variables are 
constant with respect to time, which is unrealistic given that most relationships among 
variables are likely to be time-varying so that the coefficients are not constant over time 
(Tavlas, 2008:18). 
192 
 
The present study makes use of the Choleski decomposition approach, which is the approach 
used in VAR models run in Eviews. The forecast errors in terms of the {} sequence are 
decomposed in order to obtain the inter-relationships among the variables, with the ordering: 
inflation, output, and money supply for the basic model and for the extended model, the 
respective transmission mechanism. The ordering allows the transmission mechanism to be 
interpreted as a monetary policy reaction function. Given that the procedure uses residuals to 
obtain the impulses, they can be interpreted as responses of output and inflation to an 
unanticipated monetary policy action (Haug et al., 2005; Buigut, 2006). 
 
6.5.4 Impulse Response Functions 
The present study also makes use of impulse response functions to observe the behaviour of 
inflation and output in response to monetary policy shocks. According to Enders (2004: 274), 
impulse response analysis allows one to trace out the time path of the various shocks on the 
variables contained in the VAR system. For example, if we expressed equations (6.6) and 
(6.7) in matrix form as: 
  =  
		 + 
   
 + 
       (6.31) 
 
Alternatively, assuming the stability condition holds, the system can be written as: 
  = 
}}  + E 
  
F~FG	 + FF        (6.32) 
 
Equation (6.32) expresses  and  in terms of the {} and {} sequences, which can be 
expressed in terms of  and . Equations (6.8) and (6.9) can be expressed in matrix format 
as: 
 =

\]]\ 
1 
− 1  
          (6.33) 
 
Combining equations (6.32) and (6.33) yields: 
  = 
}}  +

\]]\  E 
  
F~FG	  1 − 1  
      (6.34) 
 
This can be simplified to: 
  = 
}}  + E 
K(I) K(I)
K(I) K(I)
~FG	          (6.35) 
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Where:  
KF = \

\]]\ 
1 
− 1   
 
In compact form, equation (6.35) becomes: 
 =  + E KFF~FG	           (6.36) 
 
The coefficients of KF in equation (6.35) are used to generate the effects of  and  shocks 
on the entire time path of the {}and {} sequences. The coefficients are called impulse 
response functions and they show the impact of a unit change in the disturbances on the 
variables in the system at different time periods, i. For example, K(0) gives the 
instantaneous impact of a unit change in  on , while K(1) shows the effects of a unit 
change in  on ). A summation of the coefficients of the impulse response functions 
gives the accumulated effects of unit impulses in  and/ or . Enders (2004: 274) notes 
that plotting these impulses gives a practical way of visually representing the behaviour of the 
{} and {} sequences in response to various shocks. 
 
6.5.5 Granger Causality 
The Granger causality test tests whether the lags of one variable enter into the equation for 
another variable, i.e., whether the one variable improves the forecasting performance of the 
other variable. This is achieved by measuring whether the current and past values of, for 
instance, {} help to forecast future values of {}. If {} does not improve the forecasting 
performance of {}, then it is said that {} does not Granger cause {}. For example, given 
a vector moving average (VMA) model of : 
 =  + K(0) + E K~FG	 (I)F       (6.37) 
 
If ) is forecast conditional on the value of , the following forecast error is obtained: 
K(0)) + K(0))         (6.38) 
 
Since the value of  is known, information concerning  does not help reduce the 
forecasting error of ). The only additional information contained in  is the current and 
past values of , which do not affect  and hence, cannot improve its forecasting 
performance.  
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6.6 DATA ISSUES 
The study makes use of quarterly data from January 1980 to December 2009 from the 
International Financial Statistic (IFS) database of the IMF. A lack of sufficient data in some 
of the SADC states presented difficulties in making conclusive comparisons as to the 
feasibility of monetary integration within the SADC region. Particularly, very few of the 
member states report fully on the amount of credit granted to the private sector and 
government, which as a result, provided an incomplete picture on the impact of the credit 
channel on domestic macroeconomic stabilisation efforts. 
 
Allen and Ndikumana (2000:139) note that for most developing countries, macroeconomic 
time series data is sparse and when available, it is usually recorded annually. This limits the 
number of observations to include in a study. In addition, data tends to be reported from the 
time the countries attained independence, which makes comparisons for countries, such as the 
SADC states, difficult as the period from which data is available differs from country to 
country.  
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
The underlying theoretical framework for the analyses is the theory of monetary transmission 
mechanisms. Economic literature asserts that the interest rate channel is the most important 
transmission mechanism in most countries. However, for developing countries, the interest 
rate channel tends not to be because their financial systems are usually shallow and poorly 
diversified. This limits the transmission of monetary policy. In such environments, the credit 
channel is expected to dominate due to the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that 
are characteristic of shallow financial systems.  
 
The study makes use of VAR analysis to investigate the importance of various monetary 
transmission mechanisms in the SADC countries. The intuition is that a similar policy action 
in a monetary union comprising countries with different transmission mechanisms due to 
divergent financial systems is likely to result in varying changes in output and prices across 
countries and possibly widen cyclical variation between countries. In turn, the member states 
will be prone to asymmetric shocks, which increase the costs of giving up the exchange rate 
as an adjustment mechanism. Hence, VAR analysis is used to analyse and compare the 
impact of monetary policy shocks through various transmission mechanisms in the SADC 
countries.  
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Chapter 7 presents and discusses the results obtained from the analyses. It is expected that the 
interest rate channel in the SADC countries with the least developed financial systems will 
not be an important transmission mechanism, while the credit channel dominates. On the 
other hand, the interest rate channel is likely to dominate in the CMA countries as the SARB 
makes use of the interest rate as the main instrument in pursuing its inflation targeting policy. 
It is expected that the SADC countries will exhibit asymmetry in monetary policy shocks, 
which would be an indication that the region as a whole is not suitable for monetary 
integration.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The results from the analyses are discussed in this chapter, together with the implications 
drawn from the estimations. The models outlined in the previous chapter were estimated 
using the Eviews 7 econometric package. Section 7.2 discusses the results from the 
preliminary tests performed on the data, which include unit root tests and cointegration 
analyses. The detailed results of the univariate stationarity tests are presented in Table D.1 of 
Appendix D, while the results of the VAR lag-length selection criteria are presented in 
Appendix E.  
 
Section 7.3 presents and discusses the results from the estimations using VAR analyses for 
each transmission mechanism and per country. The study made use of impulse response 
functions, variance decomposition analyses and Granger causality tests in the interpretation 
of the results. The detailed results of the Granger causality tests are presented in Appendix F, 
while the results for the variance decomposition analyses are presented in Appendix G. 
Appendix H presents the impulse response functions for each country, while Appendix I 
gives a summary of the descriptions of the conduct of monetary policy in the SADC 
countries. Lastly, Section 7.4 concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2 PRELIMINARY ANALYSES 
The results of the unit root tests are discussed in Section 7.2.1 below. This is followed by a 
discussion on the results from the cointegration analyses in Section 7.2.2. The descriptive 
statistics discussed in Chapter 4 are made reference to in the discussion of the results. 
 
7.2.1 Unit Root Tests 
The Dickey-Fuller test with generalised least squares de-trending (DF-GLS) and the Phillips-
Perron (PP) univariate tests were carried out with an intercept only and an intercept and time 
trend for each country. Table 7.1 below provides a summary of the results obtained from the 
unit root tests. The detailed results of the univariate stationarity tests are presented in Table 
D.1 of Appendix D. 
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Table 7.1: Summary of Unit Root Tests 
 
GDP Inflation Interest Rate 
Money 
Supply 
Exchange 
Rate 
Credit 
Angola I(0) I(1) - - I(0) I(0) 
Botswana - I(0) I(1) - I(1) I(1) 
DRC I(1) I(1) Insufficient data I(1) I(1) - 
Lesotho I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Madagascar I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) 
Malawi I(2) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(2) 
Mauritius I(1) I(0) I(0) I(2) I(1) I(1) 
Mozambique I(1) I(1) I(0) I(2) I(1) I(1) 
Namibia  I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) Insufficient data 
South Africa I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Swaziland I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) 
Tanzania I(1) I(2) I(2) I(1) I(1) Insufficient data 
Zambia I(2) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) Insufficient data 
Source: Derived from Regression Data 
 
The results of the analyses indicated that most of the variables were integrated of the first 
order, i.e., I(1) processes. Some variables, such as inflation for Lesotho and Tanzania, GDP 
for Malawi and Zambia, interest rate for Tanzania, the money supply for Mauritius and 
Mozambique, and credit for Malawi and Swaziland were integrated of the second order, i.e., 
I(2) processes . On the other hand, GDP for Angola and Namibia, inflation for Botswana, 
Malawi and Mauritius, interest rate for Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and 
Zambia, the money supply for Madagascar and Malawi, the exchange rate for Angola and 
Namibia, and credit for Angola were stationary at level. Lastly, GDP for Botswana, interest 
rate for Angola, money supply for Angola and Botswana, and credit for the DRC were non-
stationary at second difference. 
 
I(1) and I(2) series tend to wander a long way from their mean value and cross this mean 
value rarely. I(0) series, on the other hand, tend to cross the mean frequently. Table D.1 of 
Appendix D shows that a number of variables are either I(1) or I(2) series and they contain a 
stochastic trend component, as is the nature of most macroeconomic variables. This implies 
that the variables do not grow at a smooth long run rate because some of the shocks 
experienced are of a permanent nature. Hence, the effects of such shocks are never 
eliminated. On the other hand, shocks to I(0) series are temporary; their effects will dissipate 
over time and the series revert to their long run levels (Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Enders, 
2004). 
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For the SADC countries, this implies that the monetary union is likely to suffer from 
asymmetric monetary policy shocks, depending on the relative importance of each 
transmission mechanism. The discussion in Chapter 4 indicated that the member states are at 
different stages of financial development and lack diversified production structures, which 
make them prone to asymmetric shocks. The OCA theory stipulates that countries wishing to 
form a currency union should exhibit a similarity in shocks in order to minimise the costs of 
giving up the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism. Thus, asymmetric responses to 
monetary policy shocks would be an additional indication that the SADC region is not 
suitable for monetary integration as there are high costs to individual countries associated 
with such integration. This is explored further in Section 7.3. 
 
7.2.2 Cointegration Analysis 
The appropriate lag length for the VAR models was first determined before cointegration 
tests were performed. Enders (2004: 281) notes that a lag length that is too large consumes 
degrees of freedom, while lag length that is too small leads to model misspecification. Hence, 
caution should be exercised in the selection of the appropriate lag length to use. Since the 
study makes use of quarterly data, as a precaution, the maximum lag length was initially set 
at twelve, then it was reduced progressively until it was determined that the maximum lag 
length was four. The choice of the lag length was based on the standard guideline used by 
most researchers that the lag length should be approximately t/, where t is the number of 
usable observations (Enders, 2004:359). Table 7.2 below, presents a summary of the 
appropriate lag length used in each estimation. Detailed results of the VAR lag-length 
selection criteria are presented in Appendix E. 
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Table 7.2: Summary of Lag Length Selection Criteria 
 Monetary 
Aggregate 
Channel 
Interest 
Rate 
Channel 
Exchange 
Rate 
Channel 
Credit 
Channel 
Angola 4 4 4 4 
Botswana 4 2 2 4 
DRC 4 - 4 4 
Lesotho 4 4 4 4 
Madagascar 4 2 2 3 
Malawi 3 3 3 3 
Mauritius 4 4 4 4 
Mozambique 3 3 3 3 
Namibia  4 3 3 - 
South Africa 4 4 4 4 
Swaziland 4 4 4 1 
Tanzania 4 4 4 - 
Zambia 4 4 4 - 
Source: Derived from Regression Data 
 
Econometric theory asserts that cointegration analysis cannot be conducted on variables that 
are not integrated of the same order. In addition, theory asserts that variables that are 
stationary at level cannot have a cointegration relationship with any other variables. 
However, Enders (2004:323) argues that it is possible to find equilibrium relationships 
among a group of variables that are integrated of different orders. Hence, cointegration tests 
were performed to determine whether such a relationship existed between the variables 
included in the present study. Table 7.3 below provides a summary of the results from the 
cointegration tests. Detailed results of the univariate stationarity tests are presented in Table 
D.2 of Appendix D. 
 
Table 7.3: Summary of Cointegration Tests 
 Monetary 
Aggregate 
Channel 
Interest Rate 
Channel 
Exchange 
Rate 
Channel 
Credit Channel 
DRC r ≤ 1 Insufficient data r ≤ 1 - 
Lesotho r ≤ 2 r ≤ 3 r = 0 r = 0 
Mozambique r ≤ 1 - r = 0 - 
South Africa r ≤ 2 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 3 r ≤ 1 
Swaziland r ≤ 2 r ≤ 1 r = 0 r ≤ 3 
Tanzania r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 1 Insufficient data 
Zambia r = 0 r = 0 - Insufficient data 
Source: Derived from Regression Data 
 
Of the SADC countries, Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia and Zambia had stationary variables hence, cointegration analyses could not be 
carried out on the VAR models that had stationary variables. On the other hand, GDP for 
Botswana, interest rate for Angola, money supply for Angola and Botswana, and credit for 
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the DRC were non-stationary even at second difference. This implies that no equilibrium 
relationships can exist with these variables, as they are explosive. Any shocks to the economy 
will not dissipate and the variables do not return to their long run levels. Thus, cointegration 
tests were carried out only for the DRC (excluding the credit channel), Lesotho, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia and VECMs were 
subsequently estimated where cointegration relationships existed. For the rest of the 
countries, VAR models were estimated. 
 
7.3 RESULTS FROM ESTIMATIONS 
Section 7.3.1 discusses the impact of un-anticipated changes in the monetary aggregate, while 
Section 7.3.2 discusses the effects of un-anticipated changes in the interest rate on output and 
inflation in each of the SADC countries. Section 7.3.3 is a discussion of the impact of un-
anticipated changes in the interest rate and lastly, Section 7.3.4 discusses the effects of 
unanticipated changes in domestic credit issued to the private sector on the economic 
performance of the member states. 
 
It was noted that is typical for a variable to explain almost all of its forecast error variance at 
short horizons and smaller proportions at longer horizons. This occurs particularly when  
 shocks have little contemporaneous effect on , but affect the {} sequence with a lag 
(Enders, 2004: 280). Hence, the study pays particular attention to the variance decomposition 
analysis in the twelfth period, with the assumption that if a great proportion of the forecast 
error variances in output and inflation are due to their “own” shocks even at longer horizons, 
the implication is that the relevant channel is not an important transmission mechanism in the 
particular country. 
 
7.3.1 The Monetary Aggregate Channel 
The responses of changes in output (as measured by the GDP) and inflation (as measured by 
changes in the CPI) to an exogenous monetary policy shock (in the form of changes in the 
monetary aggregate) are presented below. The transmission mechanism is based on the 
quantity theory of money, which asserts that price levels vary in direct proportion to money 
supply. When money supply increases, consumers are expected to dispose of their excess 
money holdings by spending on consumer goods, hence stimulating aggregate demand. In 
turn, increases in the money supply are expected to exert an upward pressure on prices. The 
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responses of each SADC country to un-anticipated changes in the monetary aggregate are 
discussed in the sub-sections below.  
 
7.3.1.1  Angola 
The impulse response functions in Figure H.1.1 of Appendix H show that a positive shock to 
the monetary aggregate led to an increase in output, while prices declined initially then 
increased towards the fourth period. The results conform to economic theory, which 
stipulates that increases in money supply result in increases in both output and inflation. The 
Granger causality tests in Table F.1 of Appendix F indicate that there is a significant causal 
relationship between money supply and output, money supply and inflation, and output and 
inflation at the 5% level of significance. The implication drawn from the results is that 
increases in the money supply stimulate output production.  
 
This is supported by the variance decomposition analysis in Table G.1.1 of Appendix G, 
which indicate that increases in money supply accounted for over 40% of fluctuations in GDP 
on average, while own output fluctuations accounted for 30% of the variations in the twelfth 
period as compared to over 50% in the first period. On the other hand, shocks to the money 
supply accounted for 32% of the fluctuations in prices by the twelfth period in comparison to 
merely approximately 3% in the first period. In contrast, own price fluctuations accounted for 
approximately 60% of the variations in prices by the twelfth period as compared to over 90% 
in the first period. 
 
However, the magnitudes of the impulse responses are small, suggesting that the monetary 
aggregate channel is not very important in Angola. Table 4.8 in Chapter 4 indicates that 
Angola depends primarily on oil exports, which implies that expansionary monetary policy 
has an insignificant effect on stimulating output production as the demand for Angola’s 
exports are determined by activity in the oil market. Similarly, Table 4.5 indicates that 
inflation in Angola has been declining over the years, while Table 4.12 indicates that the 
budget deficit has been increasing. This implies that seignorage revenue (which is 
inflationary) has not been used to finance the deficit.  
 
Table I.1 in Appendix I indicates that the monetary aggregate is an important monetary 
policy tool in Angola. However, the results of the analyses suggest that the monetary 
aggregate channel is inefficient in the economy. The data in Tables 4.15 and 4.16 imply that 
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the economy experienced financial crises, which may have hindered the effective 
transmission of monetary policy. Lastly, the impulse response functions show that shocks to 
output and inflation tend to dissipate towards the twelfth period, suggesting that any negative 
monetary policy shocks to the union will have a temporary effect on inflation in Angola and 
will not permanently increase cyclical variations between the member states.  
 
7.3.1.2  Botswana 
The impulse response functions in Figure H.1.2 of Appendix H indicated that there was an 
insignificant response of output to a positive monetary policy shock. This was confirmed by 
the variance decomposition analysis in Table G.1.2 of Appendix G that indicated that 
approximately 90% of the fluctuations in output in the twelfth period were due to own output 
shocks, while changes in money supply accounted for merely 5% of the fluctuations in GDP. 
This can be explained by the high dependency of the economy on diamond exports, which 
account for approximately 77% of its exports as shown in Table 4.12 in Chapter 4. Hence, 
fluctuations in output are determined primarily by activity in the market for diamonds. In 
addition, Table I.1 in Appendix I indicates that the Bank of Botswana does not actively 
monitor monetary aggregates in formulating monetary policy. Thus, it was expected that the 
monetary aggregate would be a weak transmission mechanism for monetary policy in 
Botswana. 
 
In addition, the impulse response functions showed that shocks to the monetary aggregate 
affect prices with a lag, thereafter prices decline in response to a positive monetary policy 
shock (which is a violation of economic theory) before rising by the eighth period. The 
magnitude of the response is very small, suggesting that increases in the money supply were 
insignificant in explaining inflation in Botswana. The variance decomposition analysis 
indicates that more than 76% of fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period were due to own 
price shocks rather than changes in money supply, which accounted for only 10% of the price 
variations. This could be explained by the high dependency of the economy on imports from 
South Africa (over 80% of the domestic goods)90, which implies that inflation in Botswana is 
mainly imported inflation and not due to monetary expansion. 
 
                                                
90 See Table 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
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In addition, the Granger causality tests in Table F.2 of Appendix F found no significant 
causal relationship between money supply, inflation and output, confirming the insignificance 
of the monetary aggregate channel. Lastly, the impulse response for inflation does not decay, 
implying that any shocks to the monetary aggregate will result in a divergence of the level of 
inflation in Botswana from the union average. On the other hand, the impulse response for 
output tends to dissipate towards the twelfth period, suggesting that shocks to the monetary 
aggregate have a temporary effect on output and will not result in a widening of cyclical 
variations between Botswana and the other union member states.  
 
7.3.1.3  The Democratic Republic of Congo 
The impulse response function for inflation in Figure H.1.3 of Appendix H showed that a 
positive monetary shock led to an initial increase in prices in the DRC, which fell sharply 
between the sixth and ninth periods before rising again. In addition, the impulse does not 
decay, suggesting that any shocks to the monetary aggregate have permanent effects on prices 
and could potentially lead to a divergence of inflation rates in the DRC from the SADC 
levels. The Granger causality tests in Table F.3 of Appendix F suggest that money supply 
Granger causes inflation although only at the 10% level of significance.  
 
This suggests that increases in the monetary aggregate are not the leading cause of inflation 
in the DRC, which may be attributed to the civil wars that have been going on for decades. 
This assertion is supported by the variance decomposition analysis in Table G.1.3 of 
Appendix G, which indicate that shocks to the monetary aggregate accounted for 
approximately 20% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks accounted for 
approximately 50% of the variations in the twelfth period.  
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for output shows that a positive monetary 
policy shock leads to an initial decline in output, thereafter output fluctuates but the impulse 
does not decay. This suggests that shocks to the monetary aggregate could potentially widen 
cyclical variations between the DRC and the rest of the SADC member states. However, the 
Granger causality tests indicate that money supply does not Granger cause output, implying 
that increases in money supply have negligible effects on stimulating output growth.  
 
Furthermore, the variance decomposition analysis indicate that increases in output accounted 
for less than 5% of the fluctuations in output, while own output shocks accounted for 
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approximately 85% of the variations in the twelfth period. The results suggest that the 
monetary aggregate channel is not an important transmission mechanism in the DRC. This is 
to be expected given that the economy depends mainly on the export of diamonds and oil as 
shown in Table 4.2 in Chapter 4, which implies that changes in output are determined 
primarily by changes in the demand for its commodities in their respective markets and 
monetary policy has limited scope in stimulating the economy.  
 
The insignificance of the monetary aggregate in determining economic activity in the DRC is 
further explained by the under-development of its financial system. Money and banking are 
mostly limited to Kinshasa the country’s capital, and dollarisation remains substantial in the 
economy, with over 85% of all bank deposits in foreign currency. This limits the efficiency 
of domestic monetary policy in determining output and inflation in the economy.  
 
7.3.1.4  Lesotho 
The impulse response function for output in Figure H.1.4 of Appendix H shows that a 
positive money supply shock is insignificant in stimulating output in Lesotho. There is a 
marginal increase in output in the first two quarters, output fluctuates thereafter and the 
effects of the shock do not dissipate. This implies that any shocks to the monetary aggregate 
have a permanent effect on output. However, the magnitudes of the responses are very small, 
suggesting that the cyclical variations between union members would be small.  
 
In addition, the Granger causality tests in Table F.4 of Appendix F indicate that money 
supply Granger causes output in Lesotho. However, the variance decomposition analysis in 
Table G.1.4 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to the monetary aggregate accounted for a 
small proportion of the fluctuations in output (approximately 11% in the twelfth period), 
while own output shocks account for approximately 89% of the variations in output. This 
implies that changes in the monetary aggregate are ineffective in stimulating output in 
Lesotho. The insignificance of the monetary aggregate in determining output in Lesotho is to 
be expected, given that the smaller CMA countries have limited scope to exercise 
independent policy as the SARB sets the pace of monetary policy for the CMA91. 
 
                                                
91 See Table I.1 in Appendix I. 
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On the other hand, the impulse response functions indicate that there is an initial decrease in 
inflation in the first two quarters, in response to a positive monetary policy shock, which is a 
contradiction of economic theory. Prices fluctuate thereafter and the impulse does not 
dissipate, implying that shocks to the monetary aggregate have a permanent effect on 
inflation and are likely to result in a divergence of inflation in Lesotho from the union levels.  
 
However, the magnitudes of the responses are very small, suggesting that the monetary 
aggregate channel is weak. This is confirmed by the variance decomposition analysis, which 
indicates that shocks to the money supply accounted for approximately 12% of the variations 
in prices in the twelfth, while own price shocks accounted for approximately 30% of the 
fluctuations in prices. On the other hand, changes in GDP accounted for approximately 57% 
of the price variations, implying that a fall in output leads to a significant rise in inflation. 
Lastly, Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 indicates that Lesotho imports more than 82% of its goods 
from within the SADC region, particularly from South Africa. This implies that a significant 
proportion of inflation in Lesotho is imported inflation from South Africa. 
 
7.3.1.5  Madagascar 
The impulse response function for output in Figure H.1.5 of Appendix H showed that there 
was a sharp decline in output in the first four quarters, in response to a positive shock to the 
monetary aggregate. Thereafter, output increases but the effects of the shock do not decay. 
This implies that shocks to the monetary aggregate have permanent effects on output and 
could result in a widening of cyclical variation between union member states. 
 
The fairly-large magnitude of the impulse response suggests that the monetary aggregate 
channel is significant in stimulating output growth in Madagascar. This is supported by the 
Granger causality tests in Table F.5 of Appendix F, which indicate that money supply 
Granger causes output. In addition, the variance decomposition analysis indicate that shocks 
to the money supply accounted for approximately 60% of the variations, while own output 
shocks accounted for approximately 37% of the fluctuations in output in the twelfth period. 
 
Similarly, the impulse response functions show that there is an initial decrease in prices, in 
response to a positive shock to the monetary aggregate, which is in contradiction to economic 
theory. Prices begin to rise after the fifth period; however, the effect of the shock does not 
dissipate, implying that shocks to the monetary aggregate have permanent effects on inflation 
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in Madagascar. This is a cause for concern as it further implies that any shocks to the 
monetary aggregate could lead to a divergence of the level of inflation in Madagascar from 
the union levels.  
 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.5 of Appendix F indicate that money supply Granger 
causes inflation. In addition, the variance decomposition analysis in Table G.1.5 of Appendix 
G show that shocks to the monetary aggregate accounted for approximately 34% of the 
fluctuations in prices, while own shocks accounted for merely 6% of the variations in prices 
in the twelfth period. On the other hand, shocks to output accounted for approximately 60% 
of the variations in prices, implying that decreases in the previous period’s output exerted 
inflationary pressure on prices in the current period. This confirms the findings of Nassar 
(2005), who noted that inflation in Madagascar was driven largely by past events and hence, 
monetary policy was ineffective and lacked credibility.  
 
7.3.1.6  Malawi 
The impulse response functions in Figure H.1.6 of Appendix H show that the responses of 
output and inflation to a positive monetary policy shock in Malawi are negligible. There is an 
initial decrease in output, thereafter output fluctuates around its long run mean and the effects 
of the shock dissipate towards the twelfth period. This implies that shocks to the monetary 
aggregate have temporary effects on output and will not widen cyclical variations in a 
monetary union. On the other hand, prices increase in response to a positive shock to the 
monetary aggregate and the effect of the shock does not decay, implying that any 
unanticipated changes in the monetary aggregate will have permanent effects on inflation in 
Malawi. However, the effects are likely to be small given the small size of the impulse 
responses. 
 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.6 of Appendix F found no significant causal 
relationship between money supply, output and inflation, suggesting that the monetary 
aggregate channel is an ineffective transmission mechanism in Malawi. This is supported by 
the variance decomposition analysis in Table G.1.6 of Appendix G, which indicate that 
fluctuations in output were largely due to own output fluctuations (more than 97%), and not 
in response to changes in the monetary aggregate (which accounted for less than 2% of the 
variations in output). Similarly, own price changes accounted for approximately 77% of the 
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fluctuations in prices, while changes in the monetary aggregate accounted for approximately 
5% of the changes in prices.  
 
In summary, the information in Table I.1 in Appendix I indicates that the monetary aggregate 
plays a significant role in monetary policy in Malawi. However, the results of the analysis 
suggest that the monetary aggregate channel is weak and is not efficient in determining 
economic performance in Malawi.  
 
7.3.1.7  Mauritius 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.7 of Appendix F found no significant causal 
relationship between money supply, output and inflation, suggesting that positive shocks to 
the money supply were insignificant in determining economic performance in Mauritius. The 
impulse response function for output in Figure H.1.7 of Appendix H shows that a positive 
money supply shock led to an initial fall in output in the first two quarters before output 
increased. However, the magnitude of the response is very small, implying that changes in 
the monetary aggregate do not affect output. This is supported by the variance decomposition 
analysis in Table G.1.7 of Appendix G, which indicate that shocks to the money supply 
accounted for approximately 8% of fluctuations, while own output shocks accounted for 
approximately 82% of the variations in output in the twelfth period. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices increase 
initially when there is a positive shock to the monetary aggregate. Prices then fall between the 
fourth and eighth period before rising again. However, the magnitudes of the responses are 
very small, suggesting that increases in the money supply are not the leading cause of 
inflation in Mauritius. This is supported by the variance decomposition analysis, which 
indicate that shocks to the money supply accounted for approximately 5% of fluctuations, 
while own price shocks accounted for approximately 85% of the variations in prices in the 
twelfth period. 
 
Mauritius is likely to suffer from imported inflation, given its close trade linkages with the 
EU and the rest of the world. Table 4.3 in Chapter 4 shows that the country imports 
approximately 35% of its goods from the EU and 43% from the rest of the world, which 
implies that the economy is prone to imported inflation and economic contagion from its 
trade partners. A cause for concern is that the effects of the shocks do not decay in both 
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output and inflation, implying that any shocks encountered within the monetary union will 
result in a permanent divergence in the Mauritian inflation rates and output growth from the 
union levels. However, the divergence is likely to be minimal given the small size of the 
impulse responses. Overall, the results suggest that the monetary aggregate is not an 
important transmission mechanism in Mauritius. These results are in line with the findings of 
Tsangarides (2010), who found the monetary aggregate channel to be weak in Mauritius.  
 
7.3.1.8  Mozambique 
The impulse response function for output in Figure H.1.8 of Appendix H shows that there is a 
decrease initially in output in response to a positive monetary policy shock, before rising 
towards the fifth period. The initial response of output is contrary to economic theory, which 
asserts that an increase in the money supply leads to an increase in output. However, the 
magnitude of the response is very small, implying that the monetary aggregate is ineffective 
in stimulating economic growth in Mozambique.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.1.8 of Appendix G confirm this finding, 
indicating that own output shocks accounted for 44% of the variations in output in the twelfth 
period, while shock to the money supply and prices accounted for approximately 21% and 
34% of the variations, respectively. In addition, the Granger causality tests in Table F.8 of 
Appendix F indicated that money supply did not Granger cause output. Lastly, the impulse 
response functions show that the effects of a monetary policy shock do not dissipate, which 
implies that any shocks to the monetary aggregate have permanent effects on output. 
However, the effects are likely to be minimal given the small size of the impulse responses.  
 
On the other hand, prices increase sharply in the first four periods, in response to a monetary 
policy shock, thereafter there is a sharp fall in prices between the fifth and sixth period before 
rising again. However, the impulse decays by the twelfth period, implying that shocks to the 
monetary aggregate have temporary effects on prices in Mozambique and will not lead to a 
divergence from union levels.  
 
7.3.1.9 Namibia 
The impulse response function for output in Figure H.1.9 of Appendix H shows that output 
falls, in response to a positive money supply shock, which is contrary to an expectation that 
increases in money supply lead to increases in aggregate demand. However, the magnitude of 
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the response of output to money supply shocks is very small and dissipates around the 
eleventh period; implying that any shocks to the monetary aggregate have temporary effects 
on output. 
 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.9 of Appendix F show that money supply does not 
Granger cause output. This is supported by the variance decomposition analysis in Table 
G.1.9 of Appendix G, which shows that monetary policy shocks accounted for less than 4% 
of the variations in output, while own output shocks accounted for 55% of the fluctuations in 
the twelfth period. The results suggest that the monetary aggregate channel is weak in 
Namibia. 
 
Similarly, the Granger causality tests show that money supply does not Granger cause 
inflation in Namibia. The impulse response function for inflation shows that there is an initial 
decrease in prices in response to a positive monetary policy shock, thereafter prices fluctuate 
but the effect of the shock does not dissipate. This implies that any shocks to the monetary 
aggregate are likely to result in a divergence in the level of inflation in Namibia from the 
SADC average rates of inflation. The variance decomposition analysis indicate that own price 
shocks account for approximately 55% of fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period, while 
shocks to the money supply and output account for approximately 20% and 25% of the 
shocks, respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, indicates that Namibia imports approximately 84% of its goods from 
within the SADC region, particularly from South Africa. This implies that the economy is 
mostly prone to imported inflation. In addition, Table I.1 in Appendix I, shows that the 
primary goal of monetary policy in Namibia is the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate 
between the Namibian dollar and the South African rand. This implies that the monetary 
aggregate is not used as a tool to determine economic performance but rather, as an 
intervention mechanism to maintain the currency peg (SADC Bankers, 2011). 
 
7.3.1.10 South Africa 
The impulse response functions for both output and inflation in Figure H.1.10 of Appendix H 
show that these variables increase in response to a positive monetary policy shock. In 
addition, the impulses do not decay, implying that any shocks to the monetary aggregate will 
have permanent effects on the economy. However, the magnitudes of these responses are 
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very small, suggesting that the monetary aggregate channel is weak in South Africa. Hence, 
any monetary policy shocks will have negligible effects on union average performances.  
 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.10 of Appendix F indicate that money supply Granger 
causes output but not inflation. This result is supported by the variance decomposition 
analyses in Table G.1.10 of Appendix G that show that monetary policy shocks accounted for 
approximately 50% of the variations in output, while own output shocks accounted for 49% 
of the variations. The magnitude of the impulse response however indicates that positive 
shocks to the money supply are ineffective in stimulating output growth in South Africa. 
 
On the other hand, approximately 84% of the fluctuations in prices were due to own price 
shocks, while monetary policy shocks accounted for 14% of the price fluctuations. This 
implies that inflation in South Africa is not a monetary phenomenon. Table I.1 in Appendix I, 
shows that that the monetary aggregate is not the main instrument of monetary policy for the 
SARB. The Bank allows market forces to determine the amount of liquidity in the money 
market (SADC Bankers, 2011). In addition, the SARB maintains a policy of inflation 
targeting. Hence, an expansionary monetary policy action would contradict the SARB’s main 
objective of price stability because it is inflationary.  
 
The results are in line with that of Moll (1999), who found no close and reliable relationship 
between money supply, and nominal and real variables in South Africa. The study by 
Akinboade et. al (2001) support this finding, suggesting that inflation in South Africa is 
structural in nature. In conclusion, the monetary aggregate channel is not an important 
transmission mechanism in South Africa. 
 
7.3.1.11 Swaziland 
The impulse response function for output in Figure H.1.11of Appendix H shows that output 
falls initially, in response to a positive money supply shock and then increases between the 
third and sixth period before returning to its base trajectory. However, the magnitude of the 
impulse response is very small, suggesting that monetary policy shocks have negligible 
effects on output. This is supported by the variance decomposition analysis in Table G.1.11 
of Appendix G, which indicate that own output shocks accounted for more than 80% of the 
variations, while money supply shocks accounted for approximately 10% of the fluctuations 
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in output in the twelfth period. Thus, the monetary aggregate channel is insignificant in 
stimulating the economy. 
 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.11 of Appendix F found a significant causal 
relationship between money supply, inflation and output in Swaziland. The impulse response 
function for inflation shows that prices increase, in response to a positive money supply 
shock. However, the variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to the money 
supply accounted for approximately 22% of the changes in prices in the twelfth period, while 
own price shocks accounted for approximately 55% of the variations. The rest of the 
fluctuations were due to output shocks. 
 
Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, indicates that Swaziland imports approximately 96% of its goods 
from within the SADC region, particularly from South Africa. This implies that the economy 
is mostly prone to imported inflation and not inflation arising from seignorage. In addition, 
the Central Bank of Swaziland does not actively determine domestic monetary policy as it 
follows policy set by the SARB as per CMA arrangement. Hence, the monetary aggregate 
channel is weak in controlling domestic inflation. Furthermore, Table I.1 in Appendix I, 
shows that money supply aggregates are under-estimated in the economy due to the unknown 
volumes of South African rands in circulation. As such, the use of money supply aggregates 
for monetary policy purposes are inadequate, as the proportion of South African rands in 
circulation is significant (SADC Bankers, 2011). 
 
7.3.1.12 Tanzania 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.12 of Appendix F found no significant causal 
relationship between the variables, implying that a positive money supply shock had no 
significant impact on output or inflation in Tanzania. The impulse response function for 
output in Figure H.1.12 of Appendix H shows that there is an initial fall in output, in response 
to a monetary expansion, before rising in the third quarter. Thereafter output fluctuates but 
the effects of the shock do not decay. The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.1.2 of 
Appendix G indicates that more than 80% of the variations in output were due to own output 
shocks, while monetary policy shocks accounted for 13% of the fluctuations in the twelfth 
period. 
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On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices increase 
sharply in response to a positive monetary shock between the first two periods. Thereafter 
prices fluctuate but the impulse does not decay. This implies that any shocks to the monetary 
aggregate will have permanent effects on prices. However, the magnitude of the response is 
very small; indicating that shocks to the monetary aggregate will have minimal effects on 
union average rates. Lastly, the variance decomposition analysis indicate that monetary 
policy shocks accounted for 43% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks 
accounted for 46% of the changes in the twelfth period. 
  
7.3.1.13 Zambia 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.13 of Appendix F found that money supply Granger 
cuased inflation and output in Zambia. The impulse response function for output in Figure 
H.1.13 of Appendix H shows that there is an initial fall in output, in response to a monetary 
expansion, before rising in the third quarter. Thereafter output fluctuates but the effects of the 
shock do not decay. The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.1.13 of Appendix G 
indicates that approximately 51% of the variations in output were due to own output shocks, 
while monetary policy shocks accounted for 43% of the fluctuations in the twelfth period. 
However, the magnitude of the impulse response is very small; suggesting that the monetary 
aggregate channel is insignificant in stimulating output. 
 
In addition, Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 shows that output comprises mainly of the production of 
copper for exports. This implies that output performance is primarily determined by the 
demand for copper in the commodity market and not domestic monetary policy actions. Thus, 
changes in the money supply are ineffective in determining economic performance in 
Zambia. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices increase 
sharply in response to a positive monetary shock between the first two periods. Thereafter 
prices fluctuate and the impulse dissipates in the twelfth period. This implies that any shocks 
to the monetary aggregate will have temporary effects on prices. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicate that monetary policy shocks accounted for 
approximately 13% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks accounted for 
approximately 36% of the changes in the twelfth period. The rest of the price fluctuations 
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were due to output shocks. The results are in line with those of Bova (1999), who noted that 
food inflation in Zambia is not sensitive to changes in the money supply but rather, it is 
associated with changes in supply conditions such as weather and production costs.  
 
7.3.1.14 Summary 
The results from the analyses suggest that the monetary aggregate channel is weak in most of 
the SADC member states, with the exception of Madagascar. In addition, the SADC countries 
display asymmetry in their responses to shocks to the monetary aggregate. There is an initial 
fall in output in response to a positive shock to the monetary aggregate for the DRC, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia, 
while prices fall initially for Angola, Lesotho, Madagascar and Namibia, which is contrary to 
economic expectations. Lastly, for most of the SADC countries, shocks to the monetary 
aggregate do not dissipate, which implies that they are likely to lead to a divergence in 
economic performances of the member states within the monetary union. 
 
7.3.2 The Interest Rate Channel 
The responses of output and inflation to an exogenous monetary policy shock (in the form of 
changes in the policy rate) are presented below. Ceteris paribus, a reduction in the policy rate 
should result in reductions in other short-term interest rates. In turn, the fall in the interest 
rates is expected to stimulate investment and aggregate demand, and lead to a rise in prices. 
The subsections below discuss the impact of changes in the policy rate on each of the SADC 
countries. The interest rate channel could not be analysed for the DRC due to insufficient 
data. 
 
7.3.2.1  Angola 
The impulse response function in Figure H.2.1of Appendix H for inflation shows that prices 
respond with a lag of two periods to a positive shock to the policy rate. There is a slight 
increase in prices from period three but the effect of the shock does not dissipate. This 
implies that any shocks to the interest rate are permanent, and therefore will result in a 
divergence of inflation in Angola from the union levels. The variance decomposition analysis 
in Table G.2.1 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to the interest rate accounted for 40% of 
the fluctuations in prices, while own shocks accounted for approximately 34% of the 
variations in the twelfth period. On the other hand, shocks to the monetary aggregate account 
for approximately 13% of the fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period. 
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On the other hand, the impulse response function for output shows that output increases in the 
first four periods, response to a positive shock to the interest rate. Thereafter, output 
fluctuates but the effects of the shock do not decay, implying that any shocks to the interest 
rate are permanent and could potentially widen cyclical variations between Angola and the 
rest of the SADC member states.  
 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.1 of Appendix F found a significant causal relationship 
between output and the interest rate. The variance decomposition analysis supports this 
finding, indicating that shocks to the interest rate accounted for approximately 53% of the 
fluctuations in output, while own output shocks accounted for only 20% of the variations in 
the twelfth period. Shocks to the money supply and prices accounted for less than 9% and 
17% of the fluctuations, respectively. However, the magnitudes of the responses are very 
small, suggesting that the interest rate channel is weak. 
 
The results suggest that the interest rate channel plays an important role in monetary policy in 
Angola. This is supported by the data in Table 4.16 in Chapter 4, which shows that in the past 
decade, banks in Angola have improved on their efficiency in mobilising deposit money 
relative to the size of the economy. However, Table 4.15 indicates that the financial system in 
Angola is still under-developed; hence, there is limited scope for monetary transmission 
through the interest rate channel. This is seen in the very small size of the impulse response, 
which indicates that the interest rate channel is weak in controlling inflation. 
 
7.3.2.2  Botswana 
The results from the impulse response function for inflation in Figure H.2.2 of Appendix H 
shows that there is an initial increase in prices before falling towards the third quarter, in 
response to a positive shock to the interest rate. Prices begin to rise again after the eighth 
period but the impulse does not decay implying that shocks to the interest rate have 
permanent effects on prices. The Granger causality test in Table F.2 of Appendix F indicates 
that the interest rate does not Granger cause neither output nor inflation.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.2.2 of Appendix G indicates that 20% of the 
fluctuations in prices can be attributed to shocks to the interest rate, while own price shocks 
account for approximately 71% of the changes in the twelfth period. This suggests that the 
interest rate channel is insignificant in controlling inflation in Botswana. This is to be 
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expected given the high dependency of the economy on imports from South Africa, which 
implies that inflation in the economy is mainly imported inflation and is independent of 
domestic monetary policy actions. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for output show that there is an initial 
decline in output before increasing towards the fourth quarter, in response to a positive shock 
to the interest rate. However, the magnitude of the response is small, suggesting that a 
reduction in the policy rate has little effect on stimulating output in Botswana. The variance 
decomposition analysis supports this finding, indicating that shocks to the interest rate 
accounted for approximately 28% of the fluctuations in output, while own output shock 
accounted for 69% of the variations in the twelfth period.  
 
The information in Table I.1 of Appendix I, shows that the Bank rate is used to affect other 
market rates in the control of inflation. However, the data in Tables 4.15 and 4.16 indicate 
that there is minimal development in the financial system in Botswana. Moreover, Table 4.18 
shows that banking sector concentration is high. This implies that the banking sector 
exercises monopolistic power in the determination of market rates and prices independent of 
central bank actions, which in turn hinders the transmission of monetary policy. 
 
7.3.2.3  Lesotho 
The Granger causality test in Table F.4 of Appendix F found a significant causal relationship 
between the interest rate and output in Lesotho. Similarly, the variance decomposition 
analysis in Table G.2.3 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to the interest rate accounted for 
28% of the fluctuations in output, while own output shocks and, shocks to the money supply 
each accounted for approximately 33% of the variations in the twelfth period.  
 
The impulse response function in Figure H.2.3 of Appendix H shows that output increases 
initially in response to a positive shock to the interest rate; thereafter it fluctuates and never 
reverts to its long run mean. This implies that any shocks to the interest rate have permanent 
effects on output, and will possibly widen cyclical variations within the monetary union. 
However, the magnitude of the response is very small, suggesting that the impact of the 
interest rate on output is minimal. 
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On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that there is a slight 
decrease in prices in the first two periods in response to a positive monetary policy shock. 
Thereafter prices fluctuate and never revert to their long run mean. This implies that any 
shocks to the interest rate will have permanent effects on prices and may lead to a divergence 
of inflation in Lesotho from union average rates. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to the interest rate accounted for 
approximately 14% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks and output shocks 
accounted for approximately 31% and 45%, respectively, of the variations in the twelfth 
period. The results suggest that the interest rate channel is weak in controlling inflation in 
Lesotho. The very small magnitude of the impulse response supports this assertion. 
 
The inefficiency of domestic interest rate policy in determining economic performance in 
Lesotho is expected. Given the country’s membership in the CMA arrangement, the South 
African Reserve Bank determines the interest rate policy for the region. However, the SARB 
sets monetary policy in response to changes in the South African market, which may not be 
in line with the required policy in the smaller countries. Hence, monetary policy is generally 
ineffective in these countries. Furthermore, as seen in Table 4.18, the banking sector 
concentration in Lesotho is high. This implies that the banking sector exercises monopolistic 
power in the determination of market rates and prices independent of central bank actions, 
which in turn hinders the transmission of monetary policy.  
 
7.3.2.4  Madagascar 
The impulse response function for output in Figure H.2.4 of Appendix H shows that there is 
an initial fall in output in the first three periods before it rises, in response to a positive shock 
to the interest rate. On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that 
prices increase in response to a positive interest rate shock. However, the impulses dissipate 
in both variables by the twelfth period, suggesting that the interest rate has temporary effects 
on the economy. In addition, the Granger causality tests in Table F.5 of Appendix F found no 
significant causal relationship between the variables. 
 
The variance decomposition analyses in Table G.2.4 of Appendix G support this finding, 
indicating that shocks to the interest rate accounted for approximately 5% of the variations in 
output and inflation in the twelfth period, while own shocks accounted for 28% and less than 
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1% of the variations, respectively. On the other hand, shocks to the money supply accounted 
for 65% of the variations in output, while output shocks accounted for approximately 61% of 
the fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period. The results support earlier findings that the 
monetary aggregate channel is significant in stimulating output growth, while inflation in 
Madagascar was driven largely by past events and hence, monetary policy was ineffective. 
 
In addition, Table 4.18 shows that there is high bank concentration in the financial sector, 
which implies that competition in the sector is relatively low. As such, the three banks 
exercise monopolistic power in the determination of market rates and prices independent of 
central bank actions, which further hinders the transmission of monetary policy. 
 
7.3.2.5  Malawi 
The impulse response function for inflation in Figure H.2.5 of Appendix H shows that prices 
increase in response to a positive interest rate shock. The impulse response dissipates by the 
twelfth period, suggesting that shocks to the interest rate have temporary effects on prices. In 
addition, the Granger causality tests in Table F.6 of Appendix F suggest that there is a weak 
causal relationship between the interest rate and prices. This is supported by the variance 
decomposition analysis in Table G.2.5 of Appendix G, which indicates that approximately 
71% of the fluctuations in prices were due to its own shocks, while interest rate shocks 
accounted for 5% of the variations in the twelfth period. Output and money supply shocks 
accounted for 18% and less than 5% of the fluctuations, respectively. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for output shows that output falls initially in 
response to a positive interest rate shock. Thereafter, it fluctuates around its long run mean 
but the effects of the shock do not decay. This implies that shocks to the interest rate have 
permanent effects on output. However, the variance decomposition analysis indicates that 
shocks to the interest rate account for approximately 3% of the fluctuations in output, while 
own output shocks account for close to 94% of the variations in the twelfth period. Thus, 
suggesting that the impact of the interest rate channel on output is limited. 
 
The data in Tables 4.16 and 4.17 in Chapter 4 shows that Malawi has experienced a decline 
in the efficiency of its financial system over the years. In addition the data in Table 4.18 
indicates that the bank concentration in Malawi is high, which implies that the banking sector 
exercises monopolistic power in the determination of market rates and prices independent of 
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the policy rate. These factors have led to the interest rate channel being inefficient in the 
transmission of monetary policy. 
 
7.3.2.6  Mauritius 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.7 of Appendix F found no significant causal 
relationship between the interest rate, inflation and output in Mauritius. The impulse response 
function for inflation in Figure H.2.6 of Appendix H shows that prices rise in response to a 
positive monetary policy shock. In addition, the impulse does not decay, which implies that 
any shocks to the interest rate have a permanent effect on prices. The variance decomposition 
analysis in Table G.2.6 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to the interest rate account for 
approximately 36% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks account for 
approximately 51% of price variations in the twelfth period. The results suggest that the 
interest rate channel plays an important role in controlling inflation in Mauritius but is not the 
main transmission mechanism. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for output shows that output falls in 
response to a positive monetary policy shock. However, the impulse response decays after 
twelve periods, suggesting that shocks to the interest rate have temporary effects on output. In 
addition, the magnitude of the response is very small, implying that the interest rate channel 
is weak in stimulating output. This is supported by the variance decomposition analysis, 
which indicates that shocks to the interest rate account for less than 10% of the fluctuations in 
output, while own shocks account for approximately 74% of output variations in the twelfth 
period. 
 
The data in Tables 4.16 and 4.17 indicates that Mauritius has shown a consistent 
improvement in the efficiency of its financial system. This suggests that the financial system 
is growing, which explains the relevance of the interest rate channel in controlling inflation. 
However, the central bank is still unable to stimulate investment through a reduction in the 
policy rate. This could be attributed to the fact that the central bank lacks independence92 and 
thus, lacks credibility, which deters investors. 
 
                                                
92 See Table I.1 of Appendix I. 
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7.3.2.7  Mozambique 
The impulse response analysis in Figure H.2.7 of Appendix H shows that prices increase in 
the first three periods in response to a positive interest rate shock. Prices then fall between the 
third and seventh period, before rising again. The effects of the shock dissipate by the twelfth 
period, indicating that shocks to the interest rate have temporary effects on prices and will not 
lead to a divergence of inflation level in Mozambique from union average rates.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.2.7 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to 
the interest rate accounted for approximately 25% of the fluctuations in prices in the twelfth 
period, while own price shocks accounted for approximately 35% of the price variations and 
money supply shocks, 28%. This implies that monetary policy is significant in controlling 
inflation in Mozambique.  
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for output shows that there is an initial 
decrease in output in response to a positive interest rate shock before rising from the fourth 
quarter. In addition, the impulse response decays by the tenth period, indicating that shocks to 
the interest rate have temporary effects on output and will not lead to a widening of cyclical 
variations within the union. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to the interest rate accounted for 
approximately 55% of the fluctuations in output in the twelfth period, while own output 
shocks accounted for approximately 23% of the variations and money supply shocks, 
approximately 21%. The results suggest that monetary policy is significant in stimulating 
output in Mozambique. However, the magnitudes of the impulses are very small, implying 
that the interest rate has limited scope in stimulating output. 
 
Although the data in Tables 4.15 and 4.16 indicates that Mozambique experienced a financial 
crisis in the past, the data in Table 4.17 shows that there has been an improvement in 
efficiency of its financial system. This explains the significant role the interest rate channel 
plays in the economy. However, the high bank concentration, as shown in Table 4.18 hinders 
the transmission of monetary policy. 
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7.3.2.8  Namibia 
The impulse response functions in Figure H.2.8 of Appendix H shows that both output and 
inflation fall in response to a positive shock to the policy rate, which is contrary to economic 
expectations. The impulses do not decay, which suggests that any shocks to the interest rate 
will have permanent effects on output and inflation and hence, are likely to result in a 
divergence in its economic performance from those of the rest of the SADC states. However, 
the magnitudes of the responses are small, suggesting that the effects of the shocks are 
minimal. 
 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.9 of Appendix F show that the interest rate is 
insignificant in stimulating economic performance in Namibia. This is supported by the 
variance decomposition analyses in Table G.2.8 of Appendix G, which indicate that shocks to 
the interest rate accounted for approximately 11% of the variations in both output and 
inflation, while own shocks accounted for 88% and 16% of the variations in the twelfth 
period, respectively. Most of the price changes were due to output shocks, which suggest that 
inflation is driven by past events to a certain extent. As suggested by the data in Table 4.3 in 
Chapter 4, Namibia is prone to imported inflation from South Africa given that more than 
80% of its imports originate from there. 
 
The data in Tables 4.16 and 4.17 in Chapter 4 shows that Namibia has consistently shown an 
improvement over the years in the efficiency of its financial system. This implies that the 
interest rate channel ought to play a significant role in the transmission of monetary policy. 
However, the high bank concentration in Namibia as seen in Table 4.18 implies that 
competition in the financial sector is relatively low; as such, the three largest banks exercise 
monopolistic power in the determination of market rates and prices independent of central 
bank actions. This in turn, hinders the transmission of monetary policy. 
 
7.3.2.9  South Africa 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.10 of Appendix F found a significant causal 
relationship between interest rate, output and inflation in South Africa. However, the 
magnitude of the impact of the interest rate on output and inflation remained small as shown 
by the impulse responses in Figure H.2.9 of Appendix H. The variance decomposition 
analyses in Table G.2.9 of Appendix G support this finding, indicating that shocks to the 
interest rate accounted for 17% of output variations and less than 5% of price fluctuations in 
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the twelfth period. Own output shocks accounted for approximately 44% of the variations in 
output in the twelfth period, while money supply shocks accounted for 38% of the changes. 
On the other hand, own price shocks accounted for 81% of the price fluctuations, while 
money supply shocks accounted for approximately 12% of the changes in the twelfth period. 
 
The results suggest that the interest rate channel is insignificant in controlling inflation in 
South Africa. This is because, as seen in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, South Africa trades 
extensively with Europe and the rest of the world, which makes it prone to imported inflation 
as well as economic contagion from its trading partners. This is in line with the findings Nell 
(2000), whose study concluded that South Africa was prone to imported inflation. In addition, 
Akinboade et. al (2001), note that labour costs are a leading cause of inflation in South Africa 
and that the interest rate has no direct influence on them. Hence, the interest rate channel has 
limited scope in determining economic performance in South Africa. 
 
7.3.2.10 Swaziland 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.11 of Appendix F show that the interest rate does not 
Granger cause output or inflation in Swaziland. The impulse response function in Figure 
H.2.10 of Appendix H for output shows that output falls sharply in the first three quarters 
then rises for the next two periods, before falling again. The impulse response does not decay, 
suggesting that shocks to the interest rate have permanent effects on output. However, the 
magnitude of the response is very small, implying that shocks to the interest rate have 
negligible effects on output. The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.2.10 of 
Appendix G supports this finding, indicating that shocks to the interest rate accounted for less 
than 4% of the variations in output, while own output shocks accounted for approximately 
84% of fluctuations in output in the twelfth period.  
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices rise in the 
first three quarters in response to a positive interest rate shock. Thereafter, prices fluctuate 
around the mean but the impulse does not decay, suggesting that shocks to the interest rate 
have permanent effects on prices. The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks 
to the interest rate accounted for approximately 9% of the variations in prices, while own 
price shocks accounted for approximately 47% of the fluctuations in the twelfth period. 
Output and money supply shocks accounted for approximately 23% and 20% of the price 
variations in the twelfth period, respectively.  
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The results suggest that the interest rate channel is weak in Swaziland. The data in Tables 
4.15 and 4.16 in Chapter 4 suggests that Swaziland is financially under-developed although it 
has improved in the efficiency of its financial system (as seen in Table 4.17). The 
inefficiency of the interest rate channel may therefore, be attributed to the high bank 
concentration in the financial sector, which makes it possible for the few banks in the market 
to exercise monopolistic power in the determination of market rates and prices, which in turn 
hinders the transmission of monetary policy. Similar conclusions were reached by Dlamini et. 
al (2001), who found that the interest rate played no significant role in the determination of 
inflation in Swaziland. 
 
7.3.2.11 Tanzania 
The impulse response function for inflation in Figure H.2.11 of Appendix H shows that a 
positive interest rate shock led to an initial rise in prices in the first two quarters in Tanzania. 
Prices fluctuate around the mean from the third period and the impulse decays by the 
eleventh period. The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.2.11 of Appendix G 
indicates that shocks to the interest rate contributed to approximately 21% of the fluctuations 
in prices, while own price shocks accounted for approximately 47% of the changes and 
money supply shocks, 27% in the twelfth period. The results suggest that monetary policy 
plays an important role in controlling inflation in Tanzania. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for output shows that output falls in 
response to a positive interest rate shock, which is contrary to economic expectations. The 
variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to the interest rate accounted for 
approximately 7% of the fluctuations in output, while own output shocks accounted for 
approximately 79% of the variations and money supply shocks, only 7% in the twelfth 
period. The results suggest that the interest rate channel is ineffective in stimulating output in 
Tanzania.  
 
The data in Tables 4.16 and 4.17 in Chapter 4 shows that there has been a small improvement 
over the years in the efficiency of the financial system in Tanzania. In addition, Table 4.18 
shows that there has been a reduction in bank concentration, hence, a reduction in the 
monopolistic power exercised by banks in the determination of market rates and prices. The 
insignificance of the interest rate channel in stimulating investment therefore implies that the 
central banks lacks credibility in its policies. 
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7.3.2.12 Zambia 
The impulse response function for output in Figure H.2.12 of Appendix H shows a slight 
initial decrease in output in response to a positive interest rate shock. Thereafter output 
fluctuates but the impulse response does not decay, implying that shocks to the interest rate 
have permanent effects on output. However, the magnitudes of the responses are small thus, 
suggesting that socks to the interest rate have minimal effects on output and therefore will not 
lead to a widening of cyclical variations within the union. 
 
The variance decomposition analyses in Table G.2.12 of Appendix G indicate that shocks to 
the interest rate accounted for about 17% of the fluctuations in output, while own output 
shocks accounted for 25% of the variations in the twelfth period. Money supply and price 
shocks on the other hand, accounted for approximately 30% and 27% of the fluctuations in 
output, respectively. This implies that changes in the money supply as well as past trends in 
the price level played a role in determining the level of output produced in the current period. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices increase in 
response to a positive interest rate shock. There is a sharp fall in prices between the third and 
fourth period before rising again. The effect of the shock does not decay, implying that any 
shocks to the interest rate will have permanent effects on prices. The variance decomposition 
analyses indicate that shocks to the interest rate accounted for less than 9% of the fluctuations 
in prices, while own price shocks accounted for approximately 63% of the variations in the 
twelfth period. Money supply and output shocks on the other hand, accounted for 
approximately 15% and 13% of the fluctuations in prices, respectively. The results suggest 
that the interest rate channel is weak in controlling inflation in Zambia. The data in Tables 
4.16 and 4.17 in Chapter 4 shows that Zambia is still financially under-developed, which 
hinders the transmission of monetary policy through the interest rate channel.  
 
7.3.2.13 Summary 
The results from the analyses suggest that the interest rate channel is weak in most of the 
SADC member states, with the exception of Angola, Mauritius and Mozambique. However, 
for the latter group of countries, the interest rate channel is not the dominant monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The results conform to economic expectations that for developing 
countries, the interest rate channel tends not to be the most important transmission 
mechanism because their financial systems are usually shallow and poorly diversified. 
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In addition, the SADC countries display asymmetry in their responses to shocks to the 
monetary aggregate. There is an initial decrease in output, in response to a positive interest 
rate shock for Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia, while prices fall initially for Lesotho, Madagascar 
and Namibia. Lastly, for most of the SADC countries, shocks to the interest rate do not 
dissipate, which implies that they are likely to lead to a divergence in economic performances 
of the member states within the monetary union. 
 
7.3.3  The Exchange Rate Channel 
The responses of output and inflation to an exogenous monetary policy shock (in the form of 
changes in the exchange rate) are presented below. Economic theory states that increases in 
the money supply lead to depreciation of the exchange rate, which in turn stimulate net 
exports and result in an increase in aggregate demand. On the other hand, exchange rate 
depreciation leads to a rise in the price level. The sub-sections below discuss the responses of 
the SADC countries to changes in the exchange rate.  
 
7.3.3.1  Angola 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.1 of Appendix F found a significant causal relationship 
between the exchange rate, output and inflation in Angola. The impulse response function for 
output in Figure H.2.1 of Appendix H shows that there is a slight increase in output in the 
first two periods, in response to a positive shock to the exchange rate. Output fluctuates from 
the third period, but with a downward trend. In addition, the impulse response does not decay 
thus, suggesting that any shocks to the exchange rate have permanent effects on the economy. 
However, the magnitude of the response is very small, suggesting that any shocks to the 
exchange rate have minimal effects on output and hence, would not result in a divergence of 
growth rates from the prevailing union levels.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.3.1 of Appendix G support this finding, 
indicating that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 6% of the fluctuations in output, 
while own output shocks accounted for approximately 20% of the variations in the twelfth 
period. Price shocks had the most influence on output, accounting for approximately 64% of 
the fluctuations in the twelfth period, while money supply shocks accounted for fewer than 
10% of the variations. This is because, as seen in Table 4.2 in Chapter 4, 98% of exports from 
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Angola comprise oil products and market prices for oil are pre-determined by the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in USD terms. As such, exchange 
rate depreciation would not stimulate output but price levels from the previous period would 
have a significant influence on output. 
 
The impulse response function for inflation shows that shocks to the exchange rate affect 
prices with a lag of two periods. There is a sharp increase in the third period, prices fall 
sharply between the third and fourth period before rising again. The impulse response 
dissipates by the twelfth period. This implies that any shocks to the exchange rate are likely 
not to result in a divergence in the inflation rates of Angola from the prevailing union levels. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 
approximately 4% of the fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period, while on price shocks 
accounted for 83% of the variations. On the other hand, shocks to the money supply and 
output accounted for approximately 9% and 4% of the variations in prices, respectively. The 
results suggest that nominal exchange rate depreciation is not the leading cause of inflation in 
Angola but rather it is largely driven by past events, which could be attributed to the civil 
wars the country faced.  
 
7.3.3.2  Botswana 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.2 of Appendix F did not find a significant causal 
relationship between the exchange rate, output and inflation in Botswana. The impulse 
response analysis for output in Figure H.2.2 of Appendix H shows that shocks to the 
exchange rate are insignificant in stimulating output in Botswana. There is a slight decrease 
in output in the second period then output increases in the next two periods before declining 
again. However, the impulse responses are very small and the effects of the shock start to 
decay by the eighth period.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis  in Table G.3.2 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to 
the exchange rate accounted for 26% of the fluctuations in output, while own output shocks 
accounted for approximately 67% of the variations in the twelfth period. Price and money 
supply shocks each accounted for approximately 3% of the fluctuations in output in the 
twelfth period. Theoretically, depreciation of the exchange would improve the 
competitiveness of the diamond exports and hence, improve output performance, while at the 
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same time increasing the price of imported inputs and finished goods. However, Botswana 
maintains a crawling peg exchange rate regime in which its currency is pegged to a weighted 
basket of currencies that comprises SDR currencies and the South African Rand (ZAR), with 
the ZAR having most weight in the basket93. This implies that the Bank of Botswana actively 
intervenes in the market to maintain the currency peg and as such, does not use the exchange 
rate to improve export competitiveness. Thus, the exchange rate channel is weak in 
Botswana. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices rise gradually 
in response to a shock to the exchange rate but decline from the fifth period, before rising 
again in the ninth period. In addition, the impulse does not decay, implying that any shocks to 
the exchange rate will have permanent effects on prices and may derail Botswana inflation 
from the average rates prevailing in the union. However, the magnitude of the response is 
very small, suggesting that shocks to the exchange rate have minimum impact on prices.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 
approximately 5% of the fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period, while on price shocks 
accounted for 87% of the variations. On the other hand, shocks to the money supply and 
output accounted for approximately 3% and 4% of the variations in prices, respectively. The 
results suggest that exchange rate depreciation is not the leading cause of inflation in 
Botswana. As already mentioned, inflation in Botswana is mainly imported inflation from 
South Africa given the high dependency of the economy on exports from the latter. 
 
7.3.3.3  The Democratic Republic of Congo 
The impulse response function for output in Figure H.2.3 of Appendix H shows that output 
falls in response to an exchange rate shock, which is contrary to economic theory. Output 
fluctuates around its long run mean but the effects of the shock do not decay, suggesting that 
shocks to the exchange rate have permanent effects on output. The variance decomposition 
analysis in Table G.3.3 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to the exchange rate accounted 
for 12% of the variations in output in the twelfth period, while own output shocks accounted 
for approximately 76% of the changes. Shocks to the money supply and price accounted for 
                                                
93 See Table I.1 of Appendix I. 
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approximately 6% and 7% of the variations in output, respectively. The results suggest that 
the exchange rate is insignificant in stimulating output in the DRC. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices rise in 
response to an exchange rate shock, which conforms to economic theory. In addition, the 
impulse response does not decay, implying that any shocks to the exchange rate have 
permanent effects on prices and could potentially lead to a divergence of inflation in the DRC 
from prevailing union levels.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 
approximately 33% of the variations in output in the twelfth period, while own price shocks 
accounted for approximately 39% of the changes. Shocks to the money supply and output 
accounted for approximately 16% and 12% of the variations in prices, respectively. The 
Granger causality tests in Table F.3 of Appendix F indicated that inflation and money supply 
Granger caused the exchange rate, while inflation Granger caused the exchange rate. This 
may be an indication of the presence of the vicious cycle of hyperinflation, where budget 
deficit financing led to rapid increases in the money supply, which in turn led to depreciation 
of the exchange rate and increases in prices.  
 
Aghveli and Khan, (1977), and Burdekin and Burkett (1996) note that nominal government 
expenditure rises concurrently with price increases, while nominal revenues are generally 
fixed in the short run. This in turn implies that the budget deficit increases in the face of 
inflation, which necessitates further monetary expansion; leading to a vicious cycle of 
depreciation-inflation spiral. The variance decomposition analysis of the money supply 
suggest the presence of the vicious cycle of hyperinflation, indicating that shocks to the 
exchange rate accounted for approximately 21% of the fluctuations in money supply in the 
twelfth period.  
 
The results are in line with the findings of Nachega (2005), who however notes that the 
vicious cycle stopped in the early 2000s when the authorities reoriented their fiscal, 
monetary, and exchange rate policies. This led to a fall in domestic inflation and a resumption 
of economic growth. It was highlighted that high fiscal deficits were the leading cause of 
inflation in the DRC. Thus, it is imperative that the country meets the fiscal restrictions 
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prescribed in the SADC macroeconomic convergence targets prior to joining the union in 
order to avoid de-stabilising the union with uncontrolled debt problems in future. 
 
7.3.3.4  Lesotho 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.4 of Appendix F indicate that the exchange rate 
Granger caused inflation but not output in Lesotho. The impulse response function for 
inflation in Figure H.2.4 of Appendix H shows that prices fall initially in response to a 
positive shock to the exchange rate then fluctuates from the second period. The effects of the 
shock do not however decay, suggesting that changes in the exchange rate have permanent 
effects on prices and are likely to result in a permanent divergence of the inflation rates in 
Lesotho from the union levels. However, the magnitude of the response is very small, 
implying that changes in the exchange rate will have minimal effects on prices.  
 
In addition, the Granger causality tests indicated that inflation Granger caused money supply 
and the exchange rate. This implies that increases in prices lead to a real appreciation of the 
exchange rate. In order to prevent the exchange rate from appreciating and hence, maintain 
the currency at par to the ZAR, the central bank increases the money supply in circulation. 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.3.4 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to 
the exchange rate accounted for approximately 38% of the variations in output in the twelfth 
period, while own price shocks accounted for approximately 21% of the changes. Shocks to 
the money supply and output accounted for approximately 17% and 23% of the variations in 
prices, respectively. The contribution of imported inflation to changes in prices falls with the 
introduction of the exchange rate, implying that changes in the exchange rate have an impact 
on domestic prices. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for output shows that output increases 
initially in response to a depreciation in the exchange rate. In addition, the effects of the 
shock do not decay, implying that changes in the exchange rate will lead to a widening of 
cyclical variations between Lesotho and the rest of the SADC member states. However, the 
magnitude of the impulse is very small, that changes in the exchange rate will have minimal 
effects on output. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to the exchange rate and money 
supply each accounted for 7% of the variations in output in the twelfth period, while own 
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output shocks accounted for approximately 84% of the changes. The implication drawn is 
that the exchange rate is insignificant in stimulating output growth in Lesotho. This is 
expected given that the local currency is pegged at par to the ZAR, as per CMA arrangement. 
As such, there is no scope for manipulating the exchange rate for domestic stabilisation 
processes. 
 
7.3.3.5  Madagascar 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.5 of Appendix F found no significant causal 
relationship between the exchange rate and output in Madagascar. The variance 
decomposition analyses and impulse response functions in Figure H.2.5 of Appendix H 
confirm this finding, indicating that the impact of exchange rate shocks on output are 
insignificant in determining economic performance. Moreover, the impulses decay by the 
fifth period, suggesting that shocks to the exchange rate have temporary effects on the 
economy and will not result in a widening of cyclical variations between Madagascar and the 
rest of the SADC member states.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis for output in Table G.3.5 of Appendix G supports this 
finding, indicating that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 28% of the variations in 
output, while on output shocks accounted for approximately 1% of its variations in the 
twelfth period. Price and money supply shocks accounted for approximately 1% and 67% of 
the fluctuations in output in the twelfth period, respectively. This suggests that the exchange 
rate channel is weak in stimulating output in Madagascar. The monetary aggregate however, 
plays a significant role in monetary policy. 
 
On the other hand, the variance decomposition analysis shows that shocks to the exchange 
rate accounted for approximately 57% of the variations in prices, while on price shocks 
accounted for less than 1% of the fluctuations in the twelfth period. Shocks to the money 
supply and output accounted for approximately 34% and 8% of the variations in prices, 
respectively. The results suggest that both the monetary aggregate and exchange rate 
channels are significant in controlling inflation in Madagascar.  
 
7.3.3.6  Malawi 
The impulse response function for inflation in Figure H.2.6 of Appendix H shows that prices 
fall in response to a depreciation of the exchange rate, which is contrary to economic 
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expectations. In addition, the impulse does not decay, indicating that shocks to the exchange 
rate have permanent effects on prices and are likely to result in a divergence of the level of 
inflation in Malawi from prevailing union rates. The variance decomposition analysis in 
Table G.3.6 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 
approximately 9% of the fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period, while own price shocks 
accounted for 55% of the variations. Output and money supply shocks accounted for 25% 
and 10% of the fluctuations, respectively. The results suggest that the exchange rate is weak 
in controlling inflation in Malawi. 
 
On the other hand, the variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to the exchange 
rate accounted for approximately 93% of the variations in output, while own output shocks 
accounted for only 2% of the fluctuations in the twelfth period. The results suggest that the 
exchange rate plays a major role in stimulating output. Depreciation of the exchange 
improves the competitiveness of exports in Malawi and hence, improves output performance. 
However, the magnitude of the impulse response is very small, suggesting that the effects of 
the exchange rate on stimulating output are minimal. This may be explained by the 
dependence of the economy on the export of primary and “first-stop processing” goods 
whose performance is determined by the demand for the goods in their respective export 
markets.  
 
7.3.3.7  Mauritius 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.7 of Appendix F found a causal relationship between 
money supply and the exchange rate and, inflation and the exchange rate. The impulse 
response function for inflation in Figure H.2.7 of Appendix H shows that prices initially fall 
in response to a depreciation in the exchange rate before rising from the fifth period. The 
impulse response does dot decay, suggesting that shocks to the exchange rate have permanent 
effects on prices and may result in a divergence of inflation in Mauritius from prevailing 
union rates. The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.3.7 of Appendix G indicate that 
shocks to the exchange rate accounted for approximately 24% of the fluctuations in prices in 
the twelfth period, while own price shocks accounted for approximately 65% of the 
fluctuations. The results suggest that the exchange rate channel plays a role in the control of 
inflation. 
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On the other hand, the impulse response function for output show that output falls in response 
to a depreciation in the exchange rate, which is contrary to economic expectations. However, 
the impulses were small suggesting that the exchange rate is weak in stimulating output in 
Mauritius. The variance decomposition analysis indicate that shocks to the exchange rate 
accounted for approximately 20% of the fluctuations in output in the twelfth period, while 
own output shocks accounted for approximately 64% of the variations.  
 
7.3.3.8  Mozambique 
The response of prices to a depreciation in the exchange rate as shown by the impulse 
response function in Figure H.2.8 of Appendix H conforms to economic theory that 
depreciation leads to an increase in the price of imports, which in turn leads to an increase in 
domestic prices. Of great concern is that the effects of the impulses do not decay, which 
implies that any shocks to the exchange rate will result in a permanent divergence of inflation 
from the union levels. However, the variance decomposition analysis in Table G.3.8 of 
Appendix G indicated that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for approximately 4% of 
the variations in prices in the twelfth period, while own price shocks account for 
approximately 67% of the fluctuations. Output and money supply shocks accounted for 17% 
and 11% of the fluctuations, respectively. In addition, the Granger causality tests in F.8 of 
Appendix F indicate that the exchange rate did not Granger cause inflation. The results 
suggest that the exchange rate is weak in controlling inflation in Mozambique. 
 
The Granger causality tests found no significant causal relationship between the exchange 
rate and output in Mozambique. The impulse response function shows that output increases 
slightly in the first period before falling in the next three periods. Output fluctuates from then 
on but the effects of the shock do not dissipate, suggesting that shocks to the exchange rate 
may result in a widening of cyclical variations between Mozambique and the rest of the 
SADC member states.  
 
However, the magnitude of the impulse is very small, implying that the exchange rate 
channel is weak in stimulating output. The variance decomposition analysis indicate that 
shocks to the exchange rate accounted for approximately 5% of the fluctuations in output in 
the twelfth period, while own output shocks accounted for approximately 81% of the 
variations. 
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7.3.3.9  Namibia 
The impulse response function for output in Figure H.2.9 of Appendix H shows that output 
responds with a lag of two periods to a positive shock to the exchange rate. Thereafter output 
falls, which is contrary to economic expectations that exchange rate depreciation stimulates 
exports and hence, leads to an increase in output. The Granger causality tests in Table F.9 of 
Appendix F found a weak causal relationship between output and the exchange rate that is 
supported by the variance decomposition analysis in Table G.3.9 of Appendix G, which 
indicates that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for fewer than 7% of the variations in 
output. On the other hand, own output shocks accounted for approximately 25% of the 
variations in output in the twelfth period, while shocks to the monetary aggregate accounted 
for 54% of the changes in output. The results suggest that increases in the monetary aggregate 
are significant in stimulating output in Namibia, while the exchange rate channel is weak. 
 
The impulse response function for inflation shows that prices increase in the first two periods, 
in response to a positive shock to the exchange rate. Thereafter prices fluctuate around the 
long run mean and the effects of the shock do not decay. This implies that any shocks to the 
exchange rate will result in a permanent divergence of inflation in Namibia from the 
prevailing rates in the union. The variance decomposition analysis indicated that shocks to 
the exchange rate accounted for approximately 45% of the variations in prices in the twelfth 
period, while own price shocks account for approximately 13% of the fluctuations. Output 
and money supply shocks accounted for 25% and 16% of the fluctuations, respectively.  
 
In addition, the Granger causality tests found a significant causal relationship between the 
exchange rate, and money supply. This implies that a real appreciation of the exchange rate 
leads to an increase in the money supply in circulation in an effort to prevent the exchange 
rate from appreciating. This is because the Namibian dollar is pegged at par to the ZAR as 
per CMA arrangement hence; the central bank actively intervenes in the market to maintain 
the peg. 
 
7.3.3.10 South Africa 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.10 of Appendix F found no evidence of a significant 
causal relationship between the exchange rate, inflation and output in South Africa. The 
impulse response function for inflation in Figure H.2.10 of Appendix H shows that prices rise 
in response to a depreciation in the exchange rate. There is a sharp decline in prices between 
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the fifth and sixth period before rising again. However, the magnitude of the impulse 
response is small, suggesting that changes in the exchange rate were not the leading cause of 
inflation. The variance decomposition analysis supports in Table G.3.10 of Appendix G this 
finding, indicating that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for approximately 18% of the 
fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period, while own price shocks accounted for 69% of the 
fluctuations. Output and money supply shocks accounted for 10% and 4% of the fluctuations, 
respectively. The results suggest that the exchange rate is insignificant in controlling inflation 
in South Africa. 
 
The results support earlier findings that South Africa is susceptible to imported inflation 
given its strong trade linkages with Europe and the rest of the world as seen in Table 4.3 in 
Chapter 4. In addition, the results support the findings of Akinboade et. al (2001) that labour 
costs are a leading cause of inflation in South Africa. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for output shows that output falls in 
response to a positive shock to the exchange rate, which is contrary to economic expectations. 
The impulse response does not decay, indicating that shocks to the exchange rate have 
permanent effects on output. However, the magnitude of the response is very small, 
suggesting that changes in the exchange rate have negligible effects on output and thus, are 
likely not to result in a widening of cyclical variations between South Africa and the rest of 
the SADC member states. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicated that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 
approximately 23% of the variations in output in the twelfth period, while own output shocks 
accounted for 49% of the variations. On the other hand, shocks to the monetary aggregate 
accounted for approximately 27% of the changes in output. The results suggest that changes 
in the exchange rate and monetary aggregate contribute to stimulating output in South Africa. 
However, a majority of the changes in output are due to own output shocks. 
 
7.3.3.11 Swaziland 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.11 of Appendix F found no significant causal 
relationship between money supply, the exchange rate, inflation and output in Swaziland. The 
impulse response function for inflation in Figure H.2.11 of Appendix H shows that prices rise 
in response to a depreciation in the exchange rate. In addition, the impulse response does not 
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decay, suggesting that shocks to the exchange rate have permanent effects on prices. 
However, the magnitude of the response is very small, suggesting that changes in the 
exchange rate have minimal effects on output and will not result in a widening of cyclical 
variations between Swaziland and the rest of the SADC countries. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.3.11 of Appendix G shows that shocks to the 
exchange rate accounted for 7% of the fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period, while own 
price shocks accounted for 50% of the price changes. Output and money supply shocks on the 
other hand, accounted for 27% and 15% of the fluctuations, respectively. The results suggest 
that the exchange rate is weak in controlling inflation in Swaziland. This is to be expected 
given the CMA arrangement, which requires Swaziland to maintain the value of its currency 
at par with the ZAR. Hence, there is limited scope for the central bank to use independent 
exchange rate policy to control inflation. 
 
On the other hand, the variance decomposition analysis for output shows that output falls 
initially, in response to a positive shock to the exchange rate. Thereafter, output fluctuates but 
the effects of the shock do not dissipate, suggesting that shocks to the exchange rate have 
permanent effects on output. However, the magnitude of the response is very small, 
indicating that changes in the exchange rate were unlikely to result in a widening in cyclical 
variation of Swaziland from the rest of the union members. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicated that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 
less than 1% of the variations in output in the twelfth period, while own output shocks 
accounted for 91% of the variations. Money supply and price shocks each accounted for 
approximately 4% of the variations. The results suggest that the exchange rate is insignificant 
in stimulating output in Swaziland. 
 
7.3.3.12 Tanzania 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.12 of Appendix F show that the exchange rate Granger 
caused both output and inflation in Tanzania. The impulse response function for output in 
Figure H.2.12 of Appendix H shows that output responded to shocks in the exchange rate 
with a lag before falling sharply. Thereafter output fluctuates but the effects of the shock do 
not dissipate. The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.3.12 of Appendix G indicates 
that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for approximately 57% of the variations in output 
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in the twelfth period, while own output shocks accounted for 27% of the variations. Money 
supply and price shocks accounted for approximately 14% and less than 2% of the variations, 
respectively. The results suggest that changes in the exchange rate are significant in 
stimulating output in Tanzania. From Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, it is observed that Tanzania 
exports a substantial amount of its goods to Europe and the rest of the world. Depreciation of 
the exchange rate stimulates aggregate demand and hence, output.  
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices rise initially, 
in response to a positive shock in the exchange rate. Thereafter prices fluctuate but the effects 
of the shock do not dissipate. However, the magnitude of the response is small, suggesting 
that shocks to the exchange rate are likely to have minimal effects on prices and would not 
lead to a divergence of inflation in Tanzania from prevailing rates. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis shows that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 
5% of the fluctuations in prices in the twelfth period, while own price shocks accounted for 
approximately 31% of the price changes. Output and money supply shocks on the other hand, 
accounted for approximately 43% and 31% of the fluctuations, respectively. The results 
suggest that the exchange rate channel is weak in controlling inflation in Tanzania, while on 
the other hand, changes in the monetary aggregate channel play a significant role in 
controlling inflation. The results also suggest that inflation in Tanzania is driven partly by 
past events as well as imported inflation given its strong trade linkages with Europe and the 
rest of the world. 
  
7.3.3.13 Zambia 
The impulse response function in Figure H.2.13 of Appendix H for output shows that output 
responded to a shock in the exchange rate with a lag of two periods before rising sharply. 
Thereafter output fluctuates but the effects of the shock do not dissipate. The variance 
decomposition analysis in Table G.3.13 of Appendix G indicates that shocks to the exchange 
rate accounted for approximately 7% of the variations in output in the twelfth period, while 
own output shocks accounted for 38% of the variations. Money supply and price shocks 
accounted for approximately 58% and 4% of the variations, respectively. The results suggest 
that the monetary aggregate channel plays a significant role in stimulating output, while the 
exchange rate channel is weak. 
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On the other hand, the impulse response function shows that a positive shock to the exchange 
rate led to a slight increase in prices before falling in the second period. Prices rise again 
between the sixth and ninth period, before falling again. Furthermore, the impulse does not 
decay, implying that any shocks to the exchange rate will have permanent effects on inflation. 
Thus, shocks to the exchange rate could result in a divergence of inflation in Zambia from 
union levels. However, the magnitude of the impulse is small, suggesting that the exchange 
rate channel is weak.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicate that shocks to the exchange rate accounted for 
17% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks account for approximately 27% of 
the variations. Output and money supply shocks on the other hand, accounted for 
approximately 38% and 17% of the fluctuations, respectively. The results suggest that 
inflation in Zambia is driven largely by past events rather than changes in the exchange rate. 
 
7.3.3.14 Summary 
The results from the analyses suggest that the exchange rate channel is weak in most of the 
SADC member states, with the exception of the DRC, Madagascar, Namibia, Swaziland and 
Tanzania. Of the latter group of countries, depreciation of the exchange rate was found to be 
significant in stimulating output in Tanzania only, while it led to a substantial rise in prices in 
the other countries. Once again, the SADC countries display asymmetry in their responses to 
shocks to the exchange rate. There is an initial fall in output in Botswana, the DRC, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland, while prices fall initially for Lesotho, 
Malawi and Mauritius. Lastly, shocks to the exchange rate do not decay in most of the SADC 
countries. This implies that any shocks to the exchange rate are likely to lead to a divergence 
in economic performances of the member states within the monetary union. 
  
7.3.4  The Credit Channel 
The responses of output and inflation to an exogenous monetary policy shock (in the form of 
changes in the amount of banking sector credit issued to the private sector) are presented 
below. Economic theory states that an increase in the money supply would lead to an increase 
in credit and eventually to an increase in aggregate demand, output and price. The 
subsections below discuss the responses of each SADC country to un-anticipated changes in 
private sector credit issued. The exchange rate channel could not be analysed in Madagascar, 
Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia due to insufficient data. 
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7.3.4.1  Angola 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.1 of Appendix F found that banking sector credit 
Granger caused inflation, money supply and output in Angola. The impulse response function 
for output in Figure H.4.1 in Appendix H indicates that the credit channel is significant in 
stimulating output in Angola. Output increases in response to a positive shock to banking 
sector credit but the effects of the shock do not decay. This suggests that any shocks to the 
exchange rate will have permanent effects on output and are likely to result in a widening of 
cyclical variations between Angola and the rest of the SADC member states. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.4.1 in Appendix G indicates that shocks to 
domestic credit accounted for approximately 85% of the variations in output in the twelfth 
period, while own output shocks accounted for approximately 17% of the fluctuations. 
Money supply and price shocks on the other hand, accounted for approximately 3% and 5% 
of the variations, respectively.  
 
The results suggest that the credit channel plays an important role in stimulating output in 
Angola. The information in Tables 4.15-4.17 in Chapter 4 indicates that the financial sector 
in Angola is under-developed. The results thus conform to economic theory, which states that 
increases in the money supply in financially under-developed economies lead to a reduction 
in adverse selection and moral hazard, which in turn leads to an increase in the supply of 
credit. The increase in credit leads to increases in aggregate demand and inflation (Loayza 
and Schmidt- Hebbel, 2002:5). 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices rise initially 
before falling, in response to a positive shock to credit. In addition, the impulse response does 
not decay, suggesting that shocks to credit have permanent effects on prices and are likely to 
lead to a divergence of the inflation rate in Angola from the prevailing SADC rates. The 
variance decomposition analysis supports this finding, indicating that shocks to banking 
sector credit accounted for approximately 81% of the variations in prices, while own price 
shocks accounted for approximately 11% of the price fluctuations in the twelfth period. On 
the other hand, shocks to money supply and output accounted for approximately 3% and 5% 
of the variations in prices, respectively. The results suggest that increases in domestic credit 
were inflationary and thus, the credit channel is significant in controlling inflation in Angola. 
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7.3.4.2  Botswana 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.2 of Appendix F found that banking sector credit 
Granger caused money supply but not inflation or output in Botswana. The impulse response 
function for output in Figure H.4.2 in Appendix H shows that output responds with a lag of 
three periods to a positive shock in banking sector credit. Thereafter output rises sharply and 
then fluctuates but never returns to its long run mean. This suggests that any shocks to the 
exchange rate will have permanent effects on output and are likely to result in a widening of 
cyclical variations between Botswana and the rest of the SADC member states. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.4.2 in Appendix G indicates that shocks to 
domestic credit accounted for approximately 26% of the variations in output in the twelfth 
period, while own output shocks accounted for approximately 64% of the fluctuations. 
Money supply and price shocks on the other hand, accounted for approximately 10% and less 
than 1% of the variations, respectively. The results suggest that the credit channel does not 
play a significant role in stimulating output in Botswana. This may be attributed to the fact 
that there is excess liquidity in the financial sector, as indicated in Table I.1 of Appendix I. 
This implies that monetary policy shocks transmitted through the bank-lending channel will 
not play an active role in determining economic performance in Botswana. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices rise initially, 
in response to a positive shock to credit, before falling towards the fourth period. In addition, 
the impulse response does not decay, suggesting that shocks to credit have permanent effects 
on prices and are likely to lead to a divergence of the inflation rate in Botswana from the 
prevailing SADC rates.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to banking sector credit accounted 
for approximately 19% of the variations in prices, while own price shocks accounted for 
approximately 40% of the price fluctuations in the twelfth period. On the other hand, shocks 
to money supply and output accounted for approximately 5% and 35% of the variations in 
prices, respectively. The results suggest that the credit channel does not play a major role in 
controlling inflation in Botswana, which may be attributed to the fact that the central bank 
does not actively control the amount of credit in circulation. 
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7.3.4.3  The Democratic Republic of Congo 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.3 of Appendix F found no evidence of a significant 
causality relationship between credit and inflation. The impulse response function for 
inflation in Figure H.4.3 in Appendix H shows that prices respond with a lag of two periods 
to a positive shock to banking sector credit before rising. Thereafter prices fluctuate and the 
effect of the shock dissipates around the twelfth period. The variance decomposition analysis 
in Table G.4.3 in Appendix G indicates that shocks to banking sector credit accounted for 
approximately 13% of the variations in prices, while own price shocks accounted for 
approximately 22% of the price fluctuations in the twelfth period. On the other hand, shocks 
to money supply and output accounted for approximately 51% and 14% of the variations in 
prices, respectively. The results suggest that the monetary aggregate channel plays a 
significant role in the control of inflation in the DRC; while on the other hand, the credit 
channel is weak.  
 
On the other hand, the Granger causality tests found evidence of weak feedback causality 
between credit and output. The impulse response function for output shows that output rises 
initially in response to a positive shock to banking sector credit. Output then fluctuates from 
the fourth period but the effects of the shock do not decay, suggesting that any shocks to 
banking sector credit will have a permanent effect on output and are likely to result in a 
divergence in the growth rates of the DRC from the rest of the SADC member states. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to domestic credit accounted for 
approximately 47% of the variations in output in the twelfth period, while own output shocks 
accounted for approximately 25% of the fluctuations. Money supply and price shocks on the 
other hand, accounted for approximately 23% and 4% of the variations, respectively. The 
results suggest that the credit channel plays a significant role in stimulating output in the 
DRC, which is to be expected in financially under-developed economies (as seen in Tables 
4.15-4.17 in Chapter 4). However, its impact on economic performance is reduced by the fact 
that money and banking are mostly limited to Kinshasa and, dollarisation remains substantial 
in the economy, with over 85% of all bank deposits in foreign currency.  
 
7.3.4.4  Lesotho 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.4 of Appendix F indicate that banking sector credit did 
not Granger cause inflation. The impulse response function for inflation in Figure H.4.4 in 
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Appendix H shows that prices increase in the first three periods, in response to a positive 
shock to banking sector credit. Thereafter, prices fluctuate but the impulse does not decay, 
which implies that shocks to banking sector credit have a permanent effect on prices and 
could potentially lead to a divergence of the inflation rates in Lesotho from union levels. 
However, the magnitudes of the impulses are small; suggesting that any shocks to the credit 
channel will have minimal effects on prices.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.4.4 in Appendix G indicates that shocks to 
banking sector credit accounted for 7% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks 
accounted for approximately 48% of the variations in the twelfth period. On the other hand, 
shocks to money supply and output accounted for approximately 31% and 12% of the 
variations in prices, respectively. The results support earlier findings that inflation in Lesotho 
is mainly imported inflation from South Africa. Furthermore, the results suggest that inflation 
is partly due to monetary expansion. The credit channel is however, weak in controlling 
inflation. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for output shows that there is an initial 
increase in output before it fluctuates but the impulse does not decay. This implies that 
shocks to domestic credit could widen the cyclical variations in the business cycles of 
Lesotho and the rest of the SADC member states. However, the magnitudes of the impulses 
are very small, implying that the cyclical variations would be negligible. 
 
The Granger causality tests found that banking sector credit did not Granger cause output in 
Lesotho. The variance decomposition analysis support this finding, indicating that shocks to 
banking sector credit accounted for 2% of the fluctuations in output, while own output shocks 
accounted for approximately 90% of the variations in the twelfth period. Money supply and 
price shocks on the other hand, accounted for approximately 6% and 1% of the variations, 
respectively. The results imply that the credit channel is weak in Lesotho. 
 
Table 4.15 in Chapter 4 indicates that the average ratios of banking sector credit to GDP in 
Lesotho are low, while Table 4.17 indicates that banks are inefficient in channelling credit to 
the private sector. This implies that financial inter-mediation is low in Lesotho. However, 
contrary to economic expectations that the credit channel is important in financially under-
developed economies, the credit channel is insignificant in stimulating output in Lesotho. 
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7.3.4.5  Mauritius 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.7 of Appendix F found evidence of feedback causality 
between credit and inflation in Mauritius. The impulse response function for inflation in 
Figure H.4.5 in Appendix H shows that prices respond with a two period lag to a positive 
shock to banking sector credit. Thereafter, prices rise for two periods before falling for about 
four periods and then rising again. However, the effects of the shock do not dissipate, 
implying that shocks to banking sector credit are likely to result in a divergence of inflation in 
Mauritius from prevailing union rates.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.4.5 in Appendix G indicates that shocks to 
banking sector credit accounted for 18% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks 
accounted for approximately 51% of the variations in the twelfth period. On the other hand, 
shocks to money supply and output accounted for approximately 4% and 26% of the 
variations in prices, respectively. The results suggest that the credit channel plays a role in 
controlling inflation in Mauritius however; inflation is driven largely by past events. 
 
On the other hand, the Granger causality tests banking sector credit does not Granger cause 
output in Mauritius. The impulse response function for output shows that output falls 
initially, in response to a positive shock to banking sector credit. It then rises sharply for two 
periods before falling again. The effects of the shock decay around the eleventh period, 
suggesting that any shocks to banking sector credit have temporary effects on output. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis support this finding, indicating that shocks to banking 
sector credit accounted for less than 5% of the fluctuations in output, while own output 
shocks accounted for approximately 78% of the variations in the twelfth period. Money 
supply and price shocks on the other hand, accounted for approximately 10% and 7% of the 
variations, respectively. The results suggest that the credit channel is weak in Mauritius. 
 
7.3.4.6  Mozambique 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.8 of Appendix F found no evidence of a significant 
causal relationship between credit, inflation and output. The impulse response function for 
output in Figure H.4.6 in Appendix H shows that output falls for the first three periods, in 
response to a positive shock to banking sector credit. Thereafter, output fluctuates and the 
effects of the shock dissipate towards the twelfth period, suggesting that any shocks to 
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banking sector credit have temporary effects on output. In addition, the magnitude of the 
impulse response is very small, suggesting that the credit channel is weak in Mozambique.  
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.4.6 in Appendix G support this finding, 
indicating that shocks to banking sector credit accounted for approximately 8% of the 
fluctuations in output, while own output shocks accounted for approximately 60% of the 
variations in the twelfth period. Money supply and price shocks on the other hand, accounted 
for approximately 27% and 4% of the variations, respectively. The results suggest that the 
monetary aggregate channel and not the credit channel, plays a significant role in stimulating 
output in Mozambique. However, monetary policy has limited scope in determining 
economic performance. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices fall initially 
in response to a positive shock to banking sector credit. The impulse response decays towards 
the eleventh period, suggesting that any shocks to banking sector credit will have temporary 
effects on prices. The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to banking sector 
credit accounted for 3% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks accounted for 
approximately 39% of the variations in the twelfth period. On the other hand, shocks to 
money supply and output accounted for approximately 29% and 28% of the variations in 
prices, respectively. The results suggest that the credit channel is weak in determining 
inflation in Mozambique. Inflation is driven partly by monetary expansion and partly by past 
events. Tables 4.15 and 4.16 in Chapter 4 show that Mozambique experienced a financial 
crisis in the past. The data for the last decade indicates that the financial sector is still under-
developed, which would imply that the credit channel should be important in such an 
economy. However, the results suggest otherwise. 
 
7.3.4.7  South Africa 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.10 of Appendix F indicate that banking sector credit 
does not Granger cause either inflation or output in South Africa. The impulse response 
function in Figure H.4.7 in Appendix H for output shows that output increases for the first 
eight periods, in response to a positive shock to banking sector credit. In addition, the impulse 
response does not decay, suggesting that any shocks to banking sector credit have permanent 
effects on output. However, the magnitude of the response is very small, suggesting that any 
shocks to banking sector credit have minimal effects on output. 
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The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.4.7 in Appendix G indicates that shocks to 
banking sector credit accounted for approximately 29% of the fluctuations in output, while 
own output shocks accounted for approximately 16% of the variations in the twelfth period. 
Money supply and price shocks on the other hand, accounted for approximately 19% and 
35% of the variations, respectively. The results suggest that the credit channel plays a role in 
stimulating output in South Africa. Table 4.17 in Chapter 4 suggests that the banking sector is 
efficient in issuing credit to the domestic sector, as the average ratio of domestic credit to 
liquid liabilities has been over 100% for the last two decades. Thus, increases in domestic 
credit stimulate aggregate demand, and hence output in South Africa.  
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices fall initially 
before rising in the fifth period, in response to a positive shock to banking sector credit. In 
addition, the impulse response does not decay, suggesting that any shocks to banking sector 
credit have permanent effects on prices. The variance decomposition analysis indicates that 
shocks to banking sector credit accounted for 29% of the fluctuations in prices, while own 
price shocks accounted for approximately 40% of the variations in the twelfth period. On the 
other hand, shocks to money supply and output accounted for approximately 16% and 15% of 
the variations in prices, respectively. The results suggest that the credit channel plays a role in 
controlling inflation in South Africa. 
 
7.3.4.8  Swaziland 
The Granger causality tests in Table F.11 of Appendix F found no evidence of a significant 
causal relationship between banking sector credit, output and inflation in Swaziland. The 
impulse response function for output in Figure H.4.8 in Appendix H shows that output falls 
sharply in response to a positive shock to banking sector credit, which is contrary to 
economic expectations. Output rises between the second and fourth period and then falls 
again before remaining constant. However, the impulse response does not decay, suggesting 
that the effects of the shock are permanent. On the other hand, the magnitude of the response 
is small, implying that any shocks to credit will have minimal effects on output. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis in Table G.4.8 in Appendix G indicates that shocks to 
banking sector credit accounted for approximately 14% of the fluctuations in output, while 
own output shocks accounted for approximately 56% of the variations in the twelfth period. 
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Money supply and price shocks on the other hand, accounted for approximately 13% and 
16% of the variations, respectively. The results suggest that the credit channel is weak in 
stimulating output in Swaziland. 
 
On the other hand, the impulse response function for inflation shows that prices rise sharply 
in the first two periods, in response to a positive shock to banking sector credit. Prices then 
fall during the next two periods, and then rise again briefly before remaining constant. 
However, the impulse response does not decay, suggesting that the effects of the shock are 
permanent. On the other hand, the magnitude of the response is small, implying that any 
shocks to credit will have minimal effects on prices. 
 
The variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks to banking sector credit accounted 
for 11% of the fluctuations in prices, while own price shocks accounted for approximately 
78% of the variations in the twelfth period. On the other hand, shocks to money supply and 
output accounted for approximately 5% and 4% of the variations in prices, respectively. The 
results suggest that the credit channel is weak in Swaziland. In addition, the results support 
earlier findings that inflation in Swaziland is mainly imported inflation.  
 
The results do not conform to expectations given that Table 4.17 in Chapter 4 suggests that 
the banking sector is efficient in issuing credit to the domestic sector, as the average ratio of 
domestic credit to liquid liabilities is high. On the other hand, Tables 4.15 and 4.16 indicate 
that the financial sector in Swaziland is under-developed. Hence, it is expected that the credit 
channel would be important in such an economy. 
 
7.3.3.9  Summary 
The results from the analyses suggest that the credit channel is important in Angola, the DRC 
and South Africa. For the rest of the SADC countries, the credit channel is weak. In addition, 
for Angola and the DRC, the credit channel is a dominant transmission mechanism, which 
conforms to economic theory that this channel dominates in economies that are under-
developed financially. In addition, there is an initial decrease in output, in response to a 
positive shock to private sector credit in Mauritius, Mozambique and Swaziland. On the other 
hand, prices fall initially in Mozambique and South Africa. The results suggest that any 
shocks to credit will result in a divergence in economic performance in the SADC countries. 
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7.4 CONCLUSION 
The results of the analyses indicate that the SADC member states display asymmetries in 
their responses to monetary policy shocks and the relative importance of transmission 
mechanisms. For most of the member states, the effects of monetary policy shocks do not 
dissipate but are permanent. This implies that a common monetary policy within the union is 
likely to widen cyclical variations between the member states. Hence, it is unlikely that 
monetary integration will result in a harmonisation of the business cycles of the SADC 
countries. 
 
The monetary aggregate channel is weak in most of the SADC member states, with the 
exception of Madagascar, which may be an advantage for the monetary union because it 
implies that the possibilities of monetary expansions to finance budget deficits would be 
reduced. Similarly, inflationary pressures arising from seignorage would be reduced, which 
implies that there is reduced possibilities of weakening the value of the union currency. 
However, this is on condition that the member states do not allow countries with debt 
problems into the union, which may later put the union under pressure to monetise the 
deficits. 
 
The exchange rate channel is weak in most of the SADC member states, with the exception 
of the DRC, Madagascar, Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania. This implies that the costs of 
giving up the exchange rate as a policy instrument are fewer for most of the SADC countries 
as it is not the dominant transmission channel in these countries. On the other hand, the 
interest rate channel is important in Angola, Mauritius and Mozambique. while it is relatively 
weak in the rest of the countries. The relative insignificance of the interest rate channel in 
most SADC countries poses potential problems in the monetary union given that it is likely to 
be the main policy instrument for the union central bank. This is because the use of the 
monetary aggregate channel for adjustment purposes may not be favourable since it has the 
disadvantage of being inflationary, which has the potential of destabilising the value of the 
union currency.  
 
Economic literature states that the credit channel is likely to dominate in developing countries 
due to inadequate development of their financial systems, which hinders the transmission of 
monetary policy through the money market. However, the study found that the credit channel 
is important in Angola, the DRC and South Africa, while it is relatively unimportant in the 
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other countries considered. However, the impact of shocks to the credit channel on output and 
inflation in the former group of countries remained small, which poses potential problems in 
that the union requires effective alternative adjustment mechanisms to the exchange rate. 
 
The dissimilarities in responses to monetary policy shocks and the subsequent lack of 
effective adjustment mechanisms are due to the member states’ failure to meet the OCA 
criteria. It was ascertained that most SADC states depend on primary production and the 
export of commodities and hence, their output performance is dependent on exogenous 
factors that affect their respective export markets. As such, national monetary policy has a 
limited effect, if any, on economic performance in the member states. 
 
It has been suggested that for countries that have in the past failed to use independent 
monetary and exchange rate policy for domestic macroeconomic stabilisation purposes, 
monetary integration may be beneficial to them. It is argued that a regional monetary 
authority may be more efficient in setting policy, as the primary goal of most monetary 
unions is price stabilisation.  
 
However, the study ascertained that the financial systems of most of the SADC member 
states were shallow and under-developed, which implies that even if the region implements 
monetary integration, the transmission of monetary policy would remain inefficient in these 
countries. Hence, the above argument may not apply to the SADC region at present because a 
regional monetary authority would encounter the same structural bottlenecks that national 
monetary authorities currently come across. The transmission of monetary policy would still 
be inefficient within the monetary union.  
 
An additional cause for concern is the relative openness of the SADC countries and in 
particular, South Africa’s close trade linkages with the rest of the world (especially the EU), 
which make it vulnerable to economic contagion. The high dependency of some of the 
smaller countries on South Africa implies that any negative shocks that affect South Africa’s 
main trading partners will affect South Africa and in turn, the smaller countries. However, 
with no effective adjustment mechanisms for macroeconomic stabilisation, the union would 
have to endure the effects of the shocks, be it inflation or a recession. This would be counter-
productive for the poor member states whose main macroeconomic objectives are poverty 
reduction and stimulating economic growth.  
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Thus, the study confirms that the similarity in shocks and business cycles is a “catch-all” 
OCA criterion. The failure to meet the other OCA criteria implies that the member states will 
respond asymmetrically to shocks. In turn, without the option to use the exchange rate for 
domestic stabilisation purposes and with no effective alternative adjustment mechanisms in 
place, the effects of the shocks will endure in union members. Given the dissimilarities in the 
economic structures and sizes of the SADC countries, the effects of the shocks are likely to 
differ in each country and monetary integration is likely not to result in a harmonisation of 
the economies of the member states. It can therefore, be concluded that under the prevailing 
conditions, the SADC countries are not suitable for monetary integration. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of the study was to determine the implications of monetary integration within 
the SADC countries for regional economic integration and development in the region. The 
findings of the study indicate that at present, a region-wide monetary union is not feasible for 
the SADC member states. The reasons behind this finding are summarised below in terms of 
the state of macroeconomic convergence, the optimum currency area (OCA) criteria and the 
efficiency of monetary and exchange rate policies.  
 
8.1.1 Macroeconomic Convergence 
The disparity in the economic size and performance of the member states presents an obstacle 
to monetary integration within the SADC region. Monetary integration entails a convergence 
in the primary macroeconomic stability indicators, i.e. inflation, interest rates and exchange 
rates. However, the poorer member states currently have different macroeconomic goals from 
the richer countries. The former group of countries focus on poverty reduction, 
macroeconomic reform for stabilisation and stimulating economic growth, while the latter 
group is intent on building competitiveness for their external sector and attracting inward and 
outward investment. This implies that the macroeconomic indicators will differ according to 
domestic policy. Thus, premature adherence by the smaller countries to the macroeconomic 
convergence criteria will be bad policy.  
 
Premature convergence implies that higher inflation rates and unbalanced fiscal- monetary 
policy mixes in the smaller countries, reflected in positive interest rate differentials, may 
prompt authorities to cut their rates prematurely. However, this may delay economic 
convergence, as the underlying economic problems may persist. Furthermore, the low interest 
rates may send the wrong incentive for investment in the smaller countries, resulting in 
overheating economies and loss of competitiveness.  
 
Lastly, the experience of the Euro zone with the sovereign debt crisis provides an example of 
the hazards of premature convergence between countries with different economic 
performances and unbalanced fiscal- monetary policy mixes. The SADC countries could 
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potentially face more severe problems than the Euro zone should they encounter a similar 
debt crisis because the region has less resources to bail out member states with debt 
problems. Furthermore, some of the SADC countries are included in the group of the world’s 
highly indebted poor countries, which implies that they would be incapable of contributing to 
a bail-out fund should they be called upon to. Thus, a debt crisis could potentially lead to a 
break-up of the union. To avoid such a fall out, the member states are cautioned against 
premature integration. 
 
Most studies conducted on this subject are in support of approaching monetary integration 
through an extension of the CMA arrangement. There are however, variations in the 
recommendations as to which non-CMA SADC countries are the most suitable candidates to 
join the CMA arrangement. Overall, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia are the countries 
frequently cited as possible candidates, while some studies have also suggested that Angola, 
Malawi, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are potential candidates.  
 
The present study found that Botswana and Mozambique were the most suitable countries to 
first ascend to the CMA arrangement, followed by Malawi and Zambia once they stabilise 
their exchange rates and inflation vis-a-vis the prevailing average rates in the CMA. On the 
other hand, Zimbabwe may be the most suitable candidate for CMA membership given that 
the country ceased official use of its national currency in 2009, opting for the use of multiple 
currencies. CMA membership would ease the problems of transacting in multiple currencies, 
which economic agents are currently experiencing. Furthermore, CMA membership offers 
gains in credibility in the determination of monetary policy for the country, whose central 
bank lost credibility due to political interference in the determination of monetary policy. 
However, there is insufficient data on the performance of key macroeconomic variables in 
Zimbabwe since the onset of a dollarised system to confirm this proposition. 
  
An extension of the CMA arrangement however, implies the loss of sovereignty over 
monetary policy, which may discourage non-CMA SADC states from joining the CMA 
arrangement. If the SADC states opt to approach monetary integration through the 
enlargement of the CMA arrangement, they may have to modify the current agreement to one 
that gives the member countries a degree of authority in the determination of policy in the 
region. 
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8.1.2 The OCA Criteria 
The findings of the study indicated that the SADC states currently do not currently meet the 
pre-requisites of an OCA. Of particular concern is that the member states lack diversity in 
their production structures, particularly in the smaller member states. This implies that, 
should a negative shock occur in the markets for their primary products that requires the use 
of domestic stabilisation policies, the effects of the shocks are likely to persist in the affected 
countries as the member states do not have effective alternative adjustment mechanisms for 
macroeconomic stabilisation. 
 
The study also noted that the national currencies of the smaller countries are insignificant in 
the world market, while the ZAR is vulnerable to changes in the global market. In addition, it 
was noted that South Africa has close trade linkages with the rest of the world, especially the 
European Union. Thus, the integration of the South African economy with the rest of the 
world is likely to expose the smaller countries to economic contagion. However, the 
stabilisation policies that South Africa may wish to implement in response to external shocks 
that are asymmetric to the smaller countries may not provide sufficient adjustments in their 
economies, hence posing potential conflict within the union.  
 
8.1.3 Efficiency of National Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy 
Lastly, the study found that national monetary and exchange rate policies were inefficient in 
the determination of output performance and the control of inflation in most of the SADC 
states. It was however, concluded that the argument that countries that have in the past failed 
to use national monetary and exchange rate policy for domestic macroeconomic stabilisation 
purposes should join/ form a monetary union, with the understanding that a regional central 
bank will be more efficient in determining policy, may not hold for the SADC region. 
 
This was attributed partly to the near-homogenous nature of production in the member states 
and the relative openness of their economies (which implies that national economic activity is 
determined by exogenous factors) and partly to the under-development of the financial 
systems of most of the member states (which implies that the transmission of monetary policy 
is inefficient in these economies). Hence, monetary policy determined by a union central 
bank is likely to remain ineffective under the current economic conditions.  
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An additional cause for concern is the approach to monetary integration through an extension 
of the CMA arrangement. The study determined that national monetary and exchange rate 
policies in the smaller CMA countries were ineffective in determining economic performance 
in these countries. However, it has been suggested that an extension of the CMA arrangement 
may require a revision of the current agreement that allows South Africa to determine 
monetary policy on behalf of the union. This implies that, the smaller CMA countries may 
not be suitable candidates of the monetary union as they do not meet the OCA criteria. Thus, 
approaching monetary integration through an extension of the CMA arrangement may cause 
problems at a later stage in terms of the suitability of the smaller CMA countries to be 
included as union members.  
 
8.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of the study have a number of policy implications for monetary integration in 
the SADC countries; these are discussed in this subsection. To begin with, there is a need for 
the SADC countries to diversify their production. Production in the region currently 
comprises of “first-stop” primary goods hence; the countries depend on external markets for 
their exports. Diversified economies will be less susceptible to external shocks and would 
foster increased intra-regional trade, which would in turn reduce the likelihood of asymmetric 
shocks in the region.  
 
Furthermore, the high divergence in the per capita income levels of the SADC countries 
implies that the rich countries have different policy objectives from the poor countries. It is 
therefore, premature to expect a convergence in macroeconomic stability indicators in the 
SADC countries. The countries should rather focus on stimulating growth in the poorer 
countries to foster real economic convergence before requiring a convergence in 
macroeconomic stability indicators. 
 
Lastly, the effectiveness of monetary policy in the non-SACU countries may also be limited 
by the level of development in their financial sectors, which affects the transmission of 
policy. The countries therefore, need to work on the development and integration of their 
financial sectors, to complement their integration efforts.  
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8.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The SADC countries are still in the implementation phase of a FTA area. As such, there is 
limited integration in their economies. Trade liberalisation is expected to foster structural 
transformation in the economies of the member states; hence, some of the conclusions drawn 
on the suitability of monetary integration in the region may change with time. 
 
The lack of valid data due to poor data reporting in some of the SADC countries presented a 
further limitation of the study. Conclusions drawn from the analyses are not inclusive of all 
the countries and therefore, do not provide a complete picture with regard to which countries 
are suitable for monetary integration.  
 
8.4 SUGGESTED AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is premature to expect the SADC countries to respond symmetrically to socks given the 
divergence in their economies. However, as the SADC countries deepen regional economic 
integration, they are likely to meet some of the OCA criteria. Therefore, there is a need to 
continuously monitor the nature of the response to shocks in the SADC countries. Similarly, 
there is a need to continuously monitor the extent of economic convergence in the SADC 
countries as the countries become more integrated.  
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APPENDIX A 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
  
Box A.1: The Solow Growth Model 
The model assumes a closed economy where: 
i. Physical capital, human capital, labour and knowledge/technology are the only factors of production 
(natural resources and land are ignored);  
ii. All factors have positive marginal products, which are subject to diminishing returns; 
iii. The savings/ investment rate, sk, is exogenous (no individual optimisation);  
iv. The labour force grows at a constant rate, n, which is exogenous; 
v. The depreciation rate, δk, is exogenous;   
vi. Technology grows at a constant rate, x, which is exogenous. This therefore implies that AL grows at a 
rate of (n + x); and  
vii. Capital accumulation is the main driving force for wealth (Solow, 1956).   
The model is expressed mathematically using a Cobb-Douglas production function, assuming constant returns to 
scale (CRTS) to factors of production, where: 
 = (, o)             (A.1) 
Where: Y denotes output; K denotes capital; L denotes labour and A denotes technology. Technology is assumed 
to be labour-augmenting, thus AL denotes effective units of labour. 
The assumption of CRTS implies that:  
(v, vo) = v(, o)   For any v ≥ 0                 (A.2) 
Expressing the function in Cobb-Douglas form gives: 
  = ∝ (o)∝                                                                                                         (A.3) 
The assumption of CRTS means that:  
    (v) ∝ (vo)∝       (A.4) 
    =  v∝∝v∝(o)∝       (A.5) 
     = v∝(o)∝        (A.6) 
Therefore, Y can be expressed in intensive form as:  
If we define v =   then it follows that: 
 P  , 1T =  

 (, o)           (A.7) 
 
Thus: 
 =      =  

   _() = (, 1) and  = _()         (A.8) 
 
The assumption of diminishing returns implies that:  
B(, o) > 0,  B(, o) > 0          (A.9) 
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0 <∝ < 1 
and 
 BB(, o) < 0,  BB(, o) < 0        (A.10) 
The rate of capital accumulation is expressed as:  
) =  +   −             (A.11) 
Where: S is savings; and all the other variables are as defined above. 
From equation A.11, it follows that:  
) −  =   −             (A.12) 
The per-capita values are expressed as: 
 ≡  " o ;   ≡  o"                                                                    (A.13) 
Thus, the rate of capital accumulation can be expressed as: 
 = c − ( + y +  )          (A.14) 
The assumption of diminishing returns implies that the economy would eventually reach the steady-state values of 
k* at which  = 0. 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form: 
 =  ∝(o )(∝)          (A.15) 
with: 
∗ =  Wc(∝)[ ( + y +  )"  (∝)"         (A.16) 
Then if all the parameters in equation 5.16 for two economies, i and j, are identical then  
ki* = kj*, and thus yi
*
 = yj
*          (A.17) 
This implies that output per worker in economies i and j would converge to the same level when they reach the 
steady-state and from there on the economies will grow at the same constant level. 
Source: Solow (1956); Mankiw et al (1992); Rassekh (1998) 
 
The predictions of the model do not however imply that the economies experience the same output levels or 
growth rates beforehand, but rather that the evolution and the long run levels of income (i.e., the steady-state) of 
every country is determined by that economy’s structural parameters. In other words, differences in output levels 
are explained by differences in s,n and δ. More specifically, a country’s steady-state income is determined by its 
rates of accumulation of human and physical capital, as well as the rate of population growth. Thus, countries will 
reach different steady-states determined by their structural parameters. Therefore, absolute economic convergence 
is attainable only when the determinants of steady-state income are similar across countries (Rassekh, 1998:87).  
 
Furthermore, the model predicts that permanent differences in growth rates are attributed to differences in x, 
while temporary differences are due to transition dynamics and/or shocks to s,n and δ. Thus, only conditional 
convergence can occur between countries with different initial levels of capital after controlling for the parameters 
that determine the different steady-states of each country (Mankiw et al, 1992; Jenkins and Thomas, 1997; 
Rassekh, 1998). 
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  Box A.2: The Factor Price Equalisation (FPE) Theorem 
The FPE theorem can be illustrated mathematically using two regions/countries (i and j): 
National income expressed in factor earnings is written as: 
F = FoF + |FF           (A.18) 
Where: Y denotes income, w denotes wages, L denotes labour, r denotes interest, K denotes capital, and i = 1, 
2. 
In per capita terms: 
F o" F = (FoF + |FF) oF"          (A.19) 
Put differently: 
F = F + |F(F oF)" =  F +  |F(F oF)"        (A.20) 
Where: y denotes per capita income and S denotes the savings rate. 
 
Prior to economic integration, national incomes may differ due to differences in either factor endowments or 
factor prices. However, once the economies trade freely, the FPE theorem predicts that w and r would 
equalise, such that: 
F =   +  |(F oF)" =  +  |(F oF)"        (A.21) 
This means that differences in the national incomes in the two countries will be determined by differences in 
their factor endowment ratios. Similarly, long run national incomes of the two countries will be determined 
by the size of their population or labor force, L and the savings rate (S/L). 
However, if factors are mobile, then K/L would converge. Given that per capita savings rate is a 
decreasing function of per capita income, the savings rate declines when per capita income reaches its 
steady-state. Similarly, when the wage rate reaches its threshold level, growth in the labour force also ceases. 
The two factors combined should lead to a convergence in national incomes. 
Source: Kim (1998) 
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  Box A.3: EU’s Fiscal Policy Framework 
The EU’s fiscal policy framework is based on the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). The EDP-SGP framework 
imposes fiscal discipline on member nations by setting demanding fiscal requirements for allowing 
countries to join the monetary union and making budgetary prudence a permanent feature of the region. 
The BEPG, on the other hand, provide an opportunity to discuss macroeconomic priorities and try to steer 
the EU’s overall fiscal-monetary policy mix in the right direction.  
The EDP stipulates that countries must avoid “excessive deficits” prior to joining the union, which 
entails not having government budget deficits exceeding 3% of GDP (unless the ratio has been declining 
substantially and continually, and is close to that reference value, or the excess over that value is 
exceptional and temporary). The EDP also stipulates that countries should not have a public debt that 
exceeds 60% of GDP (unless the ratio is declining and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
rate). 
The Council of Ministers, on a recommendation by the Commission, issues a confidential finding to 
any country designated to have an “excessive deficit”. In this finding, the Council outlines its views on the 
fiscal policy needs of the country and recommends concrete corrective measures. If the country fails to 
respond appropriately within a specific time limit, the Council can make its recommendations public. In 
addition, countries benefiting from the Cohesion Fund may find their financing from this source in 
jeopardy if they fail to take corrective action. For euro-area countries, the Council may also impose 
sanctions such as the interruption of European Investment Bank lending, non-interest-bearing deposits, and 
fines. 
The SGP strengthens the EDP. Under the SGP, EU countries commit themselves to a medium-term 
budgetary position close to balance or surplus. This is expected to allow the automatic fiscal stabilisers to 
work over the business cycle without breaching the Maastricht limit of a deficit of over 3% of GDP. In 
addition, the SGP defines the circumstances under which a deficit exceeding the 3% reference value may 
be considered exceptional, such as when it arises from an unusual event outside the control of the member 
state in question and having a major fiscal impact. An exception may also be made when an excessive 
deficit arises from a severe economic downturn, defined as a situation where annual GDP falls by at least 
2%.  
Furthermore, the SGP clarifies other aspects of the EDP, such as the imposition of sanctions, and 
strengthens the surveillance of fiscal policies by introducing an “early warning system”. Member nations 
are required to present, on an annual basis, stability programs specifying their medium-term budgetary 
objectives and an adjustment path for the deficit/GDP and debt/GDP ratios. EU countries outside the euro-
area must present convergence programs on an annual basis.  
Critics of the fiscal policy rule, however argue that the room left by the SGP for discretionary, counter-
cyclical fiscal policy is too limited because, unless countries succeed in running substantial surpluses 
during “normal times”, the 3% of GDP limit will in most cases only allow for the operation of the 
automatic fiscal stabilisers. 
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Lastly, the BEPG discussions, conducted on an annual basis, provide an opportunity to discuss fiscal 
policy coordination issues within a more general framework that encompasses other macroeconomic 
policies and structural reforms. The BEPG are meant to be the synthesis of the EU’s consensus on 
economic policy. 
Source: Arroyo (2003:113). 
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ba
bw
e 
th
e 
da
ta
 w
as
 
fr
om
 
19
80
-
20
02
 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
to
 
th
e 
eu
ro
, 
w
hi
le
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
in
 
su
pp
or
t 
of
 l
in
ki
ng
 a
n 
E
A
C
 c
ur
re
nc
y 
to
 t
he
 
eu
ro
 w
as
 w
ea
k.
 
A
zi
ak
po
no
 (
20
06
) 
T
he
 
S
A
C
U
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
19
90
-2
00
4 
T
he
 s
tu
dy
 i
nv
es
ti
ga
te
d 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
am
on
gs
t 
th
e 
S
A
C
U
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 u
si
ng
 
co
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
an
d 
er
ro
r 
co
rr
ec
ti
on
 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
. 
M
or
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
al
ly
, 
th
e 
st
ud
y 
in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 
of
 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
ag
e 
co
nd
it
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
an
 D
om
in
an
t 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
(S
A
D
H
) 
in
 
th
e 
S
A
C
U
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
. 
T
he
 
re
su
lt
s 
co
nf
ir
m
ed
 
th
e 
oc
cu
rr
en
ce
 
of
 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 S
A
C
U
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
, 
w
hi
ch
 w
as
 m
ai
nl
y 
a 
re
su
lt
 o
f 
po
li
cy
-,
 r
at
he
r 
th
an
 
m
ar
ke
t 
co
nv
er
ge
nc
e.
 
T
hu
s,
 
su
gg
es
ti
ng
 
th
at
 t
he
re
 w
er
e 
li
m
it
ed
 a
rb
it
ra
ge
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
ti
es
 
b e
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
 I
n 
ad
di
ti
on
, 
th
e 
re
su
lt
s 
in
di
ca
te
d 
th
at
 t
he
re
 w
as
 a
  
hi
er
ar
ch
y 
in
 t
he
 
le
ve
l 
 o
f 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
w
it
h 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a,
 w
it
h 
N
am
ib
ia
 a
t 
th
e 
to
p,
 f
ol
lo
w
ed
 b
y 
S
w
az
il
an
d,
 
th
en
 
L
es
ot
ho
, 
an
d 
la
st
ly
, 
B
ot
sw
an
a.
 
L
as
tl
y,
 
th
e 
re
su
lt
s 
co
nf
ir
m
ed
 t
he
 S
A
D
H
 i
n 
th
e 
S
A
C
U
 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
 
A
zi
ak
po
no
 e
t 
a
l 
(2
00
7)
 
A
ll
 
of
 
th
e 
S
A
D
C
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
ex
ce
pt
 
th
e 
D
R
C
 
19
90
- 
20
05
 
T
he
 s
tu
dy
 i
nv
es
ti
ga
te
d 
th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f 
ba
nk
in
g 
m
ar
ke
t 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 S
A
D
C
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 u
si
ng
 
pr
in
ci
pa
l 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 a
na
ly
si
s 
an
d 
pa
ss
-t
hr
ou
gh
 
an
al
ys
is
. T
he
 s
tu
dy
 te
st
ed
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 n
at
io
na
l 
ce
nt
ra
l 
ba
nk
 r
at
es
, 
le
nd
in
g 
an
d 
de
po
si
t r
at
es
   
T
he
 
re
su
lt
s 
co
nf
ir
m
ed
 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 
of
 
a 
co
nv
er
ge
nc
e 
cl
ub
 a
ro
un
d 
th
e 
C
M
A
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
, 
w
it
h 
so
m
e 
of
 t
he
 n
on
-C
M
A
 S
A
D
C
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 
sh
ow
in
g 
a 
te
nd
en
cy
 
to
 
co
nv
er
ge
 
w
it
h 
th
e 
C
M
A
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
. 
T
he
 a
ut
ho
rs
 s
ug
ge
st
ed
 t
ha
t 
m
on
et
ar
y 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
in
 
th
e 
fo
rm
 
of
 
an
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
of
 t
he
 C
M
A
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t 
to
 i
nc
lu
de
 
B
ot
sw
an
a,
 
S
ey
ch
el
le
s 
an
d 
Z
am
bi
a 
w
as
 
po
ss
ib
le
. 
A
zi
ak
po
no
 (
20
08
) 
S
A
C
U
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
19
90
-2
00
5 
T
he
 a
ut
ho
r 
in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
 t
he
 e
xt
en
t 
of
 m
on
et
ar
y 
an
d 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
au
to
no
m
y 
an
d 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
an
d 
th
e 
re
st
 o
f 
th
e 
S
A
C
U
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
us
in
g 
co
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
an
d 
er
ro
r 
co
rr
ec
ti
on
 m
od
el
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 l
on
g-
ru
n 
ca
us
al
it
y 
an
al
ys
is
 (
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
w
ea
k 
ex
og
en
ei
ty
 t
es
t)
. 
T
he
 r
es
ul
ts
 s
ug
ge
st
ed
 a
 l
ow
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
do
m
es
ti
c 
po
li
cy
 a
ut
on
om
y 
in
 B
ot
sw
an
a,
 L
es
ot
ho
 a
nd
 
S
w
az
il
an
d,
 w
hi
le
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
 w
as
 t
he
 c
as
e 
fo
r 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
an
d 
N
am
ib
ia
. 
F
ur
th
er
m
or
e,
 t
he
 
re
su
lt
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
th
at
 
th
e 
S
A
R
B
 
ov
er
w
he
lm
in
gl
y 
in
fl
ue
nc
es
 p
ol
ic
y 
st
an
ce
 a
nd
 
th
e 
m
on
ey
 
m
ar
ke
t 
be
ha
vi
ou
rs
 
of
 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
. 
L
as
tl
y,
 i
t 
w
as
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 t
ha
t 
ca
us
al
it
y 
ru
ns
 f
ro
m
 S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
to
 t
he
 o
th
er
 
m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
, 
im
pl
yi
ng
 t
ha
t 
co
nv
er
ge
nc
e 
in
 
m
ar
ke
t 
in
te
re
st
 
ra
te
s 
w
as
 
du
e 
to
 
ef
fo
rt
s 
of
 
ba
nk
s 
in
 t
he
 B
L
N
S
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 t
o 
al
ig
n 
in
te
re
st
 
26
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ra
te
s 
w
it
h 
th
os
e 
of
 
S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
a.
 
T
he
 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 
re
ac
he
d 
w
as
 
th
at
 
a 
m
on
et
ar
y 
un
if
ic
at
io
n,
 w
it
h 
th
e 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
an
 R
an
d 
as
 a
 
co
m
m
on
 c
ur
re
nc
y 
an
d 
th
e 
S
A
R
B
 a
s 
a 
so
le
 
ce
nt
ra
l b
an
k 
w
as
 f
ea
si
bl
e.
 
Jo
hn
s 
(2
00
9)
 
10
 
S
A
D
C
 
C
ou
nt
ri
es
, 
na
m
el
y 
 
B
ot
sw
an
a,
 
L
es
ot
ho
, 
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r,
 
M
al
aw
i, 
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e,
 
N
am
ib
ia
, 
S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
a,
 
S
w
az
il
an
d,
 
T
an
za
ni
a 
an
d 
Z
am
bi
a 
19
90
-2
00
7 
T
he
 s
tu
dy
 i
nv
es
ti
ga
te
d 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ss
-
th
ro
ug
h 
of
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 
in
 
te
n 
S
A
D
C
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
us
in
g 
an
 
in
te
re
st
 
ra
te
 
pa
ss
-t
hr
ou
gh
 
m
od
el
. 
T
he
 
re
su
lt
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ed
 
a 
co
nv
er
ge
nc
e 
gr
ou
p 
co
ns
is
ti
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
S
A
C
U
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
, 
B
ot
sw
an
a,
 
M
al
aw
i, 
an
d 
to
 
so
m
e 
ex
te
nt
, 
Z
am
bi
a.
 
T
he
 
st
ud
y 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
th
at
 a
 r
eg
io
n-
w
id
e 
m
on
et
ar
y 
un
io
n 
w
as
 c
ur
re
nt
ly
 n
ot
 f
ea
si
bl
e 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
S
A
D
C
 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
m
on
et
ar
y 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 f
or
m
 o
f 
an
 e
xt
en
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
C
M
A
 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t 
to
 
in
cl
ud
e 
B
ot
sw
an
a,
 
M
al
aw
i a
nd
 Z
am
bi
a 
w
as
 p
os
si
bl
e.
 
 
O
bi
ny
el
ua
ku
 a
nd
 V
ie
gi
 (
20
09
) 
B
ot
sw
an
a,
 
L
es
ot
ho
, 
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r,
 
M
al
aw
i, 
M
au
ri
ti
us
,  
S
ey
ch
el
le
s,
   
S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
a,
 
S
w
az
il
an
d,
 
T
an
za
ni
a,
 
Z
am
bi
a 
 
an
d 
Z
im
ba
bw
e 
19
80
-2
00
6 
T
he
 s
tu
dy
 i
nv
es
ti
ga
te
d 
th
e 
re
le
va
nc
e 
of
 f
is
ca
l 
an
d 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 
in
 
th
e 
de
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 
in
fl
at
io
n 
in
 
th
e 
S
A
D
C
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
us
in
g 
V
A
R
 
an
al
ys
is
. 
T
he
 
re
su
lt
s 
in
di
ca
te
d 
th
at
 
fi
sc
al
 
po
li
cy
 
do
m
in
at
ed
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 
in
 
th
e 
de
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 
in
fl
at
io
n 
in
 
L
es
ot
ho
, 
B
ot
sw
an
a,
 M
al
aw
i, 
Z
am
bi
a 
an
d 
Z
im
ba
bw
e,
 
w
hi
le
 
S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
a,
 
S
w
az
il
an
d,
 
M
au
ri
ti
us
, 
S
ey
ch
el
le
s 
an
d 
T
an
za
ni
a 
ex
hi
bi
te
d 
a 
m
on
et
ar
y 
do
m
in
an
t 
re
gi
m
e.
 
T
he
 
st
ud
y 
fo
un
d 
th
at
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
w
it
h 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
, 
su
ch
 
as
 
B
ot
sw
an
a 
an
d 
L
es
ot
ho
, 
co
ul
d 
st
il
l 
ex
hi
bi
t 
a 
fi
sc
al
 d
om
in
an
t 
re
gi
m
e.
 T
hu
s,
 i
t 
w
as
 
su
gg
es
te
d 
th
at
 
th
e 
S
A
D
C
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
ai
m
 
to
 
co
or
di
na
te
 t
he
ir
 m
on
et
ar
y 
an
d 
fi
sc
al
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
in
 
or
de
r 
to
 
at
ta
in
 
pr
ic
e 
st
ab
il
it
y 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
pr
op
os
ed
 m
on
et
ar
y 
un
io
n.
 
26
2 
 Ta
bl
e 
B
.2
: S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 E
xc
ha
ng
e 
R
at
e 
S
ys
te
m
s,
 P
ol
ic
y 
F
ra
m
ew
or
k,
 E
xc
ha
ng
e 
C
on
tr
ol
 R
es
tr
ic
ti
on
s 
on
 C
ap
it
al
 a
nd
 C
ur
re
nt
 A
cc
ou
nt
 T
ra
ns
ac
ti
on
s 
in
 th
e 
S
A
D
C
 C
ou
nt
ri
es
 
C
ou
nt
ry
 
E
xc
ha
ng
e 
R
at
e 
S
ys
te
m
 
E
xc
ha
ng
e 
C
on
tr
ol
 
on
 
C
ur
re
nt
 
A
cc
ou
nt
 
T
ra
ns
ac
ti
on
s 
R
es
tr
ic
ti
on
s 
on
 C
ap
it
al
 A
cc
ou
nt
 T
ra
ns
ac
ti
on
s 
A
ng
ol
a 
Fr
ee
 f
lo
at
in
g 
ex
ch
an
ge
 r
at
e 
A
lm
os
t 
al
l 
cu
rr
en
t 
ac
co
un
t 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 h
av
e 
be
en
 
li
be
ra
li
se
d.
 
C
ap
it
al
 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
ar
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
to
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
ex
ch
an
ge
 l
ic
en
si
ng
 
by
 
th
e 
au
th
or
it
ie
s.
 
In
w
ar
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
is
 
pr
oh
ib
it
ed
 
in
 
so
m
e 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
se
ct
or
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
de
fe
nc
e 
an
d 
se
cu
ri
ty
.  
C
ap
it
al
 r
ep
at
ri
at
io
n 
up
on
 l
iq
ui
da
ti
on
 i
s 
su
bj
ec
t 
to
 p
ri
or
 a
pp
ro
va
l 
of
 t
he
 M
in
is
te
r 
of
 F
in
an
ce
.  
A
nn
ua
l 
tr
an
sf
er
s 
of
 d
iv
id
en
ds
 a
re
 s
ub
je
ct
 t
o 
ap
pr
ov
al
 b
y 
B
N
A
.  
A
ll
 c
ap
it
al
 t
ra
ns
fe
rs
 a
re
 s
ub
je
ct
 t
o 
li
ce
ns
in
g 
an
d 
co
nt
ro
l.
 
B
ot
sw
an
a 
C
ra
w
li
ng
 
P
eg
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(T
he
 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
is
 
pe
gg
ed
 
to
 
a 
w
ei
gh
te
d 
ba
sk
et
 o
f 
cu
rr
en
ci
es
 
th
at
 
co
m
pr
is
es
 
S
D
R
 
cu
rr
en
ci
es
 
an
d 
th
e 
S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
an
 R
an
d)
. 
E
xc
ha
ng
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
 
w
er
e 
ab
ol
is
he
d 
in
 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 1
99
9.
 T
he
re
 i
s 
a 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t 
fo
r 
cu
st
om
er
s 
to
 
co
m
pl
et
e 
fo
rm
s 
to
 
re
co
rd
 
in
w
ar
d 
an
d 
ou
tw
ar
d 
tr
an
sf
er
 
or
 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
pa
ym
en
ts
 
w
he
re
 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 
ex
ce
ed
s 
an
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t o
f 
P
10
 0
00
. 
F
ul
l 
ca
pi
ta
l 
ac
co
un
t 
co
nv
er
ti
bi
li
ty
 
si
nc
e 
F
eb
ru
ar
y 
19
99
 
L
es
ot
ho
 
F
ix
ed
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ra
te
 (
P
eg
ge
d 
at
 p
ar
 w
it
h 
th
e 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
an
 
R
an
d)
 
N
o 
co
nt
ro
ls
 o
n 
cu
rr
en
t a
cc
ou
nt
 
T
ra
ns
ac
ti
on
s*
* 
•
 
N
o 
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
 o
n 
ca
pi
ta
l 
ac
co
un
ts
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
C
M
A
.  
•
 
L
im
it
ed
 r
ef
or
m
s 
on
 c
ap
it
al
 a
cc
ou
nt
 s
in
ce
 
Ju
ne
, 2
00
3,
 w
hi
ch
 in
cl
ud
e:
 
i. 
F
or
ei
gn
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
by
 p
ri
va
te
 i
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
C
M
A
 is
 li
m
it
ed
 to
 M
25
0,
00
0;
 
ii
. 
O
pe
ni
ng
 o
f 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 a
nd
 o
ff
sh
or
e 
ac
co
un
ts
 f
or
 p
ri
va
te
 i
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
 i
s 
li
m
it
ed
 t
o 
M
25
0,
00
0;
  
ii
i. 
D
ir
ec
t 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
by
 
co
rp
or
at
e 
/ 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
C
M
A
 i
s 
al
lo
w
ed
 u
p 
to
 M
50
 m
il
li
on
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
S
A
D
C
 
re
gi
on
 a
nd
 u
p 
to
 M
30
 m
il
li
on
 e
ls
ew
he
re
 
iv
. N
o 
re
st
ri
ct
io
n 
on
 lo
ng
-t
er
m
 c
ap
it
al
 in
fl
ow
s 
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r 
In
de
pe
nd
en
tl
y 
fl
oa
ti
ng
* 
 
 
M
al
aw
i 
M
an
ag
ed
 f
lo
at
in
g 
w
it
h 
no
 p
re
-
de
te
rm
in
ed
 
pa
th
 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 r
at
e 
N
o 
co
nt
ro
ls
 o
n 
cu
rr
en
t a
cc
ou
nt
 
T
ra
ns
ac
ti
on
s 
B
ot
h 
in
w
ar
d 
an
d 
ou
tw
ar
d 
di
re
ct
 a
nd
 p
or
tf
ol
io
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 r
eq
ui
re
 p
ri
or
 a
pp
ro
va
l. 
M
au
ri
ti
us
 
M
an
ag
ed
 f
lo
at
in
g 
w
it
h 
no
 p
re
-
de
te
rm
in
ed
 
pa
th
 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 r
at
e 
N
o 
co
nt
ro
ls
 o
n 
cu
rr
en
t a
cc
ou
nt
 
T
ra
ns
ac
ti
on
s*
* 
N
o 
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
 o
n 
ca
pi
ta
l 
ac
co
un
t 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
in
 
re
sp
ec
t 
of
 
bo
th
 
in
w
ar
d 
an
d 
ou
tw
ar
d 
26
3 
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e 
Fr
ee
 f
lo
at
in
g 
•
 
N
o 
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
 
ar
e 
im
po
se
d 
on
 
th
e 
ex
po
rt
s 
of
 g
oo
ds
.  
•
 
T
he
 
im
po
rt
at
io
n 
of
 
go
od
s 
m
us
t 
be
 
pr
ec
ed
ed
 
by
 
ne
go
ti
at
io
n 
of
 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 w
it
h 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
ks
.  
•
 
T
he
re
 a
re
 n
o 
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
 o
n 
th
e 
en
tr
y 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
fo
r 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
P
ay
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
se
rv
ic
es
 e
xc
ee
di
ng
 a
 v
al
ue
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t 
to
 
U
S
D
5 
00
0 
m
us
t 
be
 
li
ce
ns
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
ce
nt
ra
l b
an
k 
•
 
N
on
-r
es
id
en
ts
 a
nd
 t
ra
ve
le
r 
ca
n 
im
po
rt
 a
ny
 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
ag
ai
ns
t 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n.
  
•
 
O
nl
y 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 d
ec
la
re
d 
m
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Table B.3: Summary of Scoring In Terms of OCA Criteria 
 Rating 
Trade Openness High 
 In % of GDP 34.2 
Diversification in Production Low 
Trade Interdependence Very Low 
 Exports 11.58 
 Imports 12.86 
Labour Mobility Low 
Likelihood of Asymmetric Shocks High 
Intra-regional Financial Integration Interim 
In SACU countries High 
Intra-regional Transfer System No 
In SACU countries Yes 
Existence of large country within the region 
 from which  to import credibility 
Yes 
Political Integration High 
Source: Own calculations 
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Box C.1: The European Monetary System (1979-1998) 
The European Monetary System (EMS) was formed in March 1979 in keeping with the EU’s (then called the European 
Economic Community or ECC) aim for monetary integration, with the ultimate goal of establishing a common currency with 
a regional central bank. The UK did not join the EMS at on-set. 
The aim of the EMS was to obtain stability in the exchange rates between the EU currencies and to encourage 
convergence of economic and monetary policies. Thus, the EMS facilitated the interdependence of the EU countries through 
the use of an exchange rate mechanism (ERM), which had four main components; the European Currency Unit (ECU), the 
parity grid, the divergence indicator and the credit facilities. 
The ECU was a monetary unit based on a basket of the weighted average of the currencies of the member nations. The 
number of units of each participating currency in the ECU was fixed, while the weights of the various currencies changed over 
time, as intra-European exchange rates fluctuated. An advantage of the ECU is that it offered greater stability than any one of 
the national currencies. The ECU also functioned as a reserve instrument issued by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(EMCF) to EMS central banks. The countries were allocated a quota into the EMCF, 20% to be paid in gold (valued at market 
price) and the remainder in dollars, in exchange for ECUs.   
The parity grid consisted of the central rate, the bi-central rate and the marginal intervention. Each participating nation had 
a central rate for its currency that was determined by all members and was expressed as the amount of that nation's currency 
equal to one ECU. The central rates were fixed but could be revised only with a re-alignment. In this way, the EMS was a 
fixed but adjustable exchange rate system, with the currencies of the member nations floating jointly against the dollar.  
The central rates were used in the parity grid to monitor currency fluctuations relative to each other. The ratio of one 
country's central rate to another's formed the bi-central rate. The value of this ratio was allowed to fluctuate by a maximum of 
2.25% on either side of its parity. When the ratio reached the allowable "margin", i.e., 75% of its allowed limits, a threshold of 
divergence was reached, the affected nation was expected to take a number of corrective steps to prevent its currency 
fluctuating outside the allowed range. These included diversified intervention measures of domestic monetary policy, changes 
in central parity, or other measures of economic policy. This was known as marginal intervention. 
In the extreme case, where the exchange rate reached the limit of its range, the weak- and the strong-currency members 
had to share the burden of the necessary adjustment. For example, if the French franc depreciated to its upper limit against the 
German mark, the French central bank had to sell Deutshe mark (DM) reserves and the German central bank had to lend the 
necessary DM to France. The divergence indicator was designed to give a country a warning when its currency was nearing 
the divergence of the ECU central rate. 
Lastly, the EU countries established EMCF to provide short- and medium-term balance-of-payments support to members. 
There are three financing facilities in the EMS: the Very Short Term Financing Facility (VSTF), the Short Term Monetary 
Support (STMS) and the Medium Term Financial Assistance (MTFA). The VSTF and the STMS were issued by the central 
banks, while the MTFA was issued by the Council of Ministers.  
The VSTF consisted of an unlimited credit line that participating central banks opened to each other, in their own 
currencies to finance obligatory intervention in EC currencies. The amounts drawn were expressed in ECU's and carried 
interest. On the other hand, the STMS and the MTFA were systems of mutual credit that EC member states could grant each 
other. The initial loan period under the STMS was three months, but was extendable to a total duration of nine months, while 
that of the MTFA was two to five years. 
Source: Kondonassis and Malliaris (1994:296-7), Salvatore (2004: 715), Mongelli (2008). 
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Box C.2: The 1992-1993 Currency Crises in the European Monetary System 
A combination of several factors led to the 1992-1993 crises within the exchange rate mechanism (ERM). To 
begin with, Germany was experiencing a prolonged cyclical upswing in the aftermath of the unification of the 
East and West German economies while the rest of the European countries were undergoing a recession. The 
high cost of restructuring East Germany in 1992 increased the nation’s inflationary pressures, which prompted 
the German central bank (the Bundesbank) to tighten its monetary policy. This resulted in an increase in 
interest rates and an appreciation in the mark against other currencies. The United Kingdom and Italy felt they 
could not maintain the exchange rate within the ERM in the face of high and rising unemployment. 
In addition, there were increasing doubts about the future of the EMU due to the negative outcome of the 
Danish referendum in June 1992, which were exacerbated in the run-up to the French referendum in 
September that same year. Furthermore, high inflation countries within the European Monetary System 
(EMS) periodically needed to devalue their currencies with respect to the EMS in order to maintain 
competitiveness relative to low inflation countries, such as Germany. However, more than five years had 
lapsed without realignments of the parities in the ERM as such; countries that had not advanced in nominal 
convergence experienced a loss in competitiveness. Finally, the several contagion effects between the 
countries prompted the onset of the crisis and fuelled its persistence. 
 In late 1992, the United Kingdom and Italy withdrew from the EMS, enabling their currencies to 
depreciate and their interest rates to fall, which stimulated economic growth, while Sweden, Finland and 
Norway abandoned the unilateral links of their currencies to the ECU. Numerous other realignments followed. 
However, the Bundesbank refused to lower the discount rate as was expected by financial analysts and 
traders. Speculators responded by selling the currencies of France, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and Belgium.  
The combined market intervention efforts of the central banks of the member nations could not reverse the 
market forces in the face of the massive speculative attack. Market doubts concerning the preparedness and 
ability of EU central banks to raise interest rates in defence of exchange rates in situations where such policies 
might clash with the requirements of the domestic economy led to pressures within the EMS. As a result, the 
monetary authorities agreed to abandon the narrow band of ±2.25 percent for a much wider band of ±15 
percent on either side of the central rates. This put an end to the speculative attacks but exchange rates 
remained at their pre-crisis level. 
Source: Alberola et al, (2003:34); Salvatore (2004:716) 
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Table D.2: Cointegration Tests 
Table D.2.1: Cointegration Tests- Monetary Aggregate Channel 
 
Country 
 
Rank 
Max -Eigen Trace 
Statistic 
Prob. 
(95%) 
Prob. 
(99%) 
Statistic 
Prob. 
(95%) 
Prob. 
(99%) 
DRC 
r = 0  33.11  0.00*  0.00* 55.52  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  21.24  0.00*  0.00*  22.41  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  1.18  0.28  0.28  1.18  0.28  0.28 
LES 
r = 0  54.01 0.00* 0.00*  84.76 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 1  21.40 0.00* 0.00*  30.75 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 2  9.34 0.00* 0.00*  9.34 0.00* 0.00* 
MOZ 
r = 0  29.15  0.00*  0.00*  55.45  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  20.28  0.00*  0.00*  26.30  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  6.02  0.01*  0.01  6.019  0.01*  0.01 
RSA 
r = 0  33.91  0.00*  0.00*  77.35  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  29.80  0.00*  0.00*  43.44  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  13.63  0.00*  0.00*  13.63  0.00*  0.00* 
SWA 
r = 0  43.36  0.00*  0.00*  78.53  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  19.15  0.00*  0.00*  35.16  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  16.01  0.00*  0.00*  16.01  0.00*  0.00* 
TAN 
r = 0  62.44  0.00*  0.00*  85.27  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  16.29  0.02*  0.02  22.83  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  6.54  0.01*  0.01  6.54  0.01*  0.01 
ZAM 
r = 0  25.25  0.01*  0.01  46.00  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  12.67  0.08  0.08  20.75  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  8.08  0.00  0.00  8.08  0.00*  0.00* 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Notes:  Critical values for the trace statistic for r=0, r≤ 1 and r ≤ 2 are 29.80, 15.49 and 3.84 at the 95% level 
of significance, and  35.46, 19.94 and 6.63 at the 99% level of significance, respectively. 
• Critical values for the max-eigen statistic for r=0, r≤ 1 and r ≤ 2 are 21.13, 14.26 and 3.84 at the 95% 
level of significance, and 25.86, 18.52 and 6.63 at the 99% level of significance, respectively. 
• * Indicates the presence of at least 1, 2, 3, or 4 cointegrating vectors. 
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Table D.2.2: Cointegration Tests- Interest Rate Channel 
 
Country 
 
Rank 
Max-Eigen Trace 
Statistic Prob. 
(95%) 
Prob. 
(99%) 
Statistic Prob. 
(95%) 
Prob. 
(99%) 
LES r = 0  53.41  0.00*  0.00*  112.91  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  28.02  0.00*  0.00*  59.50  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  21.17  0.00*  0.00*  31.48  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 3  10.30  0.00*  0.00*  10.30  0.00*  0.00* 
RSA r = 0  45.36  0.00*  0.00*  101.94  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  31.26  0.00*  0.00*  56.58  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  15.63  0.03*  0.03  25.32  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 3  9.69  0.00*  0.00  9.69  0.00*  0.00* 
SWA r = 0  44.32  0.00*  0.00*  116.43  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  38.71  0.00*  0.00*  72.10  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  18.47  0.01*  0.01  33.39  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 3  14.92  0.00*  0.00  14.92  0.00*  0.00* 
TAN r = 0  67.97  0.00*  0.00*  119.00  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  27.17  0.00*  0.00*  51.04  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  16.75  0.01*  0.01  23.87  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 3  7.12  0.00*  0.00  7.12  0.00*  0.00* 
ZAM r = 0  40.74  0.00*  0.00*  76.14  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  20.60  0.05  0.05  35.40  0.01*  0.01 
r ≤ 2  8.16  0.36  0.36  14.80  0.06  0.06 
r ≤ 3  6.64  0.00  0.00  6.64  0.00  0.00 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Notes: Critical values for the trace statistic for r=0, r≤ 1, r ≤ 2, and r ≤ 3 are 47.86, 29.80, 15.49 and 3.84 at 
the 95% level of significance, and  54.68, 35.46, 19.94 and 6.63 at the 99% level of significance, 
respectively. 
• Critical values for the max-eigen statistic for r=0, r≤ 1, r ≤ 2, and r ≤ 3 are 27.58, 21.13, 14.26 and 3.84 
at the 95% level of significance, and 32.71, 25.86, 18.52 and 6.63 at the 99% level of significance, 
respectively. 
• * Indicates the presence of at least 1, 2, 3, or 4 cointegrating vectors. 
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Table D.2.3: Cointegration Tests- Exchange Rate Channel 
 
Country 
 
Rank 
Max-Eigen Trace 
Statistic Prob. 
(95%) 
Prob. 
(99%) 
Statistic Prob. 
(95%) 
Prob. 
(99%) 
DRC r = 0  51.89  0.00*  0.00*  101.16  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  30.21  0.00*  0.00*  49.27  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  17.49  0.01*  0.01  19.06  0.01*  0.01 
r ≤ 3  1.56  0.21  0.21  1.56  0.21  0.21 
LES r = 0  52.19 0.00* 0.00*  104.79 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 1  24.09 0.02* 0.02  52.60 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 2  17.95 0.01* 0.01  28.51 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 3  10.56 0.00* 0.00  10.56 0.00* 0.00* 
MOZ r = 0  44.49 0.00* 0.00*  87.67 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 1  24.87 0.01* 0.01  43.18 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 2  11.45 0.13 0.13  18.31 0.01* 0.01 
r ≤ 3  6.87 0.00 0.00  6.87 0.00* 0.00 
RSA r = 0  39.13 0.00* 0.00*  103.48 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 1  30.48 0.00* 0.00*  64.34 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 2  21.67 0.00* 0.00*  33.87 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 3  12.20 0.00* 0.00*  12.20 0.00* 0.00* 
SWA r = 0  47.45 0.00* 0.00*  102.58 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 1  23.50 0.02* 0.02  55.13 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 2  17.90 0.01* 0.01  31.63 0.00* 0.00* 
r ≤ 3  13.73 0.00* 0.00  13.73 0.00* 0.00* 
TAN r = 0  71.94  0.00*  0.00*  115.68  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  27.55  0.00*  0.00*  43.75  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  10.10  0.20  0.20  16.20  0.03*  0.03 
r ≤ 3  6.09  0.01  0.01  6.09  0.01*  0.01 
ZAM r = 0  26.79  0.06  0.06  56.32  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  14.39  0.33  0.33  29.53  0.05  0.05 
r ≤ 2  9.00  0.28  0.28  15.13  0.05  0.05 
r ≤ 3  6.13  0.01  0.01  6.13  0.01  0.01 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Notes: Critical values for the trace statistic for r=0, r≤ 1, r ≤ 2, and r ≤ 3 are 47.86, 29.80, 15.49 and 3.84 at 
the 95% level of significance, and  54.68, 35.46, 19.94 and 6.63 at the 99% level of significance, 
respectively. 
• Critical values for the max-eigen statistic for r=0, r≤ 1, r ≤ 2, and r ≤ 3 are 27.58, 21.13, 14.26 and 3.84 
at the 95% level of significance, and 32.71, 25.86, 18.52 and 6.63 at the 99% level of significance, 
respectively. 
• *Indicates the presence of at least 1, 2, 3, or 4 cointegrating vectors. 
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Table D.2.4: Cointegration Tests- Credit Channel 
 
Country 
 
Rank 
Max-Eigen Trace 
Statistic Prob. 
(95%) 
Prob. 
(99%) 
Statistic Prob. 
(95%) 
Prob. 
(99%) 
LES r = 0  44.77  0.00*  0.00*  80.02  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  18.06  0.13  0.13  35.26  0.01*  0.01* 
r ≤ 2  16.81  0.02  0.02  17.20  0.03*  0.03* 
r ≤ 3  0.39  0.53  0.53  0.39  0.53  0.53 
MOZ r = 0  30.42  0.02*  0.02  63.67  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  23.18  0.02*  0.02  33.24  0.01*  0.01 
r ≤ 2  7.02  0.48*  0.48  10.06  0.27  0.27 
r ≤ 3  3.03  0.08*  0.08  3.03  0.08  0.08 
RSA r = 0  56.60  0.00*  0.00*  103.68  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  29.57  0.00*  0.00*  47.08  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  12.90  0.08  0.08  17.51  0.02*  0.02 
r ≤ 3  4.61  0.03  0.03  4.61  0.03*  0.03 
SWA r = 0  55.03  0.00*  0.00*  154.24  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 1  38.38  0.00*  0.00*  99.20  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 2  32.53  0.00*  0.00*  60.82  0.00*  0.00* 
r ≤ 3  28.29  0.00*  0.00*  28.29  0.00*  0.00* 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Notes: Critical values for the trace statistic for r=0, r≤ 1, r ≤ 2, and r ≤ 3 are 47.86, 29.80, 15.49 and 3.84 at 
the 95% level of significance, and  54.68, 35.46, 19.94 and 6.63 at the 99% level of significance, 
respectively. 
• Critical values for the max-eigen statistic for r=0, r≤ 1, r ≤ 2, and r ≤ 3 are 27.58, 21.13, 14.26 and 3.84 
at the 95% level of significance, and 32.71, 25.86, 18.52 and 6.63 at the 99% level of significance, 
respectively. 
• * Indicates the presence of at least 1, 2, 3, or 4 cointegrating vectors. 
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APPENDIX E 
RESULTS FOR LAG SELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
Table E.1: Angola 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  44.65 NA  1.37e-05 -2.68 -2.55 -2.64
1  70.32  44.71  4.68e-06 -3.76 -3.21 -3.58
2  81.68  17.59  4.10e-06 -3.91 -2.94 -3.59
3  82.99  1.77  7.06e-06 -3.41 -2.03 -2.96
4  119.56   42.46*   1.31e-06*  -5.19*  -3.39*  -4.60*
Interest Rate Channel 
0 -153.35 NA  0.30  10.15  10.34  10.21
1 -112.24  68.96  0.06  8.53  9.45  8.83
2 -65.97  65.68  0.00  6.57  8.24  7.12
3 -50.92  17.47  0.01  6.64  9.04  7.42
4  15.53   60.02*   0.00*   3.38*   6.53*   4.40*
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  16.21 NA  5.35e-06 -0.78 -0.60 -0.72
1  118.33  171.30  2.09e-08 -6.34 -5.41 -6.04
2  147.60  41.54  9.39e-09 -7.20 -5.53 -6.65
3  179.85  37.45  3.83e-09 -8.24 -5.84 -7.46
4  265.50   77.36*   5.91e-11*  -12.74*  -9.59*  -11.71*
Credit  Channel 
0  32.44 NA  1.88e-06 -1.83 -1.65 -1.77
1  126.54  157.82  1.23e-08 -6.87 -5.94 -6.57
2  145.21  26.50  1.10e-08 -7.04 -5.38 -6.50
3  159.89  17.04  1.39e-08 -6.96 -4.55 -6.17
4  244.65   76.56*   2.27e-10*  -11.39*  -8.25*  -10.37*
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Notes: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
• LR = sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); FPE = Final Predicition Error; AIC = 
Akaike information criterion; SC = Schwarz information criterion; HQ = Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criterion 
• These definitions apply for all analyses from here on 
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Table E.2: Botswana 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  72.55 NA  4.21e-06 -3.86 -3.73 -3.81
1  106.50  60.35  1.06e-06 -5.25  -4.72* -5.06
2  120.29  22.20  8.19e-07 -5.51 -4.59  -5.19*
3  124.98  6.78  1.07e-06 -5.27 -3.95 -4.81
4  140.82   20.23*   7.77e-07*  -5.65* -3.94 -5.05
Interest Rate Channel 
0  55.70 NA  6.65e-07 -2.87 -2.69 -2.81
1  106.01  86.64  9.95e-08 -4.77  -3.89*  -4.47*
2  124.25   27.35*   9.11e-08* -4.90 -3.31 -4.35
3  141.38  21.89  9.39e-08 -4.96 -2.67 -4.16
4  160.55  20.23  9.51e-08  -5.14* -2.15 -4.09
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  119.93 NA  1.87e-08 -6.44 -6.26 -6.37
1  160.68  70.17  4.77e-09 -7.81  -6.93*  -7.50*
2  180.98   30.44*   3.90e-09*  -8.05* -6.47 -7.50
3  188.96  10.20  6.68e-09 -7.60 -5.32 -6.81
4  208.72  20.85  6.55e-09 -7.81 -4.82 -6.77
Credit  Channel 
0  135.52 NA  3.16e-09 -8.22 -8.03 -8.15
1  171.19  60.19  9.35e-10 -9.44  -8.53* -9.14
2  190.77  28.15  7.87e-10 -9.67 -8.02 -9.12
3  202.34  13.73  1.19e-09 -9.39 -7.01 -8.60
4  239.90   35.21*   4.12e-10*  -10.74* -7.62  -9.71*
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table E.3: The Democratic Republic of Congo 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -304.86 NA  0.366  7.51  7.60  7.54
1 -285.30  37.21  0.28  7.25  7.60  7.39
2 -278.22  12.94  0.30  7.30  7.91  7.54
3 -271.41  11.97  0.31  7.35  8.23  7.70
4 -196.43   126.18*   0.06*   5.74*   6.89*   6.20*
Exchange Rate Channel 
0 -278.12 NA  0.01  6.88   6.70*  6.93
1 -246.32  59.72  0.01  6.49  7.08  6.73
2 -232.95  23.80  0.01  6.56  7.62  6.98
3 -220.03  21.73  0.01  6.63  8.16  7.25
4 -144.14   120.32*   0.00*   5.17*  7.17   5.97*
Credit  Channel 
0 -234.43 NA  1.32  11.63  11.80  11.69
1 -207.83  46.70  0.79  11.11  11.95  11.42
2 -177.31  47.64  0.40  10.40  11.91  10.95
3 -142.62  47.39  0.17  9.49  11.67  10.28
4 -97.05   53.35*   0.04*   8.05*   10.89*   9.09*
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table E.4: Lesotho 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  195.94 NA  2.26e-06 -4.49 -4.40 -4.45
1  232.28  69.30  1.20e-06 -5.12  -4.78*  -4.98*
2  240.39  14.91  1.22e-06 -5.10 -4.50 -4.86
3  242.91  4.45  1.42e-06 -4.95 -4.09 -4.61
4  267.76   42.18*   9.89e-07*  -5.32* -4.21 -4.87
Interest Rate Channel 
0 -87.23 NA  9.81e-05  2.12  2.23  2.17
1 -46.34  77.01  5.50e-05  1.54   2.11*   1.77*
2 -33.31  23.33  5.91e-05  1.61  2.64  2.02
3 -28.47  8.22  7.71e-05  1.87  3.35  2.47
4  13.95   68.08*   4.22e-05*   1.26*  3.20  2.04
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  365.15 NA  2.65e-09 -8.40 -8.28 -8.35
1  404.68  74.47  1.53e-09 -8.95  -8.37*  -8.72*
2  417.68  23.27  1.65e-09 -8.88 -7.85 -8.46
3  426.48  14.93  1.96e-09 -8.71 -7.22 -8.11
4  454.89   45.60*   1.48e-09*  -8.99* -7.06 -8.22
Credit  Channel 
0  195.78 NA  3.36e-09 -8.16 -8.00 -8.10
1  244.20  86.54  8.47e-10 -9.54  -8.75*  -9.24*
2  254.50  16.64  1.10e-09 -9.30 -7.88 -8.76
3  266.09  16.78  1.38e-09 -9.11 -7.06 -8.34
4  298.86   41.82*   7.30e-10*  -9.82* -7.15 -8.82
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Table E.5: Madagascar 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -260.65 NA  0.03  5.12  5. 20  5.15
1  148.54  786.60  1.42e-05 -2.65 -2.34 -2.53
2  188.10  73.74  7.83e-06 -3.24  -2.71*  -3.03*
3  196.17  14.57  7.98e-06 -3.23 -2.46 -2.91
4  208.99   22.41*   7.43e-06*  -3.30* -2.30 -2.90
Interest Rate Channel 
0  1111.04 NA  5.43e-15 -21.50 -21.40 -21.45
1  1548.26  831.98  1.52e-18 -29.67 -29.16 -29.47
2  1589.92  76.04   9.26e-19*  -30.17*  -29.25*  -29.80*
3  1599.72  17.13  1.05e-18 -30.05 -28.72 -29.51
4  1618.91   32.03*  9.93e-19 -30.11 -28.37 -29.41
Exchange Rate Channel 
0 -166.69 NA  0.00  3.314  3.42  3.35
1  243.92  781.34  1.52e-07 -4.35 -3.84 -4.14
2  289.99   84.09*   8.49e-08*  -4.93*  -4.01*  -4.56*
3  300.92  19.10  9.40e-08 -4.83 -3.50 -4.29
4  315.79  24.83  9.68e-08 -4.81 -3.07 -4.11
Credit  Channel 
0 -26.43 NA  0.00  2.90  3.10  2.94
1  81.70  164.78  3.42e-08 -5.88 -4.88 -5.66
2  103.76  25.21  2.34e-08 -6.45 -4.66 -6.06
3  139.23   27.02*   6.68e-09*  -8.31*  -5.72*  -7.75*
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table E.6: Malawi 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -203.51 NA  0.01  3.72  3.79  3.75
1 -17.65  358.32  0.00  0.53  0.83  0.65
2  17.80  66.43  0.00  0.06  0.57  0.26
3  40.25   40.86*   0.00*  -0.18*   0.55*   0.11*
4  47.04  11.98  0.00 -0.14  0.81  0.24
Interest Rate Channel 
0 -962.44 NA  429.18  17.41  17.51  17.45
1 -559.33  769.91  0.40  10.44  10.93  10.64
2 -517.33  77.17  0.25  9.97   10.85*  10.34
3 -488.40   51.09*   0.20*   9.74*  11.01   10.25*
4 -475.26  22.25  0.21  9.79  11.45  10.46
Exchange Rate Channel 
0 -80.47 NA  5.38e-05  1.52  1.62  1.56
1  114.07  371.57  2.16e-06 -1.69 -1.21 -1.50
2  152.55  70.71  1.44e-06 -2.10  -1.22* -1.74
3  183.73   55.06*   1.10e-06*  -2.37* -1.10  -1.86*
4  197.28  22.95  1.16e-06 -2.33 -0.67 -1.66
Credit  Channel 
0 -1637.44 NA  5.41e+15  47.58  47.71  47.63
1 -1438.01  369.95  2.66e+13  42.26  42.91  42.52
2 -1379.04  102.56  7.68e+12  41.01   42.18*   41.48*
3 -1360.36   30.33*   7.20e+12*   40.94*  42.62  41.60
4 -1347.51  19.37  8.07e+12  41.03  43.23  41.90
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Table E.7: Mauritius 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  205.44 NA  5.21e-07 -5.95 -5.85 -5.91
1  237.44  60.24  2.65e-07 -6.63  -6.23* -6.47
2  240.93  6.25  3.12e-07 -6.46 -5.78 -6.19
3  249.72  14.99  3.15e-07 -6.46 -5.48 -6.07
4  284.97   57.02*   1.47e-07*  -7.23* -5.96  -6.73*
Interest Rate Channel 
0  110.33 NA  5.15e-07 -3.12 -2.99 -3.07
1  217.38  198.37  3.54e-08 -5.80  -5.15*  -5.54*
2  232.46  26.16  3.66e-08 -5.77 -4.60 -5.31
3  243.38  17.65  4.30e-08 -5.62 -3.93 -4.95
4  282.59   58.81*   2.23e-08*  -6.31* -4.09 -5.43
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  339.24 NA  6.14e-10 -9.86 -9.72 -9.80
1  377.88  71.59  3.16e-10 -10.52  -9.87* -10.26
2  386.89  15.63  3.90e-10 -10.32 -9.14 -9.85
3  409.02  35.79  3.30e-10 -10.50 -8.80 -9.82
4  447.66   57.94*   1.74e-10*  -11.16* -8.94  -10.28*
Credit  Channel 
0  349.01 NA  3.96e-10 -10.29 -10.16 -10.24
1  401.78  97.66  1.32e-10 -11.39  -10.73* -11.13
2  406.59  8.32  1.86e-10 -11.06 -9.87 -10.59
3  416.86  16.55  2.23e-10 -10.89 -9.18 -10.21
4  472.24   82.65*   7.07e-11*  -12.06* -9.82  -11.18*
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table E.8: Mozambique 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  122.57 NA  8.75e-07 -5.43 -5.31 -5.39
1  146.25  43.05  4.50e-07 -6.10  -5.61* -5.92
2  159.00  21.45  3.82e-07 -6.27 -5.42 -5.96
3  177.09   27.96*   2.57e-07*  -6.69* -5.47  -6.23*
4  181.34  5.98  3.28e-07 -6.47 -4.89 -5.88
Interest Rate Channel 
0  4.567 NA  1.15e-05 -0.02  0.14  0.03
1  178.71  308.71  8.69e-09 -7.21 -6.40 -6.91
2  213.48  55.32  3.77e-09 -8.07 -6.61 -7.53
3  249.05   50.12*   1.63e-09* -8.96  -6.85*  -8.17*
4  266.68  21.63  1.67e-09  -9.03* -6.27 -8.01
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  181.73 NA  3.64e-09 -8.08  -7.92* -8.02
1  209.92  49.97  2.10e-09 -8.63 -7.82  -8.33*
2  227.99  28.74  1.95e-09 -8.73 -7.27 -8.18
3  251.55   33.19*   1.45e-09*  -9.07* -6.96 -8.29
4  262.11  12.97  2.05e-09 -8.82 -6.07 -7.80
Credit  Channel 
0  66.44 NA  5.18e-07 -3.12  -2.95* -3.06
1  90.63  42.33  3.46e-07 -3.53 -2.69 -3.23
2  110.10  30.18  2.98e-07 -3.70 -2.18 -3.15
3  135.30   34.02*   2.01e-07*  -4.16* -1.97  -3.37*
4  146.53  12.92  2.92e-07 -3.93 -1.05 -2.89
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Table E.9: Namibia 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  33.60 NA  8.01e-06 -3.22 -3.07 -3.19
1  55.82   35.07*  2.03e-06 -4.61  -4.01* -4.51
2  62.19  8.05  2.93e-06 -4.33 -3.29 -4.15
3  71.59  8.90  3.58e-06 -4.37 -2.88 -4.12
4  92.55  13.23   1.79e-06*  -5.63* -3.69  -5.30*
Interest Rate Channel 
0  35.99 NA  4.79e-07 -3.19 -3.00 -3.16
1  61.92   38.89*   1.85e-07* -4.19  -3.19* -3.99
2  77.31  16.93  2.49e-07 -4.13 -2.33 -3.78
3  98.18  14.60  3.16e-07  -4.61* -2.02  -4.11*
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  64.87 NA  2.67e-08 -6.08 -5.88 -6.04
1  90.00   37.70*  1.12e-08 -7.00 -6.00 -6.80
2  113.32  25.64  6.80e-09 -7.73 -5.93 -7.38
3  141.40  19.66   4.19e-09*  -8.94*  -6.35*  -8.43*
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table E.8: South Africa 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  618.70 NA  4.49e-09 -10.71 -10.64 -10.68
1  663.16  85.84  2.42e-09 -11.32  -11.04*  -11.21*
2  672.64  17.79  2.40e-09 -11.33 -10.83 -11.13
3  677.99  9.78  2.56e-09 -11.27 -10.55 -10.98
4  692.27   25.33*   2.34e-09*  -11.36* -10.43 -10.98
Interest Rate Channel 
0  238.75 NA  1.98e-07 -4.08 -3.99 -4.04
1  298.84  114.95  9.21e-08 -4.85  -4.37*  -4.65*
2  313.20  26.48  9.48e-08 -4.82 -3.96 -4.47
3  332.54  34.30  8.97e-08 -4.88 -3.64 -4.37
4  356.78   41.31*   7.81e-08*  -5.02* -3.39 -4.36
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  745.67 NA  2.94e-11 -12.90 -12.80 -12.86
1  795.48  95.30  1.63e-11 -13.49  -13.01*  -13.29*
2  814.27  34.63  1.56e-11 -13.53 -12.67 -13.19
3  827.59  23.64  1.64e-11 -13.49 -12.25 -12.98
4  848.49   35.61*   1.51e-11*  -13.57* -11.95 -12.91
Credit  Channel 
0  745.67 NA  2.94e-11 -12.90 -12.80 -12.86
1  795.48  95.30  1.63e-11 -13.49  -13.01*  -13.29*
2  814.27  34.63  1.56e-11 -13.53 -12.67 -13.19
3  827.59  23.64  1.64e-11 -13.49 -12.25 -12.98
4  848.49   35.61*   1.51e-11*  -13.57* -11.95 -12.91
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Table E.11: Swaziland 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  337.05 NA  4.37e-07 -6.13  -6.05*  -6.10*
1  348.42  21.92  4.19e-07 -6.17 -5.88 -6.05
2  354.69  11.73  4.40e-07 -6.12 -5.60 -5.91
3  359.69  9.08  4.74e-07 -6.05 -5.31 -5.75
4  390.13   53.61*   3.21e-07*  -6.44* -5.48 -6.05
Interest Rate Channel 
0 -56.57 NA  3.57e-05  1.11   1.21*   1.15*
1 -42.23  27.35  3.68e-05  1.14  1.63  1.34
2 -30.88  20.82  4.02e-05  1.23  2.12  1.59
3 -23.85  12.39  4.75e-05  1.39  2.67  1.91
4  16.80   68.62*   3.04e-05*   0.94*  2.62  1.62
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  466.47 NA  2.43e-09 -8.48  -8.39*  -8.44*
1  479.43  24.73  2.57e-09 -8.43 -7.94 -8.23
2  489.32  18.15  2.87e-09 -8.32 -7.43 -7.96
3  500.78  20.19  3.13e-09 -8.23 -6.95 -7.71
4  534.26   56.52*   2.29e-09*  -8.55* -6.88 -7.87
Credit  Channel 
0  327.62 NA   2.43e-10*  -10.79*  -10.65*  -10.73*
1  342.32  26.95  2.54e-10 -10.74 -10.04 -10.47
2  351.98  16.42  3.16e-10 -10.53 -9.28 -10.04
3  365.86  21.75  3.46e-10 -10.46 -8.65 -9.75
4  388.46   32.39*  2.87e-10 -10.68 -8.31 -9.75
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table E.12: Tanzania 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  208.72 NA  3.01e-06 -4.20 -4.12 -4.17
1  229.62  40.08  2.37e-06 -4.44  -4.12* -4.31
2  246.31  31.01  2.02e-06 -4.60 -4.04 -4.37
3  249.16  5.12  2.30e-06 -4.47 -3.68 -4.15
4  289.77   70.44*   1.21e-06*  -5.12* -4.09  -4.70*
Interest Rate Channel 
0 -294.01 NA  0.01  6.08  6.19  6.12
1 -243.35  96.16  0.00  5.37  5.90  5.59
2 -199.05  80.46  0.00  4.80   5.75*  5.18
3 -186.55  21.69  0.00  4.87  6.24  5.42
4 -141.48   74.50*   0.00*   4.27*  6.07   5.00*
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  291.00 NA  3.36e-08 -5.86  -5.75* -5.81
1  325.52  65.51  2.30e-08 -6.23 -5.71 -6.02
2  346.76  38.59  2.07e-08 -6.34 -5.39 -5.96
3  357.16  18.04  2.33e-08 -6.23 -4.85 -5.67
4  416.96   98.85*   9.62e-09*  -7.12* -5.33  -6.40*
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table E.13: Zambia 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  173.99 NA  1.39e-07 -7.28 -7.13 -7.23
1  196.53  41.25  7.81e-08 -7.85 -7.38 -7.67
2  216.94  34.74  4.83e-08 -8.34 -7.51 -8.03
3  245.73  45.33  2.11e-08 -9.18  -7.99* -8.73
4  262.64   24.46*   1.54e-08*  -9.52* -7.98  -8.94*
Interest Rate Channel 
0 -50.40 NA  0.000241  3.02  3.20  3.08
1  18.23  118.21  1.31e-05  0.10  0.98  0.40
2  48.95  46.07  5.98e-06 -0.72  0.86 -0.17
3  82.28  42.59  2.50e-06 -1.68  0.60 -0.88
4  115.51   35.07*   1.16e-06*  -2.64*   0.35*  -1.59*
Exchange Rate Channel 
0  221.21 NA  1.14e-09 -9.24  -9.08* -9.18
1  248.92  49.53  6.93e-10 -9.74 -8.95 -9.44
2  275.98  43.76  4.40e-10 -10.21 -8.79 -9.68
3  308.08  46.44  2.31e-10 -10.90 -8.85 -10.13
4  331.36   29.72*   1.83e-10*  -11.21* -8.53  -10.20*
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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APPENDIX F 
RESULTS FOR GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
 
Table F.1: Angola 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 5.83 0.21 GDP does not granger cause M 4 11.17 0.02a 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 24.34 0.00a M does not granger cause GDP 4 2.01 0.73 
M does not granger cause INF 4 8.70 0.07c INF does not granger cause M 4 4.81 0.30 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 4.23 0.37 INT does not granger cause INF 4 11.35 0.02a 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 10.83 0.02a INF does not granger cause INT 4 4.15 0.38 
M does not granger cause INF 4 6.42 0.17 INT does not granger cause GDP 4 23.53 0.00a 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 41.60 0.00a GDP does not granger cause INT 4 9.63 0.05b 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 2.55 0.63 M does not granger cause INT 4 16.26 0.00a 
INF does not granger cause M 4 6.60 0.15 INT does not granger cause M 4 25.12 0.00a 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 6.60 0.16 RER does not granger cause INF 4 5.99 0.19 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 7.59 0.11 INF does not granger cause RER 4 49.62 0.00a 
M does not granger cause INF 4 4.65 0.32 RER does not granger cause GDP 4 102.12 0.00a 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 84.63 0.00a GDP does not granger cause RER 4 36.06 0.00a 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 7.32 0.12 M does not granger cause RER 4 21.80 0.00a 
INF does not granger cause M 4 46.46 0.00a RER does not granger cause M 4 50.58 0.00a 
Credit  Channel        
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 6.08 0.19 CP does not granger cause INF 4 18.45 0.00a 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 8.67 0.07c INF does not granger cause CP 4 7.81 0.09c 
M does not granger cause INF 4 16.71 0.00a CP does not granger cause GDP 4 52.45 0.00a 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 56.55 0.00a GDP does not granger cause CP 4 6.84 0.14 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 6.10 0.19 M does not granger cause CP 4 3.22 0.52 
INF does not granger cause M 4 42.71 0.00a CP does not granger cause M 4 41.93 0.00a 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
Notes:  a, b, or c denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% or 10% level of significance, 
respectively 
• These definitions apply for all the tests 
 
Table F.2: Botswana 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 3.26 0.51 GDP does not granger cause M 4 0.18 0.99 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 4.32 0.36 M does not granger cause GDP 4 1.36 0.85 
M does not granger cause INF 4 0.45 0.98 INF does not granger cause M 4 4.20 0.38 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 2 1.09 0.58 INT does not granger cause INF 2 0.49 0.78 
INF does not granger cause GDP 2 1.80 0.41 INF does not granger cause INT 2 8.42 0.01b 
M does not granger cause INF 2 0.35 0.84 INT does not granger cause GDP 2 2.74 0.25 
GDP does not granger cause M 2 0.16 0.92 GDP does not granger cause INT 2 6.67 0.03b 
M does not granger cause GDP 2 0.73 0.69 M does not granger cause INT 2 2.79 0.25 
INF does not granger cause M 2 2.44 0.29 INT does not granger cause M 2 1.99 0.37 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 3 2.60 0.46 RER does not granger cause INF 3 2.43 0.49 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 1.98 0.57 INF does not granger cause RER 3 1.08 0.78 
M does not granger cause INF 3 0.97 0.81 RER does not granger cause GDP 3 1.21 0.75 
GDP does not granger cause M 3 0.40 0.93 GDP does not granger cause RER 3 4.95 0.17 
M does not granger cause GDP 3 2.56 0.46 M does not granger cause RER 3 5.47 0.14 
INF does not granger cause M 3 2.55 0.47 RER does not granger cause M 3 0.99 0.80 
Credit  Channel        
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 1.92 0.75 CP does not granger cause INF 4 3.44 0.49 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 0.25 0.99 INF does not granger cause CP 4 0.15 0.99 
M does not granger cause INF 4 6.18 0.19 CP does not granger cause GDP 4 6.42 0.17 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 5.73 0.22 GDP does not granger cause CP 4 12.56 0.01a 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 1.46 0.83 M does not granger cause CP 4 7.12 0.13 
INF does not granger cause M 4 5.22 0.26 CP does not granger cause M 4 14.39 0.01b 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table F.3: The Democratic Republic of Congo  
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 5.79 0.21 GDP does not granger cause M 4 17.06 0.00a 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 24.43 0.00a M does not granger cause GDP 4 2.39 0.66 
M does not granger cause INF 4 9.07 0.06c INF does not granger cause M 4 0.85 0.93 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 4.89 0.30 RER does not granger cause INF 4 4.31 0.36 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 27.26 0.00a INF does not granger cause RER 4 15.87 0.00a 
M does not granger cause INF 4 7.52 0.11 RER does not granger cause GDP 4 5.91 0.20 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 24.17 0.00a GDP does not granger cause RER 4 6.88 0.14 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 2.35 0.67 M does not granger cause RER 4 8.36 0.08c 
INF does not granger cause M 4 2.73 0.60 RER does not granger cause M 4 16.01 0.00a 
Credit  Channel        
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 1.34 0.85 CP does not granger cause INF 4 1.43 0.84 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 12.60 0.01a INF does not granger cause CP 4 6.07 0.19 
M does not granger cause INF 4 4.84 0.30 CP does not granger cause GDP 4 8.42 0.08c 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 15.55 0.00a GDP does not granger cause CP 4  15.18 0.00a 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 10.23 0.04b M does not granger cause CP 4 3.73 0.44 
INF does not granger cause M 4 4.40 0.35 CP does not granger cause M 4 16.21 0.00a 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table F.4: Lesotho 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 23.29 0.00a GDP does not granger cause M 4 4.53 0.34 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 0.82 0.94 M does not granger cause GDP 4 10.40 0.03b 
M does not granger cause INF 4 2.17 0.70 INF does not granger cause M 4 2.75 0.60 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 26.68 0.00a INT does not granger cause INF 4 10.36 0.03b 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 1.13 0.89 INF does not granger cause INT 4 1.36 0.85 
M does not granger cause INF 4 3.54 0.47 INT does not granger cause GDP 4 41.50 0.00a 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 2.87 0.58 GDP does not granger cause INT 4 4.60 0.33 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 12.57 0.01b M does not granger cause INT 4 1.22 0.87 
INF does not granger cause M 4 2.04 0.63 INT does not granger cause M 4 7.79 0.10 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 16.22 0.00a RER does not granger cause INF 4 9.84 0.04b 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 0.95 0.92 INF does not granger cause RER 4 12.22 0.01b 
M does not granger cause INF 4 10.12 0.04b RER does not granger cause GDP 4 5.06 0.28 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 0.81 0.94 GDP does not granger cause RER 4 1.80 0.77 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 13.51 0.01a M does not granger cause RER 4 4.37 0.36 
INF does not granger cause M 4 8.53 0.07c RER does not granger cause M 4 2.16 0.71 
Credit  Channel        
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 5.92 0.20 CP does not granger cause INF 4 3.53 0.47 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 0.90 0.92 INF does not granger cause CP 4 8.52 0.07c 
M does not granger cause INF 4 9.29 0.05c CP does not granger cause GDP 4 1.57 0.81 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 11.43 0.02 GDP does not granger cause CP 4 9.65 0.04b 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 1.43 0.84 M does not granger cause CP 4 17.85 0.00a 
INF does not granger cause M 4 16.04 0.00a CP does not granger cause M 4 16.43 0.00a 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
 
 
 
286 
 
Table F.5: Madagascar 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 7.51 0.11 GDP does not granger cause M 4 6.58 0.16 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 11.13 0.03b M does not granger cause GDP 4 13.81 0.01b 
M does not granger cause INF 4 15.26 0.00a INF does not granger cause M 4 6.35 0.17 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 2 0.05 0.98 INT does not granger cause INF 2 0.31 0.85 
INF does not granger cause GDP 2 5.65 0.06c INF does not granger cause INT 2 0.34 0.84 
M does not granger cause INF 2 12.65 0.00a INT does not granger cause GDP 2 2.63 0.27 
GDP does not granger cause M 2 0.95 0.62 GDP does not granger cause INT 2 0.29 0.86 
M does not granger cause GDP 2 8.10 0.02b M does not granger cause INT 2 0.24 0.89 
INF does not granger cause M 2 6.12 0.04b INT does not granger cause M 2 1.14 0.57 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 2 0.80 0.67 RER does not granger cause INF 2 1.42 0.49 
INF does not granger cause GDP 2 6.95 0.03b INF does not granger cause RER 2 6.62 0.04b 
M does not granger cause INF 2 12.38 0.00a RER does not granger cause GDP 2 2.21 0.33 
GDP does not granger cause M 2 0.53 0.77 GDP does not granger cause RER 2 4.19 0.12 
M does not granger cause GDP 2 12.04 0.00a M does not granger cause RER 2 12.45 0.00a 
INF does not granger cause M 2 7.19 0.03b RER does not granger cause M 2 1.38 0.50 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table F.6: Malawi 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 3 6.22 0.10 GDP does not granger cause M 3 0.50 0.92 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 7.33 0.06c M does not granger cause GDP 3 1.84 0.60 
M does not granger cause INF 3 2.94 0.40 INF does not granger cause M 3 5.60 0.13 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 3 7.44 0.06c INT does not granger cause INF 3 6.73 0.08c 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 6.68 0.08c INF does not granger cause INT 3 4.88 0.18 
M does not granger cause INF 3 2.01 0.57 INT does not granger cause GDP 3 3.78 0.29 
GDP does not granger cause M 3 0.37 0.94 GDP does not granger cause INT 3 3.76 0.29 
M does not granger cause GDP 3 2.63 0.45 M does not granger cause INT 3 3.57 0.31 
INF does not granger cause M 3 4.57 0.21 INT does not granger cause M 3 3.92 0.27 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 3 7.44 0.11 RER does not granger cause INF 3 11.26 0.02b 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 9.49 0.05c INF does not granger cause RER 3 3.76 0.44 
M does not granger cause INF 3 2.03 0.73 RER does not granger cause GDP 3 2.96 0.57 
GDP does not granger cause M 3 1.65 0.80 GDP does not granger cause RER 3 8.67 0.07c 
M does not granger cause GDP 3 4.75 0.31 M does not granger cause RER 3 2.96 0.56 
INF does not granger cause M 3 7.90 0.09c RER does not granger cause M 3 5.45 0.24 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table F.7: Mauritius 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 2.14 0.70 GDP does not granger cause M 4 5.04 0.28 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 5.58 0.23 M does not granger cause GDP 4 7.76 0.10 
M does not granger cause INF 4 4.11 0.39 INF does not granger cause M 4 0.17 0.99 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 2.24 0.69 INT does not granger cause INF 4 1.08 0.89 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 2.75 0.59 INF does not granger cause INT 4 7.05 0.13 
M does not granger cause INF 4 3.90 0.41 INT does not granger cause GDP 4 1.94 0.74 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 5.56 0.23 GDP does not granger cause INT 4 0.92 0.92 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 7.27 0.12 M does not granger cause INT 4 0.15 0.99 
INF does not granger cause M 4 0.54 0.96 INT does not granger cause M 4 1.10 0.89 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 2.00 0.73 RER does not granger cause INF 4 12.81 0.01b 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 4.74 0.31 INF does not granger cause RER 4 6.17 0.18 
M does not granger cause INF 4 5.76 0.22 RER does not granger cause GDP 4 2.30 0.68 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 2.37 0.66 GDP does not granger cause RER 4 1.80 0.77 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 7.92 0.09c M does not granger cause RER 4 9.06 0.05c 
INF does not granger cause M 4 0.12 0.99 RER does not granger cause M 4 6.17 0.18 
Credit  Channel        
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 2.93 0.56 CP does not granger cause INF 4 8.76 0.06c 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 7.27 0.12 INF does not granger cause CP 4 11.60 0.02b 
M does not granger cause INF 4 1.30 0.86 CP does not granger cause GDP 4 4.30 0.36 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 2.66 0.61 GDP does not granger cause CP 4 24.22 0.00a 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 9.77 0.04b M does not granger cause CP 4 3.42 0.48 
INF does not granger cause M 4 0.35 0.98 CP does not granger cause M 4 2.98 0.56 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table F.8: Mozambique 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 3 9.94 0.02b GDP does not granger cause M 3 7.42 0.06 c 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 7.77 0.05 c M does not granger cause GDP 3 3.12 0.37 
M does not granger cause INF 3 3.47 0.32 INF does not granger cause M 3 2.03 0.56 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 3 8.36 0.04b INT does not granger cause INF 3 20.77 0.00a 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 0.39 0.94 INF does not granger cause INT 3 1.29 0.73 
M does not granger cause INF 3 4.88 0.18 INT does not granger cause GDP 3 3.53 0.32 
GDP does not granger cause M 3 10.62 0.01b GDP does not granger cause INT 3 33.68 0.00a 
M does not granger cause GDP 3 5.22 0.15 M does not granger cause INT 3 5.45 0.14 
INF does not granger cause M 3 0.99 0.80 INT does not granger cause M 3 1.73 0.63 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 3 4.18 0.24 RER does not granger cause INF 3 0.37 0.94 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 1.11 0.77 INF does not granger cause RER 3 0.09 0.99 
M does not granger cause INF 3 5.64 0.13 RER does not granger cause GDP 3 1.42 0.70 
GDP does not granger cause M 3 8.02 0.04b GDP does not granger cause RER 3 5.02 0.17 
M does not granger cause GDP 3 3.81 0.28 M does not granger cause RER 3 0.11 0.99 
INF does not granger cause M 3 0.92 0.82 RER does not granger cause M 3 8.30 0.04b 
Credit  Channel        
GDP does not granger cause INF 3 4.46 0.21 CP does not granger cause INF 3 1.16 0.76 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 0.48 0.92 INF does not granger cause CP 3 3.69 0.30 
M does not granger cause INF 3 1.25 0.74 CP does not granger cause GDP 3 2.50 0.47 
GDP does not granger cause M 3 4.47 0.21 GDP does not granger cause CP 3 1.39 0.71 
M does not granger cause GDP 3 7.16 0.07 c M does not granger cause CP 3 2.12 0.55 
INF does not granger cause M 3 2.74 0.43 CP does not granger cause M 3 3.75 0.29 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table F.9: Namibia 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 4.71 0.31 GDP does not granger cause M 4 3.07 0.54 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 7.35 0.12 M does not granger cause GDP 4 3.45 0.48 
M does not granger cause INF 4 1.30 0.86 INF does not granger cause M 4 3.66 0.45 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 3 0.73 0.86 INT does not granger cause INF 3  2.79 0.42 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 0.43 0.93 INF does not granger cause INT 3 10.09 0.02b 
M does not granger cause INF 3 2.35 0.50 INT does not granger cause GDP 3 1.06 0.78 
GDP does not granger cause M 3 3.37 0.33 GDP does not granger cause INT 3 15.14 0.00a 
M does not granger cause GDP 3 0.21 0.97 M does not granger cause INT 3 4.19 0.24 
INF does not granger cause M 3 1.37 0.71 INT does not granger cause M 3 3.08 0.37 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 3  7.74 0.05c RER does not granger cause INF 3 12.05 0.01b 
INF does not granger cause GDP 3 4.07 0.25 INF does not granger cause RER 3 3.07 0.37 
M does not granger cause INF 3 4.87 0.18 RER does not granger cause GDP 3 6.71 0.08c 
GDP does not granger cause M 3 2.52 0.47 GDP does not granger cause RER 3 3.13 0.37 
M does not granger cause GDP 3 4.10 0.25 M does not granger cause RER 3 5.71 0.12 
INF does not granger cause M 3 6.78 0.07c RER does not granger cause M 3 9.37 0.02b 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table F.10: South Africa 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 1.67 0.79 GDP does not granger cause M 4 4.01  0.40 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 0.32 0.99 M does not granger cause GDP 4 16.32 0.00a 
M does not granger cause INF 4 1.29 0.86 INF does not granger cause M 4 2.73 0.60 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 2.95 0.57 INT does not granger cause INF 4 1.95 0.74 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 0.59 0.96 INF does not granger cause INT 4 1.74 0.78 
M does not granger cause INF 4 1.27 0.87 INT does not granger cause GDP 4 27.39 0.00a 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 3.84 0.43 GDP does not granger cause INT 4 32.82 0.00a 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 18.36 0.00a M does not granger cause INT 4 4.53 0.34 
INF does not granger cause M 4 2.18 0.70 INT does not granger cause M 4 11.86 0.02b 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 2.48 0.65 RER does not granger cause INF 4 7.77 0.10 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 0.54 0.97 INF does not granger cause RER 4 2.90 0.57 
M does not granger cause INF 4 0.57 0.97 RER does not granger cause GDP 4 6.96 0.14 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 4.71 0.32 GDP does not granger cause RER 4 6.97 0.14 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 16.79 0.00a M does not granger cause RER 4 0.46 0.98 
INF does not granger cause M 4 2.32 0.68 RER does not granger cause M 4 11.08 0.02b 
Credit  Channel        
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 4.32 0.36 CP does not granger cause INF 4 2.93 0.57 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 3.22 0.52 INF does not granger cause CP 4 14.01 0.01b 
M does not granger cause INF 4 4.83 0.30 CP does not granger cause GDP 4 0.41 0.98 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 20.75 0.00a GDP does not granger cause CP 4 8.20 0.08c 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 15.59 0.00a M does not granger cause CP 4 6.02 0.20 
INF does not granger cause M 4 20.74 0.00a CP does not granger cause M 4 18.51 0.00a 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table F.11: Swaziland 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 7.94 0.09 GDP does not granger cause M 4 3.79 0.43 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 11.14 0.02b M does not granger cause GDP 4 10.38 0.03b 
M does not granger cause INF 4 13.27 0.01b INF does not granger cause M 4 2.34 0.67 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 20.94 0.00a INT does not granger cause INF 4 7.49 0.11 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 16.58 0.00a INF does not granger cause INT 4 0.95 0.92 
M does not granger cause INF 4 12.98 0.01b INT does not granger cause GDP 4 4.51 0.34 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 5.12 0.27 GDP does not granger cause INT 4 5.45 0.24 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 8.96 0.06c M does not granger cause INT 4 13.49 0.01b 
INF does not granger cause M 4 1.41 0.84 INT does not granger cause M 4 4.07 0.39 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 23.88 0.00a RER does not granger cause INF 4 6.14 0.19 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 13.96 0.01b INF does not granger cause RER 4 6.16 0.19 
M does not granger cause INF 4 10.32 0.03b RER does not granger cause GDP 4 0.75 0.94 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 4.95 0.29 GDP does not granger cause RER 4 3.34 0.50 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 8.82 0.06c M does not granger cause RER 4 11.53 0.02b 
INF does not granger cause M 4 2.29 0.68 RER does not granger cause M 4 3.13 0.53 
Credit  Channel        
GDP does not granger cause INF 1 0.16 0.69 CP does not granger cause INF 1 1.92 0.16 
INF does not granger cause GDP 1 1.11 0.29 INF does not granger cause CP 1 2.78 0.09 
M does not granger cause INF 1 4.76 0.03b CP does not granger cause GDP 1 0.40 0.52 
GDP does not granger cause M 1 0.09 0.75 GDP does not granger cause CP 1 0.09 0.76 
M does not granger cause GDP 1 1.55 0.21 M does not granger cause CP 1 1.69 0.19 
INF does not granger cause M 1 0.13 0.71 CP does not granger cause M 1 0.01 0.92 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table F.12: Tanzania 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 7.06 0.13 GDP does not granger cause M 4 2.09 0.72 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 5.37 0.25 M does not granger cause GDP 4 3.84 0.43 
M does not granger cause INF 4 4.50 0.34 INF does not granger cause M 4 5.20 0.27 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 5.97 0.20 INT does not granger cause INF 4 18.44 0.00a 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 5.20 0.27 INF does not granger cause INT 4 5.52 0.24 
M does not granger cause INF 4 7.68 0.10 INT does not granger cause GDP 4 17.65 0.00a 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 4.23 0.37 GDP does not granger cause INT 4 11.98 0.02b 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 3.77 0.44 M does not granger cause INT 4 4.96 0.29 
INF does not granger cause M 4 4.35 0.36 INT does not granger cause M 4 14.43 0.00a 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 15.19 0.00a RER does not granger cause INF 4 11.84 0.02b 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 1.90 0.75 INF does not granger cause RER 4 1.99 0.74 
M does not granger cause INF 4 2.95 0.57 RER does not granger cause GDP 4 22.44 0.00a 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 2.50 0.64 GDP does not granger cause RER 4 20.39 0.00a 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 11.64 0.02b M does not granger cause RER 4 25.04 0.00a 
INF does not granger cause M 4 5.20 0.27 RER does not granger cause M 4 4.18 0.38 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table F.13: Zambia 
Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. Null Hypothesis df Chi-Square Prob. 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 11.72 0.02b GDP does not granger cause M 4 5.55 0.23 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 5.94 0.20 M does not granger cause GDP 4 11.64 0.02b 
M does not granger cause INF 4 10.65 0.03b INF does not granger cause M 4 6.56 0.16 
Interest Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 8.51 0.07c INT does not granger cause INF 4 2.90 0.57 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 3.81 0.43 INF does not granger cause INT 4 7.99 0.09c 
M does not granger cause INF 4 9.75 0.04b INT does not granger cause GDP 4 5.62 0.23 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 5.31 0.00a GDP does not granger cause INT 4 25.64 0.00a 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 9.35 0.05c M does not granger cause INT 4 8.78 0.07c 
INF does not granger cause M 4 14.97 0.25 INT does not granger cause M 4 16.53 0.00a 
Exchange Rate Channel 
GDP does not granger cause INF 4 5.35 0.25 RER does not granger cause INF 4 3.39 0.49 
INF does not granger cause GDP 4 4.05 0.39 INF does not granger cause RER 4 2.04 0.73 
M does not granger cause INF 4 2.90 0.57 RER does not granger cause GDP 4 4.66 0.32 
GDP does not granger cause M 4 5.84 0.21 GDP does not granger cause RER 4 1.45 0.83 
M does not granger cause GDP 4 5.17 0.27 M does not granger cause RER 4 2.49 0.64 
INF does not granger cause M 4 5.02 0.28 RER does not granger cause M 4 2.39 0.66 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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APPENDIX G 
RESULTS FOR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS 
 
G.1: Monetary Aggregate Channel 
Table G.1.1: Angola 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.10  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.15  94.25  1.79  3.95
 8  0.16  86.03  6.94  7.02
 12  0.16  82.13  8.99  8.86
 Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.14  43.01  56.98  0.00
 4  0.14  40.62  56.42  2.94
 8  0.22  38.33  34.16  27.50
 12  0.24  41.36  30.69  27.93
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.06  2.97  3.61  93.40
 4  0.11  29.45  6.51  64.03
 8  0.11  32.20  6.66  61.12
 12  0.11  32.00  6.61  61.38
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) LRGDP D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.1.2: Botswana 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.07  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  87.63  0.87  11.50
 8  0.08  86.11  2.58  11.31
 12  0.08  85.42  2.99  11.59
 Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.06  0.71  99.29  0.00
 4  0.07  5.84  86.89  7.26
 8  0.08  5.05  89.28  5.66
 12  0.08  4.95  89.19  5.86
 Variance Decomposition of LINF: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.14  10.09  9.30  80.60
 4  0.23  11.55  9.11  79.34
 8  0.29  10.29  13.47  76.23
 12  0.31  10.33  13.38  76.29
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) LRGDP LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.1.3:  The Democratic Republic of Congo 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.89  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.98  91.88  5.95  2.17
 8  1.02  86.04  11.51  2.44
 12  1.06  80.67  16.72  2.61
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.64  1.88  98.12  0.00
 4  0.83  3.88  82.40  13.71
 8  1.06  5.66  84.14  10.19
 12  1.28  4.63  85.17  10.20
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.43  5.29  23.57  71.14
 4  0.52  13.47  31.38  55.14
 8  0.63  19.32  29.68  50.99
 12  0.67  21.57  28.50  49.93
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.1.4: Lesotho 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.21  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.23  99.74  0.13  0.13
 8  0.25  89.84  9.51  0.64
 12  0.26  86.54  12.71  0.75
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.03  7.10  92.90  0.00
 4  0.03  9.20  90.65  0.15
 8  0.04  9.96  89.87  0.17
 12  0.05  11.20  88.66  0.13
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LINF)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.17  0.34  42.94  56.72
 4  0.20  1.82  47.25  50.92
 8  0.25  5.14  61.22  33.63
 12  0.26  11.77  57.35  30.87
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.1.5: Madagascar  
 Variance Decomposition of LRMS: 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.48  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.89  95.56  3.13  1.31
 8  0.98  85.88  5.38  8.74
 12  0.99  85.71  5.43  8.86
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.41  60.47  39.53  0.00
 4  0.48  61.90  36.99  1.10
 8  0.51  60.15  37.37  2.48
 12  0.52  59.99  36.84  3.16
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.30  26.83  72.80  0.37
 4  0.32  28.81  65.45  5.74
 8  0.36  32.39  61.82  5.78
 12  0.36  33.66  60.21  6.12
 Cholesky Ordering: LRMS D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.1.6: Malawi 
 Variance Decomposition of LRMS: 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(D(LRGDP)) LINF
 1  0.66  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  1.08  99.51  0.13  0.36
 8  1.30  93.28  1.60  5.12
 12  1.44  83.78  3.65  12.57
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRGDP)): 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(D(LRGDP)) LINF
 1  0.06  0.03  99.96  0.00
 4  0.08  1.45  97.26  1.29
 8  0.09  1.42  97.29  1.28
 12  0.09  1.42  97.30  1.27
 Variance Decomposition of LINF: 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(D(LRGDP)) LINF
 1  0.30  0.44  9.98  89.58
 4  0.62  2.12  17.45  80.43
 8  0.71  4.09  17.45  78.46
 12  0.71  5.45  17.19  77.35
 Cholesky Ordering: LRMS D(D(LRGDP)) LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.1.7: Mauritius  
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.12  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.13  93.43  6.46  0.10
 8  0.16  92.46  7.29  0.24
 12  0.18  92.30  7.40  0.29
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.01  0.00  99.99  0.00
 4  0.01  2.04  92.76  5.18
 8  0.01  6.80  84.51  8.67
 12  0.01  8.67  82.58  8.74
 Variance Decomposition of LINF: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.20  0.55  3.89  95.55
 4  0.30  4.04  5.70  90.24
 8  0.31  5.27  9.41  85.31
 12  0.32  5.38  9.81  84.80
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) D(LRGDP) LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.1.8: Mozambique  
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.04  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.07  73.39  16.31  10.30
 8  0.08  67.58  14.24  18.18
 12  0.09  68.01  13.41  18.58
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.02  30.28  69.71  0.00
 4  0.03  29.45  58.60  11.94
 8  0.03  23.00  50.69  26.30
 12  0.04  21.20  44.83  33.96
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.56  26.66  9.62  63.73
 4  0.69  20.99  11.66  67.35
 8  0.81  18.21  16.02  65.77
 12  0.89  15.36  14.78  69.86
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.1.9: Namibia 
Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.24  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.27  76.05  5.12  18.82
 8  0.41  60.16  3.35  36.47
 12  0.48  53.48  8.47  38.03
  Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.01  31.88  68.11  0.00
 4  0.03  11.84  78.33  9.82
 8  0.07  5.49  59.00  35.50
 12  0.08  3.81  55.11  41.06
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.29  24.57  3.47  71.94
 4  0.37  30.58  7.11  62.29
 8  0.44  23.21  25.43  51.34
 12  0.52  20.27  25.20  54.51
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) LRGDP D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.1.10: South Africa 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1 0.03 100.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 0.03 92.36 6.87 0.76 
 8 0.04 87.66 11.02 1.32 
 12 0.04 86.69 12.08 1.22 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1 0.01 3.76 96.24 0.00 
 4 0.01 31.89 67.99 0.12 
 8 0.01 44.95 54.68 0.36 
 12 0.01 49.94 49.35 0.71 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1 0.22 6.20 0.06 93.74 
 4 0.26 8.62 2.04 89.34 
 8 0.29 13.87 2.29 83.83 
 12 0.30 14.00 2.33 83.67 
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.1.11: Swaziland 
Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1 0.07 100.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 0.07 97.24 1.23 1.53 
 8 0.09 93.71 4.57 1.72 
 12 0.09 94.43 3.94 1.63 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1 0.03 2.28 97.72 0.00 
 4 0.03 3.41 94.85 1.74 
 8 0.04 10.20 83.43 6.37 
 12 0.04 10.13 81.80 8.07 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1 0.26 12.18 13.22 74.60 
 4 0.27 15.21 16.42 68.37 
 8 0.32 20.94 22.82 56.24 
 12 0.32 22.26 23.01 54.73 
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.1.12: Tanzania  
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
 1 0.08 100.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 0.09 96.31 1.40 2.28 
 8 0.09 94.73 2.07 3.20 
 12 0.10 94.29 2.60 3.10 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
 1 0.06 24.22 75.77 0.00 
 4 0.07 21.09 75.78 3.12 
 8 0.08 15.21 79.45 5.33 
 12 0.10 13.23 80.99 5.77 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LINF)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
 1 0.25 26.14 4.10 69.75 
 4 0.34 30.87 6.26 62.85 
 8 0.40 43.86 9.98 46.14 
 12 0.41 43.23 10.43 46.32 
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.1.13: Zambia  
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.06  100.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.07  86.78  8.28  4.92
 8  0.08  84.68  9.72  5.59
 12  0.08  83.58  10.84  5.56
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRGDP)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.01  7.62  92.37  0.00
 4  0.02  31.43  67.12  1.43
 8  0.02  39.45  54.93  5.61
 12  0.02  43.15  51.59  5.24
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.11  10.49  39.31  50.18
 4  0.12  18.02  41.17  40.79
 8  0.15  13.44  50.95  35.60
 12  0.16  12.80  51.34  35.84
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
 
  
298 
 
G.2: Interest Rate Channel 
Table G.2.1: Angola 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(D(RINT)) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.07  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.10  84.91  7.50  0.23  7.34
 8  0.12  59.29  16.42  16.84  7.43
 12  0.14  48.38  22.54  19.52  9.54
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(RINT)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(D(RINT)) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  55.54  0.00  99.99  0.00  0.00
 4  64.57  3.63  83.46  9.18  3.70
 8  68.11  10.55  75.71  9.06  4.66
 12  71.28  10.19  72.93  12.29  4.58
 Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(D(RINT)) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.09  2.86  46.44  50.69  0.00
 4  0.11  3.79  54.96  38.86  2.38
 8  0.21  7.81  51.67  23.90  16.60
 12  0.28  8.79  53.25  20.53  17.40
Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(D(RINT)) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.05  0.59  39.70  10.52  49.16
 4  0.10  15.58  32.09  11.51  40.80
 8  0.12  14.77  37.21  11.46  36.54
 12  0.12  13.93  39.94  11.57  34.54
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) D(D(RINT)) LRGDP D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.2.2: Botswana 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.06  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.07  92.38  2.30  0.81  4.49
 8  0.07  91.73  2.51  0.94  4.79
 12  0.07  91.49  2.61  0.94  4.94
 Variance Decomposition of D(RINT): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.32  3.60  96.39  0.00  0.00
 4  0.40  9.01  66.30  14.07  10.60
 8  0.42  8.30  61.80  13.37  16.51
 12  0.43  8.07  60.74  12.98  18.20
 Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.07  0.06  11.16  88.76  0.00
 4  0.10  0.60  23.34  74.03  2.01
 8  0.12  0.53  27.54  69.83  2.08
 12  0.12  0.51  27.86  69.02  2.58
 Variance Decomposition of LINF: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.14  3.47  20.02  0.63  75.86
 4  0.28  1.97  17.33  5.39  75.29
 8  0.31  1.98  20.95  5.65  71.40
 12  0.31  1.96  21.03  5.55  71.43
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.2.3: Lesotho 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.20  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.24  93.91  2.99  2.88  0.22
 8  0.26  92.59  3.76  2.83  0.81
 12  0.26  92.05  3.84  3.12  0.98
 Variance Decomposition of D(RINT): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  6.30  2.05  97.95  0.00  0.00
 4  6.49  3.20  95.62  0.55  0.64
 8  6.61  4.24  92.98  2.09  0.69
 12  6.72  4.65  91.07  3.60  0.68
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.02  3.94  0.07  95.98  0.00
 4  0.02  6.05  3.48  89.67  0.79
 8  0.03  10.49  29.03  59.90  0.59
 12  0.04  9.49  31.33  58.68  0.50
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LINF)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.17  1.56  0.05  37.07  61.31
 4  0.20  1.48  3.29  41.02  54.21
 8  0.25  4.30  7.57  51.58  36.55
 12  0.27  10.14  13.87  45.14  30.84
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.2.4: Madagascar 
 Variance Decomposition of LRMS: 
 Period S.E. LRMS RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.51  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  1.00  96.29  2.28  0.90  0.53
 8  1.04  93.72  3.65  1.87  0.76
 12  1.05  93.53  3.78  1.92  0.76
 Variance Decomposition of RINT: 
 Period S.E. LRMS RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  3.53E-07  12.59  87.41  0.00  0.00
 4  4.53E-07  19.37  80.04  0.20  0.39
 8  4.55E-07  19.79  79.40  0.25  0.55
 12  4.55E-07  19.83  79.36  0.26  0.55
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. LRMS RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.45  60.65  2.39  36.96  0.00
 4  0.52  61.12  5.27  32.49  1.12
 8  0.56  64.99  5.18  28.78  1.04
 12  0.56  65.32  5.18  28.47  1.03
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. LRMS RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.33  23.97  4.72  70.99  0.31
 4  0.34  30.36  4.57  64.75  0.32
 8  0.35  33.49  5.07  60.99  0.44
 12  0.36  33.90  5.06  60.58  0.44
 Cholesky Ordering: LRMS RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.2.5: Malawi 
 Variance Decomposition of LRMS: 
 Period S.E. LRMS RINT D(D(LRGDP)) LINF
 1  0.66  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  1.02  98.90  0.43  0.08  0.58
 8  1.13  94.34  0.38  1.14  4.13
 12  1.19  86.31  0.37  2.89  10.42
 Variance Decomposition of RINT: 
 Period S.E. LRMS RINT D(D(LRGDP)) LINF
 1  32.38  0.03  99.96  0.00  0.00
 4  53.65  1.43  95.33  0.49  2.74
 8  68.95  0.91  84.04  1.53  13.52
 12  79.65  0.69  74.66  2.94  21.71
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRGDP)): 
 Period S.E. LRMS RINT D(D(LRGDP)) LINF
 1  0.06  0.02  0.03  99.94  0.00
 4  0.08  1.55  2.71  94.42  1.32
 8  0.09  1.80  3.09  93.79  1.32
 12  0.09  1.85  3.22  93.63  1.30
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. LRMS RINT D(D(LRGDP)) LINF
 1  0.29  0.70  0.04  9.27  89.98
 4  0.64  2.35  4.22  18.01  75.41
 8  0.73  3.94  5.33  18.47  72.25
 12  0.74  4.83  5.32  18.31  71.54
 Cholesky Ordering: LRMS RINT D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.2.6: Mauritius 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) LINF
 1 0.12 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 4 0.13 92.07 0.30 7.23 0.39
 8 0.17 91.25 0.26 7.92 0.55
 12 0.19 91.13 0.29 8.00 0.57
 Variance Decomposition of RINT: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) LINF
 1 0.37 2.74 97.25 0.00 0.00
 4 0.93 1.98 88.66 0.61 8.73
 8 1.16 1.47 69.74 1.82 26.95
 12 1.22 1.40 62.88 3.92 31.78
Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.01  0.00  6.57  93.42  0.00
 4  0.01  2.29  10.39  83.95  3.35
 8  0.01  6.49  9.97  76.19  7.34
 12  0.01  8.62  9.85  74.14  7.37
Variance Decomposition of LINF: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.21  0.69  31.86  0.58  66.85
 4  0.31  4.72  36.15  2.13  56.98
 8  0.33  5.82  35.04  6.17  52.94
 12  0.33  5.91  36.67  6.44  50.96
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.2.7: Mozambique 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.04  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.07  72.53  17.47  7.64  2.35
 8  0.08  72.82  17.51  7.51  2.15
 12  0.08  73.65  16.92  7.24  2.19
 Variance Decomposition of RINT: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.25  21.05  78.95  0.00  0.00
 4  0.47  9.13  83.98  5.49  1.40
 8  0.55  10.67  70.95  14.40  3.98
 12  0.59  11.70  64.71  17.67  5.93
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.03  24.40  54.20  21.40  0.00
 4  0.03  20.94  55.92  23.00  0.13
 8  0.03  20.89  55.84  23.09  0.18
 12  0.03  20.92  55.84  23.07  0.18
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.47  32.65  13.81  3.97  49.56
 4  0.54  28.33  22.44  10.08  39.14
 8  0.57  27.88  25.05  11.10  35.97
 12  0.57  27.68  25.58  11.25  35.48
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) RINT D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.2.8: Namibia 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.31  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.42  69.63  11.33  12.96  6.06
 8  0.61  39.16  5.77  44.02  11.03
 12  0.74  27.18  8.42  56.34  8.04
 Variance Decomposition of D(RINT): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.23  0.97  99.02  0.00  0.00
 4  0.53  8.94  22.79  49.65  18.60
 8  0.92  3.04  16.55  72.37  8.02
 12  1.62  1.05  12.33  83.38  3.22
 Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.01  2.52  0.79  96.68  0.00
 4  0.04  0.85  7.42  91.66  0.05
 8  0.09  0.26  10.78  88.08  0.87
 12  0.16  0.09  11.00  87.99  0.90
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.26  22.50  23.02  8.59  45.88
 4  0.42  21.36  11.04  42.71  24.87
 8  0.48  17.53  10.78  50.82  20.85
 12  0.55  13.73  11.16  58.86  16.24
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(RINT) LRGDP D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.2.9: South Africa 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.02  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.03  87.95  0.65  10.73  0.65
 8  0.04  83.61  1.38  14.24  0.75
 12  0.04  82.64  1.23  15.48  0.64
  Variance Decomposition of D(RINT): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  5.65  5.57  94.42  0.00  0.00
 4  8.33  19.48  64.77  15.16  0.57
 8  9.42  29.15  57.54  12.79  0.49
 12  10.43  30.51  57.61  11.42  0.44
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.00  5.29  0.97  93.73  0.00
 4  0.00  33.54  1.84  63.97  0.63
 8  0.01  36.19  17.58  45.54  0.68
 12  0.01  37.82  17.14  44.34  0.68
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.22  6.65  0.21  0.06  93.06
 4  0.26  9.01  1.52  1.45  87.99
 8  0.30  12.05  3.41  2.26  82.25
 12  0.30  11.73  4.75  2.34  81.16
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.2.10: Swaziland 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.07  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.07  94.44  1.87  2.45  1.24
 8  0.09  91.03  2.36  5.33  1.28
 12  0.09  91.85  2.19  4.64  1.32
 Variance Decomposition of D(RINT): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  8.67  0.00  99.99  0.00  0.00
 4  9.49  5.49  89.53  4.46  0.52
 8  10.65  13.70  78.54  6.85  0.91
 12  11.08  15.16  74.79  9.11  0.94
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.03  1.68  1.74  96.57  0.00
 4  0.04  1.98  4.61  91.97  1.44
 8  0.05  6.60  4.50  81.20  7.69
 12  0.06  5.49  3.88  83.82  6.81
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.26  11.10  1.90  14.67  72.32
 4  0.28  13.28  3.79  18.93  64.00
 8  0.33  18.43  8.75  22.63  50.19
 12  0.35  19.71  9.28  23.51  47.49
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(RINT) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.2.11: Tanzania 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(RINT)) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.07  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  85.07  8.20  3.78  2.94
 8  0.10  81.81  9.79  4.86  3.52
 12  0.11  81.27  9.77  5.81  3.12
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(RINT)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(RINT)) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  26.47  0.38  99.61  0.00  0.00
 4  41.99  4.41  84.89  9.25  1.42
 8  44.47  7.99  78.06  10.04  3.88
 12  45.67  8.49  77.68  9.72  4.09
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(RINT)) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.05  15.75  0.00  84.24  0.00
 4  0.07  11.06  11.58  73.63  3.70
 8  0.09  8.04  8.73  76.73  6.48
 12  0.10  7.05  7.01  78.78  7.14
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LINF)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(RINT)) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.22  16.29  0.11  1.77  81.81
 4  0.32  19.22  8.40  2.72  69.64
 8  0.40  28.44  19.47  5.08  46.99
 12  0.41  27.41  20.70  5.12  46.74
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(D(RINT)) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.2.12: Zambia 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) RINT D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.06  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.09  71.47  5.56  3.59  19.36
 8  0.11  63.23  7.31  10.28  19.16
 12  0.13  60.34  8.05  11.08  20.50
 Variance Decomposition of RINT: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) RINT D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  7.87  0.91  99.08  0.00  0.00
 4  21.09  16.82  78.44  1.69  3.02
 8  27.54  12.90  78.48  5.75  2.85
 12  35.22  10.75  76.71  8.12  4.41
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRGDP)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) RINT D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.01  45.04  3.54  51.40  0.00
 4  0.02  43.41  18.45  37.54  0.58
 8  0.03  36.80  16.23  24.05  22.90
 12  0.03  30.37  16.69  25.43  27.50
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) RINT D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.11  16.68  2.93  29.27  51.10
 4  0.21  7.19  8.88  16.08  67.83
 8  0.24  17.23  9.33  13.95  59.46
 12  0.29  15.31  8.88  13.06  62.73
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) RINT D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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G.3: Exchange Rate Channel 
Table G.3.1: Angola 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRER LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.05  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  52.45  11.15  9.40  26.98
 8  0.11  30.39  14.27  16.44  38.88
 12 0.12  29.34  13.50  17.32  39.82
 Variance Decomposition of LRER: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRER LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.02  32.75  67.24  0.00  0.00
 4  0.04  22.31  35.83  4.84  37.00
 8  0.15  3.78  5.43  5.40  85.37
 12  0.20  2.59  6.40  4.51  86.48
 Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRER LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.05  23.34  3.96  72.69  0.00
 4  0.07  21.77  17.11  45.58  15.52
 8  0.13  11.34  6.31  21.80  60.53
 12  0.14  9.83  6.44  20.13  63.58
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRER LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.06  1.95  0.23  4.23  93.57
 4  0.09  5.26  2.55  2.87  89.30
 8  0.09  8.64  3.42  4.39  83.53
 12  0.09  8.97  3.58  4.34  83.09
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) LRER LRGDP D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.3.2: Botswana 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.07  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.07  90.12  1.35  0.43  8.08
 8  0.07  89.11  1.51  0.91  8.45
 12  0.07  88.69  1.65  0.94  8.69
Variance Decomposition of D(LRER):  
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.07  0.26  99.73  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  13.83  79.11  4.69  2.35
 8  0.08  14.28  77.35  5.51  2.84
 12  0.08  14.23  76.97  5.94  2.83
 Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.07  0.11  26.49  73.38  0.00
 4  0.09  4.60  25.26  66.56  3.56
 8  0.10  4.03  26.20  66.31  3.44
 12  0.11  3.69  25.60  67.59  3.10
 Variance Decomposition of LINF: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.14  3.02  0.57  0.39  96.00
 4  0.27  3.20  2.73  5.96  88.09
 8  0.31  2.76  3.57  5.68  87.97
 12  0.33  2.66  4.55  5.56  87.21
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRER) LRGDP LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.3.3: The Democratic Republic of Congo 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1  0.80  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.93  79.43  9.15  10.31  1.09 
 8  1.12  55.64  20.61  13.89  9.84 
 12  1.18  52.06  20.96  16.67  10.29 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1  0.17  0.38  99.61  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.20  5.78  72.98  11.31  9.91 
 8  0.23  10.35  67.48  9.33  12.82 
 12  0.25  9.84  65.35  10.67  14.12 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1  0.63  6.20  2.42  91.36  0.00 
 4  0.84  5.83  9.34  74.59  10.21 
 8  1.05  6.48  10.28  75.95  7.26 
 12  1.28  5.50  12.01  75.88  6.59 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1  0.44  6.34  11.75  13.79  68.10 
 4  0.59  10.88  30.24  12.52  46.36 
 8  0.72  17.71  28.53  15.15  38.59 
 12  0.86  16.41  32.67  11.67  39.24 
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.3.4: Lesotho  
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
 1  0.23  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.36  94.93  0.72  0.04  4.30 
 8  0.44  88.01  1.31  1.25  9.43 
 12  0.50  87.87  1.32  1.61  9.19 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
 1  0.04  0.00  99.99  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.04  6.40  90.58  0.14  2.88 
 8  0.05  4.55  91.33  1.71  2.41 
 12  0.05  5.05  90.68  1.80  2.47 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
 1  0.03  8.04  7.35  84.60  0.00 
 4  0.03  9.22  7.98  82.76  0.04 
 8  0.04  8.28  8.86  81.94  0.91 
 12  0.05  7.68  7.44  84.02  0.86 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LINF)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
 1  0.17  1.98  13.08  31.21  53.72 
 4  0.20  4.50  17.17  32.66  45.66 
 8  0.28  11.26  36.57  27.40  24.85 
 12  0.30  16.93  38.26  23.41  21.39 
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS)  D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.3.5: Madagascar 
 Variance Decomposition of LRMS: 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1  0.51  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 4  1.01  97.95  1.21  0.04  0.80 
 8  1.04  96.52  2.06  0.22  1.19 
 12  1.05  96.45  2.13  0.23  1.19 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1  0.45  59.72  40.28  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.52  60.92  36.36  1.04  1.68 
 8  0.56  64.84  32.35  1.27  1.53 
 12  0.56  65.27  31.95  1.26  1.52 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1  0.45  60.94  34.58  4.48  0.00 
 4  0.52  62.61  32.17  3.81  1.41 
 8  0.56  66.73  28.38  3.60  1.29 
 12  0.56  67.14  28.01  3.56  1.29 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
 1  0.33  23.64  67.72  8.33  0.31 
 4  0.35  30.18  60.60  8.93  0.30 
 8  0.36  33.78  57.30  8.45  0.46 
 12  0.36  34.23  56.90  8.40  0.47 
 Cholesky Ordering: LRMS D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.3.6: Malawi 
 Variance Decomposition of LRMS: 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) LINF 
 1  0.64  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 4  1.11  96.29  1.05  1.63  1.03 
 8  1.38  92.02  3.11  2.43  2.43 
 12  1.49  85.46  4.46  4.94  5.14 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) LINF 
 1  0.06  0.47  0.00  99.53  0.00 
 4  0.08  1.68  3.30  91.48  3.54 
 8  0.09  1.99  4.69  89.54  3.77 
 12  0.09  2.22  4.87  89.05  3.85 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRGDP)): 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) LINF 
 1  0.08  0.33  97.01  2.66  0.00 
 4  0.08  1.11  94.02  3.11  1.75 
 8  0.09  1.40  93.50  2.99  2.11 
 12  0.09  1.42  93.48  2.90  2.19 
 Variance Decomposition of D LINF: 
 Period S.E. LRMS D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) LINF 
 1  0.29  0.82  10.14  0.90  88.14 
 4  0.58  2.78  13.19  11.28  72.75 
 8  0.71  7.76  9.74  25.28  57.21 
 12  0.73  10.19  9.53  24.94  55.34 
 Cholesky Ordering: LRMS D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.3.7: Mauritius 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.12  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.13  88.70  7.91  2.59  0.78
 8  0.17  89.52  5.25  4.30  0.91
 12  0.19  89.83  4.61  4.60  0.94
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.03  5.17  94.82  0.00  0.00
 4  0.04  10.97  83.11  3.33  2.57
 8  0.04  11.77  79.29  3.42  5.50
 12  0.04  12.06  78.50  3.58  5.84
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.01  0.18  21.31  78.49  0.00
 4  0.01  3.69  20.39  72.59  3.31
 8  0.01  7.25  20.87  65.32  6.54
 12  0.01  8.71  20.64  63.89  6.74
 Variance Decomposition of LINF: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.19  1.46  1.80  4.96  91.77
 4  0.29  10.09  10.86  2.15  76.88
 8  0.32  9.33  24.56  1.79  64.30
 12  0.33  8.96  23.97  1.91  65.14
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.3.8: Mozambique 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.04  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.07  61.89  10.81  16.85  10.45
 8  0.08  52.19  20.39  13.74  13.67
 12  0.09  51.33  22.42  12.40  13.85
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.08  27.09  72.91  0.00  0.00
 4  0.10  28.82  61.92  8.94  0.32
 8  0.12  27.74  63.37  8.65  0.25
 12  0.14  27.53  63.28  8.93  0.26
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.03  28.72  0.06  71.22  0.00
 4  0.04  16.43  4.96  75.20  3.40
 8  0.05  13.25  5.41  78.29  3.04
 12  0.05  11.09  4.90  81.03  2.97
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.62  32.16  0.02  16.84  50.97
 4  0.97  16.06  3.08  20.63  60.23
 8  1.20  12.93  3.97  18.56  64.54
 12  1.40  10.66  4.48  17.58  67.27
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.3.9: Namibia 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRER LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.24  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.38  62.84  24.11  12.13  0.89
 8  0.71  60.89  18.17  13.00  7.93
 12  1.08  51.31  14.63  22.95  11.09
Variance Decomposition of LRER: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRER LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.06  4.03  95.96  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  7.47  78.72  6.84  6.94
 8  0.09  27.31  55.96  10.51  6.19
 12  0.12  32.32  43.38  14.49  9.79
Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRER LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.01  28.78  4.86  66.34  0.00
 4  0.04  58.39  2.27  31.17  8.15
 8  0.10  55.93  5.53  25.62  12.90
 12  0.24  54.45  6.53  24.90  14.10
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) LRER LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.18  19.45  8.45  0.31  71.77
 4  0.42  17.34  41.38  24.47  16.79
 8  0.47  15.81  44.81  25.18  14.18
 12  0.50  16.46  44.63  25.57  13.32
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) LRER LRGDP D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.3.10: South Africa 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.02  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.03  83.40  9.79  5.71  1.07
 8  0.03  70.33  18.11  9.77  1.77
 12  0.04  64.83  22.42  10.58  2.15
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.08  1.14  98.85  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  2.07  92.07  5.13  0.71
 8  0.09  2.25  89.72  5.42  2.59
 12  0.09  2.73  88.93  5.59  2.73
Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.00  2.07  0.17  97.74  0.00
 4  0.00  21.54  7.98  70.37  0.09
 8  0.01  24.82  20.76  53.83  0.56
 12  0.01  26.67  23.17  48.60  1.55
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.21  5.43  2.82  0.47  91.27
 4  0.25  7.29  8.23  4.75  79.71
 8  0.29  10.26  15.93  4.14  69.65
 12  0.30  9.98  17.77  4.04  68.18
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.3.11: Swaziland 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.07  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.07  96.54  0.86  1.56  1.04
 8  0.09  90.74  3.53  4.42  1.30
 12  0.09  91.19  3.71  3.77  1.32
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.07  0.44  99.56  0.00  0.00
 4  0.09  7.34  89.61  0.95  2.09
 8  0.11  9.52  84.42  0.66  5.40
 12  0.12  10.30  83.31  0.60  5.77
Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.03  2.07  0.14  97.79  0.00
 4  0.04  2.07  1.11  96.01  0.80
 8  0.05  4.97  1.04  89.71  4.28
 12  0.06  4.01  0.99  91.17  3.82
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.27  13.34  0.01  16.10  70.55
 4  0.28  13.97  3.67  19.46  62.90
 8  0.32  15.79  6.32  25.65  52.24
 12  0.34  15.28  7.38  27.18  50.16
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.3.12: Tanzania 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.08  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  94.02  3.86  0.85  1.25
 8  0.09  90.48  5.04  1.76  2.70
 12  0.10  90.04  4.58  2.82  2.54
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.10  5.78  94.21  0.00  0.00
 4  0.12  12.81  71.99  14.18  1.01
 8  0.14  15.59  67.79  15.41  1.18
 12  0.15  15.79  69.18  13.76  1.25
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.05  26.15  16.63  57.20  0.00
 4  0.06  20.40  36.21  42.75  0.62
 8  0.07  15.54  49.80  32.95  1.69
 12  0.08  14.31  56.92  27.18  1.57
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LINF)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.23  31.41  2.13  9.05  57.39
 4  0.33  36.67  3.16  14.48  45.67
 8  0.41  42.82  4.76  21.27  31.12
 12  0.41  42.74  5.11  21.07  31.06
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.3.13: Zambia 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.06  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  82.71  1.35  10.66  5.27
 8  0.08  79.16  3.45  11.70  5.67
 12  0.09  78.70  3.48  11.98  5.82
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRER): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.12  43.65  56.34  0.00  0.00
 4  0.13  44.57  50.36  2.75  2.30
 8  0.13  46.21  47.71  3.63  2.42
 12  0.13  46.42  47.05  3.85  2.66
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRGDP)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.01  14.12  0.75  85.11  0.00
 4  0.02  39.75  4.74  54.52  0.97
 8  0.02  46.96  8.11  40.96  3.95
 12  0.02  50.53  7.47  38.17  3.82
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF)
 1  0.11  10.85  6.32  37.13  45.67
 4  0.13  20.95  14.27  31.88  32.89
 8  0.16  17.39  15.58  38.82  28.19
 12  0.17  16.97  17.38  37.98  27.65
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRER) D(D(LRGDP)) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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G.4: Credit Channel 
Table G.4.1: Angola 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRCP LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.05  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  74.57  3.62  15.88  5.91
 8  0.10  49.90  5.98  34.09  10.02
 12  0.12  42.67  10.35  34.50  12.46
 Variance Decomposition of LRCP: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRCP LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.04  0.99  99.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.20  2.99  89.98  3.66  3.34
 8  0.46  1.48  90.00  3.41  5.09
 12  0.66  1.49  90.21  3.48  4.80
 Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRCP LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.07  10.04  1.88  88.07  0.00
 4  0.09  13.29  27.22  57.91  1.56
 8  0.18  3.68  68.84  21.56  5.90
 12  0.24  3.21  74.85  16.80  5.12
Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) LRCP LRGDP D(LINF)
 1  0.04  0.00  52.62  2.09  45.27
 4  0.11  0.33  81.68  4.33  13.65
 8  0.12  3.02  81.35  4.67  10.94
 12  0.13  2.88  81.35  4.68  11.07
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) LRCP LRGDP D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.4.2: Botswana 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.06  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.08  63.54  14.14  12.20  10.09
 8  0.09  51.31  30.14  10.35  8.18
 12  0.10  49.98  31.59  10.25  8.16
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRCP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.02  0.00  99.99  0.00  0.00
 4  0.02  21.95  71.57  6.31  0.16
 8  0.03  22.96  70.41  6.01  0.61
 12  0.03  29.53  63.88  5.32  1.24
 Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.06  2.69  0.33  96.96  0.00
 4  0.07  6.18  25.17  68.47  0.17
 8  0.09  9.34  25.09  65.29  0.26
 12  0.11  9.69  26.42  63.63  0.24
 Variance Decomposition of LINF: 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) LRGDP LINF
 1  0.12  20.47  0.02  19.59  59.90
 4  0.21  12.90  23.30  17.58  46.20
 8  0.31  7.19  16.16  33.96  42.67
 12  0.36  5.48  19.08  35.09  40.32
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRCP) LRGDP LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.4.3: The Democratic Republic of Congo 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.41  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.58  55.25  23.36  18.79  2.58
 8  0.71  40.58  22.72  30.47  6.21
 12  0.82  35.99  24.47  32.77  6.75
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRCP)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  1.20  4.79  95.20  0.00  0.00
 4  1.76  12.01  78.19  5.40  4.39
 8  2.37  16.24  68.20  8.40  7.13
 12  2.89  28.86  50.21  13.77  7.15
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.72  23.83  2.03  74.13  0.00
 4  1.27  44.44  7.62  39.27  8.65
 8  1.84  32.20  28.34  33.62  5.82
 12  2.33  23.33  46.73  25.55  4.37
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.58  52.86  5.11  6.05  35.96
 4  0.70  49.26  7.93  14.66  28.13
 8  0.85  51.89  12.87  12.58  22.64
 12  0.88  51.09  12.85  14.44  21.60
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.4.4: Lesotho 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.18  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.31  79.82  6.16  0.44  13.56
 8  0.40  61.92  9.95  4.79  23.33
 12  0.47  55.82  9.62  10.07  24.47
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRCP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.06  75.63  24.36  0.00  0.00
 4  0.12  38.95  60.43  0.17  0.43
 8  0.16  36.21  57.95  5.02  0.80
 12  0.18  37.80  55.80  3.94  2.44
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.01  5.14  1.53  93.32  0.00
 4  0.01  5.44  2.95  90.51  1.08
 8  0.02  5.69  2.39  90.73  1.17
 12  0.02  6.43  2.35  89.95  1.25
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LINF)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF))
 1  0.18  32.35  1.42  1.42  64.79
 4  0.19  30.24  1.65  4.98  63.11
 8  0.23  32.25  5.61  13.42  48.71
 12  0.25  31.65  7.84  12.60  47.89
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(D(LINF)) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.4.5: Mauritius 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.12  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.13  93.50  2.02  3.95  0.51
 8  0.17  91.76  3.85  3.50  0.88
 12  0.19  91.06  4.80  3.28  0.85
Variance Decomposition of D(LRCP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.02  12.01  87.98  0.00  0.00
 4  0.02  7.63  74.09  15.02  3.24
 8  0.03  6.41  62.67  20.33  10.57
 12  0.03  6.27  59.61  22.25  11.85
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.01  0.16  0.74  99.08  0.00
 4  0.01  3.53  3.79  90.13  2.53
 8  0.01  8.04  4.18  80.14  7.61
 12  0.01  10.29  4.56  77.71  7.41
 Variance Decomposition of LINF: 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) LINF
 1  0.19  1.00  6.71  11.02  81.25
 4  0.32  4.32  16.57  21.57  57.52
 8  0.34  4.48  17.42  25.77  52.31
 12  0.35  4.45  18.39  26.30  50.83
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) LINF 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.4.6: Mozambique 
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRMS)): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.04  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.06  62.23  15.13  15.19  7.43
 8  0.08  60.66  15.21  14.18  9.93
 12  0.08  60.94  14.37  13.78  10.89
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRCP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.77  5.68  94.31  0.00  0.00
 4  0.94  15.60  73.60  0.47  10.32
 8  0.98  16.02  67.64  4.56  11.76
 12  0.98  16.20  67.44  4.61  11.73
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.02  31.86  4.46  63.67  0.00
 4  0.03  27.08  6.23  66.09  0.58
 8  0.03  27.66  7.88  60.88  3.55
 12  0.03  27.55  8.27  60.24  3.92
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.55  32.61  0.60  16.41  50.36
 4  0.62  30.14  2.69  25.95  41.20
 8  0.64  29.13  3.28  28.45  39.12
 12  0.64  29.13  3.40  28.46  39.00
 Cholesky Ordering: D(D(LRMS)) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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Table G.4.7: South Africa 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.01  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.05  31.31  40.19  20.07  8.41
 8  0.07  28.44  26.32  13.47  31.76
 12  0.11  42.92  21.81  11.21  24.03
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRCP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.02  19.59  80.40  0.00  0.00
 4  0.06  22.11  52.47  11.06  14.34
 8  0.09  33.26  35.34  9.10  22.28
 12  0.13  40.01  29.76  11.52  18.70
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.00  23.36  5.59  71.04  0.00
 4  0.00  20.42  21.84  37.81  19.92
 8  0.02  25.28  36.04  16.14  22.52
 12  0.02  19.39  28.94  16.02  35.64
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.51  2.75  28.79  26.77  41.67
 4  0.72  10.49  29.51  29.27  30.71
 8  2.04  20.49  31.60  30.55  17.34
 12  3.53  15.69  29.13  14.92  40.23
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(LRCP) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
 
Table G.4.8: Swaziland 
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRMS): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.06  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 4  0.07  98.18  1.00  0.12  0.69
 8  0.07  98.12  1.01  0.13  0.73
 12  0.07  98.07  1.01  0.13  0.77
 Variance Decomposition of D(D(LRCP)): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.04  7.94  92.05  0.00  0.00
 4  0.05  12.96  66.82  5.12  15.08
 8  0.05  11.57  57.99  4.91  25.50
 12  0.06  10.50  51.92  4.53  33.03
 Variance Decomposition of D(LRGDP): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.02  9.73  15.20  75.05  0.00
 4  0.03  14.48  14.74  64.14  6.62
 8  0.03  13.90  14.42  60.01  11.65
 12  0.03  13.23  14.19  56.44  16.13
 Variance Decomposition of D(LINF): 
 Period S.E. D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF)
 1  0.29  3.64  3.66  14.41  78.27
 4  0.43  7.52  11.98  8.51  71.97
 8  0.55  6.23  11.69  5.90  76.16
 12  0.64  5.43  11.46  4.82  78.27
 Cholesky Ordering: D(LRMS) D(D(LRCP)) D(LRGDP) D(LINF) 
Source: Derived using Eviews 7 
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a 
C
er
ti
fi
ca
te
s 
(B
oB
C
s)
, 
(u
se
d 
to
 
af
fe
ct
 
th
e 
co
st
 
an
d 
qu
an
ti
ty
 
of
 
lo
an
ab
le
 
fu
nd
s.
 
•
 
R
es
er
ve
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
 
ar
e 
in
 
pl
ac
e 
bu
t 
ar
e 
le
ss
 
bi
nd
in
g 
as
 
an
 
T
he
 
B
an
k 
do
es
 
no
t 
ac
ti
ve
ly
 
m
on
it
or
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
ag
gr
eg
at
es
 
in
 
fo
rm
ul
at
in
g 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
; 
in
st
ea
d 
th
e 
B
an
k 
m
on
it
or
s 
th
e 
gr
ow
th
 
in
 
do
m
es
ti
c 
cr
ed
it
 
an
d 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
as
 in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 ta
rg
et
s.
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in
te
re
st
, 
w
hi
ch
 m
us
t 
be
 r
ep
ai
d 
w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 t
he
 e
nd
 
of
 t
he
 f
in
an
ci
al
 y
ea
r 
in
 w
hi
ch
 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
gr
an
te
d.
 
in
st
ru
m
en
t 
of
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 
m
ai
nl
y 
du
e 
to
 
th
e 
ex
ce
ss
 l
iq
ui
di
ty
 i
n 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t. 
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 
C
on
go
 
M
on
et
ar
y 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
•
 
L
ac
ks
 in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
(T
he
 B
an
k 
is
 a
n 
in
st
it
ut
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
go
ve
rn
ed
 b
y 
pu
bl
ic
 la
w
 w
it
h 
a 
le
ga
l 
st
at
us
, 
m
an
da
te
d 
to
 
de
fi
ne
 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
t 
th
e 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 o
f 
th
e 
co
un
tr
y)
. 
T
he
 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
of
 
st
ab
le
 
pr
ic
es
, 
so
 
as
 
to
 
fa
ci
li
ta
te
 
th
e 
st
ab
il
it
y 
of
 
th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 
an
d 
ex
te
rn
al
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
th
e 
do
m
es
ti
c 
cu
rr
en
cy
. 
T
hi
s 
in
 t
ur
n 
w
il
l 
pa
ve
 
th
e 
w
ay
 
to
 
a 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
an
d 
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 
gr
ow
th
 
an
d 
th
e 
ac
hi
ev
em
en
t 
of
 
ot
he
r 
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 o
bj
ec
ti
ve
s 
In
di
re
ct
 
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
: 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
 
ra
te
 
(u
se
d 
to
 
co
nt
ro
l 
cr
ed
it
),
 
an
d 
 
re
se
rv
e 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
 
an
d 
”T
re
as
ur
y 
bi
ll
s”
 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
(f
or
 
re
fi
na
nc
e 
op
er
at
io
ns
) 
- 
L
es
ot
ho
 
F
ol
lo
w
s 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 
of
 
S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
a 
as
 
pe
r 
C
M
A
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t 
•
 
L
ac
ks
 in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
 (
T
he
 p
ai
d 
up
 c
ap
it
al
 o
f 
th
e 
C
en
tr
al
 
B
an
k 
is
 
su
bs
cr
ib
ed
 
an
d 
he
ld
 
ex
cl
us
iv
el
y 
by
 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
C
en
tr
al
 B
an
k 
ha
s 
it
s 
ow
n 
bu
dg
et
 
fo
r 
pu
rp
os
es
 
of
 
it
s 
op
er
at
io
ns
).
 
•
 
T
he
 B
an
k 
is
 m
an
da
te
d 
to
 
de
al
 
w
it
h/
tr
an
sa
ct
 
in
 
va
lu
ab
le
 
ob
je
ct
s 
of
, 
an
d 
on
 
be
ha
lf
 
of
, 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t;
 
ex
te
nd
 
cr
ed
it
 
to
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
w
it
hi
n 
st
ip
ul
at
ed
 t
er
m
s 
an
d 
co
nd
it
io
ns
; 
an
d 
se
rv
e 
as
 f
is
ca
l 
ag
en
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
am
bi
ts
 o
f 
it
s 
pr
in
ci
pa
l l
aw
. 
•
 
P
ro
m
ot
in
g 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 
in
te
rn
al
 
an
d 
ex
te
rn
al
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
st
ab
il
it
y 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
op
er
 
fu
nc
ti
on
in
g 
of
 
a 
so
un
dl
y 
ba
se
d 
m
on
et
ar
y 
an
d 
fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ys
te
m
; 
•
 
A
ch
ie
vi
ng
 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 
an
 a
de
qu
at
e 
le
ve
l 
of
 f
or
ei
gn
 
cu
rr
en
cy
 r
es
er
ve
s 
in
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
su
pp
or
t 
th
e 
pe
g 
of
 t
he
 L
ot
i 
to
 th
e 
R
an
d;
 
•
 
T
he
 f
os
te
ri
ng
 o
f 
m
on
et
ar
y,
 
cr
ed
it
 
an
d 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
co
nd
it
io
ns
 c
on
du
ci
ve
 t
o 
th
e 
or
de
rl
y,
 
ba
la
nc
ed
 
an
d 
su
st
ai
ne
d 
ec
on
om
ic
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 th
e 
co
un
tr
y;
 
•
 
M
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 
an
 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
in
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e;
 
•
 
Fa
ci
li
ta
ti
ng
 
ec
on
om
ic
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 
in
 
L
es
ot
ho
 
an
d 
at
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ti
m
e 
av
oi
di
ng
 t
he
 
ad
ve
rs
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 i
nf
la
ti
on
 
an
d 
a 
de
te
ri
or
at
in
g 
ex
te
rn
al
 
•
 
M
or
al
 s
ua
si
on
; 
•
 
R
ep
ur
ch
as
e 
op
er
at
io
ns
;  
•
 
O
pe
n 
m
ar
ke
t 
op
er
at
io
ns
; 
•
 
R
es
er
ve
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
; 
•
 
L
om
ba
rd
 r
at
e 
•
 
R
es
er
ve
 
m
on
ey
 
pl
ay
s 
th
e 
m
ai
n 
ro
le
 
in
 
th
e 
co
nd
uc
t 
of
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
.  
(A
 t
ar
ge
t 
is
 s
et
 o
n 
re
se
rv
e 
m
on
ey
 a
nd
 a
ny
 d
ev
ia
ti
on
 
of
 a
ct
ua
l 
re
se
rv
e 
m
on
ey
 
fr
om
 t
he
 t
ar
ge
t 
re
pr
es
en
ts
 
an
 e
xc
es
s 
or
 s
ho
rt
ag
e 
of
 
li
qu
id
it
y.
 
M
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 
tr
ea
su
ry
 
bi
ll
s 
ar
e 
is
su
ed
 
on
 
a 
bi
-m
on
th
ly
 
ba
si
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 
li
qu
id
it
y 
co
nd
it
io
ns
 
in
 
th
e 
ec
on
om
y 
an
d 
m
at
ur
in
g 
do
m
es
ti
c 
de
bt
).
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ba
la
nc
e 
M
al
aw
i 
M
on
et
ar
y 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
•
 
C
en
tr
al
 
ba
nk
 
is
 
fu
ll
y 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
•
 
T
he
 c
en
tr
al
 b
an
k 
an
d 
T
re
as
ur
y 
co
ns
ul
t 
on
 a
 r
eg
ul
ar
 b
as
is
 a
bo
ut
 
th
e 
fo
rm
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
fi
sc
al
 p
ol
ic
y.
 
A
t 
hi
s 
di
sc
re
ti
on
, 
th
e 
G
ov
er
no
r 
m
ay
 
in
fo
rm
 
th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
F
in
an
ce
 a
bo
ut
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
ts
 i
n 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
; 
•
 
T
he
 
ce
nt
ra
l 
ba
nk
 
m
ay
 
m
ak
e 
sh
or
t-
te
rm
 
ad
va
nc
es
 
to
 
th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
in
 
re
sp
ec
t 
of
 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 
sh
or
tf
al
ls
 i
n 
bu
dg
et
 
re
ve
nu
es
, p
ro
vi
de
d 
th
at
 t
he
 t
ot
al
 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 
ad
va
nc
es
 
sh
al
l 
no
t 
ex
ce
ed
 
20
%
 
of
 
th
e 
an
nu
al
 
bu
dg
et
ed
 d
om
es
ti
c 
re
ve
nu
es
.  
(A
ll
 
ad
va
nc
es
 
ar
e 
pa
ya
bl
e 
w
it
hi
n 
fo
ur
 
m
on
th
s 
of
 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t's
 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
ye
ar
 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 a
dv
an
ce
s 
w
er
e 
m
ad
e,
 a
nd
 
if
 a
ft
er
 t
he
 e
nd
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
ye
ar
 
su
ch
 a
dv
an
ce
s 
re
m
ai
n 
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g,
 
th
e 
po
w
er
 
of
 
th
e 
B
an
k 
to
 
gr
an
t 
fu
rt
he
r 
su
ch
 a
dv
an
ce
s 
sh
al
l 
no
t 
be
 
ex
er
ci
sa
bl
e 
un
ti
l 
th
e 
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
ad
va
nc
es
 h
av
e 
be
en
 r
ep
ai
d)
. 
T
he
 
pr
om
ot
io
n 
of
 
ec
on
om
ic
 
gr
ow
th
, e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t, 
st
ab
il
it
y 
in
 
pr
ic
es
 
an
d 
to
 
m
ai
nt
ai
n 
a 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
of
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 
po
si
ti
on
 
•
 
L
iq
ui
di
ty
 r
es
er
ve
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
 (
L
R
R
);
  
•
 
O
pe
n 
m
ar
ke
t 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
(O
M
O
);
 
an
d 
•
 
T
he
 b
an
k 
ra
te
 
M
2 
pl
ay
s 
a 
m
aj
or
 r
ol
e 
in
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 
M
au
ri
ti
us
 
M
on
et
ar
y 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
•
 
L
ac
ks
 I
nd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
T
he
 c
en
tr
al
 b
an
k 
is
 t
he
 b
an
ke
r 
to
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t, 
th
e 
ad
vi
se
r 
on
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
an
d 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
m
at
te
rs
 
an
d 
th
e 
de
po
si
to
ry
 
of
 
th
e 
of
fi
ci
al
 
fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
re
se
rv
es
 
of
 
M
au
ri
ti
us
 
an
d 
of
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t f
un
ds
; 
•
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
m
ay
 
ra
is
e 
•
 
T
he
 
m
ai
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
is
 
th
e 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
of
 
pr
ic
e 
st
ab
il
it
y 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
om
ot
io
n 
or
de
rl
y 
an
d 
ba
la
nc
ed
 
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t;
 
O
th
er
 o
bj
ec
ti
ve
s 
in
cl
ud
e:
 
•
 
T
he
 r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
of
 c
re
di
t 
an
d 
cu
rr
en
cy
 i
n 
th
e 
be
st
 i
nt
er
es
ts
 
of
 
th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 
In
di
re
ct
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
au
ct
io
ni
ng
 
of
 
B
an
k 
of
 
M
au
ri
ti
us
 
bi
ll
s/
no
te
s,
 
co
nd
uc
t 
of
 
re
pu
rc
ha
se
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
an
d 
sp
ec
ia
l 
de
po
si
t f
ac
il
it
ie
s 
B
ro
ad
 
M
on
ey
 
L
ia
bi
li
ti
es
 
(M
3)
 i
s 
on
e 
of
 t
he
 m
ai
n 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 u
se
d 
to
 a
ss
es
s 
m
on
et
ar
y 
co
nd
it
io
ns
 
34
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ad
va
nc
es
 
fr
om
 
th
e 
B
an
k 
to
 
c o
ve
r 
ne
ga
ti
ve
 n
et
 c
as
h 
fl
ow
 o
f 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
at
 
su
ch
 
ra
te
 
as
 
m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 
w
it
h 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t. 
T
he
 
to
ta
l 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 
su
ch
 
ad
va
nc
es
 
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g,
 
to
ge
th
er
 
w
it
h 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 
in
 
th
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
of
 
th
e 
B
an
k,
 
ot
he
r 
th
an
 
un
de
r 
re
pu
rc
ha
se
 
ag
re
em
en
ts
, 
sh
al
l 
no
t 
ex
ce
ed
 
10
%
 
of
 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t’
s 
re
ve
nu
e 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
gr
an
ts
 
an
d 
re
ce
ip
ts
 o
f 
a 
ca
pi
ta
l 
na
tu
re
 f
or
 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t f
in
an
ci
al
 y
ea
r.
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 M
au
ri
ti
us
; 
•
 
T
o 
en
su
re
 t
he
 s
ta
bi
li
ty
 a
nd
 
so
un
dn
es
s 
of
 
th
e 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
sy
st
em
 o
f 
M
au
ri
ti
us
; 
•
 
T
o 
ac
t 
as
 t
he
 c
en
tr
al
 b
an
k 
fo
r 
M
au
ri
ti
us
 
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e 
IM
F 
su
pp
or
te
d 
or
 o
th
er
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
pr
og
ra
m
 
C
en
tr
al
 b
an
k 
is
 i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
 b
ut
 i
s 
m
an
da
te
d 
to
 
re
sp
ec
t 
th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 p
ol
ic
y 
de
fi
ne
d 
by
 t
he
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
T
he
 r
ed
uc
ti
on
 o
f 
in
fl
at
io
n 
•
 
O
pe
n 
M
ar
ke
t 
O
pe
ra
ti
on
s,
  
•
 
T
he
 
ce
nt
ra
l 
ba
nk
’s
 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
in
te
re
st
 r
at
es
 
(t
he
 S
ta
nd
in
g 
L
en
di
ng
 
Fa
ci
li
ty
 
an
d 
th
e 
D
ep
os
it
 
L
en
di
ng
 
Fa
ci
li
ty
),
 
•
 
R
es
er
ve
 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
t 
R
at
io
; a
nd
  
•
 
M
or
al
 s
ua
si
on
 
T
he
 r
es
er
ve
 m
on
ey
 p
la
ys
 
th
e 
m
aj
or
 
ro
le
 
as
 
an
 
op
er
at
io
na
l 
ta
rg
et
 a
nd
 M
3 
as
 th
e 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 ta
rg
et
 
N
am
ib
ia
 
F
ol
lo
w
s 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 
of
 
S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
a 
as
 
pe
r 
C
M
A
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t 
•
 
C
en
tr
al
 b
an
k 
is
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
ow
in
g 
to
 t
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
in
 
th
e 
C
M
A
, 
th
e 
sc
op
e 
fo
r 
an
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 i
s 
ve
ry
 li
m
it
ed
. 
•
 
T
he
 B
an
k 
m
ay
 g
ra
nt
 a
dv
an
ce
s 
to
 
th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
on
 
su
ch
 
te
rm
s 
an
d 
co
nd
it
io
ns
 
as
 
th
e 
B
oa
rd
 
an
d 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
ay
 
ag
re
e 
up
on
, 
ev
er
y 
su
ch
 
lo
an
 
m
us
t 
be
 
re
pa
id
 
w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 t
he
 d
at
e 
on
 w
hi
ch
 
T
o 
su
pp
or
t 
th
e 
fi
xe
d 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
ra
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
N
am
ib
ia
 d
ol
la
r 
an
d 
th
e 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
an
 r
an
d 
(t
hi
s 
po
li
cy
 
ha
s 
be
en
 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
in
 
at
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
ul
ti
m
at
e 
m
on
et
ar
y 
po
li
cy
 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
of
 
pr
ic
e 
st
ab
il
it
y)
. 
•
 
T
he
 R
ep
o 
R
at
e;
 
•
 
R
es
er
ve
 R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
; 
an
d 
•
 
M
or
al
 s
ua
si
on
 
M
2 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
is
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
an
al
yt
ic
al
 p
ur
po
se
s 
34
1 
 
th
e 
lo
an
 
in
 
qu
es
ti
on
 
w
as
 
g r
an
te
d.
 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
In
fl
at
io
n 
ta
rg
et
in
g 
•
 
C
en
tr
al
 b
an
k 
is
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t.
 
T
he
 G
ov
er
no
r 
of
 t
he
 S
A
R
B
, 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
of
 
F
in
an
ce
 
an
d 
of
fi
ci
al
s 
of
 
th
e 
N
at
io
na
l 
T
re
as
ur
y 
an
d 
th
e 
S
A
R
B
 
m
ee
t 
re
gu
la
rl
y 
to
 
co
-o
rd
in
at
e 
m
on
et
ar
y 
an
d 
fi
sc
al
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
•
 
T
he
 S
A
R
B
 i
s 
no
t 
in
vo
lv
ed
 i
n 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
fi
na
nc
in
g.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
it
 
m
ay
 
gr
an
t 
an
 
un
se
cu
re
d 
lo
an
 
to
 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
un
de
r 
S
ec
ti
on
 
10
 
(1
)(
f)
(i
) 
of
 th
e 
S
A
R
B
 A
ct
. 
 
T
o 
pr
ot
ec
t 
th
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
in
 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
 
of
 
ba
la
nc
ed
 
an
d 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 g
ro
w
th
 in
 th
e 
co
un
tr
y 
•
 
In
 
pu
rs
ui
ng
 
it
s 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
th
e 
S
A
R
B
 
st
ri
ve
s 
to
 
ac
hi
ev
e 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
st
ab
il
it
y,
 
i.e
. p
ri
ce
 s
ta
bi
li
ty
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
st
ab
le
 
co
nd
it
io
ns
 
in
 
th
e 
fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ec
to
r 
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